Skip to main content

Full text of "Civilian morale"

See other formats


From the collection of the 

7 ^ 

^ m 

o Prejinger 
V Uibrary 



San Francisco, California 

Digitized by the Internet Archive 

in 2006 with funding from 

Microsoft Corporation 

Civilian Morale 


Second Yearbook of the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues 

Goodwin Watson 


Published for Reynal § Hitchcock 






^y "-ir. <. i t) 



''Morale" has been an abused word. The eager desire of citi- 
zens to be of more service to their country, in this hour of 
great danger, tends to concentrate on something supposedly 
having to do with "morale." Baseball, sermons, night clubs, red- 
white-and-blue posters, uniforms, vitamin pills, martial music, 
V symbols, boys' clubs, morning calisthenics, news reels of enemy 
atrocities, and hundreds of other activities have been defended as 
''building morale." Some thoughtful people have come to wonder 
whether it might not be better to drop the word entirely. 

With all the talk, there has been too little scientific understand- 
ing. No one can doubt the basic importance of morale. Our whole 
national effort — in factories, in Washington, on ships at sea and 
in air, and in the army lines — depends upon morale. If the war 
is long drawn out, the importance of sound morale will increase. 
Only we shall need facts and sound analysis, not loose propa- 
ganda, pep talks, and rationalization of whatever may be tradi- 
tional, pleasant, or profit-bringing. 

The main purpose of this book is to tell America what scientific 
investigation of morale has thus far demonstrated. The research 
is still, of course, unfinished. It is hoped that this book may itself 
stimulate more and better studies of morale. But we cannot wait 
until the facts are all in. Research has a frontier but no final 
boundary. Meanwhile a war must be won. Here then, is an in- 
terim report on what psychologists now think about morale 

The book appears as the second yearbook * of the Society for 

* The first yearbook, edited by George W. Hartmann and Theodore M. New- 
comb, was entitled Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation, and was 
published in 1940. 


Psychological Study of Social Issues. This Society is an affiliate 
of the American Psychological Association, with two main pur- 
poses. One is to turn the attention of psychological research 
toward the urgent problems of our present social, economic, and 
political life. The other is to make available to citizens, and es- 
pecially to officials in a position to determine policy, the conclu- 
sions which can be drawn from scientific study of human behavior. 

Concern with American morale in the face of a developing 
world crisis was evidenced at the meeting of the S.P.S.S.I. in 
September, 1940. At that time a Committee on Morale was ap- 
pointed, under the chairmanship of Professor Gardner Murphy. 
During the year 1940-1941 interest in morale grew, and at the 
1941 meetings several programs of the American Psychological 
Association and of the American Association for Applied Psy- 
chology were devoted to discussions of morale. In accord with its 
purpose to communicate psychological findings on public ques- 
tions, the S.P.S.S.I. decided, in September, 1941, to postpone 
some other yearbooks, and to concentrate immediate effort on a 
volume dealing with civilian morale. Professor Goodwin Watson 
of Teachers College, Columbia University, was appointed editor, 
and the book was planned in collaboration with the president of 
the S.P.S.S.I., Professor Kurt Lewin, University of Iowa, and 
the Society's secretary. Professor Theodore Newcomb, University 
of Michigan. 

Psychologists, disciplined in careful scientific reserve, are reluc- 
tant to draw from their data the kind of conclusions which make 
newspaper headlines. Men in responsible posts of government 
and business must, however, make decisions even though the 
evidence is not 100 percent conclusive. The writers in this volume 
have been urged not only to use their research findings to the 
maximum, but also to go on to express their own judgment on 
what those facts should mean in social action. The result is a 
book which rests on foundations of science, but which includes 
also the wisdom and recommendations of men speaking as citizens 
of a democracy. 


These findings and recommendations being of chief importance, 
it has been decided to avoid a distracting profusion of footnotes 
by placing the bibliography at the end of the book, where each 
chapter bibHography is separately listed and numbered, complete 
within itself. Numerical references in the text are to this bibli- 
ography; asterisks, etc., refer to the relatively few footnotes 
which appear on the text pages. 

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the declarations of war came 
after most of the chapters had been prepared. Publication was 
necessarily delayed while manuscripts were revised to fit the war- 
time situation. It is a tribute to the foresight of this group of 
social scientists, however, that no changes in position or argument 
were required. Revisions consisted only of changes in phraseology 
and occasional illustrations. The development from defense of 
democracy to war against fascism had been anticipated, and the 
principles stated were as fundamental after we became a belliger- 
ent as they had been before, and as they are likely to be for 
peacetime reconstruction. 

Especial acknowledgement is due to Katherine L. Bruner (Mrs. 
Jerome S. Bruner) for her assistance in putting manuscripts 
into proper form. The public should know also that the editor 
and all authors in this book have contributed their services with- 
out any financial return. Earnings from books prepared by the 
Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues are all used to 
further the objective of closer working relationships between 
psychological research and the pressing problems of our changing 

April, 1942, 


THE following set of principles governing the publication 
of its Yearbooks has been officially adopted by the Society 
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues : 

The Yearbooks of the Society are cooperative attempts to as- 
semble psychological research and thought on specially designated 
social problems. They report new researches, summarize existing 
knowledge on the given topics, and, so far as justified, submit con- 
clusions and recommendations in the form of plans of action. An 
important aim of the Yearbooks is to show that scientific methods 
can be helpfully applied in areas of social controversy. Since the 
Yearbooks aim to contribute to the solution of pressing problems 
and to stimulate further research upon them, available informa- 
tion will seldom be conclusive. 

The Society sponsors these projects in the conviction that it is 
important to attempt psychological investigations on the issues 
represented. The Society makes every reasonable effort to secure 
as adequate and unbiased treatment of the problems as possible. 
However, the Society does not officially sponsor any findings, con- 
clusions, or implications which the authors of the particular 
chapters or the editors report. 

In presenting material of this type, it is especially important 
that every effort be made to adhere to the usual standards of sci- 
entific inquiry and discussion. Several more specific principles 
follow : 

1. On any controversial issue, effort should be made to report 
all relevant evidence so far as this can be done. Where there is a 
dearth of evidence on certain phases of the problem, or where cer- 
tain types of evidence are omitted, this fact should be pointed out. 



Likewise, indication should be given of the extent to which 
conclusions go beyond the available evidence. 

2. All evidence which is presented should conform as far as 
feasible to accustomed canons of scientific procedure. This refers 
to such matters as valid sampling, adequate statistical practices, 
statements of assumptions, and description of the sources and 
conditions under which data were obtained. Insofar as evidence 
falls short in these respects, appropriate note should be made of 
the fact. 

3. In the interpretation of evidence concerning which competent 
analysts arrive at different conclusions, it is essential that the ma- 
jor differences be made explicit. The attempt should be made to 
state the alternative views in a way that will be acceptable to the 
adherents of the several views, although the space allotted to such 
statements must, of practical necessity, be determined by the judg- 
ment of the editors. 

The undersigned have been elected by the members of the So- 
ciety to serve as the Committee of Editorial Review. We have 
read the chapters submitted to us by the Editor, for inclusion in 
this volume, with the foregoing set of principles in mind. We 
hereby attest our approval of its publication. 

James J. Gibson 

Robert B. MacLeod 

Ernest R. Hilgard, Chairman. 

Table of Contents 



I. The Nature of Democratic Morale 3 

Gordon W. Allport 

11. The Psycho dynamic Problem of Democracy 19 

Thomas M. French 

III. Five Factors in Morale 30 

Goodwin Watson 

IV. Time Perspective and Morale 48 

Kurt Lewin 

V. Morale and National Character 71 

Gregory Bateson 


VI. Children are Important to Morale 95 

Lois Barclay Murphy 

VII. The Morale of Youth Groups 119 

Ronald Lippitt 

VIII. Morale and the Training of Leaders 143 

Alex Bavelas 

IX. Propaganda and Morale 166 

S. S. Sargent 

X. News and Morale: A Miniature Experiment 175 

Theodore Newcomb 








American Morale When the War Began 
Donald Rugg 



Student Morale 

Joe and Eugenia Belden 



Morale and the Jewish Minority 
Otto Klineberg 



Morale Among Negroes 
Kenneth B. Clark 



Morale in Canada 


J. D. Ketchum 
J. S. A. Bois 


XVL Morale During Unemployment 273 

Goodwin Watson 

/XVII. Morale on the Job 349 

Richard L. Hull, Arthur Kolstad 

-XVIII. Labor Unions and Morale 365 

Goodwin Watson 


XIX. Essentials for a Civilian Morale Program in 

American Democracy 405 

Gardner Murphy 

Bibliography ■ 437 

Index 449 

Part One: Theory of Morale 

I. The Nature of Democratic Morale 
II. The Psychodynamic Problem of Democracy 

III. Five Factors in Morale 

IV. Time Perspective and Morale 
V. Morale and National Character 


The Nature of Democratic Morale 
GORDON w. ALLPORT Harvard University 

IT SEEMS that only in times of national peril do we take an in- 
terest in morale. After the Armistice of 1918 the term vir- 
tually disappeared from use. Bit by bit it crept back when a 
few years ago the ravages of the depression among the unem- 
ployed became a matter of national concern. But it was not until 
the summer of 1940 that ''morale" seemed almost overnight to 
become the most fashionable and arresting of terms — the theme 
of countless lectures, conferences, articles. It is now the theme of 
a book, and will be the theme of more books to come. The sharp 
turn in events from a period of indecision to a state of war alters, 
but by no means eliminates, the problem of building a sound and 
invincible democratic morale in America. 

Morale, like health and sanity, has to do with a background 
condition in living. It is found in the fringe rather than in the 
focus of consciousness, and in describing fringes of consciousness 
our scientific language is poor and inept. What, for example, is 
the psychologist to do with the "J^^^^^^^^^" tradition" that lies 
somehow recessed in the intellectual and emotional life of a hun- 
dred million American citizens? That this tradition is an im- 
portant factor in daily conduct no one can deny, but its effects 
are so diffused that we can neither describe its structure in our 
minds nor measure its influence upon our behavior. When to the 
teachings of Jefferson and other founding fathers we add the im- 
pact of orthodox and reformed Christianity, the traditions of lib- 
ertarianism, intellectualism, and humanism — all intermingled to 
form a faith in the sacredness of the human person and in popu- 
lar government — we are forced to conclude that the really im- 



portant supports for our national morale reside in remote corners 
of our personalities, and are not easily accessible to analysis. 

Yet even with this handicap the psychologist feels that he has 
something to contribute to the common cause of building and 
maintaining the morale of America so that it may be fully equal 
to the storms and dangers that lie ahead. His habits of observa- 
tion and fact-collecting do help him to assess the mental and emo- 
tional strength and weakness of the people, and he hopes that his 
insights will assist administrators and educators actively engaged 
in the task of building resistance, courage, and a positive will. 

Morale Defined 

Morale has to do with individual attitude in a group endeavor. 
Two of its essential features are predominantly personal and 
private in character, and the third is predominantly social. A satis- 
factory definition must include all three. 

The first ingredient of morale is the possession by the indi- 
vidual of a solid set of convictions and values which for him make 
life worth living. Because he believes that he is able to meet what- 
ever emergencies the future has in store for him, his emotional 
tone is high. He is prepared to put forth a zestful defense of 
those values that to him engender meaning in life. 

Second, the individual is aware of specific tasks that he must 
carry through, of problems that he must solve, in order to defend 
and extend his store of values. His immediate purposes are held 
clearly in view, with the result that his convictions are channelized 
into co-ordinated, skillful, and decisive action. Without a task to 
be performed, a plan to be carried through, morale would be little 
more than an oceanic feeling of bliss, agreeable no doubt, but 

Third, in times of common peril there must be an essential 
harmony between the values and aims of the individual and those 
of his group. There must likewise be an essential harmony and 
co-ordination in their output of effort. A group commits suicide 


if in times of common danger each member pursues his own 
course obHvious of the common good and common safety. 

These three necessary ingredients of morale have to do re- 
spectively with the preparation of the individual, with his par- 
ticipation, and with the solidarity of the group. From them we can 
construct a definition of national morale. 

By high national morale we mean (a) the healthful state of the 
convictions and values in the individual citizen that endows him 
with abundant energy and confidence in facing the future; (b) his 
decisive, self-disciplined effort to achieve specific objectives that 
derive from his personal convictions and values; and (c) the 
agreement among citizens {especially in times of crisis) in respect 
to their convictions and values and the co-ordination of their ef- 
forts in attaining necessary objectives. 

Are Democratic Morale and Totalitarian Morale Alike? 

If human nature is everywhere basically the same, and if the 
requirements of social cohesion are essentially similar from cul- 
ture to culture, then the above definition of morale applies in prin- 
ciple to national groups whatever their political tradition, whether 
totalitarian, democratic, monarchic, or nomadic. Such a universal 
interpretation of the definition is correct, so far as it goes. But it 
is not very helpful if we are interested in the particular require- 
ments of high morale in a specific culture. Since our special inter- 
est lies in the upbuilding of a sturdy democratic morale in the 
United States, we must continue our analysis for the purpose of 
specifying just what forms of preparedness, participation, and 
solidarity are appropriate to our national group. 

First, however, we are confronted with a grimly realistic objec- 
tion. Some thoughtful people, psychologists among them, believe 
that to talk about ''democratic morale" at the present time is intol- 
erable sentimentalism, a futile gesture of sweetness and light in 
the face of grisly reality. These hard-headed counselors warn us 
against being too academic, too fearful of our own aggression 


and not fearful enough of the enemy's aggression. It is vain, they 
say, to emphasize the spiritual and peace-loving components of 
democratic morale when wolves and jackals threaten. They point 
out that in a life-and-death struggle it is brute strength that 
counts, and that the side using the most bestial and least demo- 
cratic of tactics is likely to win. A strictly democratic morale, 
they insist, can be no match for the macabre indecency of totali- 
tarian attack. 

This forceful argument applies fairly well to conditions of 
actual combat where blind obedience, primitive emotional excite- 
ment, and hate prevail. Many of the qualities demanded on the 
field of battle have no place in the ethics of democracy. Be it said, 
however, that face-to- face encounters with the enemy are rela- 
tively brief in their duration, and that the strength of moral 
reserve in the combatants is drawn from deep regions in the per- 
sonality. The soldier of a democracy, even though in combat 
superficially indistinguishable from his frenzied opponent, finds 
himself sustained by unique springs of energy. His background, 
his hopes, his values, his objectives are different from those of 
the Fuehrer-enslaved totalitarian. And it is from these unique 
features of his morale that we expect his superiority to stem, 
especially under conditions of adversity. 

It is true that the fully developed person, provided he finds in 
democracy satisfactions for his basic wants, ordinarily harbors 
few impulses of aggression. The conditions of freedom under 
which he develops leave little dammed-up hostility to release upon 
an out-group. But unfortunately, peace-loving people tend to 
ascribe their own peaceful intentions to others, to trust where 
they should not trust — a form of projection that might be called 
^'Chamberlain's error." As long ago as 1822 President Monroe 
pointed out that by their very nature democracies do not provide 
at the proper season for great emergencies, that for war they are 
always caught unprepared — a form of self-deception that might 
be called "the Pearl Harbor error." But Monroe believed — as all 


democrats must believe — that, once aroused, their own form of 
morale can be equal to any demands upon it. 

It is, therefore, psychologically sound to distinguish in essence 
between the morale of a true democrat and the morale of a sub- 
ject living under a dictatorship. Even though in actual combat the 
distinction is blurred and a purely democratic type of morale is 
difficult to preserve, still the contrast is vitally important. To keep 
it in mind not only enables us to build on the unique strength of 
democracy, but also enables us to keep our moral purposes 
straight, so that after the period of confusion and unavoidable 
lapses, the nation may return (as thus far it always has) to its 
own guiding ethic. The mark of a true democrat is that he sees 
no progress in any social action unless it is based upon sincere 
respect for the individual, and unless it results ultimately in the 
growth of human personality. From this fundamental creed of 
living (utterly opposed to the creed of all dictatorships) demo- 
cratic morale draws both its power and its meaning. 

The Unique Features of Democratic Morale * ^ 

, 2, 3 

The analysis that follows is intended to provide criteria for 
testing concrete programs of action. Psychological principles and 
normative standards are brought together in what we may call 
ethical -practical rules for the advancement of democratic morale. 
Without presuming to condemn any individual practice that vio- 
lates one or more of these rules, we can nevertheless assert that a 
practice is ordinarily to be commended for abiding by these rules 
and to be criticized for departing too widely from their spirit. 

* None of these features Is found in totalitarian morale. The characteristics 
of the latter are set forth in the studies listed in the bibliography ; see page 437. 
In the preparation of the present study Dr. C, L. Golightly has given valued 

Superior numbers here, and others similarly inserted throughout this book, 
refer to books, articles, etc., listed in the Bibliography at the back of the book 
before the Index. Items in the Bibliography are arranged and numbered alpha- 
betically by chapter. This reference, for example, refers to items 1, 2 and 3 
under the references for Chapter I in the Bibliography. 


Democracy is not a fixed and absolute array of moral scruples to 
which unswerving obedience is demanded. It is an unrealized 
ideal, a light from beyond the horizon. Exigencies of the moment 
delay our progress. Strategy may momentarily deflect our course. 
But in general the unique strength of morale in a democracy can 
be fully realized only if these psycho-ethical criteria are kept in 
mind when we develop our programs of morale-building. 


A program is good if it arouses in Americans a sense of per- 
sonal responsibility for sharing in the task of protecting de- 

This criterion does not approve the practice of dictators who 
coerce obedience through police power, through fear, or through 
the arousal of hypnotic frenzy in personalities prepared by rhyth- 
mic drill, dervish-like chanting, and oratory. It does approve 
campaigns for securing a voluntary mobilization of talents for 
national defense. It approves appeals to the public to express ap- 
preciation (as well as criticism) of their government, to express 
gratitude for the benefits they have received. It approves cam- 
paigns to secure prompt and willing payment of taxes as the dues 
all citizens owe for the privilege of living in a country that serves 
them well. It advocates education respecting the obligations of 
citizenship. Being as a rule more alert to our privileges than to 
our duties, we need, especially in times of war, to have the latter 
kept constantly before our minds. 


• A program is good if its aim and practice are intended to fur- 
ther the well-being, growth, and integrity of each individual per- 

A democracy believes that the maximum development possible 
in each individual is for the best interests of all, and it imposes 


only such regulation upon this development as is judged necessary 
for safeguarding equal privilege of development in others. A 
morale-building program, therefore, should take pains to prevent 
hysterical persecutions. Unlike the dictatorships, a democracy can 
countenance no intentionally planned state crimes : dissenting 
opinion cannot be a ground for persecution. An individual and 
he alone (never his family or his race) can be held accountable 
for his misdoings. Charity and love are tonic emotions in wartime 
as well as in peace. Morale-building programs should give en- 
couragement to benevolent organizations to extend their work. 

Respect for the person is not altogether a principle of lenience. 
It engenders a sentiment of powerful hatred of oppression. Re- 
spect for the person is the motive power behind Jefferson's oft- 
quoted pledge, "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal 
hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man." Espe- 
cially in wartime is it well to stiffen the militant fiber of the nation 
by arousing this very sentiment. Already strong, it can be stimu- 
lated and augmented until it becomes the dominant factor in win- 
ning the war. Militant and psychologically effective, it is at the 
same time entirely consonant with the ethics of democracy. 


A program is good if it stresses the basic tenet of democracy 
that all persons have equal rights to the pursuit of happiness, to 
liberty, and to life; and also if it includes, beyond the demand for 
national defense, a prevision of a better world after the war for 
all peoples, regardless of race and nationality. 

Even though the defense of democracy is at the moment bound 
together with the defense of this nation, yet it is impossible to con- 
ceive of democracy as a purely nationalistic creed. The strength- 
ening of morale at home legitimately entails the hope for a better 
world. The assertions of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic 
Charter were of necessity statements of universal aims for the 
common man everywhere. To attempt to build morale on the basis 


of fanatic nationalism is to exclude the peculiar strength of the 
universal inherent in the democratic appeal. 

Realism compels us to admit that in this country millions of 
our own people still live behind discriminatory barriers. Their ac- 
cusation is that while we preach democracy for the world we 
make little attempt to achieve it at home. The morale of these 
citizens can be raised only by programs that honestly put forth 
an effort to make democracy reach into every realm of human 
association inside America. We cannot expect immediate and 
final success, but the mere fact that injustices are being fought 
will strengthen the morale of those whose cause is recognized as 
just. The Negro, for example, does not ask a complete prior solu- 
tion of his problems before he participates in national defense; 
he asks merely that the democratic idea extend itself in his direc- 
tion even while it is reaching across the seas.* 


A program is good if it provides for reasonable security, fair 
treatment, and honorable status in the group for all individuals. 

If a nation has many unemployed, its morale is inevitably low. 
Many recent studies have clearly established the fact that in our 
culture a job, in addition to being a provision of security, is a 
symbol of status, a source of self-respect. A morale-building pro- 
gram is to be commended if it helps to obtain adequately paid and 
socially acceptable jobs for as many people as possible. 

Status is obtained through a standard of living that enables 
the individual to take his place unabashed in community endeav- 
ors. It is also provided through adequate recognition of the con- 
tributions of those whose work is essential to the welfare of the 
nation. The soldier, the factory worker, the shipbuilder, should 
be accorded the prestige that their services merit. The laborer is 
too often cited for strikes and too seldom for his productive in- 
dustry. Newspapers carry too few stories of the accomplishments 

* See further discussion of Negro morale in Chapter XIV. 


of factory workers. Prestige, of which there seems to be a Hmited 
amount in competitive cultures, in any co-operative endeavor be- 
comes almost limitless; the contributions of each member can be 
praised, and there is honor enough to go around. 

If democracy and capitalism are historically linked, so too are 
democracy and the protest against capitalism. Therefore it is false 
to identify the morale of a democracy with allegiance to the profit 
system. Public corporations, co-operatives, private or public col- 
lectivisms are entirely compatible with democracy. It is accordingly 
consistent with a morale-building program to advocate those eco- 
nomic reforms that will best guarantee the continued expansion 
of the democratic view into all aspects of our national life. 


A program is good if it expresses the majority will of the 
people, and if it enhances the acceptance of the principle of ma- 
jority rule. 

No morale-building policy can advocate schemes that would 
set up rule by an elite, whether of family, of race, or of wealth. 
The criterion calls for willing acceptance, by all, of the pooled 
judgment of the maximum number of interested and informed 
individuals. It calls also for the acceptance of a representative 
government, which has been found to be an economy necessitated 
by the size of the population. Loyal oppositions are encouraged. 
The multiparty system is defended, but the losing groups are 
expected to co-operate with the government in all essential matters. 

It is a psychological fact that most people agree on vaguely 
stated propositions but incline to quarrel over specific objectives 
and immediate policies. It is here that good sportsmanship is es- 
pecially needed, for it is particularly hard for us to accept detailed 
decisions formulated by our opponents. Even in wartime there are 
impulses to favor one's own subgroup within the nation and to 
force upon the latter special policies and solutions not desired by 
the majority. 



A program is good if it raises the confidence of people in their 
chosen leaders. 

Democracy and a strong central government are not incompat- 
ible. Morale-building programs should make this point clear. In 
the modern world the complex creed of democracy demands more 
rather than less leadership and more rather than less centraliza- 
tion. A leader should be accorded respect in proportion to his 
strength, and in proportion to his ability to articulate and carry 
out the will of the people. 

So negative are Americans toward the "leadership principle" 
that leaders of any type are likely to be suspected and handicapped 
by criticism and abuse. Our president is our favorite scapegoat. 
It was carefully planned that he should not be a king, a beloved 
father around whom all might rally in times of trouble. Although 
in England it appears that this symbol of security is not in the 
slightest degree incompatible with democratic morale, the problem 
of leadership in America is different. There are no symbolic per- 
sonages to evoke reverence and faith. 

The responsibilities of democratic leadership stand in marked 
contrast to those of dictatorial leadership. In the latter case the 
individuals at the top confer, interpret, and withdraw rights ; the 
individuals at the bottom assume all obligations. The system is 
unilateral, stratified, and capricious. Its acceptance by the common 
man can be explained only in terms of a regression on his part to 
the point where, like a child, he surrenders his own conscience and 
externalizes it upon the leader-parent. The weakness of this iden- 
tification lies in the danger that when the leader fails there is 
likelihood of a sudden panic. The leader cannot admit his mis- 
takes ; to do so would be to weaken his unstable power. It is for 
this reason above all that tyrannies, as Aristotle observed, tend to 
be short-lived. By contrast, the rise and fall of a democratic leader 
create few perturbations. Yet while in office or in authority he 
needs and deserves respect in proportion to the extent to which 


he expresses and carries out the will of the majority. He needs 
to be protected from overwork and from serious abuse and cap- 
tious criticism that may handicap his efforts. While the war lasts, 
programs of morale-building should take these facts into account. 


A program is good if it recognizes the creative role played by 
minorities in a democracy, and if it diminishes hostility among 
the in-groups of the nation. 

This rule clearly endorses programs that make Americans aware 
and proud of their ability to live together peacefully although pos- 
sessed of the most diverse racial, religious, and cultural standards. 
Because in times of tension there is danger of growing irritation 
within the nation, small groups may suffer in consequence. 
Morale-building must combat every sign of disruption and perse- 
cution. In particular the Negro, the Jewish, the loyal Japanese, and 
the labor groups require protection; so too the conscientious ob- 
jector, who is usually a thoughtful and humane individual anxious 
and willing to serve his country in a civilian capacity. Since totali- 
tarian propaganda is often a matter of wedge driving, of setting 
group against group, its insidious influence must be counteracted. 

It is necessary to draw a distinction between minority groups 
that are harmless (or helpful) and those that are subversive. In 
ordinary times, so great is the resilience of democracy, the latter 
are tolerated and absorbed. But in times of peril it is not possible 
to condone practices which contradict the spirit and purposes of 
democracy. Civil rights may have to be restricted to those who if 
they themselves were in power would extend the same rights to 
others. A democratic state cannot afford to be weak and suicidal 
in its policies. Tolerance is the guiding rule up to the point where 
it cannot safely be extended to forces that would destroy the 
possibility of tolerance forever. 



A program is good if it respects the principles of freedom of 
thought and uncensored communication. 

One of America's assets is the confidence our citizens feel in 
existing channels of communication. President Roosevelt has 
wisely promised all the news to the people provided it is verified 
and not of military assistance to the enemy. But people need also 
to feel a sense of obligation to profit from the news, to develop 
from it an awareness of the problems confronting the nation and 
a true estimate of the dangers that threaten. Hence morale-build- 
ing programs should see to it that listening becomes creative ; that 
discussion, debate, and forums are stimulated; that education be 
encouraged to focus its attention upon the basic issues of de- 
mocracy, and to set an example by practicing democracy in the 
schools. The desires of the common man who alone should dictate 
this peace should be freely discussed. Unlike 1918, we are now 
intent not only on winning the war, but on winning the peace as 

It should be observed that in times of unusual tension it is par- 
ticularly important to arrange special periods for questioning and 
complaint. Lessons concerning the merits of such safety valves 
can be learned from Great Britain. 


A program is good if it utilizes the full intellectual equipment 
of each individual, so that his morale may involve the whole man 
and not merely an emotional segment of his nature. 

Morale in a democracy will never be enhanced through the 
burning of books or through the insulation of the public from 
facts. News, both good and bad, must be spread. If disillusion- 
ment and anxiety are the penalty of unrestricted news, then disil- 
lusionment and anxiety must be incorporated somehow into the 
stuff of morale. In their private lives people learn to face the 


grimmest of facts and somehow to rise above them in courage 
and faith. And they can do so when the problems confronting 
them are national problems rather than exclusively personal prob- 

It is significant that today there are demands that the govern- 
ment repudiate the discredited type of morale service employed in 
World War I with its prime emphasis upon immediate emotional 
results. The Creel Committee somehow offended our sense of 
democratic dignity even though its activities did not begin to ap- 
proach the mendacious and hysterical performances of Hitler and 

However defective the intellectual operations of a democratic 
citizen may be, still he counts on them to pull him through an 
emergency. Alien to him is the nonsensical creed of Nazism with 
its demand for fanatical obedience, Aryan science, compulsory 
hatred of the Jews, raciology, a new male aristocracy, glorification 
of Hitler, Blut und Boden, Kraft durch Freude, Gleichschaltung. 
Instantaneous is the democrat's repudiation of Goebbels's advice 
to ''forget such terms as humanitarianism, civilization, interna- 
tional rights, and international confidence." "For us Nazis," says 
Goebbels, ''these arguments no longer have any appeal, since we 
long ceased believing in them." Equally unacceptable to a demo- 
crat is Nietzsche's assertion that "the criterion of truth lies in the 
enhancement of the feeling of power." Such irrationalism is not 
the foundation for a democratic morale, and programs of action 
cannot be based upon it. 


A program is good if it recognizes that democracy is not a vio- 
lent process, but is a matter of "piecemeal and retail" progress; if 
it regards war as a means to be employed only as a last resort in 

Dictatorship develops a perpetual war economy and relies on a 
constant state of aggression ; democracy deplores the use of force, 


and resorts to it (in principle) only as a means of survival. De- 
mocracy believes in the possibility of appeal to reason; it believes 
that aggression may be eradicated by a training in self -discipline 
and the creation of an environment that is not excessively frus- 
trating to the individual. 

Nazi morale is founded upon a Messianic conviction that de- 
mands proof of its own rightness through an array of successes 
that crescendo without end. Whether it could survive long periods 
of unevent fulness is questionable. A democratic morale may 
countenance war, but only as a means, never as an end in itself. 
It is sometimes said that our dislike of war will weaken our na- 
tional morale, that dreading the means we shall not vigorously 
employ it in our defense. Yet a surgeon may be skillful and effec- 
tive without craving to cut into his patients. He has learned to 
make a virtue of necessity, to master a means that will avoid a 
larger evil. 

It is important to say again that peaceful democratic change has 
not brought a solution to some of our domestic problems, for 
example those involving the Negro, unemployment, crime. Faith 
in meliorism requires that evidence be at hand for improvements 
under way, else a plea that we fight to preserve the method of 
peaceful change becomes unconvincing. It is essential, therefore, 
for morale-building programs to include in their scope the exten- 
sion of peaceful democratic change at home in order that the ideal 
of a melioristic democracy may seem to be worth every sacrifice 
demanded for its realization. 


A program is good if it aids in achieving a co-ordinated and 
voluntary division of labor for the solution of common problems. 

In spite of the disillusionment of the last war and the miseries 
of the depression, the Japanese attack forged new bonds of al- 
legiance within the nation and cemented old ones. Now that the 
unity of purpose is high the problem is to help each person find 


his appropriate role. In peacetime we are used to meeting threats 
and frustrations in our own Hves with a requisite output of effort 
and adaptive skill, but in wartime new habits and new vocations 
are required, geared to those of our neighbors. 

The spectacular feats of co-operation of which Americans are 
sporadically capable require genius in organization. Planning 
co-ordinated tasks for every citizen is the spearhead of morale. 

Be it noted that verbalization is often a substitute activity for 
those who feel their duties keenly but are unable to discharge 
these duties in action. Morale-building programs should be on 
their guard against this particular form of futility, likewise 
against busy-work and preoccupation with irrelevant detail. Yet 
another danger is that in working for one's own profession, club, 
organization one comes to think that one is working for the na- 
tion. To advance Rotary, the ladies' aid, or to draw governmental 
subsidy for one's neighborhood may be an altruistic act, but it 
does not necessarily advance national interest. Altruism and 
enthusiasm are not synonymous with effective national service. 
Morale-builders should see to it that each man and each woman 
has a job that is useful and adapted to his talents. This assign- 
ment requires a great deal in the way of vocational education, 
vocational placement, and shrewd practical management in fac- 
tory, office, neighborhood, school, and government. 


These eleven characteristics of democratic morale mark it off 
from the uniformitarian, tribalistic, regressive morale of the dicta- 
torships. It must not be thought, however, that human nature is 
utterly distinct under the two contrasting social systems. A long 
list of resemblances in morale could be appended. Both groups, for 
example, of necessity rely upon slogans, for the obvious reason 
that the human mind demands both clarity and simplicity in the 
framing of issues. Both groups have fatigue and lassitude to com- 
bat, and physical health to safeguard. Likewise, as has been 


pointed out, in conditions of actual combat considerations of skill, 
strength, and primitive emotional excitement are virtually identi- 
cal. Finally, in military and civilian populations everywhere the 
principles of suggestion and crowd psychology operate; dema- 
goguery is present on both sides. Temporary emotional frenzy 
looks alike in Madison Square Garden and in the Sportpalast. 

Even though these similarities exist, we must believe that the 
man who can best stand the strain of modern warfare, whether it 
be of guns or of nerves, is the individual who of his own will is 
determined to resist and to win. The conditions for a superior per- 
sonal will are potentially with the democracies, for the "whole" 
man has a more integral strength than has the "segmentalized" 
man. In a democracy every personality can be a citadel of resist- 
ance to tyranny. In the co-ordination of the intelligences and wills 
of one hundred million ''whole'' men and women lies the formula 
for an invincible American morale. 


The Psychodynamic Problem of Democracy 
THOMAS M. FRENCH Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago 

IN THE great struggle for existence in which we are now en- 
gaged, one of the most potent psychological weapons em- 
ployed by our enemies has been a direct attack upon the 
fundamental philosophy of democracy. The danger of such an at- 
tack lies of course in the fact that it appeals to doubts and feelings 
of disillusionment that have already been undermining our own 
faith in democratic institutions. Such doubts might conceivably 
become a serious threat to our morale in the war that we are now 
waging. It is important, therefore, that we face them frankly and 
courageously. Not only must we examine carefully the reasons 
for our skepticism, but it will be well also to inquire into the deeper 
sources of our faith in the principles of self-government. 

Doubts as to whether it is possible for a people to govern them- 
selves well are as old as the democratic dream itself. Indeed, dur- 
ing a great part of the world's history, it has been quite taken for 
granted that the task of government could safely be entrusted only 
to a divinely ordained ruler, or at best to some sort of superior 
ruling class. In the last century, however, following upon the 
American and French Revolutions, there developed a rapidly 
spreading entllusiasm for democratic ideals and parliamentary in- 
stitutions. By the end of the century, many of us were already 
developing a complacent and shallow faith that the world was 
progressing steadily toward universal acceptance of democratic 
principles. Even the Communists dreamed that a transitional pe- 
riod of dictatorship would be followed more or less automatically 
by the extension of the principle of self-government beyond the 
political field into the economic field as well. 



In the last two decades this shallow complacency has been rudely 
shaken. With a new content appropriate to our modern problems, 
the old doubts rise again. Democracy may indeed have worked 
fairly well so long as we were a nation of small and independent 
farmers; but in the world of today our social and economic life 
has become so much more complex. The whole world has become 
interdependent to a degree that could hardly have been dreamed 
in previous times. Industry and our whole social life are, there- 
fore, inevitably becoming much more highly and complexly or- 
ganized. We have all become little cogs in a vast machine, and 
economic independence in the sense that our ancestors knew it has 
become a thing of the past. How, then, can it be possible that a 
whole people could be sufficiently well informed to be able to make 
intelligent decisions about such highly technical problems as those 
that face the governing bodies of the nations of the present day? 

If democracy were a religious faith and nothing more, we 
should repudiate such doubts promptly and turn with renewed 
energy to battle for our democratic ideals; but the task of self- 
government requires intelligence as well as enthusiasm, and it 
would seem better, therefore, to meet the challenge of these ques- 
tions by attempting to analyze the interplay of forces upon which 
the successful operation of a democracy depends. If we can gain 
some notion of this interplay of forces, then we ought to be able 
to estimate more carefully the conditions under which the experi- 
ment of self-government by a whole people is most likely to be 

Such problems in social dynamics obviously belong in the field 
of the sociologist and the political scientist who have experience in 
the study of dynamic interactions between social trends and insti- 
tutions, and between mass movements and their leaders, in the 
light of the broad perspective of history. The psychologist's inter- 
est in such problems arises, of course, from the fact that the be- 
havior both of leaders and of masses must ultimately be accounted 
for in terms of human motives. As psychologists, therefore, we 
shall do well to circumscribe our problem. In attempting to throw 


light upon the interplay of forces in a democracy, it will be well 
for us to restrict ourselves to a few rather elementary problems 
concerning motivations. What motives impel men to desire or to 
dream of democracy? What psychological problems must men 
face if they attempt to realize their democratic dreams? What at- 
titudes and habits of mind are most conducive to the success of a 
democracy ? 

To answer these questions adequately would require a thorough 
study of the story of successful and unsuccessful attempts at self- 
government throughout world history. What follows is merely a 
sketch for such a study, a few reflections upon historical facts that 
are known to all of us, in the light of what we know about human 
motives. x 

Rebellion Against Tyranny 

From a superficial reading of history, one inevitably gains the 
impression that' rebellion against despotism plays a very important 
role in the motivation of the proponents of democracy. Enthusi- 
astic democrats delight in such phrases as "give me liberty or give 
me death," and love to picture themselves with their feet upon the 
necks of tyrants. Indeed, most democracies cherish the tradition of 
a struggle against the arbitrary power of some individual or priv- 
ileged class. Upon reflection it is not difficult to understand why 
this should be so. One can sense how the struggle against a com- 
mon enemy tends to solidify the members of a group, to drain off 
their antagonisms against each other by turning them against the 
common enemy, and to give to the members of the group every 
rational motive to co-operate in a common cause. 

It is equally plain, on the other hand, that the motive of rebel- 
lion alone cannot teach a people how to govern themselves suc- 
cessfully. Only too many tragedies of history make it very plain 
that even the need to unite in the face of a common enemy is not 
always a sufficient motive to make co-operative action possible; 
and even if the common hatred of a despot is able to unite men 
in rebellion against him, certainly this motive can no longer be 


trusted when once the despot has been removed. When once the 
arbitrary power of a tyrant has been ended, there is only too much 
danger that some leader of the rebel forces will himself wish to 
seize despotic power ; or widespread fear of such despotic usurpa- 
tion of authority may divide the group into a number of warring 
factions and make impossible further co-operative action. As ex- 
ample, we may recall that our own American colonies in the Rev- 
olution were not always united in their struggle against the 
common enemy and that for a number of years after the war was 
over, their very existence seemed to be threatened by jealousies 
and strife both within and between the states. 

Learning Self -Government 

Self-government is self-restraint. If a people are to govern 
themselves, they must be able and willing not only to rebel against 
the arbitrary authority of others, but also to submit to the legiti- 
mate authority of the laws that they themselves make and of those 
persons whom they choose to enforce them. In order that there 
may be sufficient mutual trust and confidence to make possible ef- 
fective co-operation, it is necessary not only that the members of 
a democracy should be alert to resist despotic usurpation of power, 
but also that they should be willing themselves to renounce the de- 
sire to seek arbitrary power over others. 

It is important for our purpose to inquire into the motives that 
make possible this sort of community self-restraint. In attempting 
to answer this question it is necessary to realize that this capacity 
is probably never acquired suddenly or all at once. One of the most 
significant teachings of history is the fact that the art of self- 
government is something that has to be learned. Before the thir- 
teen American colonies were able to throw off the authority of the 
mother country, they had had a century and more of training in 
self-government in local affairs and in legal and parliamentary 
struggles with the royal governors. Just as a child does not step 
from the cradle into the responsibilities of adult life, so a com- 


munity is not born with the capacity for self-government, but 
must acquire by gradual steps the proper habits of mind and the 
necessary experience. One of the most interesting conclusions 
from Kurt Lewin's recent experiments in group activity is the fact 
that if a group has been accustomed to an autocratic regime, it 
takes time for it to adjust to a democratic organization of its ac- 
tivity.*' ^' ^^ Adjustment to an autocratic ''atmosphere" takes place 
much more quickly; but democratic attitudes are a product of 
learning and growth. 

The Ideal of Political Equality 

Few people now take seriously the romantic notion of an in- 
born urge toward social equality. The evidence all points in the 
opposite direction. The little boy envies the care that the mother 
bestows upon the baby in the cradle; if he is able to overcome this 
wish to be the baby again, he is apt to seek consolation in the fact 
that he is bigger and stronger than the baby and able to assert 
himself in the competitive struggle • with others. As everyone 
knows, the struggle to gain preference and domination over others 
continues also into adult life and plays an exceedingly important 
role in shaping our social institutions. In the communities with 
which we are most familiar, business is organized very largely 
upon a competitive basis, and within both political and industrial 
organizations there are ever-present struggles and intrigue for 
dominance and preferment. 

There is much to suggest that the democratic ideal must arise 
as a reaction formation against these widespread motives that set 
every man against his fellow. As evidence for this conclusion, we 
may cite the enthusiasm of nascent democracies like the early 
American and French republics for the philosophical doctrine that 
all men are equal. Such doctrines imply not only protest against 
the aristocratic pretensions of others, but also a renunciation of 
one's own desires to get the better of his fellows. In some com- 
munities this intolerance of inequality may even tend to inhibit 


achievement and to put obstacles in the way of the acceptance of 
leadership. Both the conscience of an individual and a strong com- 
munity pressure demand that he who achieves something note- 
worthy or who aspires to be a leader must take great care to make 
it clear that he is really no better than his fellows. In the burst of 
enthusiasm of the early Jacksonian democracy, it was the boast of 
one western town that there were no "principal citizens." 

The motive for this reaction formation against inequality would 
seem to be some need for the security of solidarity with the group. 
In a considerably different emotional setup, we encounter a simi- 
lar reaction formation in early childhood. The children of a family 
do not govern themselves. Nevertheless we find that here, as in the 
democratic community, great importance is likely to be attached to 
the idea of equality. Father and mother must not love any one 
child more than the others. The mechanism is simple. Each child 
renounces his own desires to get the better of brothers and sisters 
on condition that the other children must also content themselves 
with an equal place in the parents' affections. 

There seems good reason to believe that similar mechanisms un- 
derlie the insistence of democrats upon the idea that all men are 
equal. Sometimes democratic leaders appeal to such motives quite 
consciously and frankly. As an example I may cite one of Lin- 
coln's principal arguments against slavery: "If A can prove, how- 
ever conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave B, why may not 
B snatch the same argument, and prove equally that he may en- 
slave Af . . . You say A is white, and B is black. It is color, 
then: the lighter having the right to enslave the darker? . . . 
Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you 
meet with a fairer skin than your own. . . . You do not mean 
color exactly ? You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors 
of the blacks, and therefore have the right to enslave them? . . . 
Take care again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man 
you meet, with an intellect superior to your own." ^^ 

In this argument, we see Lincoln appealing quite frankly to the 


motive to renounce the claim to superiority over others, lest one 
be compelled on the same principle to accept domination by others. 
On the other hand, the attitudes against which Lincoln is protest- 
ing show plainly the underlying emotional conflict out of which 
these conflicting philosophies arise. Each person would like to be 
assured that he is at least the equal of others, while he finds at the 
same time excuses for restricting as far as possible the number of 
those whom he will be constrained to recognize as equals. Logi- 
cally, obviously, Lincoln has a very good case, but the problem is 
one not of logic but of emotional and sociodynamic equilibrium, 
and in the logic of many peoples' emotions the case for inequality 
is very strong. 

Leadership in Democracy 

Freud many years ago suggested that what binds together such 
integrated groups as the church and the army is the common de- 
votion of the members of the group to the leader and the confi- 
dence of each member that the leader is caring for all alike."^ 
Under these circumstances strong bonds of identification develop 
bet\<^een each group member and the leader and between the sev- 
eral members of the group with each other. So long as this devo- 
tion to the leader continues, the group maintains its solidarity, but 
if anything occurs to shake the confidence of the group in the 
leader or in his equal regard for each of the members, then the 
group suddenly disintegrates. This principle is illustrated by a 
number of recorded instances of acute panic spreading rapidly 
through an army when the supreme leader was killed or discred- 

The above analysis by Freud obviously fits an autocracy much 
better than a democracy. In a democracy there is a tendency to be- 
come resentful or suspicious of any leader who seems likely to 
gain too dominant an influence over the group. The leader must 
always remember that he has been chosen by the group and that 
from this fact solely he derives his authority. Obviously this is a 

9 4 



point of danger in the sociodynamic equilibrium of a democracy.* 
As we have seen, if this reaction against inequahty is excessive, 
it may put obstacles in the way of achievement and necessary lead- 
ership; but even if it is not excessive, the members of a democracy 
must renounce the security of knowing that they will be provided 
for by a good father. In renouncing the security of this common 
dependence upon a fatherlike leader, they tend also to undermine 
the basis of their solidarity with each other. Since the solidarity 
of the group can no longer rest upon common devotion to a su- 
preme leader, some other principle must be found to bind its mem- 
bers together in co-operative effort. Freud and others have 
tentatively suggested that this unifying principle might be a com- 
mon devotion to an idea. Is it possible perhaps that the love of 
democracy itself might be the bond best fitted to unite a people in 
the task of governing themselves ? 

The transition from autocratic to democratic institutions would 
seem to involve for a people much the same emotional readjust- 
ment as does the departure of the young man from the parental 
home to establish an independent economic existence and to found 
a home of his own. As in the case of the individual, the commu- 
nity that throws ofT autocratic rule must renounce the security of 
being children in the parental home, to substitute in its place the 
pride of independence and achievement and the satisfaction of 
mutual devotion to each other and to the group as a whole. ^' ^' ^' * 
As in the case of the individual, too, this readjustment cannot take 
place suddenly in one step, but can only be the product of a long 
training in the art of self-government. 

We come thus to the realization that the success of a democracy 
depends upon a somewhat delicate psychodynamic equilibrium. On 
the one hand, it is of the very essence of democracy that it implies 
a renunciation of the more extreme forms of competitive struggle 
between its members. In order that all may be secure against be- 
ing ruled by a tyrant, it is necessary that everyone must also re- 

* This point is particularly stressed by Robert Waelder in an article as yet 


nounce the desire to be a tyrant. Especially the potential leaders 
must be trained, from youth on, to aspire to be the servants and 
not the masters of the people whom they lead, and to be loyal al- 
ways to the principle that their authority is derived from the fact 
that they are the chosen and temporary representatives of those 
whom they govern. 

On the other hand, danger threatens if the self-assertive im- 
pulses of the members of the community are too much inhibited. 
A community whose members are ready too easily to surrender 
their individual interests to the supposed welfare of the state may 
become only too ripe to succumb to the usurpations of the next 
would-be tyrant. "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance." In a 
really vital democracy, every citizen must be alert to detect and 
resist any attempt at arbitrary and unwarranted use of authority. 

In recent years there has been much to remind us of the danger 
of a democracy's becoming soft, of its losing its will to self-asser- 
tion and self-defense against its enemies both outside and inside 
it borders. Now that we are at war, we are becoming aroused to 
the necessity of aggressive action to defend our institutions 
against open attack. Times of war, however, put democratic insti- 
tutions to their most severe test. The necessity of secrecy and the 
imperative need for effective leadership in acute emergencies make 
it necessary to put restraints upon public discussion and tend to en- 
courage attitudes that are more appropriate in an autocracy. At no 
time is it more important to maintain the tradition that a people's 
leaders are its servants and not its masters and that a people must 
be alert against attempts to abuse authority. We must not forget, 
on the other hand, that a rebellious spirit can foment revolutions 
and divide a people into warring factions ; but if a people is to be- 
come capable of self-government, the spirit of rebellion must be 
supplemented by a strong loyalty to the common task of building 
a unified nation. 


Solidarity by Mutual Sacrifice 

I believe that history and common experience make it suffi- 
ciently plain that fear and rational expediency are not adequate 
motives to weld together a people in co-operative effort even in 
the face of common danger. If a people has not already some sense 
of solidarity, then fear is apt to result in panic rather than in com- 
mon action. The outlook is much better, however, if a people al- 
ready have a memory and a tradition of successful communal 
effort. It seems to be a principle of rather general validity that 
people learn to love the activities they habitually and successfully 
practice, and nothing seems to bind together a group so effectively 
as the consciousness or memory of having successfully braved 
dangers or performed difficult tasks together. Upon this principle 
we can understand why it takes time for a people to learn the art 
of self-government. The very rivets that bind together the struc- 
ture must be forged one by one. Each difficulty successfully over- 
come, each conflict satisfactorily adjusted, becomes a sort of 
reservoir of confidence, of community pride, a bond uniting a peo- 
ple in common loyalties that may serve to prepare them for even 
greater difficulties in the future. Starting with practice in local 
self-government in the early town meetings, our early American 
ancestors elected Colonial legislatures that carried on parliamen- 
tary struggles with royal governors; finally united, though often 
somewhat halfheartedly, to wage what was ultimately a success- 
ful revolution; and, after a period of threatened disintegration, 
later succeeded in agreeing upon a governmental framework that 
made possible a really effective Federal structure. Thus, step by 
step, if we took the time, we could trace the process by which we 
grew in a sense of national unity and of our capacity to reconcile 
our differences and govern ourselves. 

From all of this it follows that a people's capacity for self- 
government tends to grow with practice. Correspondingly the 
greatest danger to a democracy arises when different sections of 
the people get out of touch with each other, when they seek to out- 


wit each other by clever propaganda and become fascinated with 
the dishonest art of selHng people something which it is against 
their interest to buy. If democracy is to survive, we must cultivate 
the art of confronting divergent views in lively public discussion 
and in a spirit of readiness for mutual sacrifices for the common 
good. We must develop a keen and widespread interest in the 
problem of how the great mass of us can be stimulated to question 
the source and motives of propaganda and to think for ourselves 
about public questions instead of being merely passive recipients 
of opinions that someone wants to plant in our minds. We are now 
engaged in the task of defending democracy against external ene- 
mies. But even now and increasingly in the postwar period we 
must realize that this is not enough. The art of self-government 
must be practiced and developed and loved if it is to survive. If we 
can learn to adapt the art of vital public discussion to the complex- 
ities of modern life, then we too shall have made our contribution 
to the faith of our people that even in these difficult times we can 
govern ourselves. 


Five Factors in Morale 

A Summary and Elaboration of a Round-table 
Discussion * 

MORALE is a multiple-meaning term. In this discussion it 
is used to describe what people do rather than merely 
the way they feel. Good morale is shown by the stamina 
with which people stand up under punishment and by the energy 
with which they strive to realize their ideals. Poor morale is evi- 
denced by those who * 'can't take it," and who become easily dis- 
couraged and disillusioned. 

Defining the Goal 

The first essential for good morale is a positive goal. People 
who have nothing to look forward to will show poor morale. One 
of the most destructive consequences of our prolonged economic 
depression was that so many young people came to feel that there 
was no hope ahead. Bakke has described the deterioration of 
morale in fairly distinct stages.^ At first the unemployed youth 
followed leads intelligently and hopefully. Gradually they lost 
hope, but plodded wearily on in a blind, persistent effort to find 

* During the meetings of the American Psychological Association at Evan- 
ston, Illinois, in September, 1941, The Society for Psychological Study of Social 
Issues arranged for a Round-table Discussion on the theme, "The Psychological 
Bases of National Morale." The participants were: Chairman, Dr. Rensis 
Likert, Division of Program Surveys, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. 
Gregory Bateson, Committee for National Morale, New York; Dr. Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld, Department of Sociology, Columbia University; Dr. Kurt Lewin, 
University of Iowa; Dr. Goodwin Watson, Teachers College, Columbia Uni- 
versity, now with the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service. This summary 
was prepared by Goodwin Watson, using the conclusions of the round table as 
an outline, but with the incorporation in the present chapter of supporting argu- 
ments in addition to those brought out in the discussion. 



work. Eventually they gave up the futile quest and sank into 
apathy. Lazarsf eld's study of a village where nearly all were 
unemployed showed that loss of other goals accompanied the 
deterioration in morale from vocational frustration.^ Women 
maintained morale better than did the men, because the women 
still had something to live for, in caring for homes and children. 

A potent source of poor morale in the United States during the 
period before our entrance into actual fighting was uncertainty 
about the future. People didn't feel sure that better times were 
coming. As new factories were built, workers wondered whether 
they would be standing idle ''after this is all over." Business men 
took the higher profits of defense spending without any confidence 
that the improvement would be more than temporary. ''How shall 
we ever pay our staggering national debt?" they asked, and, "Who 
will buy the products of our mills when government orders de- 

In the international scene also, the goal is still uncertain. Many 
remember the high intentions of Woodrow Wilson and the sorry 
results. The Four Freedoms and Eight Points are attempts to help 
the people formulate more clearly and effectively the goal they 
seek. If we may judge by reactions in the press and in opinion 
polls, neither set of aims goes far enough to inspire new hope in 
the disheartened. The aims seem good, but they do not deal defi- 
nitely and constructively with the worries which still obscure the 
future and prevent formation of impelling goals. 

Even the most conservative minds recognize that profound 
changes are taking place in our society. The reminder is frequently 
offered that the world is experiencing not only a war but also a 
revolution. A recent (October, 1941) Fortune poll showed more 
than 90 per cent of business leaders convinced that we would not 
return after the war to the kind of private enterprise which they 
personally preferred. Where are we headed? For what goals can 
we work and fight? American youth, especially, are asking for 
"time-perspective" forward. They want to know, if they are to 


postpone their careers, to defer marriage, and to sacrifice their 
lives: '^What is it all for?" 

An answer in general terms has been proposed by Wendell 

We must begin now to shape in our minds the kind of world 
we want. We must not await the war's end to make these purposes 
clear. For then some men will feel the gloat of victory, and others 
the bitterness of defeat; demagogues will capitalize the passions 
of the people and the greedy grasping of some will teach only an 
immediate material advantage; and superpatriots among us all 
again will shout the shibboleths of nationalism and isolationism. 
We must have the imagination to dare and the vision to see that 
from such cataclysms as we are experiencing today, great ven- 
tures are possible. . . . We can, if we have the will, convert what 
seems to be the death rattle of our time into the birth pains of a 
new and better order. 

It is not the function of psychologists alone to define more 
clearly the outline of the ''new and better order" which so many 
long to see emerge from the world catastrophe. Psychologists can 
help, perhaps, to correct some common fallacies such as overem- 
phasis upon nationalism, race distinctions, or material goods as the 
basis for happiness. Psychological investigations in laboratory and 
clinic confirm the common-sense observation that a society adapted 
to human nature must provide for struggle and the joy of achieve- 
ment alike. Happiness, indeed, more often accompanies the sense 
of moving toward goals than the full attainment of them. 

In a democracy, definition of goals is a task to which all citizens 
contribute. Each must have a voice in formulating the ends for 
which he is going to live. Educators, economists, political leaders, 
sociologists, writers, clergymen, artists, and others have special 
contributions to make. 

The urgent thesis of our discussion is that too little attention 
has thus far been given to defining postwar goals. Morale has been 
based too largely on negative factors : fear, hatred, anger. Those 

* A talk delivered at Maple Leaf Gardens, Toronto, March 24, 1941. 


have their place, as we shall see, but they are not enough. It is sig- 
nificant that an executive, responsible for organizing conferences 
among the more alert and progressive educators of the country 
during the fall of 1941, found them relatively uninterested in im- 
mediate matters of defense training. Teachers wanted to work on 
postwar planning. The seniors at Antioch College, preparing for 
their 1941 commencement, set aside traditions to arrange a panel 
on economic planning after peace. Youth organizations, at least 
until the Pearl Harbor explosion, expressed more concern with 
what the National Resources Planning Board was envisioning by 
way of future possibilities for sustained abundance than in any 
other aspect of defense. 

A pamphlet issued recently by the National Resources Planning 
Board ^ brings what will be, to many, welcome reassurance. Pro- 
fessor Alvin H. Hansen here offers assurance that ''we shall have 
when the war is over, the technical equipment, the trained and ef- 
ficient labor and the natural resources required to produce a sub- 
stantially higher real income for civilian needs than any ever 
achieved before in our history." He goes on to offer "a positive 
program of postwar expansion and full employment." It is a fa- 
vorable sign that government agencies are thus recognizing that 
morale depends upon programs which look beyond the defeat of 
the enemy to the creation of hope-inspiring conditions at home 
and abroad. 

Morale, first of all, demands a magnetic pole toward which the 
aspirations of men are drawn. 

Mutual Support 

A second fundamental factor in morale is togetherness. Morale 
is stronger in those persons who feel themselves a part of a larger 
group, sharing a common goal. Convictions are firmer when it is 
felt that other people join in them. An individual who, alone, 
might easily become discouraged or intimidated, can sustain his 
faith and keep on fighting if he is with his gang. A study reported 


later (in Chapter XVI) shows that those individuals among the 
unemployed who kept up better morale were the ones with better 
social integration. Studies of industrial morale have shown that a 
major contribution to job satisfaction comes from the comrade- 
ship with fellow workers. Every mass meeting, whether directed 
toward patriotic action, or labor gains, or religious zeal, or some 
other purpose, makes use of the psychological truth that morale is 
reinforced by social support. A study by Sherif has shown ex- 
perimentally that when our first experience of a confusing situ- 
ation is shared with others, we take out of that experience a set 
which influences our individual outlook, and that even when we 
bring unique viewpoints into the group, those differences have 
their sharp edges and corners rubbed off, until we become more 
and more like the group. 

The togetherness which fosters morale is more than the fact of 
being in the same room or the same organization. The vital factor 
is a sense of shared purpose. When America was divided in its 
policy about the war, and in its hopes for the future, morale was 
weak. When no overarching end commands the loyalty of citi- 
zens, they seek the goals of conflicting subgroups. As J. F. Brown 
has pointed out,^ in normal peacetime the family, school, labor, 
religious, recreational, and other groupings are dominant, and the 
sense of national citizenship is weak. 

Under the stress of emergency the subgroup boundaries become 
less pronounced while the boundary including all who share the 
national purpose grows stronger. One of Hitler's most successful 
techniques has been to accentuate the divisions within an enemy 
country at the expense of national solidarity. Lincoln quoted an 
earlier authority, ''A house divided against itself cannot stand." 

To share a hatred seems easier than to share an aspiration. 
Unity can be secured for the defeat of a common enemy, even 
though the groups thus united have little constructive purpose in 
common. The usual consequence is that after victory over the en- 
emy has been attained, the unity is lost and the victors fall out 


among themselves. They may well, indeed, as some believe hap- 
pened for America in 1918, even lose the fruits of victory. 

The morale problem, therefore, calls upon us to find purposes 
which unite the American people, and which will carry on beyond 

Fig.1 Peace Structure 

Fig, 2 War Structure 

the defeat of some particular external threat. A morale built on 
the type of national purpose expressed in slogans like "Hang Hit- 
ler" or ''Revenge Pearl Harbor" will not carry us far in either 
domestic or international co-operation. 

The process by which common purposes can be discovered and 
created becomes of vital concern for national morale. Gordon All- 
port in our first chapter asserts that a Creel-Committee type of 
propaganda, even if raised to the Goebbels level of efficiency, will 
not build solidarity in America. We have learned, partly from 
propaganda analysis in the teaching of social science, but more 
fully from bitter experience, that we cannot trust all that adver- 


tisers or newspapers or radio speakers proclaim. That modern 
youth has remained so cynical has been more than a little disturb- 
ing to some adults who have tried to use again the flag-waving 
speeches of 1917. On the other hand, experiences with panel dis- 
cussions of youth, where they were encouraged to express frankly 
their own fears and hopes for the future, have brought out tre- 
mendous resources of aspiration and will for world reconstruction. 
The contribution of psychology in improving techniques of con- 
ference and discussion will be discussed further under another 
heading of this chapter. 

The importance of a sense of shared living raises a question 
about such military traditions as those intended to keep barriers 
between officers and men. In the American Revolution, in the War 
of 1812, in the Mexican Expedition of 1836, and as late as the 
Civil War, there were many effective companies in which officers 
and privates shared the same living arrangements, and co-oper- 
ated on a basis of substantial social equality. The election of offi- 
cers by the soldiers was a common practice. It is rather surprising 
that the military forces of the countries with democratic political 
traditions have in recent years lagged behind totalitarian states 
in building group solidarity. The camaraderie of the Russian army 
was frowned upon by our military leaders, at least until the sum- 
mer of 1941. William L. Shirer has reported that even in the Nazi 
army, despite the stress on 'leadership" and the autocratic ideal, 
the old Prussian caste tradition has been broken down.^^ 'The gulf 
that used to exist between officers and men had almost completely 
disappeared in the German army and even in the navy. Privates 
and captains ate the same food and drank beer in the same cafes, 
at the same tables." A report on Vice Admiral Karl Doenitz, "cre- 
ator and commander of Germany's U-boat fleet," attributes part 
of his successes to a policy of emphasizing ''democratic relation- 
ships between officers and men to avoid the difficulty with muti- 
nous officer-bullied crews which helped break down the German 
U-boat service in World War I." * Hitler has sometimes claimed 

* Time, February 2, 1942, p. 28. 


that his army in fact practices more democracy than the armies of 
the self -proclaimed democracies. In March of 1942 new orders 
introduced a common mess for officers and men of the Italian 
army. The Japanese army claims to have ''no officer caste." 

When social barriers are introduced, it is probable that both 
military and civilian morale suffer. British experience on the home 
front has shown that morale is better if food and clothing are so 
rationed that distinctions in wealth or rank are minimized. In 
later chapters we shall be considering other divisive factors in 
American life — those of race, for example. Despite our melting- 
pot tradition, there are substantial groups unassimilated in our 
national psyche. A major assignment for those agencies, public 
and private, which are concerned with building morale, is to bat- 
ter down all the barriers which prevent us from feeling that we 
are one people, sharing common purposes and a common fate. 
Edward R. Murrow, after experiencing war in Spain, Britain, 
North Africa, and in the Pacific, drew the significant conclusion 
that the first essential for morale during hardship is that everyone 
shall feel that all are sacrificing in substantial equality. 

Knowledge of Common Danger 

The third factor in morale is awareness of some danger in 
which group members feel themselves involved. It is significant 
that, as shown in Chapter XII, American readiness to sacrifice in- 
creased with the increasing defeats and hardships suffered by the 
cause with which our interests were most identified. Reports of 
British victories, on the contrary, left us freer to indulge our per- 
sonal and small-group preferences. 

The experience of France and England during that period of 
1939 sometimes called the ''phony" war, shows that morale is not 
built simply by a declaration of war. It took disaster in Norway, 
the doom barely escaped at Dunkirk, and the mass bombing of 
British cities to put steel into British resolution. 


The most striking illustration of the effect of a threat upon 
morale occurred in the United States on that memorable Sunday 
afternoon of December 7, 1941. In the space of a few hours, the 
isolationist bloc dissolved ; disputes among ourselves suddenly be- 
came trivial; out of the shock of the news from Pearl Harbor 
arose a grand and thrilling sense of unity. The historians may well 
conclude that any military advantage which Japan gained from 
her surprise attack was far outweighed by the instantaneous wave 
of anger which transformed America into a solid determined 
fighting force. The raid on Hawaii may well have been one of the 
costliest psychological blunders in all history. 

Danger mobilizes the emergency resources of the organism. The 
classic work of Cannon ^ has shown that threats arousing anger 
and fear increase the output of adrenalin and stir up the autonomic 
nervous system. The body goes into preparation for vigorous ac- 
tion. A faster heart rate sends the blood circulating more rapidly, 
carrying food and oxygen to hard-working skeletal muscles. The 
heaving chest of strong emotion indicates the increased intake 
of oxygen and expulsion of waste products from the lungs. The 
liver releases glycogen to furnish increased energy. Some of the 
changes, appropriate to conditions of personal combat under which 
they evolved, no longer help in the struggle fought with compli- 
cated mechanical weapons. 

Military efficiency today may require a cool head rather than 
emotional excitement. But both popular writing and scientific re- 
search show many instances in which individuals under excep- 
tional stress have attained unprecedented heights of achievement. 
Horses or oxen can pull out of the mud a motor vehicle with many 
times their ''horsepower," partly because as living organisms the 
animals can adapt their efforts to demands and can concentrate 
to meet an emergency. Experience with committees, boards, and 
other social organizations shows quite as clearly that when the life 
of a vigorous institution is threatened, a higher quality of effort 
and group co-operation results. It is notoriously unsafe to inter- 


vene in a family quarrel, for the most antagonistic parties may 
unite vigorously against the intruder. 

The mobilizing factor is necessarily psychological. It is not 
danger but awareness of danger which heightens morale. While 
the American people were threatened, but disregarded the threat 
as remote, improbable, unreal, or easily counteracted, it proved 
very difficult to get defense work taken seriously. Although from 
almost every point of view a war geographically remote is prefer- 
able to one which strikes at our own cities and factories, never- 
theless, morale is more of a problem when the fighting is far away. 
We read of dive bombers and scorched earth, and perhaps the 
first time our emotions are stirred. But nothing follows. The 
stimulus does not serve to prepare us for a developing emergency. 
The next time such a story comes to us over the radio or in our 
reading, we pass over it with less effect. The psychologist speaks 
of ^'negative adaptation" or ''experimental extinction"; the lay- 
man understands well enough that we gradually become calloused 
and indifferent. Real danger is a developing situation in which, if 
we do nothing, the peril noticeably increases. When nothing spe- 
cial happens after warnings, the warnings lose effect. Mass obser- 
vation in Britain has testified to the ineffectiveness of warnings 
about carrying gas masks when little or no poison gas has actually 
been employed. The psychological principle is as old as the ''Wolf, 
Wolf" parable. The danger of using air-raid warnings for pur- 
poses of training is that they are likely to be taken less and less 

There is a natural tendency, when a warning is not observed, 
to repeat it with increased emphasis. But, as we have seen, exag- 
gerated threats by alarmists produce an effect quite contrary to 
what is sought. If awareness of danger is to contribute to morale, 
and is to lead to emergency mobilization of personal resources for 
the defense of threatened values, then the greatest care must be 
used in presenting the remote dangers. Either minimize them or 
overdraw them, and the threatened citizens may shrug their shoul- 
ders and go about their business as usual. An evasive retreat 


behind shrinking oceans proved no answer to international ag- 
gression. A blind complacence over a war boom is no answer to 
a malfunctioning economy. Panic and hysteria are no more ade- 
quate ; they may even by exaggeration lead people to ignore seri- 
ous warnings. The British tradition of muddling through and the 
American optimism which assumes that no international calami- 
ties can destroy our democracy, because that never has happened 
before — these are liabilities in the face of a truly grave menace. 
A major concern, in the improvement of morale, must be to aid 
citizens in discovering for themselves and making realistic in 
their own feelings, the authentic dangers amid which we live. 

Something Each Can Do 

The fourth factor in our psychological analysis of morale is 
the conviction that zve can do something to improve matters. 
Granted a goal, membership in a group of comrades who share 
this goal, and some threat to the security of the on-going quest, 
the next essential is some recourse adequate to meet the threat. If 
the danger appears to be too great, people may be overwhelmed, 
paralyzed, and demoralized. 

Among psychological studies which contribute to our under- 
standing of the importance of a channel for action are those of 
children in fear situations. "Although skill alone may fail to root 
out fear," writes Jersild,^ "in general it may be said that . . . the 
child who has acquired the widest range of competence and the 
best array of skills is likely to have the fewest fears." Interviews 
with parents showed that attempts to promote competence in deal- 
ing with the feared stimulus succeeded much better than did reas- 
surance, explanation, example of courage, enforced contact with 
the fear situation, ridicule, protection, or ignoring the fear. 

Clinical experience often demonstrates the transformation of 
demoralizing fear into a vigorous drive for action, once a promis- 
ing course of action against the danger has been discovered. One 
counselor taught shy, anxious clients who were afraid of social 


encounters, some simple tricks of magic. With these as devices 
for making a contribution to social affairs, the subjects became 
willing and even eager to join in group life. High-school and col- 
lege counselors report similarly that when boys have learned tech- 
niques of calling for dates on the telephone, greeting the girl's 
family, dancing, ordering in a restaurant, and making introduc- 
tions, some students who were afraid *'to go out" became enthusi- 
astic in the pursuit. A teacher whose job was threatened found 
himself at first chilled with fear, but once his union committee 
met with him to plan what looked like a promising campaign of 
action to prevent the dismissal, his morale was transformed and 
he worked indefatigably. 

National morale in a time of crisis depends largely upon the 
ability of national leaders to show us how we can help, and to 
carry to us the conviction that if we work hard enough we may 
win out. From a failure to achieve this result, two problems of 
morale have already arisen. One is national and the other indi- 
vidual. The need for a clearer program of national action is il- 
lustrated in those citizens who are aware of the strength of the 
Axis armed forces, but who do not see what the United States is 
likely to be able to do to stop their advance. To develop just such 
a state of funk has been one objective of Axis propaganda. The 
prolonged period of inaction after war was declared in 1939 led 
some Britishers to feel that the Chamberlain government had no 
plan for winning victory. Even today the plans which have been 
communicated to civilians seem to center more on defense than 
on any program for winning the war. Perhaps evasiveness is nec- 
essary, for reasons of military strategy, but morale would be very 
much stronger in the United States if the average man could see 
a little more clearly just how Hitler is likely to be defeated. Re- 
ports that the United States is now producing a thousand airplanes 
a month; that production is ahead of expectations; that produc- 
tion may go up to a thousand a week — these have had a tonic 
effect upon the morale of some Americans. President Roosevelt's 


announcement of a Victory Program, early in January, 1942, was 
an excellent stimulus to morale. 

Both military secrecy and the exigencies of internal politics 
have prevented full revelation of American contributions to the 
struggle. News emphasis has too often been laid upon shortages 
of certain raw materials, handicaps due to strikes, and instances 
of bad planning, wasteful expenditure, and bureaucratic red tape. 
The defects in our program should not be covered up — that would 
have a particularly poisonous effect upon morale — but they should 
be seen in the perspective of the whole. What America needs is 
not detailed knowledge of the plans for victory, but a certainty 
that the plans have been drawn, and a general understanding of 
the progress being made. It may be a characteristic of democracies 
anywhere, or it may be especially true of Missouri and her forty- 
seven sister states, that the citizens want to be shown. They don't 
go in heavily for faith in Washington or even in Providence. 
Perhaps widespread experience with complicated machines which 
yield only to competent techniques and never to emotional per- 
suasion has deepened the distrust for oratory. "Hitler must be de- 
feated," says Churchill. ''All well and good," say millions of 
Americans, "but how is this to be done? What is the layout, the 
setup, the timetable?" Rightly or wrongly, the impression is wide- 
spread that only Hitler has a timetable, that initiative lies with the 
Axis, that the United Nations haven't got beyond opportunistic 
hopes of somehow ''muddling through." Morale demands greater 
awareness of workable methods for carrying out national pur- 

The conviction that "something can be done" needs to be per- 
sonalized until it becomes, "You can do something that helps!" 
The other morale difficulty, in relation to this fourth factor, is 
individual rather than national. People who share the purposes of 
American democracy, who feel those values threatened, are in 
many instances quite unclear about what they themselves can con- 
tribute. Eager to help though they have been, no channel has been 
open to them. Many, of course, now go into the armed forces. 


Others are taking responsibilities in Washington. Some collect 
warm clothes to send to England, others practice first aid or fire 
fighting, while some, unfortunately, revert to vigilanteism and 
attack anyone with a strange accent or an unorthodox view of 
economics. Knitting was an outlet for some, but its value was 
more psychological than productive, and now a wool shortage 
cuts off that form of expression. Buying Defense Bonds helps, 
but it is not fully satisfying. People want to be in on the fight — 
they want to feel needed. Busy work is not enough ; they demand 
that their efforts shall really make a difference. One of the chief 
problems of the Office of Civilian Defense is to find ways of 
harnessing the driving energy of millions of American men and 
women whose morale is dependent, in part, upon their finding 
some way to help. 

In this connection we may raise a question about the range of 
activities which are thought of as ''defense work." Perhaps the 
morale of citizens eager to contribute could be better sustained if 
government officials and agencies affecting public opinion — but 
Congress especially — were to conceive of the defense of democracy 
in broader terms. A teacher of physical education may be contrib- 
uting to American physical fitness quite as effectively in a small- 
town high school as in an army camp. A labor union which 
achieves conditions making for more democracy in American in- 
dustry, higher morale among workers, and eventually greater out- 
put, may then be contributing to defense quite as genuinely as by 
donating a day's output to England. Communities which are able 
to catch an incipient race conflict in its earliest stages, and to pre- 
vent the development of prejudice, hostility, and schism should be 
as proud of this contribution as they are of funds given to the 
United Service Organizations. If more of our everyday activities 
as parents, molders of public opinion, producers, and citizens could 
be seen to contribute in a vital way to the defense of democracy, 
the result might be a significant rise in morale. 


Approaching the Goal 

Fifth and finally, morale is dependent upon a sense of advance. 
It is not enough to have a goal and to know that there are tech- 
niques for getting toward it. We need actually to feel ourselves 
moving. There may be dangers threatening, and hard times ahead ; 
but if there is hope of a way through, and if we can feel some 
slightest measure of success in our efforts to overcome the obsta- 
cles, then we are encouraged. 

Again we may look to the clinic for numerous cases which illus- 
trate the folk maxim that ''nothing succeeds like success." Dis- 
couraged and depressed individuals who were quite unmoved by 
verbal reassurances have often begun their recovery by a very 
little success. Every good teacher has seen a child's face light up 
when he discovered that he actually was making progress and get- 
ting a grasp of the previously baffling reading or multiplication 
or shorthand or Spanish. Psychological studies of learning agree 
that pupils who feel themselves succeeding progress more rapidly 
than do those who may get a similar amount of practice but with- 
out any basis for judging how well they have done. Studies of 
level of aspiration * have demonstrated a general tendency for 
success in a task to stimulate ambition for still higher achieve- 
ment. "Success," of course, must be defined in relation to the 
goals which the individuals or group may have set for themselves. 

It is the victories we have already achieved which sustain our 
confidence in the future. Hitler's oratory has often been organized 
to recount the steps of Nazi advance. We in the United States 
have a story of progress more inspiring and better validated than 
the history Hitler invents. Our faith in democracy, in American 
enterprise, and now in American military strength, is nourished 
by awareness of the success of our American Revolution against 
heavy odds, the transformation of a continent from wilderness to 
industrial supremacy, the maintenance of unity despite tragic rift 

* One of the earliest studies was by Happe.® A more recent summary is that 
of Gould.* 


in the 1860's, the decisive role played by America in 1917, and by 
the spirit of unity and determination which almost all experienced 
after Pearl Harbor. It is events, as Harold J. Laski has said, 
which are the great tutors of public opinion. Our morale can be 
as strong as our sense of significant advance. 

Every belligerent nation understands the psychology of prog- 
ress and endeavors to give its citizens as favorable a picture as 
possible of the successes attained by its arms and leaders. In the 
effort to carry the public through periods which perhaps seem 
difficult for morale, there may be a temptation to ''slant" the 
news, or even to invent victories. Experience has shown that any 
such distortions are apt to boomerang. The sense of success arises 
from favorable news only if the news report is trusted. German 
claims of successes at Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov, in the fall 
of 1941 may have had a temporary effect of encouraging the 
German people, but this short-lived boom was more than offset 
when the Nazis failed to make good on their reports and promises. 
There may arise on the part of some news writers or radio com- 
mentators in the United States a conscious or unconscious incli- 
nation to "play up" the victories and to gloss over depressing 
news. If so, they should be warned that the long-term effect will 
be bad. Far more important than any momentary ''lift" due to 
anticipated success is continuing faith in the trustworthiness of 
our sources of information. The frankness with which Churchill 
and Roosevelt have acknowledged bad news contributes to the 
effectiveness of their reports to the democratic peoples when suc- 
cesses have been achieved. 

The sense of advance is important not only in winning the war, 
but also for winning the peace. Our faith in democracy increases 
as we experience success in the use of democratic processes. When 
we as a people, under the leadership of Henry Wallace, tackled 
the co-ordination and planning of a chaotic and depressed agri- 
culture, we tried to avoid the apparently easy route of dictator- 
ship, and to use instead democratic processes of discussion, con- 
ference, referendum, and elected local leadership. Our success en- 


courages us to believe more strongly in democracy and its work- 
ability, despite complications of numbers. Totalitarians, at home 
and abroad, tell us that the people are only a great beast, to be led 
around by the nose through skillful propaganda. Every success 
which we achieve in the use of democratic methods makes such 
subversive talk less dangerous. The T.V.A., for those people who 
^have experienced how a vast enterprise of planning can function 
•from the grass roots up, and not just from the top down, is 
; stronger than any antidemocratic arguments from Mein Kampf 
\ or from our drawing-room elite. The success already attained by 
the United Nations, and in Western Hemisphere co-operation, 
constitutes a powerful contribution to morale when we think about 
postwar international co-operation. In the economic area, our hope 
for the future is strengthened by the realization that already we 
are producing more, per man hour of labor, than any nation at 
any point in history has ever done before. Our curve of productiv- 
ity did not reach any inevitable ceiling in 1929 — rather, it has 
risen since 1929 quite as rapidly as it did from 1900 to 1929. 
There have been dips and lags along the way, but our hopes are 
well-founded for higher standards of living in the future than 
have been experienced in the most prosperous periods of the past. 
In the area of international relations, despite the bitterness of 
war, there are grounds for hope. It is unnecessary defeatism to 
assume that wars and more wars will inevitably disrupt life. True, 
we suffered disillusionment following 1918, but one failure does 
not prove the task to be beyond our powers. We can profit, when 
this war ends, by a critical understanding of the mistakes made at 
and after Versailles. But, in keeping with the fifth fundamental 
factor of morale, let us stress the fact that positive gains have 
been made. Let us remember that in its decade of existence the 
League of Nations, "product of a thousand years of slow ethical 
growth," did settle peacefully more than forty international dis- 
putes. Let us remember the International Labor Organization 
which has so effectively advanced the standard of living for back- 
ward peoples. Let us take new confidence from the astounding 


growth of political, economic, and cultural co-operation among 
the American republics. The United Nations should be interpreted 
to all lands — allied, enemy, and neutral — as more than a military 
coalition. Outlines of world organization should be formulated 
and put into operation, even while the war goes on; for the con- 
viction that our cause is worth all sacrifice depends in part upon 
a sense that through the travail a new order is actually coming to 


Time Perspective and Morale 

T^TTT^T TFWTTVr ^^^^^ Welfare Research Sta- 

KURl 1.11 WIN ^.^^^ ^^^^^ University of Iowa 

STUDIES in unemployment show how a long-drawn-out-idle- 
ness affects all parts of a person's life. Thrown out of a 
job, the individual tries to keep hoping. When he finally 
gives up, he frequently restricts his action much more than he 
has to. Even though he has plenty of time, he begins to neglect 
his home duties. He may cease to leave the immediate neighbor- 
hood; even his thinking and his wishes become narrow. ^^ This 
atmosphere spreads to the children, and they, too, become narrow- 
minded even in their ambitions and dreams. In other words, the 
individual and the family as a whole present a complete picture 
of low morale. 

An analysis of this behavior shows the importance of that psy- 
chological factor which commonly is called *'hope." Only when 
the person gives up hope does he stop "actively reaching out" ; 
he loses his energy, he ceases planning, and, finally, he even stops 
wishing for a better future. Only then does he shrink to a primi- 
tive and passive life. 

Hope means that "sometime in the future, the real situation 
will be changed so that it will equal my wishes." Hope means a 
similarity between the individual's "level of expectation" and his 
"irreality level of wishes." The picture presented by this "psycho- 
logical future" seldom corresponds to what actually happens later. 
The individual may see his future as too rosy or too bleak; fre- 
quently the character of the psychological future vacillates be- 
tween hope and despair. But, regardless of whether the individual's 
picture of the future is correct or incorrect at a given time, this 



picture deeply affects the mood and the action of the individual 
at that time. 

The psychological future is part of what L. K. Frank has called 
''time perspective." ^ The life space of an individual, far from 
being limited to what he considers the present situation, includes 
the future, the present, and also the past. Actions, emotions, and 
certainly the morale of an individual at any instant depend upon 
his total time perspective. 

The conduct of the unemployed, then, is an example of how 
time perspective may lower morale. How morale may, on the 
contrary, be heightened by time perspective is illustrated by the 
conduct of the Zionists in Germany shortly after Hitler came to 
power. The great majority of Jews in Germany had believed for 
decades that the pogroms of Czarist Russia "couldn't happen 
here." When Hitler came to power, therefore, the social ground 
on which they stood suddenly was swept from under their feet. 
Naturally, many became desperate and committed suicide; with 
nothing to stand on, they could see no future life worth living. 

The time perspective of the numerically small Zionist group, 
on the other hand, had been different. Although they too had not 
considered pogroms in Germany a probability, they had been 
aware of their possibility. For decades they had tried to study 
their own sociological problems realistically, advocating and pro- 
moting a program that looked far ahead. In other words, they 
had a time perspective which included a psychological past of sur- 
viving adverse conditions for thousands of years and a mean- 
ingful and inspiring goal for the future. As the result of such a 
time perspective, this group showed high morale — despite a pres- 
ent which was judged by them to be no less foreboding than by 
others. Instead of inactivity and encystment in the face of a 
difficult situation — a result of such limited time perspective as 
that characteristic of the unemployed — the Zionists with a long- 
range and realistic time perspective showed initiative and organ- 
ized planning. It is worth noticing how much the high morale of 
this small group contributed to sustaining the morale of a large 


section of the non-Zionist Jews of Germany. Here, as in many 
other cases, a small group with high morale became a rallying 
point for larger masses. 

Time perspective seems, indeed, to be sufficiently important for 
morale to warrant a more thorough analysis. 

Development of Time Perspective 

The infant lives essentially in the present. His goals are imme- 
diate goals; when he is distracted, he ''forgets" quickly. As an 
individual grows older, more and more of his past and his future 
affect his present mood and action. The goals of the school child 
may already include promotion to the next grade at the end of 
the year. Years later, as the father of a family, the same person 
will often think in terms of decades when planning his life. Prac- 
tically everyone of consequence in the history of humanity — in 
religion, politics, or science — has been dominated by a time per- 
spective which has reached out far into future generations, and 
which frequently was based on an awareness of an equally long 
past. But a large time perspective is not peculiar to great men. A 
hundred and thirty billion dollars of life insurance in force in 
the United States offer an impressive bit of evidence for the 
degree to which a relatively distant psychological future, not con- 
nected with the well-being of one's own person, affects the every- 
day life of the average citizen. 

Aside from the broadness of the time perspective, there is a 
further aspect important for morale. The young child does not 
distinguish clearly between fantasy and reality. To a great extent 
wishes and fears affect his judgment. As an individual becomes 
mature and gains ''self-control," he more clearly separates his 
wishes from his expectations: his life space differentiates into a 
"level of reality" and various "levels of irreality," such as fantasy 
and dream. 


Tenacity and Time Perspective 

"Tenacity in the face of adversity is the most unequivocal index 
of high morale." ^^ This is an idea widely accepted as the essence 
of military morale. While there may be some question as to 
whether the ability to persist in the face of difficulties is actually 
the most fundamental aspect of morale, unquestionably it is one 
aspect of either civilian or military morale, and as such is a good 
starting point for discussion. 

If morale means the ability to "take it," to face disagreeable 
or dangerous situations, one must ask first, "What constitute 
disagreeable or dangerous situations for an individual?" Ordi- 
narily, we are accustomed to think of physical pain or bodily 
danger; yet anyone who climbs mountains or explores jungles 
for pleasure, any boy who drives an automobile fast, or who plays 
football, shows that this answer is too simple. 

(a) The disagreeable and time perspective. Under ordinary 
circumstances, an individual will strongly resist an order to pick 
up mercury from the floor with a wooden spoon, or to eat three 
dozen unsalted soda crackers. As "subjects" in an experiment, 
on the other hand, individuals were found ready to "take it" 
without either hesitation or resistance.^ In other words, whether 
or not an activity is disgraceful or unpleasant depends to a high 
degree on its psychological "meaning," ^^ that is, on the larger 
unit of events of which this action forms a part. In the role of 
a patient, for example, the individual permits as "treatment" by 
the doctor what would otherwise be vigorously resisted because 
of bodily pain or social unpleasantness. 

A good example of the degree to which the meaning of the 
larger psychological units and the time perspective affect the felt 
pain and the morale of the individual is provided by a study of 
suffering in prison.^ It was found that the prison work which the 
individual has to do day by day has no appreciable correlation 
with the amount of his suffering. Individuals who suffered much 
were quite as likely to hold advantageous jobs so far as power 


and leisure were concerned (such as editor of the prison maga- 
zine or runner for the deputy warden) as to hold the most dis- 
advantageous or unpaid of prison jobs. (The correlation between 
the amount of suffering and the ''objective" advantage of the 
prison job was .01.) There was little negative correlation between 
the subjective satisfaction which the prisoner felt in his prison job 
and the amount of his suffering (r = —.19). A definite relation, 
on the other hand, did exist between the amount of suffering and 
certain factors connected with the future or past — a man's feeling, 
for instance, that his sentence was unjust (r = .57), or his hope 
of "getting a break" in regard to release (r = —.39). This rela- 
tion held true, moreover, in spite of the fact that the release might 
be expected to take place only after a number of years. The actual 
length of the sentence and the length of the time served do not 
correlate strongly with the amount of suffering; however, a 
marked relationship does exist between the suffering and a man's 
feeling that he has served longer than he justly should have served 

Not present hardships in the usual sense of the term, then, but 
rather certain aspects of the psychological future and the psycho- 
logical past, together with feelings of being treated fairly or 
unfairly, are most important in determining the amount of one's 
suffering. A factor of considerable weight for the amount of 
suffering in this case was uncertainty in regard to when parole 
might be granted (/' = .51). This factor, too, was one not related 
to the present immediate situation of the individual but was an 
aspect of his time perspective. 

In solitary confinement, too, it has been frequently reported, 
one of the most painful experiences is the uncertainty as to how 
much time has elapsed. Once again, it is not a present hardship 
but certain characteristics of the time perspective which lend the 
situation its anguish. 

(b) Persistency and Time Perspective. Even more than suffer- 
ing, persistency depends on the time perspective of the individual. 
As long as there is hope that difficulties may be overcome for that 


price in effort and pain which the individual is ready to pay, he 
goes on trying. If the objective is worthy, indeed, the effort is 
not even feh to be a ''sacrifice." Persistency, then, depends on 
two factors: the value of the goal and the outlook for the future. 
This holds both for child and adult, for soldier and civilian. 

A few facts pertinent to morale, drawn from experiments with 
children, *• ^^ might be mentioned here. How soon the individual 
will give up in face of an obstacle depends, according to these 
experiments, on three factors : ( 1 ) the strength of the psycho- 
logical force toward the goal (the persistency will be greater if 
the goal is more highly cherished or if the psychological distance 
to the goal is smaller) ; (2) the felt probability of reaching the 
goal (which, in turn, depends on past successes and failures and 
on the intellectual capacity of the individual) ; and (3) the degree 
of initiative of the individual. 

The first point is identical with the felt value of the cause for 
which the effort is made. The second refers to the psychological 
future. The means whereby one can influence the psychological 
future so that a man's outlook will be optimistic is a point much 
discussed in regard to military morale. Everywhere the effect of 
the past on the future is emphasized; whereas nothing is more 
difficult than to keep up morale after a defeat, persistency is 
greatly strengthened by past victories. Nor need this past neces- 
sarily be one's own past. When the individual joins a "Fighting 
69th," the tradition and history of this regiment become a part 
of his life space. And only after he has demonstrated this fact 
will he be recognized as a true member. 

Experimental data show ^ that although past successes are most 
effective if they have been won in the same field of activity, 
nevertheless ''substitute successes" and, to a lesser degree, mere 
praise and encouragement still bolster persistency. An individual 
may likewise be taught to be more persistent and to react less 
emotionally to obstacles if encouraging past experiences are built 
up.^^ Persistency, indeed, is closely related to the social position 
of the individual, to his feeling of strength and security. 


Passive individuals are on the average less persistent than active 
individuals;^ there are, however, certain exceptions. Individuals 
with low initiative sometimes show a kind of passive persever- 
ance; they remain vis-a-vis the obstacle and keep up a gesturelike 
activity toward the goal. And some active individuals, on the 
other hand, quit very soon. Instead of waiting to be driven away 
slowly by an increasing number of failures, these individuals 
have sufficient initiative to make their decision as soon as realistic 
considerations indicate that the goal cannot be reached. The ability 
to make just such active decisions is recognized as one of the basic 
requirements for military leaders. A weak individual's gesturelike 
perseverance deprives him of the flexibility necessary for arriving 
at new, more efficient solutions. The readiness to make "realistic 
decisions" may sometimes, of course, be merely a front for a lack 
of willingness to see things through. We shall come back to this 
question later. 

Group Morale 

Group morale depends on time perspective as much as does 
individual morale. Clearly demonstrative of this fact are certain 
controlled experiments with groups of individuals of college age 
who were placed in a physically disagreeable situation. ^"^ The sub- 
jects were set to work in a room which slowly filled with smoke 
oozing in from under the door; and they knew that the doors 
were locked. After a while, the smoke became rather disagreeable. 
The reactions of the group varied from panic to laughter, depend- 
ing mainly upon whether the smoke was construed as arising 
from an actual fire or as a hoax of the psychologist. The differ- 
ence between these interpretations lies mainly in a difference in 
time perspective and in the felt degree of reality of the danger. 
The recent history of morale in France, England, and the United 
States is a vivid example of how much the degree to which the 
reality of a danger is acknowledged determines group goals and 
group action.* 

* See the postscript to this chapter. 


A comparative study made of previously organized and non- 
organized groups in a situation of fear and of frustration ^^ 
showed the organized groups to be both more highly motivated 
and more persistent. They were less likely to disintegrate, al- 
though as a result of this stronger motivation they felt more 
highly frustrated in regard to group goals which could not be 
reached. Contrary to usual expectation, however, fear spread 
more quickly through the organized than the unorganized group, 
because of the higher interdependence among the members of the 
former. In a highly specific way these experiments verify our 
everyday experience that the morale of an individual faced with 
danger is highly dependent on the atmosphere of his group. 

Initiative, Productivity, Goal Level, and Time Perspective 

In Nazi Germany, morale is considered to be "a driving force 
which propels every unit of the political and military organization 
to exert maximum effort and capacity" ; it * 'implies a positive 
state of mind of the individual and the mass toward a uniform 
goal." ^ Such a concept of morale mirrors the training necessary 
for an offensive war and totalitarian uniformity. Experimental 
psychology indicates, however, that one element in this concept is 
correct for every type of morale. Tenacity in the face of obstacles, 
the ability to ''take it on the chin," is merely one aspect of a more 
fundamental state of the person which may be characterized as a 
combination of initiative and a determination to reach certain 
goals, to realize certain values. 

Given comparable settings, the morale of an individual or a 
group might be measured by the quality and quantity of its 
achievement, that is, by its productivity. Initiative and produc- 
tivity, dependent as they are on the proper balance of a variety 
of factors, are highly sensitive to changes in this balance. Here 
physical well-being plays a significant role. Today, every country 
is aware of the importance of sufficient food and vitamins for 
civilian morale. An over-satiated individual, on the other hand. 


is by no means likely to show the greatest initiative and produc- 
tivity. Subtle psychological factors play a great role in morale, 
and Hitler's plans of offensive warfare rightly consider the civil- 
ian morale of the enemy country as one of its most vulnerable 
and important points for attack. 

Productivity and a Time Perspective of Insecurity 
and Uncertainty 

Experiments with children help us isolate some of the psycho- 
logical factors determining initiative and productivity. For the 
situations of childhood are easily controlled by the all-powerful 
adult, and children probably show more quickly than adults 
those basic reactions on which the psychology of large masses 

If the free play activity of a child is interfered with, his aver- 
age level of productivity may regress, for instance, from the age 
level of five and a half years to the much lower level of produc- 
tivity of the three-and-a-half -year-old child.^ This regression is 
closely related to the child's time perspective. Because the adult 
has stopped the child in the midst of play of great interest and 
productivity, now he feels himself to be on insecure ground; he 
is aware of the possibility that the overwhelming power of the 
adult may interfere again at any moment. This "background of 
insecurity and frustration" not only has a paralyzing effect on 
long-range planning; it also lowers initiative and the level of 

The effect of interference is particularly severe if the individual 
is left in the dark as to the character of the new situation. The 
negative, nonspecific command, ''Don't!" lowers initiative and 
productivity considerably more than a command to change to a 
different but specific task.^'^ Indeed, one of the main techniques 
for breaking morale through a "strategy of terror" consists in 
exactly this tactic — keep the person hazy as to where he stands 
and just what he may expect. If in addition frequent vacillations 


between severe disciplinary measures and promises of good treat- 
ment, together with the spreading of contradictory news, make 
the ''cognitive structure" of the situation utterly unclear, then 
the individual may cease to know even whether a particular plan 
would lead toward or away from his goal. Under these conditions, 
even those individuals who have definite goals and are ready to 
take risks will be paralyzed by severe inner conflicts in regard to 
what to do. 

Pairs of strong friends, it is interesting to note, regress less in 
a background of frustration than do pairs of children who are 
not friends. ^^ Their greater tolerance for frustration seems to be 
due to a feeling of greater security among friends, as indicated, 
for instance, by a greater readiness to attack the experimenter 
as the source of frustration. Here is an example of how group 
''belongingness" may increase a feeling of security, thereby rais- 
ing the morale and the productivity of an individual. 

The initiative of a child and his productivity have been found, 
moreover, to be greater in the co-operative play of pairs of chil- 
dren than in solitary play — both in situations of frustration and 
in situations of non frustration. The increased productivity of an 
individual as a member of a group as compared with his produc- 
tivity as a lone individual is a factor of prime importance for civil- 
ian morale. Bearing out this point, a study of factory workers ^^ 
indicates that, aside from security, personal attention given to the 
individual plays a role in raising the level of productivity, prob- 
ably because of the resultant increase in his feeling of ''belong- 

This finding is but oneof many which pertain to age differences, 
individual differences, the effect of different situations, and the 
difference between the activity of individuals and groups — all of 
which indicate that productivity depends upon the number of 
diversified abilities and needs that can be integrated into an or- 
ganized, unified endeavor.^ It is the principle of ''diversity within 
unity" which dominates productivity, the principle that is so basic 
to a democratic solution of the problem of minorities and to 


democratic living in all types of groups, from small face-to-face 
groups to world organization. 

In some cases, paradoxically, a certain amount of frustration 
or difficulty actually increases productivity; such seems to be the 
case if the individual previously has not been fully involved and 
if the difficulty serves as a fuse to touch off an all-out effort. 
Closely related to this result is one of the most fundamental 
problems of morale, namely: where will the individual or the 
group set its goal? What will be its level of aspiration? 

Level of Aspiration and Time Perspective 

The three-months-old infant is as happy when someone hands 
him a toy as when he gets it by his own efforts. But the child of 
two or three years frequently rejects the help of another person, 
preferring to get by his own action an object that is difficult to 
reach. He prefers, in other words, a difficult path and a difficult 
goal to an easy path and an easy goal. This behavior of human 
beings, seemingly paradoxical, is certainly contrary to a belief 
which is widely accepted and which deeply influences thinking, 
even about politics — the belief that human beings are led by the 
"pleasure principle'' along the easiest road to the easiest goal. 
Actually, from childhood on, the goals which an individual sets 
in his daily life and for his long-range plans are influenced by his 
ideology, by the group to which he belongs, and by a tendency to 
raise his level of aspiration to the upper limit of his ability. 

On this problem experiments have yielded considerable knowl- 
edge — how the level of aspiration develops during childhood,^ how 
success and failure in one field affect the level of aspiration in 
other fields, how the individual reacts to "too difficult" or "too 
easy" tasks, and how the standards of groups influence his own 
goal level. 

The setting up of goals is closely related to time perspective.^^ 
The goal of the individual includes his expectations for the fu- 
ture, his wishes and his daydreams. Where the individual places 


his goals will be determined fundamentally by two factors, namely, 
by the individual's relation to certain values and by his sense of 
realism in regard to the probability of reaching the goal. The 
frames of reference which determine the values of success and 
failure vary considerably from individual to individual and from 
group to group. By and large, there is a tendency in our society 
to raise the level of aspiration toward the limit of the individual's 
ability. The principle of realism, on the other hand, tends to safe- 
guard the individual against failure and to keep ambition down 
to earth. How high the individual can set his goal and still keep 
in touch with the reality level is one of the most important factors 
for his productivity and his morale. 

A successful individual typically sets his next goal somewhat, 
but not too much, above his last achievement.^^ In this way he 
steadily raises his level of aspiration. Although in the long run he 
is guided by his ideal goal, which may be rather high, nevertheless 
his real goal for the next step is kept realistically close to his 
present position. The unsuccessful individual, on the other hand, 
tends to show one of two reactions : he sets his goal very low, 
frequently below his past achievement — that is, he becomes intim- 
idated and gives up reaching out toward higher goals — or he sets 
his goal far above his ability. This latter conduct is rather com- 
mon. Sometimes the result is a gesturelike keeping up of high 
goals without serious striving; it may at other times mean that 
the individual is following blindly his ideal goal, losing sight of 
what in the present situation is possible. To develop and to main- 
tain high goals and, at the same time, to keep the plan for the 
next action realistically within the limits of what is possible, seems 
to be one of the basic objectives for and a criterion of high 

How high a person will set his goal is deeply affected by the 
standards of the group to which he belongs, as well as by the 
standards of groups below and above him. Experiments with 
college students^ prove that, if the standards of a group are low, 
an individual will slacken his efforts and set his goals far below 



those he could reach. He will, on the other hand, raise his goals 
if the group standards are raised. In other words, both the ideals 
and the action of an individual depend upon the group to which 
he belongs and upon the goals and expectations of that group. 
That the problem of individual morale is to a large extent a social- 





Minimum /eve/ for rating as s/<i//ed 

J L 

2 3 4 

6 7 8 

9 10 11 12 13 14 

Fig. 1. The effect of the level of aspiration and degree of reality of a goal 

on the achievement of factory workers. Each group contains 40 workers. 

(From a study by A. J. Marrow.) 

psychological problem of group goals and group standards is thus 
clear, even in those fields where the person seems to follow indi- 
vidual rather than group goals. Such a connection between in- 
dividual and group morale is, of course, still closer in regard to 
the pursuit of group goals. 


An experiment again clarifies the issue. Experiences with 
sewing-machine workers in a newly erected plant in a rural area 
of the South demonstrate the manner in which level of aspiration 
influences learning and achievement in factory work.* After a 
week's training, the output of the novices ranged from 20 per 
cent to 25 per cent of the quantity accepted as a standard for 
skilled operators. (See Figure 1.) When, nevertheless, the novices 
were informed that this standard was one which they ought to 
reach in ten to twelve weeks, the disparity between the level of 
their performance at the end of the first week and the stated goal 
was too great — so great, indeed, that the subjects invariably ex- 
pressed skepticism of ever reaching it. Since the plant was newly 
organized, there were no skilled workers actually doing the job 
at the standard speed; hence the goal seemed to be ''too difficult," 
unattainable. Inasmuch as the wage these novices earned was al- 
ready greater than that to which they were accustomed, there was 
nothing either outside or inside the plant to give the higher 
standards social reality for the group. As a result, the individuals 
were pleased with their progress in spite of the dissatisfaction of 
the supervisors; improvements were slow, learning plateaus com- 
mon, and after fourteen weeks only 66 per cent of the standard 
had been reached. 

For a second group of novices who started at the same level, 
a definite goal was set each week, to be reached at the end of that 
week, in addition to the information about the general standards. 
At that time, too, a large number of the older workers in the 
plant had achieved the standard. This combination of an imme- 
diate goal for the near future and the acceptance of the final goal 
as a real standard for the group led to a much more rapid im- 
provement on the part of this group of novices. With but few 
learning plateaus, the average of the group had more than reached 
the goal standard at the end of the fourteenth week. 

* I am indebted to Dr. Alfred J. Marrow for making these data available. 


Morale in the Pursuit of Group Goals and 
Time Perspective 

Unfortunately there are few studies available which permit 
scientific conclusions about the relation between group morale and 
time perspective. A comparison of groups with democratic and 
autocratic structures/^' ^^' however, suggests certain conclusions. 
These groups, for example, showed very striking differences dur- 
ing periods when the leader left. Whereas the work morale of the 
democratic group was sustained at a high level, that of the auto- 
cratic group fell rapidly. In a short time, the latter group ceased 
entirely to produce. This difference may be traced to the relation 
between the individual and the group goals and to certain aspects 
of time perspective. 

The organization of work, like any other aspect of the organiza- 
tion of the autocratic group, is based on the leader. It is he who 
determines the policy of the group; it is he who sets the specific 
goals of action for the members within the group. That means 
that the goals of the individual as well as his action as a group 
member are "induced" by the leader. It is the leader's power-field 
which keeps the individual going, which determines his work 
morale, and which makes the group an organized unit. In the 
democratic group, on the contrary, every member has had a hand 
in determining the policy of the group; every member has helped 
to lay out the plans. As a result, each is more 'Ve-centered" and 
less '*ego-centered" than the member of the autocratic group. Be- 
cause the group goes ahead under its own steam, its work morale 
does not flag as soon as the power-field of the leader is eliminated. 

"Acceptance" of the group goals by the member of the auto- 
cratic group means giving in to a superior power and subordinating 
one's own will. In the democratic group, "acceptance" of the 
group goal by the member means taking it over and making it 
one's own goal. The readiness to do so, in the latter case, is partly 
based on the time perspective of the individual ; in the past, that 
is, he himself has participated in setting up that goal and now he 


feels his individuat responsibility in carrying it through. Not less 
essential is the difference in time perspective of the members of 
both groups in regard to planning the future. For the distant fu- 
ture, to be sure, the autocratic leader frequently reveals to his 
subjects some high, ideal goal. But w^hen it comes to immediate 
action, it is one of the accepted means of autocratic leaders to re- 
veal to his followers not more than the immediate next step of his 
actual plans. In this way not only is he able to keep the future 
of the members in his own hands ; in addition he makes the mem- 
bers dependent on him, and he can direct them from moment to 
moment in whatever direction he wishes. 

The member of a democratic group who himself has helped to 
lay out the long-range plan has a rather different time perspective. 
In a much clearer situation, he is able to take not only the next 
step but also the following step quite independently. Because he 
knows his position and action within the larger group plan, he can 
modify his own action with the changing situation. 

In contrast to both democratic and autocratic groups, the laissez 
faire group, where the leader keeps hands off,^^ shows only spo- 
radic flare-ups of group planning or of long-range individual 
projects. The work morale of such a group is very low compared 
with either that of the democratic or the autocratic group — an 
indication of the importance of definite goals for group morale. 
Not those goals which can be reached easily but a psychological 
future with obstacles and high goals is conducive to high morale. 

Quakerlike groups in the work camps for conscientious objec- 
tors, who as a rule pay for their own upkeep, are frequently per- 
mitted to plan by themselves how to reach the work objectives set 
for them. If reports are correct, these groups, with their self- 
planned organization, produce many times as much as groups 
under ordinary methods of supervision. One factor behind this 
achievement seems to be a long-range time perspective combined 
with the definiteness of their goal : the conscientious objectors 
attempt to train for the difficult task of reconstruction in Europe 
after the war. 


Leadership, Morale, and Time Perspective 

In another chapter of this book, the results of an experiment 
in retraining of leaders are reported.* The importance of time per- 
spective is apparent in this study both for the morale of the leaders 
themselves and for the effect of the leaders in turn on the group 
morale. The striking change in the morale of the leaders from 
"low morale" before training to "high morale" after three weeks 
of training is related to the fact that the goals of these individuals 
changed from a day-to-day attempt to keep their insecure W.P.A. 
jobs to a broader — and actually more difficult — less personal goal 
of giving children the benefit of experiencing genuine democratic 
group life. Such a change in goal level and time perspective was 
brought about partly by the experience of membership in a demo- 
cratic training group which had itself set definite goals and laid 
out its plans, and partly by the experience of leaving a depressive, 
narrow, and meaningless past for a future which, with all its 
uncertainty, contained a goal worth striving toward. 

A positive time perspective, a time perspective guided by worth- 
while goals, is one of the basic elements of high morale. At the 
same time, the process is reciprocal; high morale itself creates 
long-range time perspective and sets up worthwhile goals. At the 
end of the training process, the leaders mentioned above had set 
for themselves goals far above those of which previously they 
would have dared dream. We are dealing here with one of those 
circular types of dependencies which are frequently found in so- 
cial psychology. The highly intelligent person, for example, is 
better able than the feeble-minded person to create situations which 
will be easy to handle. As a result, the feeble-minded, with his low 
ability, frequently finds himself in more difficult situations than 
the normal Similarly, the socially maladjusted person creates more 
difficult social situations for himself than does the well-adjusted 
person and, doing badly in the difficult situation, easily goes from 

* See Chapter VIII, "Morale and the Training of Leaders," by Alex Bavelas. 


bad to worse. Again, poor morale makes for a poor time perspec- 
tive, which in turn results in still poorer morale; whereas high 
morale sets not only high goals but is likely to create situations of 
progress conducive to still better morale. 

This circular process can be observed also in regard to the 
morale of the group as a whole. The interdependence among the 
members of a group, in fact, makes the circularity of the processes 
even more unmistakable. In one experiment, for instance, a group 
of children, having been together for one hour in a democratic 
group, spontaneously demanded the continuation of that group.^ 
When informed of the lack of an adult leader, they organized 
themselves. Their morale, in other words, was high enough to 
broaden their time perspective; they set themselves a group goal 
extending over weeks — and later included a half-year project. 

Realism, Morale, and Time Perspective 

One aspect of time perspective which is essential for morale is 
realism. Here again we encounter the same paradox as that under- 
lying productivity: one criterion of morale is the height of the 
goal level which the individual is ready to accept seriously. For 
high morale, the objective to be reached will represent a great 
step forward from the present state of affairs. The ''realistic" 
politician who always keeps both feet on the ground and his hand 
in the pork barrel is a symbol of low morale. On the other hand, 
the ''idealistic" individual who has high ideals without making 
serious efforts to attain them can likewise make few claims to be- 
ing a person of high morale. Morale demands both a goal suffi- 
ciently above the present state of affairs, and an effort to reach the 
distant goal through actions planned with sufficient realism to 
promise an actual step forward. One might say that this paradox 
— to be realistic and at the same time be guided by high goals — 
lies at the heart of the problem of morale, at least as far as time 
perspective is concerned. 



What an immediate or a far distant goal means for realism and 
morale and how it is related to the time perspective of the indi- 
vidual or of a group might best be illustrated by certain aspects 
of development. The normal healthy child in the elementary school 
lives in groups of children whose standards and values, whose 
ideologies and goals, will be of utmost importance for his own 
goals and his own conduct. If he is fortunate enough to be born 
in the United States, there will be a good chance that his school 
group will have a sufficiently democratic atmosphere to give him 
a clear, first-hand experience in what it means to be a leader as 
well as a follower in a democratic group, what it means to "play 
fair," to recognize differences of opinion and differences of ability 
without intolerance or bossiness and equally, too, without softness 
or lack of backbone. Only a few children will have experienced 
anything approaching a perfect democracy; still, they will have 
experienced frequently a group atmosphere which approaches 
democracy sufficiently to give them a better taste of democratic 
procedures than the vast majority of the citizens of European 
countries are likely ever to have experienced. 

Experiments indicate that children at eight years are more altru- 
istic than adults, and that children at ten years are strongly guided 
by an ideology of fairness. ^-^ In short, the conduct of the average 
child at that age follows relatively closely the standards and values 
of the groups to which he belongs ; but these groups are the face- 
to-face groups of his school, his family, his gang. The period of 
time to which these standards and goals are related in a realistic 
manner is a matter of weeks, months, or at most of a few years. 
The scope of time and space in which national politics takes place 
in the social world of the adult is, for the young child, something 
too large and too overpowering to be considered by him in any 
but a highly abstract or naive manner. 

Growing through adolescence to young manhood or woman- 
hood means enlarging the scope and the time perspective of one's 


psychological world. In a measure, it means also leaving the small 
face-to-face groups, such as the family, or else assigning these 
small groups a secondary place in a larger social world with which 
the young person now seriously has to come into grips. It is the 
eternal right of every young generation to consider critically the 
standards and values of this larger world of the older generation. 
The better and the more democratic the education during child- 
hood has been, the more serious and the more honest will these 
critical considerations be. 

For the young person growing into problems of such magnitude 
— in fact, for anybody facing for the first time problems of a new 
order of magnitude — two reactions are typical. The individual 
may, in the first place, shrink from making decisions of such im- 
portance, trying rather to restrict himself to the smaller time per- 
spective which he was just outgrowing. His low morale will then 
lead him to place his main emphasis on the small day-by-day goals. 
An example is the college girl who, because she is so disgusted 
with the war *'over there in Europe," will not even look at the 
newspapers or listen to the radio.* 

At the other extreme is the individual who refuses to think in 
a time perspective of less than a thousand years. He thinks in 
terms of 'Vhat ought to be" ; his goals as such are frequently ex- 
cellent, and he refuses to take any action which might run counter 
to his principles. In so far as his goals are characterized by a high 
discrepancy between "what is" and ''what should be," between the 
wish level for the future and the present reality level, his time 
perspective is opposite to that of an individual who is satisfied with 
the status quo. But the very weight which the distant goal has 
for the individual who takes it seriously, the very fact that he is 
dissatisfied with the present situation, make it difficult for him to 
give sufficient consideration to the actual structure of the present 
situation, or to conceive realistically what step in the present world 
can be taken to achieve this end. For one growing into problems 
which deal with a new scope of time perspective, it is difficult, at 

* See postscript to this chapter. 


first, to distinguish between the cynic, who is ready to use any 
means to his ends, and the person of high morale, who takes his 
goal seriously enough to do what is necessary to change the present 
state of affairs. 


The conviction that a certain action will lead toward the direc- 
tion in which the individual wants to go and not in just the oppo- 
site direction is based partly on what is called technical knowledge. 
But for the individual this knowledge is very limited ; his actions 
are always based, in part, on some type of "belief." There are 
many types of such beliefs on which the principle of realism within 
morale can be based. We shall mention but two. 

The exigencies of modern warfare have compelled the armies 
to give a fair measure of independence to the individual private. 
In some respects, the army of Nazi Germany can be said to have 
more status-democracy between officers and men than had pre- 
viously existed in the army of the Kaiser. On the whole, however, 
and particularly in regard to civilian life and to civilian education. 
Hitler has placed the relation between leader and led on a basis of 
blind obedience to a degree unheard of in modern life outside of 
certain monasteries. Ever since Hitler came to power, the nursery 
school teacher, for example, has been instructed never to explain 
an order to a child, even if he could understand the reason, because 
the child should learn to obey blindly. "There are many things 
which can be forgiven, no matter how evil they may be. But dis- 
loyalty to the Fuehrer can never be pardoned." ^ 

The belief that one's action goes in the correct direction is, in 
such an atmosphere, based primarily if not exclusively on the trust 
in the leader. The area in which independent thinking is permitted 
is small, more or less limited to the execution of the immediate 
next step as objective. Blind obedience means abandoning, in all 
essential areas, that measure of reasoning and independent judg- 
ment which prevailed in Germany before Hitler's rise to power 


and which, to a much greater extent, has been one of the tradi- 
tional rights of the citizen in the United States. 

It is not chance that the fight against reason and the replace- 
ment of reason by sentiment has been one of the unfailing 
symptoms of politically reactionary movements throughout the 
centuries. To recognize reason socially means that a sound argu- 
ment "counts," no matter who brings it forth; it means recogniz- 
ing the basic equality of men. In an autocracy, only the leader 
needs to be correctly informed ; in a democracy, popular determi- 
nation of policy can work only if the people who participate in 
goal-setting are realistically aware of the actual situation. In other 
words, the emphasis on truth, the readiness to let the people know 
about difficult situations and failures, does not spring merely from 
an abstract "love of truth" but is rather a political necessity. Here 
lies one of the points on which democratic morale can, in the long 
run, be superior to authoritarian morale. A far more stable ground 
for morale than the belief in the ability of any leader individually 
is truth itself. 


This chapter was written before December 7, 1941 ; now we are 
at war. The effect on the morale of the country has been immediate 
and striking — a circumstance which bears out some of the points 
we have discussed. 

The attack on Hawaii has shown that Japan represents a much 
more serious danger than many had thought. But this feeling of 
increased and close danger has heightened rather than depressed 
morale, being as it is in line with the general finding that morale 
changes not parallel with but rather inversely to the amount of 
difficulty, so long as certain goals are maintained. 

The experience of attack upon our own country has overnight 
brought war down from the cloudy realms of possibility to the 
level of reality. Although the college girl whom we mentioned 
above may still be far from realizing fully what it means to be 
at war, nonetheless war is no longer something "over there in 


Europe." It is here. Thus as a result of our being in the war, the 
will to win has become a clear and unquestioned objective. 

Before December 7, what was a realistic outlook for one indi- 
vidual was doubted by a second and ridiculed as impossible by a 
third. Now the situation has been clarified. Countless conflicts, 
whether among factions in the population or within each individual 
himself, have ceased now that the major aspects of the time per- 
spectives are definitely set. 

Being within this new and definite situation means that certain 
basic goals and necessary actions are "given." In such a situation 
no special effort is required to keep morale high. The very combi- 
nation of a definite objective, the belief in final success, and the 
realistic facing of great difficulties is high morale. The individual 
who makes extreme efforts and accepts great risks for worthwhile 
goals does not feel that he is making sacrifice ; instead, he merely 
feels that he is acting naturally. 

When a major decision has been made, it frequently happens 
that the individual or the group will show high morale in the new 
situation because of a sudden clear awareness of the objectives 
of the enterprise as a whole. As the effort proceeds, however, a 
variety of detailed problems and difficulties is bound to arise and 
to occupy a more prominent position. There is danger that groups 
which started out with enthusiasm may yet lose their "punch" 
when the clearness of the situation at the time of decision has 
been clouded by such a multitude of details, problems, and imme- 
diate difficulties. Group morale during a prolonged effort depends 
much on the degree to which the members keep clearly in view 
the total task and the final objective. 

In the months and years to come, then, civilian morale can be 
expected to depend much upon the clarity and the value of our 
war goals, and upon the degree to which such values come to be 
deeply rooted within each individual. 


Morale and National Character 
GREGORY BATESON Committee for National Morale 

IN CASUAL conversation it is popularly assumed that national 
groups have characteristic differences — Germans are said 
to crave authority; the British are thought to be low in 
sense of humor and in foresight, but arrogant and possessed of 
bulldog tenacity; the French are thought to be gay and volatile; 
Latin emotions are supposed to predominate over reason; the 
Japanese are regarded as crafty; the Chinese as honest and 
tranquil. If such differences exist, they are of tremendous im- 
portance for the ''public-relations program" of the United States.* 
Our own distinctive American character might demand a rather 
different kind of propaganda from that which would encourage 
our allies in Britain, China, or the Soviet Union. Appeals for 
support, directed to Latin America or to waverning "neutrals" 
like France, Portugal, Turkey, and Sweden, should be based on an 
understanding of their different "national" psychologies. Counter- 
propaganda for German consumption might have to be distinct 
from that for Italy or Japan. Provision has indeed been made in 
several governmental organizations for social psychologists whose 
duty it is to interpret communication from or to other lands in the 
light of the mental characteristics of those peoples. 

* In this connection we may quote a recent editorial article based on a speech 
by Professor Morris Ginsburg {Nature, vol. 148, no. 3741, July 12, 1941). The 
article concludes : "To the statesman who must handle the broad issues of fu- 
ture policy, the enduring features of national character and the trends of its 
development are equally significant. There can be few more important tasks for 
the social sciences than to contribute to the full understanding of the character, 
mood, and prevailing interests of the nations among which the War is being 
fought, and by which an international order must be reconstituted, wherein all 
nations of the world may be able to advance along the road of civilization in 
peace and security." 



One example of the approach through research is provided by 
Efron's study of gesture,^ a book which gives us a good critical 
survey of recent German and other literature dealing with differ- 
ences in posture and gesture in terms of racial theory.* Dr. Efron 
points out that the propaganda contributions of racial and typo- 
logical theory are: (a) unsupported by empirical data; (&) phrased 
in such a way that it is not very clear what sort of observations 
would either support or disprove the descriptive statements (how, 
for example, shall we verify the "clarity" of Nordic gestures, or 
the "energy" of Dinaric?) ; and (c) obscured by compromise 
phrases, whenever racial theory has met the fact that environment 
affects gesture (e.g., Hans Gunther's dictum: "The environment 
may pattern the racial characteristics of Nordic movements, but 
cannot eradicate them entirely." ^) 

Dr. Efron goes on to a careful empirical study of gestural be- 
havior in unassimilated eastern Jews in New York City, unassimi- 
lated southern Italians, assimilated eastern Jews, and assimilated 
southern Italians. The assimilated individuals, he shows, "(a) ap- 
pear to differ greatly from their respective traditional groups, and 
(&) appear to resemble each other"; in short, the postulates of 
racial theory are not born out by empirical study. 

For the present paper, however, it is not sufficient to show that 
conspicuous differences in habit occur between various groups and 
that these differences are conditioned by cultural environment 
rather than by racial descent. Dr. Efron has, to be sure, performed 
a valuable service in documenting these two points, but we have 
to go a step further and consider the implications of such culturally 
conditioned differences for the common character of the individ- 
uals who exhibit them. 

* For a more general survey of the argument between racial and environ- 
mental theories to account for physical and mental characteristics, see Kline- 
berg.' Dr. Klineberg's work, like Efron's, is, however, focused upon this con- 
troversy. He shows satisfactorily that such psychological differences as have 
been claimed are either unsatisfactorily demonstrated or that the demonstration 
had not ruled out the probability that the differences are due to factors of use 
and environment. He does not go on to any systematic examination of the re- 
sults of use and environment, such as would be relevant to the present paper. 


For this further step, there exists a vast mass of relevant mate- 
rial, both scientifically collected observations of psychologists and 
sociologists, and raw documents by naive subjects who have in- 
dulged in international comment or fantasy. But, so far as I know, 
none of this material has been systematically analyzed for the light 
which it would shed upon our particular problem. The psycholo- 
gists and sociologists who have studied European and American 
communities have done their work without attempting to build up 
any coherent picture, either of the character structure of the indi- 
viduals whom they studied or of how these individuals differed in 
character structure from other individuals in other cultural en- 
vironments. The psychiatrists, on the other hand, have gone to the 
other extreme. For therapeutic purposes it is necessary to study 
the individual in such extreme detail that, in the end, every case 
appears special and different from every other, and the wood can- 
not be seen for the trees.* 

To rearrange and reanalyze all the collected material so that it 
shall illuminate the problems of national difference will require a 
great deal of research, which, despite its great importance, cannot 
be undertaken in the present paper. The most we can attempt here 
is to lay out an abstract frame for such future research, a frame 
which will be useful only in so far as it suggests hypotheses which 
can be empirically tested. 

We shall therefore proceed as follows : ( 1 ) We shall examine 
some of the criticisms which can be urged against our entertaining 
any concept of "national character." (2) This examination will 
enable us to state certain conceptual limits within which the phrase 
"national character" is likely to be valid. (3) We shall then go on, 
within these limits, to outline what orders of difference we may ex- 
pect to find among western nations, trying, by way of illustration, 
to guess more concretely at some of these differences. (4) Lastly, 

* An exception to this generalization is Erich Fromm's Escape from Free- 
dom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941). This work, however, is oriented 
to the broad outlines of historical process, and not to the problems of national 


we shall consider how the problems of morale and international 
relations are affected by differences of this order. 

Barriers to Any Concept of ''National Character" 

Scientific enquiry has been diverted from questions of this type 
by a number of trains of thought which lead scientists to regard 
all such questions as unprofitable or unsound. Before we hazard 
any constructive opinion as to the order of differences to be 
expected among European populations, therefore, these diverting 
trains of thought must be examined. 

It is, in the first place, argued that not the people but rather the 
circumstances under which they live differ from one community 
to another ; that we have to deal with differences either in historical 
background or in current conditions, and that these factors are 
sufficient to account for all differences in behavior without our 
invoking any differences of character in the individuals concerned. 
Essentially this argument is an appeal to Occam's Razor — an 
assertion that we ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity. 
The argument is that, where observable differences in circumstance 
exist, we ought to invoke those rather than mere inferred differ- 
ences in character, which we cannot observe. 

The argument may be met in part by quoting experimental data, 
such as Lewin's experiments (unpublished material), which 
showed that there are great differences in the way in which Ger- 
mans and Americans respond to failure in an experimental setting. 
The Americans treated failure as a challenge to increase effort ; 
the Germans responded to the same failure with discouragement. 
But those who argue for the effectiveness of conditions rather 
than character can still reply that the experimental conditions are 
not, in fact, the same for both groups ; that the stimulus value of 
any circumstance depends upon how that circumstance stands out 
against the background of other circumstances in the life of the 
subject, and that this contrast cannot be the same for both groups. 

It is possible, in fact, to argue that since the same circumstances 


never occur for individuals of different cultural background, it is 
therefore unnecessary to invoke such abstractions as national char- 
acter. This argument breaks down, I believe, when it is pointed out 
that, in stressing circumstance rather than character, we would be 
ignoring the known facts about learning. Perhaps the best docu- 
mented generalization in the field of psychology is that, at any 
given moment, the behavioral characteristics of any mammal, and 
especially of man, depend upon the previous experience and be- 
havior of that individual. Thus in presuming that character, as 
well as circumstance, must be taken into account, we are not multi- 
plying entities beyond necessity; we know of the significance of 
learned character from other types of data, and it is this knowledge 
which compels us to consider the additional "entity." 

A second barrier to any acceptance of the notion of "national 
character" arises after the first has been negotiated. Those who 
grant that character must be considered can still doubt whether 
any uniformity or regularity is likely to obtain within such a sam- 
ple of human beings as constitutes a nation. Let us grant at once 
that uniformity obviously does not occur, and let us proceed to 
consider what sorts of regularity may be expected. 

The criticism which we are trying to meet is likely to take five 
forms. ( 1 ) The critic may point to the occurrence of subcultural 
differentiation, to differences between the sexes, or between classes, 
or between occupational groups within the community. (2) He 
may point to the extreme heterogeneity and confusion of cultural 
norms which can be observed in "melting-pot" communities. 
(3) He may point to the accidental deviant, the individual who 
has undergone some "accidental" traumatic experience, not usual 
among those in his social environment. (4) He may point to the 
phenomena of cultural change, and especially to the sort of dif- 
ferentiation which results when one part of the community lags 
behind some other in rate of change. (5) Lastly, he may point to 
the arbitrary nature of national boundaries. 

These objections are closely interrelated, and the replies to them 
all derive ultimately from two postulates : first, that the individual, 


whether from a physiological or a psychological point of view, is 
a single organized entity, such that all its "parts" or ''aspects" are 
mutually modifiable and mutually interacting; and second, that a 
community is likewise organized in this sense. 

If we look at social differentiation in a stable community — say, 
at sex differentiation in a New Guinea tribe * — we find that it is 
not enough to say that the habit system or the character structure 
of one sex is different from that of another. The significant point 
is that the habit system of each sex cogs into the habit system of 
the other; that the behavior of each promotes the habits of the 
other. t We find, for example, between the sexes, such comple- 
mentary patterns as spectatorship-exhibitionism, dominance-sub- 
mission, and succoring-dependence, or mixtures of these. Never 
do we find mutual irrelevance between such groups. 

Although it is unfortunately true that we know very little about 
the terms of habit differentiation between classes, sexes, occupa- 
tional groups, etc., in western nations, there is, I think, no danger 
in applying this general conclusion to all cases of stable differentia- 
tion between groups which are living in mutual contact. It is, to 
me, inconceivable that two differing groups could exist side by side 
in a community without some sort of mutual relevance between 
the special characteristics of one group and those of the other. 
Such an occurrence would be contrary to the postulate that a com- 
munity is an organized unit. We shall, therefore, presume that 
this generalization applies to all stable social differentiation. 

Now, all that we know of the mechanics of character formation 
— especially the processes of projection, reaction formation, com- 
pensation, and the like — forces us to regard these bipolar patterns 
as unita ry within the individual. If we know that an individual is 

* Cf . Margaret Mead," especially Part III, for an analysis of sex differen- 
tiation among the Tchambuli ; also G. Bateson ® for an analysis of sex differenti- 
ation among adults in latmul, New Guinea. 

fWe are considering here only those cases in which ethological differentia- 
tion follows the sex dichotomy. It is also probable that, where the ethos of the 
two sexes is not sharply differentiated, it would still be correct to say that the 
ethos of each promotes that of the other, e.g., through such mechanisms as 
competition and mutual imitation. Cf. M. Mead." 


trained in overt expression of one half of one of these patterns, 
e.g., in dominance behavior, we can predict with certainty (though 
not in precise language) that the seeds of the other half — submis- 
sion — are simultaneously sown in his personality. We have to 
think of the individual, in fact, as trained in dominance-submis- 
sion, not in either dominance or submission. From this it follows 
that where we are dealing with stable differentiation within a com- 
munity, we are justified in ascribing common character to the 
members of that community, provided we take the precaution of 
describing that common character in terms of the motifs of rela- 
tionship between the differentiated sections of the community. 

The same sort of considerations will guide us in dealing with 
our second criticism — the extremes of heterogeneity, such as occur 
in modern ''melting-pot" communities. Suppose we attempted to 
analyze out all the motifs of relationship between individuals and 
groups in such a community as New York City ; if we did not end 
in the madhouse long before we had completed our study, we 
should arrive at a picture of common character that would be al- 
most infinitely complex — certainly that would contain more fine 
differentiations than the human psyche is capable of resolving 
within itself. At this point, then, both we and the individuals 
whom we are studying are forced to take a short cut: to treat 
heterogeneity as a positive characteristic of the common environ- 
ment, sui generis. When, with such an hypothesis, we begin to look 
for common motifs of behavior, we note the very clear tendencies 
towards glorying in heterogeneity for its own sake (as in the 
Robinson Latouche ''Ballad for Americans") and towards regard- 
ing the world as made up of an infinity of disconnected quiz-bits 
(like Ripley's "Believe It or Not"). 

The third objection, the case of the individual deviant, falls in 
the same frame of reference as that of the differentiation of stable 
groups. The boy on whom an English public-school education 
does not take, even though the original roots of his deviance were 
laid in some "accidental" traumatic incident, is reacting to the 
public-school system. The behavioral habits which he acquires may 


not follow the norms which the school intends to implant, but they 
are acquired in reaction to those very norms. He may (and often 
does) acquire patterns the exact opposite of the normal; but he 
cannot conceivably acquire irrelevant patterns. He may become a 
"bad" public-school Englishman, he may become insane, but still 
his deviant characteristics will be systematically related to the 
norms which he is resisting. We may describe his character, in- 
deed, by saying that it is as systematically related to the standard 
public-school character as the character of latmul natives of one 
sex is systematically related to the character of the other sex. His 
character is oriented to the motifs and patterns of relationship in 
the society in which he lives. 

The same frame of reference applies to the fourth consideration, 
that of changing communities and the sort of differentiation which 
occurs when one section of a community lags behind another in 
change. Since the direction in which a change occurs^ will neces- 
sarily be conditioned by the status quo ante, the new patterns, 
being reactions to the old, will be systematically related to the old. 
As long as we confine ourselves to the terms and themes of this 
systematic relationship, therefore, we are entitled to expect regu- 
larity of character in the individuals. Furthermore, the expectation 
and experience of change may, in some cases, be so important as 
to become a common character-determining factor * siii generis, 
in the same sort of way that ''heterogeneity" may have positive 

Lastly, we may consider cases of shifting national boundaries, 
our fifth criticism. Here, of course, we cannot expect that a diplo- 
mat's signature on a treaty will immediately modify the characters 
of the individuals whose national allegiance is thereby changed. 
It may even happen — for example, in cases where a preliterate 
native population is brought for the first time in contact with 
Europeans — that, for some time after the shift, the two parties to 
such a situation will behave in an exploratory or almost random 

* For a discussion of the role played by "change" and " heterogeneity" in 
melting-pot communities, cf . M. Mead ; ^ also F. Alexander.^ 


manner, each retaining its own norms and not yet developing any 
special adjustments to the situation of contact. During this period, 
we should still not expect any generalizations to apply to both 
groups. Very soon, however, we know that each side does develop 
special patterns of behavior to use in its contacts with the other.* 
At this point, it becomes meaningful to ask what systematic terms 
of relationship will describe the common character of the two 
groups; and from this point on, the degree of common character 
structure will increase until the two groups become related to each 
other just as two classes or two sexes in a stable, differentiated 

In sum, to those who argue that human communities show too 
great internal differentiation or contain too great a random ele- 
ment for any notion of common character to apply, our reply 
would be that we expect such an approach to be useful (a) pro- 
vided we describe common character in terms of the themes of 
relationship between groups and individuals within the community, 
and (b) provided that we allow sufficient time to elapse for the 
community to reach some degree of equilibrium or to accept either 
change or heterogeneity as a characteristic of their human en- 

Differences Which We May Expect between 
National Groups 

The above examination of "straw men" in the case against 
"national character" has very stringently limited the scope of this 
concept. But the conclusions from this examination are by no 
means simply negative. To limit the scope of a concept is almost 
synonymous with defining it. 

* In the South Seas, those special modes of behavior which Europeans adopt 
towards native peoples, and those other modes of behavior which the native 
adopts towards Europeans, are very obvious. Apart from analyses of "pidgin" 
languages, we have, however, no psychological data on these patterns. For a 
description of the analagous patterns in Negro-white relationships, cf. J. 
Dollard,* especially Chapter XII, Accommodation Attitudes of Negroes. 


We have added one very important tool to our equipment — the 
technique of describing the common character (or the ''highest 
common factor" of character) of individuals in a human commu- 
nity in terms of bipolar adjectives. Instead of despairing in face 
of the fact that nations are highly differentiated, we shall take the 
dimensions of that differentiation as our clues to the national 
character. No longer content to say, "Germans are submissive," or 
''Englishmen are aloof," we shall use such phrases as "dominant- 
submissive" when relationships of this sort can be shown to occur. 
Similarly, we shall not refer to "the paranoidal element in Ger- 
man character," unless we can show that by "paranoidal" we mean 
some bipolar characteristic of German-German or German- foreign 
relationships. We shall not describe varieties of character by de- 
fining a given character in terms of its position on a continuum 
between extreme dominance and extreme submissiveness, but we 
shall, instead, try to use for our descriptions some such continua 
as "degree of interest in, or orientation towards, dominance-sub- 

So far, we have mentioned only a very short list of bipolar 
characteristics : dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, and 
exhibitionism-spectatorship. One criticism will certainly be upper- 
most in the reader's mind, that, in short, all three of these charac- 
teristics are clearly present in all western cultures. Before our 
method becomes useful, therefore, we must try to expand it to 
give us sufficient scope and discriminatory power to differentiate 
one western culture from another. 

As this conceptual frame develops, no doubt, many further ex- 
pansions and discriminations will be introduced. The present paper 
will deal with only three such types of expansion. 


When we invoked bipolarity as a means of handling differentia- 
tion within society without foregoing some notion of common 
character structure, we considered only the possibility of simple 


bipolar differentiation. Certainly this pattern is very common in 
western cultures ; take, for instance, Republican-Democrat, political 
Right-Left, sex differentiation, God and the devil, and so on. 
These peoples even try to impose a binary pattern upon phenomena 
which are not dual in nature — youth vs. age, labor vs. capital, 
mind vs. matter — and, in general, lack the organizational devices 
for handling triangular systems ; the inception of any "third" party 
is always regarded, for example, as a threat to our political organi- 
zation. This clear tendency towards dual systems ought not, how- 
ever, to blind us to the occurrence of other patterns.* 

There is, for example, a very interesting tendency in English 
communities towards the formation of ternary systems, such as 
parents-nurse-child, king-ministers-people, officers-N.C.O.'s-pri- 
vates.f While the precise motifs of relationship in these ternary 
systems remain to be investigated, it is important to note that 
these systems, to which I refer as "ternary," are neither "simple 
hierarchies" nor "triangles." By a pure hierarchy, I should mean 
a serial system in which face-to- face relations do not occur be- 
tween members when they are separated by some intervening 
member; in other words, systems in which the only communica- 
tion between A and C passes through B. By a triangle I should 
mean a threefold system with no serial properties. The ternary 
system, parent-nurse-child, on the other hand, is very different 
from either of these other forms. It contains serial elements, but 
face-to- face contact does occur between the first and the third 

* The Balinese social system in the mountain communities is almost entirely 
devoid of such dualisms. The ethological differentiation of the sexes is rather 
slight ; political factions are completely absent. In the plains, there is a dualism 
which has resulted from the intrusive Hindoo caste system, those with caste 
being discriminated from those without caste. At the symbolic level (partly as 
a result of Hindoo influence) dualisms are much more frequent, however, than 
they are in the social structure (e.g., Northeast vs. Southwest, Gods vs. demons, 
symbolic Left vs. Rights, symbolic Male vs. Female, etc.). 

t A fourth instance of this threefold pattern occurs in some great public 
schools (as in Charterhouse), where the authority is divided between the 
quieter, more polished, intellectual leaders ("monitors") and the rougher, 
louder, athletic leaders (captain of football, head of long room, etc.), who have 
the duty of seeing to it that the "fags" run when the monitor calls. 


members. Essentially, the function of the middle member is to in- 
struct and discipline the. third member in the forms of behavior 
which he should adopt in his contacts with the first. The nurse 
teaches the child how to behave towards its parents, just as the 
N.C.O. teaches and disciplines the private in how he should be- 
have towards officers. In psychoanalytic terminology, the process 
of introjection is done indirectly, not by direct impact of the 
parental personality upon the child.* The face-to-face contacts 
between the first and third members are, however, very important. 
We may refer, in this connection, to the vital daily ritual in the 
British Army, in which the officer of the day asks the assembled 
privates and N.C.O.'s whether there are any complaints. 

Certainly, any full discussion of English character ought to 
allow for ternary, as well as bipolar patterns. 


So far, we have considered only what we have called "comple- 
mentary" patterns of relationship, in which the behavior patterns 
at one end of the relationship are different from, but fit in with, 
the behavior patterns at the other end (dominance-submission, 
etc.). There exists, however, a whole category of human inter- 
personal behavior which does not conform to this description. In 
addition to the contrasting complementary patterns, we have to 
recognize the existence of a series of symmetrical patterns, in 
which people respond to what others are doing by themselves 
doing something similar. In particular, we have to consider those 
competitive f patterns in which individual or group A is stimu- 

* For a general discussion of cultural variants of the Oedipus situation and 
the related systems of cultural sanctions, cf . M. Mead ; ^° also G. Roheim." 

t The term "co-operation," which is sometimes used as the opposite of "com- 
petition," covers a very wide variety of patterns, some of them symmetrical and 
others complementary, some bipolar and others in which the co-operating in- 
dividuals are chiefly oriented to some personal or impersonal goal. We may 
expect that some careful analysis of these patterns will give us vocabulary for 
describing other sorts of national characteristics. Such an analysis cannot be 
attempted in this paper. 


lated to more of any type of behavior by perceiving more of that 
same type of behavior (or greater success in that type of behavior) 
in individual or group B. 

There is a very profound contrast between such competitive 
systems of behavior and complementary dominance-submission 
systems — a highly significant contrast for any discussion of na- 
tional character. In complementary striving, the stimulus which 
prompts A to greater efforts is the relative weakness in B; if we 
want to make A subside or submit, we ought to show him that B 
is stronger than he is. In fact, the complementary character struc- 
ture may be summarized by the phrase "bully-coward," implying 
the combination of these characteristics in the personality. The 
symmetrical competitive systems, on the other hand, are an almost 
precise functional opposite of the complementary. Here the stimu- 
lus which evokes greater striving in A is the vision of greater 
strength or greater striving in B; and, inversely, if we demon- 
strate to A that B is really weak, A will relax his efforts. 

It is probable that these two contrasting patterns are alike avail- 
able as potentialities in all human beings; but clearly, any 
individual who behaves in both ways at once will risk internal 
confusion and conflict. In the various national groups, conse- 
quently, different methods of resolving this discrepancy have 
developed. In England and in America, where children and adults 
are subjected to an almost continuous barrage of disapproval 
whenever they exhibit the complementary patterns, they inevitably 
come to accept the ethics of "fair play." Responding to the chal- 
lenge of difficulties, they cannot, without guilt, kick the under- 
dog.* For British morale Dunkirk was a stimulus, not a 

In Germany, on the other hand, the same cliches are apparently 
lacking, and the community is chiefly organized on the basis of a 

* It is, however, possible that in certain sections of these nations, comple- 
mentary patterns occur with some frequency — particularly among groups who 
have suffered from prolonged insecurity and uncertainty, e.g., racial minorities, 
depressed areas, the Stock Exchange, political circles, etc. 


complementary hierarchy in terms of dominance-submission. The 
dominance behavior is sharply and clearly developed ; yet the pic- 
ture is not perfectly clear and needs further investigation. Whether 
a pure dominance-submission hierarchy could ever exist as a stable 
system is doubtful. It seems that in the case of Germany, the 
submission end of the pattern is masked, so that overt submissive 
behavior is almost as strongly tabooed as it is in America or 
England. In place of submission, we find a sort of parade-ground 

A hint as to the process by which the submissive role is modi- 
fied and rendered tolerable comes to us out of the interviews in a 
recently begun study of German life histories.* One German sub- 
ject described how different was the treatment which he, as a boy, 
received in his South German home, from that which his sister 
received. He said that much more was demanded of him; that his 
sister was allowed to evade discipline ; that whereas he was always 
expected to click his heels and obey with precision, his sister was 
allowed much more freedom. The interviewer at once began to 
look for intersex sibling jealousy, but the subject declared that 
it was a greater honor for the boy to obey. "One doesn't expect 
too much of girls," he said. ''What one felt they (boys) should 
accomplish and do was very serious, because they had to be pre- 
pared for life." An interesting inversion of noblesse oblige. 


Among the complementary motifs, we have mentioned only 
three — dominance-submission, exhibitionism-spectatorship, and 
succorance-dependence — but these three will suffice to illustrate 
the sort of verifiable hypotheses at which we can arrive by de- 
scribing national character in this hyphenated terminology, f 

* G. Bateson, unpublished research for the Council on Human Relations. 

t For a fuller study, we ought to consider such other motifs as aggression- 
passivity, possessive-possessed, agent-tool, etc. And all of these motifs will 
require somewhat more critical definition than can be attempted in this paper. 


Since, clearly, all three of these motifs occur in all western cul- 
tures, the possibilities for international difference are limited to 
the proportions and ways in which the motifs are combined. The 
proportions are likely to be very difficult to detect, except where 
the differences are very large. We may be sure ourselves that 
Germans are more oriented towards dominance-submission than 
are Americans, but to demonstrate this certainty is likely to be 
difficult. To estimate differences in the degree of development of 
exhibitionism-spectatorship or succorance-dependence in the vari- 
ous nations will, indeed, probably be quite impossible. 

If, however, we consider the possible ways in which these 
motifs may be combined together, we find sharp qualitative differ- 
ences which are susceptible of easy verification. Let us assume 
that all three of these motifs are developed in all relationships in 
all Western cultures, and from this assumption go on to consider 
which individual plays which role. 

It is logically possible that in one cultural environment A will 
be dominant and exhibitionist, while B is submissive and specta- 
tor; while in another culture X may be dominant and spectator, 
while Y is submissive and exhibitionist. 

Examples of this sort of contrast rather easily come to mind. 
Thus we may note that whereas the dominant Nazis preen them- 
selves before the people, the czar of Russia kept his private ballet, 
and Stalin emerges from seclusion only to review his troops. We 
might perhaps present the relationship between the Nazi Party 
and the people thus : 

Party People 

Dominance Submission 

Exhibitionism Spectatorship 

while the czar and his ballet would be represented : 

Czar Ballet 

Dominance Submission 

Spectatorship Exhibitionism 


Since these European examples are comparatively unproved, it 
is worthwhile at this point to demonstrate the occurrence of such 
differences by describing a rather striking ethnographic difference 
which has been documented more fully. In Europe, where we tend 
to associate succoring behavior with social superiority, we con- 
struct our parent symbols accordingly. Our God, or our king, is 
the ''father" of his people. In Bali, on the other hand, the gods are 
the "children" of the people, and when a god speaks through the 
mouth of a person in trance, he addresses anyone who will listen 
as ''father." * Similarly, the rajah is sajanganga ("spoilt" like a 
child) by his people. The Balinese, further, are very fond of put- 
ting children in the combined roles of god and dancer; in myth- 
ology, the perfect prince is polished and narcissistic. Thus the 
Balinese pattern might be summarized thus : 

High Status Low Status 

Dependence Succoring 

Exhibitionism Spectatorship 

And this diagram would imply, not only that the Balinese feel 
dependence and exhibitionism and superior status to go naturally 
together, but also that a Balinese will not readily combine succor- 
ing with exhibitionism (that is, Bali completely lacks the ostenta- 
tious gift-giving characteristic of many primitive peoples) or will 
be embarrassed if forced by the context to attempt such a com- 

Although the analogous diagrams for our Western cultures 
cannot be drawn with the same certainty, it is worthwhile to at- 
tempt them for the parent-child relationships in English, Ameri- 
can, and German cultures. One extra complication must, however, 
be faced ; when we look at parent-child relationships instead of at 
relationships between princes and people, we have to make specific 
allowance for the changes in the pattern which occur as the child 
grows older. Succorance-dependence is undoubtedly a dominant 

* M. Mead and G. Bateson, unpublished researches. 


motif in early childhood, but various mechanisms later modify 
this extreme dependence, to bring about some degree of psycho- 
logical independence. 

The English upper- and middle-class system would be repre- 
sented diagrammatically thus : 

Parents Children 

Dominance Submission (modified by ''ternary" nurse sys- 


Succoring Dependence (dependence habits broken by sepa- 

ration — children sent to school) 

Exhibitionism Spectatorship (children listen silently at meals) 

In contrast with this, the analogous American pattern seems to 

Parents Children 

Dominance (slight) Submission (slight) 

Succoring Dependence 

Spectatorship Exhibitionism 

And this pattern differs from the English not only in the reversal 
of the spectatorship-exhibitionism roles, but also in the content of 
what is exhibited. The American child is encouraged by his par- 
ents to show off his independence. Usually the process of psycho- 
logical weaning is not accomplished by sending the child away to 
a boarding school ; instead, the child's exhibitionism is played off 
against his independence, until the latter is neutralized. Later, 
from this beginning in the exhibition of independence, the indi- 
vidual may sometimes go on in adult life to show off succorance, 
his wife and family becoming in some degree his ''exhibits." • 

Though the analogous German pattern probably resembles the 
American in the arrangement of the paired complementary roles, 
certainly it differs from the American in that the father's domi- 
nance is much stronger and much more consistent, and especially 
in that the content of the boy's exhibitionism is quite different. He 
is, in fact, dominated into a sort of heel-clicking exhibitionism 


which takes the place of overt submissive behavior. Thus, while 
in the American character exhibitionism is encouraged by the 
parent as a method of psychological weaning, both its function 
and its content are for the German entirely different. • 

Differences of this order, which may be expected in all Euro- 
pean nations, are probably the basis of many of our naive and 
often unkind international comments. They may, indeed, be of 
considerable importance in the mechanics of international rela- 
tions, in as much as an understanding of them might dispel some 
of our misunderstandings. To an American eye, the English too 
often appear * 'arrogant," whereas to an English eye the American 
appears to be "boastful." If we could show precisely how much 
of truth and how much of distortion is present in these impres- 
sions, it might be a real contribution to interallied co-operation. 

In terms of the diagrams above, the ''arrogance" of the Eng- 
lishman would be due to the combination of dominance and exhi- 
bitionism. The Englishman in a performing role (the parent at 
breakfast, the newspaper editor, the political spokesman, the lec- 
turer, or what not) assumes that he is also in a dominant role — 
that he can decide in accordance with vague, abstract standards 
what sort of performance to give — and the audience can "take it 
or leave it." His own arrogance he sees either as "natural" or as 
mitigated by his humility in face of the abstract standards. Quite 
unaware that his behavior could conceivably be regarded as a com- 
ment upon his audience, he is, on the contrary, aware only of 
behaving in the performer's role, as he understands that role. But 
the American does not see it thus. To him, the "arrogant" behav- 
ior of the Englishman appears to be directed against the audience, 
in which case the implicit invocation of some abstract standard 
appears only to add insult to injury. 

Similarly, the behavior which an Englishman interprets as 
"boastful" in an American is not aggressive, although the Eng- 
lishman may feel that he is being subjected to some sort of invidi- 
ous comparison. He does not know that, as a matter of fact, 
Americans will only behave like this to people whom they rather 


like and respect. According to the hypothesis above, the "boast- 
ing" pattern results from the curious linkage whereby exhibition 
of self-sufficiency and independence is played off against over- 
dependence. The American, when he boasts, is looking for ap- 
proval of his upstanding independence ; but the naive Englishman 
interprets this behavior as a bid for some sort of dominance or 

In this sort of way, we may suppose that the whole flavor of 
one national culture may differ from that of another, and that 
such differences may be considerable enough to lead to serious 
misunderstandings. It is probable, however, that these differences 
are not so complex in their nature as to be beyond the reach of 
investigation. Hypotheses of the type which we have advanced 
could be easily tested, and research on these lines is urgently 

National Character and American Morale 

Using the motifs of interpersonal and intergroup relationship 
as our clues to national character, we have been able to indicate 
certain orders of regular difference which we may expect to find 
among the peoples who share our western civilization. Of neces- 
sity, our statements have been theoretical rather than empirical; 
still, from the theoretical structure which we have built up, it is 
possible to extract certain formulas which may be useful to the 
builder of morale. 

All of these formulas are based upon the general assumption 
that people will respond most energetically when the context is 
structured to appeal to their habitual patterns of reaction. It is not 
sensible to encourage a donkey to go up hill by offering him raw 
meat, nor will a lion respond to grass. 

A. Since all western nations tend to think and behave in bipolar 
terms, we shall do well, in building American morale, to think of 
our various enemies as a single hostile entity. The distinctions 
and gradations which intellectuals might prefer are likely to be 


B. Since both Americans and English respond most energeti- 
cally to symmetrical stimuli, we shall be very unwise if we soft- 
pedal the disasters of war. If our enemies defeat us at any point, 
that fact ought to be used to the maximum as a challenge and a 
spur to further effort. When our forces have suffered some re- 
verse, our newspapers ought to be in no hurry to tell us that 
"enemy advances have been checked." Military progress is always 
intermittent, and the moment to strike, the moment when maxi- 
mum morale is needed, occurs when the enemy is solidifying his 
position and preparing the next blow. At such a moment, it is not 
sensible to reduce the aggressive energy of our leaders and peo- 
ple by smug reassurance. 

C. There is, however, a superficial discrepancy between the 
habit of symmetrical motivation and the need for showing self- 
sufficiency. We have suggested that the American boy learns to 
stand upon his own feet through those occasions in childhood 
when his parents are approving spectators of his self-sufficiency. 
If this diagnosis is correct, it would follow that a certain bubbling 
up of self -appreciation is normal and healthy in Americans and 
is perhaps an essential ingredient of American independence and 

A too-literal following of the formula above, therefore, a too- 
great insistence upon disasters and difficulties, might lead to some 
loss of energy through the damming up of this spontaneous exub- 
erance. A rather concentrated diet of "blood, sweat, and tears" 
may be good for the English; but Americans, while no less de- 
pendent upon symmetrical motivation, cannot feel their oats when 
fed on nothing but disaster. Our public spokesmen and newspaper 
editors should never soft-pedal the fact that we have a man-sized 
job on our hands, but they will do well to insist also that America 
is a man-sized nation. Any sort of attempt to reassure Americans 
by minimizing the strength of the enemy must be avoided, but 
frank boasts of real success are good. 

D. Because our vision of the peace is a factor in our warmaking 
morale, it is worthwhile to ask at once what light the study of 


national differences may throw upon the problems of the peace 

We have to devise a peace treaty, (a) such that Americans and 
British will fight to achieve it, and (b) such that it will bring out 
the best rather than the worst characteristics of our enemies. If 
we approach it scientifically, such a problem is by no means be- 
yond our skill. 

The most conspicuous psychological hurdle to be negotiated, in 
imagining such a peace treaty, is the contrast between British and 
American symmetrical patterns and the German complementary 
pattern, with its taboo on overt submissive behavior. The allied 
nations are not psychologically equipped to enforce a harsh treaty; 
they might draw up such a treaty, but in six months they would 
tire of keeping the underdog down. The Germans, on the other 
hand, if they see their role as "submissive," will not stay down 
without harsh treatment. We have seen that these considerations 
applied even to such a mildly punitive treaty as was devised at 
Versailles; the allies omitted to enforce it, and the Germans re- 
fused to accept it. It is, therefore, useless to dream of such a treaty, 
and worse than useless to repeat such dreams as a way of raising 
our morale now, when we are angry with Germany. To do that 
would only obscure the issues in the final settlement. 

This incompatibility between complementary and symmetrical 
motivation means, in fact, that the treaty cannot be organized 
around simple dominance-submissive motifs; hence we are forced 
to look for alternative solutions. We must examine, for example, 
the motif of exhibitionism-spectatorship — what dignified role is 
each of the various nations best fitted to play? — and that of suc- 
coring-dependence — in the starving postwar world, what motiva- 
tional patterns shall we evoke between those who give and those 
who receive food? And, alternative to these solutions, we have 
the possibility of some threefold structure, within which both 
the allies and Germany would submit, not to each other, but to 
some abstract principle. 

Part Two: How Morale Develops 

VL Children Are Important to Morale 

VIL The Morale of Youth Groups 

VI IL Morale and the Training of Leaders 

IX. Propaganda and Morale 

X. News and Morale 


Children Are Important to Morale 
LOIS BARCLAY MURPHY Sarah Lawrence College 

SOME believe that the struggle between democracy and dic- 
tatorship has come because democracy has failed. In the 
United States we claim that it has not failed. The proof of 
whether we are right or wrong will come in the next five or ten 
or twenty-five years. And when it comes, the answer will depend 
in large part on the physical and mental health of our people and 
on the satisfactions in living which they have as members of a 
democracy ; these are the basic conditions which underlie effective 
work in time of peace, and strength in war. 

We know now that the physical and mental health of adults, 
their capacity for a satisfying life, is directly related to their 
earlier childhood experiences. What is the actual situation here 
today among adults in the United States ? 

At present, democracy is carrying a load of several million 
''unemployables" in addition to more than a million psychotics 
and neurotics requiring special institutional or private medical 
care. These figures do not tell us how many more vulnerables 
there are, people who will break down under the more severe 
strains we have ahead. Such groups weaken our democracy. 

At a more subtle level, there are thousands of compulsive, re- 
bellious, neurotically power-driven personalities who contribute 
to irrational and unproductive hostility between class, race, re- 
ligious, and working groups. These groups are incapacitated for 
genuinely democratic life. They further weaken our democracy. 

Other millions have inadequate wages, the housing of poverty, 
bad work conditions. These people have little basis for feeling 
that democracy has succeeded and little energy for making a 



sound contribution to its further development. Improved housing, 
more recreation, more food (including vitamins and minerals) 
can go far toward increasing their satisfactions, their health, and 
their faith. 

Today's Children Our Postwar Citizens 

But attention to adults and to economic problems alone is not 
enough. The roots of many of these adult difficulties in the fu- 
ture lie in basic experiences of children today — experiences of 
frustration and insecurity that are producing unsocial, distorted 
personalities maturing into inadequate adulthood year by year. 
Nationwide records of children's problems likely to present haz- 
ards to a democracy five, ten, fifteen years from now do not exist. 
We do have some clues to trends, based on studies of samples at 
different levels. It is also true that the Social Security Act has 
made possible important advances in the care of dependent and 
crippled children, children **in danger of becoming delinquent," 
and in giving aid to the states for maternal and child health 
services. These are all aimed at the correction of obvious "break- 
down" situations, but they are pitifully inadequate to meet the 
needs of children over the country. For instance, the appropria- 
tion of $1,510,000 authorized for grants to states for welfare 
services for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and 
neglected children and those in danger of becoming delinquent 
would not be adequate to do what is needed for New York City 
alone, with its current depression crop of delinquents. We must 
also look to the basic experiences of children not at the point of 
breakdown into delinquency or physical symptoms. We have been 
too long content with trying to correct conditions after breakdown 
occurs instead of planning for physical and mental health. We 
pay no attention to less dramatic forms of unsocial distorted per- 
sonality maturing into inadequate adulthood year by year. 

W.P.A. nursery-school teachers, for example, frequently find 
two types of personality patterns appearing in reaction to eco- 


nomic insecurity and inadequate parental love and attention. They 
report the withdrawn, shy, anxious, "shut-in" child, the youngster 
who cannot make adequate contacts with other children, who is 
likely always to have difficulty as a member of a social group — 
unless he can get help. The existence of such a type gives us con- 
cern because life in the United States becomes each year more 
and more a life of co-operating in the group. The isolated indi- 
vidualist finds less acceptance of his eccentricities than he did in 
pioneer days. W.P.A. teachers also report the hyperactive, aggres- 
sive child, the youngster who reacts to frustration by a compulsive 
effort to *'get his." This type of child, as an adult, will be an even 
greater threat to democracy, for he is the potential ''slave driver" 
or gangster — unless his needs as a child can be better met. 

In addition to these two marked types of reaction to frustration 
and insecurity, W.P.A. teachers report other patterns: rigidity, 
dependence on adults, repression of individual spontaneity. We 
must add to these the sapping of physical strength. For there are 
many children who respond to insecurity, not in terms of unsocial 
behavior (either excessively withdrawn or excessively aggressive) 
and not in terms of diminished creativeness. These children show 
physical symptoms which take their toll in strength : gastric dis- 
orders, allergies, organic weaknesses resulting from prolonged 
and excessive emotional strain; or emotional reactions of a more 
extreme character leading to an actual break with reality. 

Other clues to trends come from preschool children with supe- 
rior backgrounds. Among 70 such youngsters in one group, all 
averaging well above norms for height and weight, 10 per cent 
presented extreme personality deviations which made happy ad- 
justment to normal group life at any subsequent period unlikely 
unless special help, in most cases involving psychiatric work 
with the child, was made available. In order to make this point 
more concrete, I will illustrate a few instances of these extreme 
personality deviations. 

Albert was the son of ambitious parents, his father a business 
man, his mother an actress. His mother had been ill most of his 


first year, and he was cared for by a series of maids all of whom 
were very repressive; the last and longest one kept him in his 
carriage except when he was in his own room, until the age of 
two. By that time he was afraid to set foot on anything but his 
own linoleum floor. By the time he was three, his mother realized 
that he did not behave quite like other boys of his age : his speech 
was limited, he did not play as other children did, he seemed to be 
in a daze much of the time, talked in a strained unreal voice, was 
unresponsive to adults; the few contacts he had with other chil- 
dren were apt to end in biting or in some other aggressive attack. 
Taken to a clinic, he was found to have an intelligence quotient 
of about 65. When he was brought to nursery school, it was im- 
possible for him to be kept in a large group of 25 children because 
of the violence of his aggression toward them; and also because 
of the obvious need for afifectionate attention from one insightful 
adult who could give him a great deal of time. Experts who ob- 
served him considered his withdrawal to be schizophrenic in char- 
acter and were dubious about the outcome. As a result of carefully 
planned companionship and supervision, however, including a long 
period of encouragement to enjoy the explorations, aggression, 
and primitive messing and manipulative experiences that had been 
so severely repressed for so long, he began to play in the crude 
way that a younger child would, then learned some of the controls 
that children usually acquire in the period between three and six, 
and gained better contacts with other children. At eight his intelli- 
gence quotient is 116, and although he is still a slightly odd child, 
he is within the range of children who can participate in normal 

Bernice, a little girl of ten, has had a somewhat similar develop- 
ment; brought up literally with rubber gloves, if not with kid 
ones, by oversensitive parents who conscientiously obeyed the in- 
junction never to kiss or hug their baby, she was a lonely with- 
drawn child at three in nursery school and even at six was still 
remote from other children. She would play in parallel fashion, 
moving in a dreamlike way, unconscious of the lack of integration 
of her activity with that of the rest. Her writing was shadowy 
and vague, and she seemed unable to do anything that involved 
physical pressure or give and take. Probably because there was no 


aggression in her case, parents were loath to accept psychiatric 
help, and it is an open question whether the wholesome under- 
standing of her present teachers can alone help her enough. 

These are two instances of the "extreme personality deviations" 
which make the outlook for future adjustment very grim, if chil- 
dren are not given help during the early years when personality is 
still flexible, reachable, and capable of responding to guidance. 

Another type, more familiar perhaps through the child-guidance 
literature because of his obvious predelinquent behavior, is George. 
With both parents working at low-paid jobs to earn enough for 
a decent home, he resented the lack of attention from those closest 
to him and, feeling frustrated, began to steal before the age of 
six ; this at least brought him some attention. Actually more likely 
to obtain help because of the obviousness of his problem, he is 
probably also more likely, with this help, to develop soundly than 
either of the two withdrawn children first described. 

In addition to the 10 per cent of this preschool group who 
showed extreme personality deviations, approximately another 
10 per cent showed reaction patterns of aggression or repressed 
*'shut-in" behavior which jeopardize their future health, creative- 
ness, and capacity for stable relations with people. Often neither 
parents nor teachers know how to help these children ; their com- 
pulsiveness or withdrawal makes them inaccessible to everyday 

This ''serious 20 per cent" should not be confused with the wide- 
spread incidence of early childhood ''problems," such as ordinary 
insecurities, fears, temper tantrums, nervous habits. Although 
estimates of the incidence of problems of this sort run as high as 
60 per cent of nursery-school children, many of these are "out- 
grown" if the child has understanding guidance during early and 
later childhood. Often they are less important than parents think, 
frequently being natural concomitants of growth and periods of 
getting adjusted to social life. Parents can sometimes help best 
simply by not worrying about them ; but the more serious per- 
sonality distortions are not so easily outgrown, 


Developmental Hazards that Can Be Avoided 

In upper-class groups many of the more serious patterns are due 
to developmental hazards also, but it must be stressed that these 
are not inevitable hazards; they are simply ones that are now 
common : 

1. Unsatisfactory experiences with early nourishment. Our 
mental picture of the young baby affectionately supported in his 
mother's arms while he nurses at her breast is rapidly coming to 
be a picture of a myth. In one upper middle-class group only one- 
sixth of the children were nursed two months or longer. Some 
mothers, to be sure, make the feeding experience a happy one 
when the child is bottle-fed; but bottle-feeding often means a 
mechanical and sometimes frustrating experience. 

2. Isolation. Today we often leave our youngsters alone in cribs 
or playpens for most of the first eighteen months. Children need 
companionship, play, and the stimulus of being sung or read to 
during infancy if they are to grow into happy social relationships. 
Both in upper middle-class groups and in groups where mothers 
help support the family, babies may be left alone a large part of 
their waking hours, deprived of the stimulus and experience that 
make human contact familiar and satisfying. 

3. Constriction of activities and excessive discipline. We stop 
our children from exploring, from handling things, from playing 
with mud and with dough during the normal stage of expanding 
contact with objects and materials from eight months to three 
years. Such restriction is often the later counterpart of extremely 
rigorous or forced toilet training in the first year. The total pat- 
tern is based on excessive concern with order. 

4. Inadequate emotional experience. Our young ones lack con- 
tact with other children or adults from six months to three years. 
The result is sometimes emotional starvation and often, as a part 
of it, a sense of lack of love. This comes from all three of the com- 
mon deprivations just discussed but it is also a result of a fear of 


love, and a dependence on ''objective" techniques of bringing up 
children advocated by certain "experts." Children need loving. 

In upper-class groups some of this situation can be corrected by 
a changed emphasis in parental education or by parental release- 
therapy which will stimulate parents to feel and express more 
affection for children. But even well-to-do communities seldom 
have adequate provision for guidance or correction of serious 
problems such as those included in the "serious 20 per cent" re- 
ferred to above — the children with anxiety, phobias, withdrawal 
patterns of a severe sort. 

Economic Factors in Personality Development 

In underprivileged groups, economic and emotional insecurity 
reinforce each other. There is little compensation to offset the ex- 
pected early anxieties. Active help is needed here if our next gen- 
eration is to be strong, courageous, and capable of participating in 
a satisfactorily democratic life. 

Look at the facts : There are over thirty million children under 
14 in our country. Nearly two-thirds of them grow up in families 
with incomes of less than $1500 a year. Several million of them, 
the children of sharecroppers, of migrant workers, of our rural 
and city relief groups, grow up in families with less than $500 a 

For these children adequate food and companionship with warm, 
sustaining, interested healthy parents is impossible. To be sure, the 
odds against the poor child are not 100 per cent all of the time. 
Some of these parents can maintain a level of devotion and under- 
standing in the face of extreme deprivation which actually gives a 
few of their children more emotional security than the offspring 
of compulsive upper-class parents. But the number is few. America 
must face the fact that many of these parents are too exhausted, 
too embittered, too hungry, too tired to have anything to give a 

Great progress has been made in decreasing the death rate and 


improving the health of young children. Yet almost half of the 
sick children in small towns in families with incomes of less than 
$1000 a year receive no care from a doctor. Several million school- 
age children have uncorrected eye defects and other difficulties. 
And yet we are much further advanced in physical care than we 
are in mental hygiene and care of children. 

Let us look at what nursery-school teachers report about the 
experiences of children in different sections of the country. It is 
important, we must admit at the outset, not to neglect the important 
values for small children in the warmth of foreign-born parents 
who are as yet unimpressed by the emphasis on routines char- 
acteristic of many groups. This reassuring affection, even when it 
accompanies rather extreme domination, is one of the chief sources 
of wholesome development of children in lower economic groups. 
But the ''poor little rich girl" philosophy must not blind us to the 
grimmer aspects of child development in some working groups. 

At one extreme, teachers have repeatedly recorded the anxiety 
and distorted personalities that are bred in the migratory camps. 
''Burrell feels very keenly the stigma of living in a tent." ''The 
children from the oldest to the youngest seem to feel that they 
do not have the sort of clothes that other children have. Their 
shaggy uncut hair damps their personalities." "Living on a plat- 
form with a tent over it does away with all privacy. There are no 
yards to play in ; consequently all children have the run of the camp 
from daylight to dark." "Mary misses a home — a house. Every 
day spent in a tent seems to take something from her happiness 
and sense of security. The constant talk of moving, of being 'sent 
on' keeps her in a state of turmoil at home, and this is bound to 
reflect in her school life." "Betty feels her whole life is insecure. 
She cannot forget the ordeal of the trip from Missouri in a flimsy 
old car, begging for food and for gasoline. She often says, 'We 
have to move pretty soon. We ain't got nothin' for keeps.' " 

Records from mill and factory towns are scarcely less extreme : 
"Eldora, a shy, sad little girl, refused to eat except with her fin- 
gers. We made a home call and found the children ate with their 


fingers in the home because of the total lack of silverware." The 
little home had practically no furnishings of any kind. "The 
parents work and leave the children with relatives'' — or someone 
else. 'These children do not have ... their parents at home with 
them to supervise their play, singing, or storytelling. At a very 
early age these children have been left to play by themselves, or 
in the streets with other children." 

It is not surprising that experiences like this breed behavior like 
the following: 

From the migratory camps in California: 

Mary-Faye seemed rather stealthy and sullen during her first 
months at school. She did not care for vegetables and would slyly 
throw them under the table. She had a great aversion to colored 
children and showed it at all times. Her attitude toward adults was 
guarded, and when corrected, very sullen. Yet she was very sensi- 
tive and cried easily when thwarted. 

Margaret cried very easily and was backward and shy. She had 
long hair which hung in bangs that made her appear repulsive. 
She clung closely to her older brother and screamed whenever he 
moved from her side. 

Loice-Lee's attitude when first seen seemed to be one of fear of 
punishment. Each time an adult neared him he dodged and rolled 
his eyes. Sometimes he would throw up his hands to guard his 
head. There is some inner force which seems to drive him con- 

Merelene's behavior was one of extreme antagonism. She was 
given to temj^er tantrums at the slightest provocation, throwing 
herself upon the floor, screaming, pulling her hair, swearing. 

Perry was extremely timid, afraid of everyone. He hid from 
children. He became totally negative, sulked, cried, refused food, 
resisted bed. Many days he was completely exhausted, even ill. 

Carl cried a great deal, was negative, fatigued, had food prob- 
lems. He undressed before children to attract their attention. His 
mother said he never masturbated at home for she had threatened 
to cut off his penis if she ever caught him. He threatened every- 
one with death and jail. 

Warren was antagonistic toward everyone. He didn't want any- 


one around him. When a child approached, he struck at the child. 
He grabbed toys from children, and when they cried, he laughed 
contentedly. A real bully. 

From factory towns in Ohio : 

Dottie was easily fatigued, underweight, undernourished. She 
was passive with both children and adults. She was carried into 
the room because she was too weak to walk. She immediately sat 
down on the floor and never attempted to get up unless moved. 
When given a doll she held the doll in her arms but made no at- 
tempt to play with it. 

Billy was a nervous highstrung child. . . . While resting he 
would roll from side to side on his cot. One day as a result of his 
rolling his cot fell. He became rigid with fright. When approached 
by an adult Billy would hold both hands over his ears. . . . Many 
times he would sit quietly without moving until told to change his 

Connie was very shy and showed much suUenness and hostility 
and was very helpless. 

Glen spent his first months in nursery school under great re- 
straint, having nothing to do with either teachers or children. He 
refused his medical examination each morning, clinging to his 
mother and crying. He refused to eat. He was very shy and 

Cliflfy seemed completely passive, he would not even watch 
other children; he would soil his pants daily even though placed 
on the toilet at intervals. 

Nursery school teachers in the W.P.A. nurseries find that even 
such difficult behavior as we have described yields in a few weeks 
or months, or sometimes in a year or two, to the stable friendly 
understanding of a teacher and group life with children. Con- 
cretely : 

After about four months Glen is getting over his shyness. We 
think that being out of the one room in which he lived (sic) and 
associating with other children in Nursery School where there are 
people of a happy frame of mind, has changed his attitude. 

By the end of the year Dottie '*was more independent." Does 


not like to be helped and likes praise when she does well. When 
she washes and combs her hair, she usually remarks, "Now I look 
pretty, don't I ?" 

Billy has undergone an extreme change in behavior. From a 
tense, nervous, and dependent little boy he has gained initiative 
and independence to a certain degree. 

It should be a matter of simple common sense to begin with the 
children, not only to organize their enthusiasm and faith but to 
plan for the development of bodies, personalities, and attitudes 
that will, from the cradle, give strength to our nation. What are 
we in America doing to build a wholesome morale? Are we meet- 
ing the needs of early childhood in a way that will insure sound 
bodies and healthy minds, five, ten, twenty-five years from now? 

Urgent Need for Greatly Extended Services 

W.P.A. nursery schools for children from two to five have pro- 
vided social contacts, shelter and supplementary food for a limited 
group of children at this level. These schools must be extended. 
They need more adequate equipment, they need more food and 
vitamins, their teachers need more training, and psychiatric guid- 
ance needs to be made available. At present the teachers have little 
or no expert help for children with serious psychological or be- 
havior problems. Understaffed, they do not have the time to give 
children the extra loving and extra friendly attention they so 
sorely need. 

Nothing, virtually, is being done for children too young to go 
to nursery school. Because of this fact, serious psychological and 
behavioral difficulties are established before the children come to 
the few nursery schools we have. Infants and even somewhat older 
children who are still too young for nursery school are often cared 
for by young girls of doubtful responsibility and understanding. 
In some families where mothers must work, there is a ''new girl 
every week or so," so that the baby has no continuous love or 
security in his earliest relationships. 


Between the few who are cared for in W.P.A. nursery schools 
and the still fewer who are able to afford private nursery schools, 
there is a great gap. As a minimum step toward future safety we 
must supplement our W.P.A. schools by schools which would be 
available for working mothers generally. These would be public 
nursery schools available to all and not just to families on relief. 

Is it too much for America to provide enough schools with the 
kind of equipment which meets the developmental needs of young 
children, and which would serve food, supplemented with vitamins, 
so that these youngsters can have a chance to grow to be strong? 

Is it too much for America to plan also so that her working 
mothers are enabled to stay at home and care for their young 
children, at least through a generous nursing period, so that chil- 
dren need not start their lives deprived of their first experiences 
with love and people? 

Is it too much for America to provide at least regional child 
guidance workers who could consult with teachers in W.P.A. and 
our new needed supplementary schools, helping them with therapy 
and providing psychiatric consultation for extreme cases? 

Is it too much for America to carry out a nationwide survey of 
children's problems, to get the facts on the emotional needs of 
young children, so that we at least can have a basis for knowing 
what steps we must take if, on the morale front, we are to produce 
children equipped by personality to be democrats in the years of 
their lives still to come? 

A Census of Young Children's Needs 

One inevitable reply to these questions may be : But do we know 
enough to make wise plans for young children ? Do we know who 
needs help most, or how it can best be given ? I have to admit that 
we don't, in detail, although the large outlines are clear. Intensive 
studies of individual children have been undertaken only by a few 
groups, such as child-guidance groups reporting on delinquents; 
welfare agencies ; and the child-study centers at the universities of 


California, Minnesota, Iowa, and a few colleges like Harvard, 
Yale, Antioch, Sarah Lawrence, Smith, and Vassar. These studies 
have provided material for the most part on metropolitan chil- 
dren ; we do not know enough about the typical problems resulting 
from pressures among rural children, or children in small in- 
dustrial and mining towns. The records which I quoted from 
W.P.A. teachers were part of a small spontaneous co-operative 
project to which these teachers gave time voluntarily. They surely 
indicate the need for more adequate information about children 
and the developmental hazards to which they are exposed. A 
census of children with an appraisal of developmental status in 
terms of health, growth, and mental hygiene is just as important 
as a census of manpower in this country, for the census of children 
is a census of future adjusted, delinquent, hospitalized citizens. 
Such a census should provide information regarding the areas 
where medical help and mental hygiene are most needed, and 
should be accompanied by a census of those workers (social 
psychiatric workers, clinically trained psychologists, psychiatrically 
trained pediatricians) able to see the child as a growing person. 
The basic ideas implicit in what I am saying are implicit also in 
much of the current literature in the field of orthopsychiatry and 
pediatrics. Dr. Benjamin Spock and Dr. Margaret Fries have 
given special attention to the need for an integrated health and 
mental-hygiene approach to children on a nationwide scale. The 
obstacles, if we wait for the initiative of individual communities, 
are the inevitable obstacles of lack of funds, and of the cultural 
lag which means that by slow intellectual osmosis it would take 
a generation or two to make people aware that emotional vitamins 
are just as important as the food vitamins we have been educated 
to over the past twenty-five years. Can we afford to indulge cul- 
tural lag? The skeptic will say that the public is not ready. But 
where the public has been given a chance — as in the instances of 
the child-guidance centers in New Hampshire, in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, in Walworth County, Wisconsin, and other centers 
described in recent issues of the monthly bulletin of the Children's 


Bureau, The Child — the public has been responsive. Parents are 
not so slow to welcome real help for children as we sometimes 
think. The same forces that have turned the nation into a tooth- 
brush-conscious country and that send children to high school *'so 
they'll be able to have a better job than I have" will be ready to 
welcome workers who know how not only to help children be 
happy, but to grow up into healthy-minded citizens of our de- 

Education for Democratic Living in Groups 

In addition to these gross problems which will determine the 
ability of these children to swim, rather than sink, as adults in 
any future structure which our society may have, there are also 
important questions to be raised about the kinds of preparation 
which children are receiving for participation in a democratic 
society when tl^ey become adults. At present, the number of family 
units is increasing at the same time that the number of children 
per family is decreasing. This creates changes in family structure, 
with direct implications for the type of relationships which chil- 
dren will have, their emotional experience, amount of practice in 
carrying responsibility, sharing of work activities, and adapting to 
varying personalities. It is a widespread pattern in middle- and 
upper-class families for infants to be almost completely isolated 
during a large part of the waking day, hygienically protected from 
infection, usually by limiting contacts both with adults and with 
other children to a minimum. Such early experiences of isolation, 
of restricted contacts and activities, are probably major factors in 
the slow and tedious adjustment to social life in preschool and 
early school years. Russia has recognized the relation of early 
socialization to later capacity for social participation. Anthro- 
pologists, such as Margaret Mead, have pointed out the socializing 
effect of early proximity to family activities and neighborhood 
activities among certain primitive groups. The correction of our 
prevailing patterns is probably largely a matter of substituting a 


socially oriented psychology for the narrow "hygiene" approach 
to the development of infants. 

Other factors in the social development of children are less 
external in origin. The ignorance of contemporary parents about 
child development and their lack of ease with children are possible 
of correction by widespread parent education which is also socially 
oriented; but even such a campaign cannot correct the uncon- 
scious conflict in individual parents who project their own insecuri- 
ties and hostility on their children without realizing what they are 
doing. Parents who are afraid to give a child patterns in the 
early years when they are needed, or who cannot succeed in 
guiding children because of their own ignorance of the normal 
experience to which their children are exposed — such parents may 
unwittingly create self -centered and chaotic habits of response 
which will make later co-operative behavior virtually impossible. 
Other parents, on the contrary, reacting against the bad results of 
this type of failure to acculturate the child, may be so determined 
to make the child "behave" that they impose unreasonable demands 
unsuited to the child's age level. This type of handling may bring 
a complete submission, as a result of which the child becomes 
precociously adult and gives up his birthright of spontaneity and 
individual judgment — a result which is not likely to enrich a demo- 
cratic society — or it may bring rebellion and bitterness towards all 
authority identified with the parent. The latter would be likely to 
carry over in the form of adult hostility which makes co-operative 
eflFort impossible. 

The development of democratic personality, then, calls for plan- 
ning just as careful as is needed for well-nourished bodies, 
stable emotions, and attitudes of identification with the demo- 
cratic ideal in the nation as a whole. 

Summary of Needs of Young Children 

I have certainly said enough about what we do not know to 
make it clear that accurate estimates of specific needs cannot be 


made. If there are thirty million children in the United States 
under 14 (twenty million of whom are growing up in families of 
incomes lower than that necessary to maintain a minimum stand- 
ard of decency), it is surely a modest enough estimate to guess 
that 10 to 20 per cent need help with varying degrees of urgency. 
That would make three to six million. Under the present Social 
Security Act, an appropriation of $1,250,000 would allow an 
expenditure of less than 25 cents for each of these children. If we 
realize that we are fighting delinquency, mental breakdown, and 
the kind of personality distortion that produced Hitler, we see that 
it would be like trying to fight a Japanese armada of twenty battle- 
ships with one little tugboat. 

It is not my job to discuss the details of administration in 
Washington. Perhaps the best procedure would be to have the ap- 
propriate individuals in the Department of Agriculture take over 
the problem for rural children, and let the W.P.A. expand to 
include these services for children in mining and factory towns 
where nursery schools have been established. Or perhaps more 
could be done under the aegis of Civilian Defense. The Children's 
Bureau at present has not money enough to do the job that is 
needed across the Potomac in Virginia alone. Perhaps a special 
division should be created, concerned with Children in Wartime, 
in charge of a co-ordinated board of pediatricians, psychiatrists, 
educators, and social workers. Whoever does the job, these things 
must be included as part of the plan : 

1. Direct help to children :{ A) Physical care: impetigo and 
other physical troubles calling for medical help are not uncommon 
in the migratory camps; children are undernourished in workers' 
groups everywhere. 

{B) Direct therapy, through guided play, interviews, and other 
now established methods in the hands of psychiatric social work- 
ers and clinically trained psychologists is needed in many areas. 

(C) Help with environmental problems, such as is now avail- 
able through trained social workers, should be extended. 

2, Education of the public, especially parents and teachers: 


(A) To recognize the meaning of children's difficulties and un- 
derstand the emotional problems underlying psychosomatic symp- 
toms such as nervous vomiting, enuresis, some allergies, delinquent 
or aggressive behavior. 

(B) To be encouraged to give affection along with clear direc- 
tion, more spontaneously. 

3. Direct help to the mother through making health and men- 
tal-hygiene guidance available from pregnancy through delivery, 
infancy, and childhood of her children. The simplest way might 
be through the addition of psychiatric guidance to the health guid- 
ance now available in Well Baby Centers and clinics and the exten- 
sion of such joint mental and physical health clinics. 

4. Research to improve both diagnostic and therapeutic methods 
for dealing with children, and to give a more adequate base for 
planning help where it is most needed. As a result of studies in the 
last ten or fifteen years we are on the verge of being able to use 
paintings, play, Rorschach and intelligence-tests, records of be- 
havior for diagnosis of children's problems, and to develop the 
equipment to handle them. Research grants to centers working on 
these problems of diagnosis could speed the formulation and 
validation of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. 

Hozv About School- Age Children and Adolescents f 

Chiefly we have spoken about the needs of young children. If 
we look at needs of school-age children, beginning with New York, 
we find, for example, eighty thousand children in Harlem (which 
illustrates the situation in many cities). Because of inadequate 
homes, and because of schools which can provide no more than 
the school routine itself, nearly all of these children are in sore 
need of supervised play and hobbies. The Harlem Boys' Club takes 
care of three thousand out of the eighty thousand. Not at all 
unique, unfortunately this situation is characteristic of many met- 
ropolitan areas. Normal play is important for normal growth. It 
is important too for energy and physical development, for provid- 
ing normal motivation in accepting the social standards of one's 
group, for experience in democratic give and take, and the sub- 


limating or redirecting of emotional tensions arising at home. 
The fact that so many children need therapeutic help as a preven- 
tive for delinquency or emotional maladjustment is, of course, in 
part due to the lack of decent play facilities for so many of them. 
This deficiency builds on the deprivation and frustration which we 
pointed out in relation to the infancy and preschool years. Con- 
versely, be it noted, deeply satisfying play and activity outlets can 
release hostility and channel energies that have been distorted in 
the preschool years. 

During adolescence "new strength, new hungers, new associa- 
tions, new insights and new social demands bring a Renaissance to 
personality. Sometimes early childhood patterns persist; usually 
they are modified; occasionally they are transformed for better 
or for worse. The course of any civilization in crisis depends 
rather directly and immediately upon the hopes and fears, toler- 
ances and resentments, enthusiasms, and aggressions, understand- 
ings, goals and purposes of its adolescent citizens. . . . Hitler's 
Mein Kampf shows how adolescent years in Vienna shaped the 
outlook which today dominates the continent of Europe. It is 
common knowledge that this amazing conquest has been made 
possible and is sustained by the fanatical devotion instilled in 
Hitler Jugend, S.A. boys, and the Bund of German Girls. The 
strength of the Soviets rests upon the idealism and sacrificial 
service of the Young Consomols. Every revolution for national 
freedom, including our own American Revolution, has been the 
outcome of passionate self -dedication by youth." 

Thus wrote the editor of this book in the May issue of Pro- 
gressive Education. And he continued, ''The ineptitude of the 
United States in providing for youth will leave historians aghast. 
Everything else has been pushed in ahead of any comprehensive 
program for youth. We will conserve spruce trees, scrap iron, top 
soil and tinfoil before we get around to human resources." The 
same author summarized some of the findings of the various 
studies of youth by the American Youth Commission, the Educa- 


tional Policies Commission, the Progressive Education Associa- 
tion, the N. Y. A. We know that : 

Although national totals have not yet been reported, something 
like one in four of our young men will be rejected for Selective 
Service because of physical defects.* 

Less than one adolescent in ten normally gets one physical ex- 
amination a year. 

90 per cent of high school students get no physiology, hygiene, 
or public-health course. 

Half of our urban youth get inadequate exercise. 

One young person in five has uncorrected or inadequately cor- 
rected visual defects. 

Four out of five young people don't go to a dentist once a year. 

Each year 70,000 die from tuberculosis ; five times that many 
sufifer from it ; and the deaths of young people from tuberculosis 
are twice as frequent in the homes of skilled workers as among 
upper-income families. 

Life expectancy for youth in industry is eight years less than 
for non-industrial workers. 

Nearly 3,000,000 young people live in counties with no general 

One in twenty will spend some time in a hospital for mental 

More than one in ten is badly handicapped by preventable per- 
sonality maladjustment. 

One in five is a social isolate, seldom chosen as a companion for 
work or play. 

Half of American youth get their only sex education from the 
talk of friends. 

One in six will seek divorce, and half the group will consider 
their marriage (or celibacy) a mistake. 

Three-quarters of American youth frequently feel inferiority, 
guilt, and inadequacy so burdensome as to constitute a handicap 
in school, work, and social life. 

The unemployment rate is higher in the youth group than for 
any other working age. 

* By the standards initially required, half of the boys were being found unfit. 


Three out of four young people growing up on farms in Amer- 
ica will not be needed for agricultural production. 

For the past decade, half the young people out of school and 
ready to work have been unable to find work. 

Half of the young people working (in Maryland in 1936) were 
paid less than $13 a week. 

Nine out of ten of the Maryland young people working in fac- 
tories disliked their work and wished they could get something 

The C.C.C. and N.Y.A. have never provided for more than a 
fifth of the unemployed youth. 

The chief reason why youths leave school is that they have to 
go to work. 

75 per cent of the youths who leave school for work do so with 
no vocational guidance. 

The number desiring to enter professions is four to five times 
as large as the number of available openings. 

90 per cent of the jobs youths get require less than a year's 
preparation; most, less than a month. 

Not more than 2 per cent of unemployed youth are content to 
be idle, and these have been discouraged by frustration of their 
previous efforts. 

Favored sections of our communities are overrun with compet- 
ing youth-serving agencies, while underprivileged sections show 
few clubs. 

In rural America, except for churches, nine out of ten young 
people belong to no organization. 

Youth listens to the radio more than it reads. 

Playfields and athletic fields number less than a third of what 
are needed. 

"There is a 90 per cent deficiency in the public recreation per- 
sonnel of urban communities and a 96 per cent deficiency for rural 

A third of all persons arrested are under 25 years of age, 
whereas among those charged with auto theft, nearly 75 per cent 
are under 25. 

85 per cent of high school pupils will not go to college but, espe- 


cially in small communities, sterile academic college requirements 
dominate their high-school curriculum. 

School curricula only rarely deal directly and helpfully with the 
major life activities of youth. 

Less than half of the young people entering ninth grade in New 
York State, where expenditures for education are highest, finish 
their high-school course. 

In some school districts taxable values per child are 100 times 
as great as the resources available in other districts, even in the 
same state. 

The farm population, with 9 per cent of the nation's income, 
must educate 31 per cent of the nation's children. 

The southeastern states educate one-fourth of the nation's chil- 
dren with only one-tenth of the nation's income. 

2 per cent of our young people are illiterate, but ten times that 
number could well be called subliterate, doing practically no read- 

More than half of American youth would welcome opportunity 
for more education than they see a chance to get. 

For Negroes, and to some extent for other minority groups, all 
these problems are aggravated. 

Disability due to serious illness is 40 per cent higher among 
Negro than among white workers. 

Mortality rates from respiratory tuberculosis are ten times as 
high for Negroes under 20 years of age as for whites in the same 
age range. 

More than half of Negro youth have never been to a dentist. 

The proportion of unemployment among Negro youths in their 
early twenties is a third higher than for whites. 

The median wage for Negro young people (in Maryland) is 
slightly more than half the low wage paid to white youths. 

Four Negro farmers out of five are tenants. 

160,000 Negro youths live in counties where there is no high 
school for them. 

In five Southern states, less than 10 per cent of the Negro 
population between 15 and 20 years of age are in high school. 

In South Carolina and Alabama, in 1930, one Negro out of 
every four was reported as illiterate. 


In 12 Southern states, four out of five Negro youths have no 
access to a library. 

Arrests for Negro youth are two to four times as frequent as 
among whites. 

Per capita expenditures for Negro education in 11 Southern 
states are only about one-fourth of the provision for whites. 

In 15 states, from the day of his birth the Negro is segregated, 
with unequal accommodations. 

When the Negro becomes 21 he may not vote in the primary 
elections of 10 states; he is taxed without representation, dis- 
criminated against in sanitation, housing, and recreational facilities. 

In spite of all of our information, of the appallingly stark 
clarity of the need for training, for recreation, for guidance in 
problems, for work opportunities, little effort has been made to 
meet these needs. City governments are responsible for sewers and 
for fire departments — not for any of those activities for youth 
which will keep them out of personality conflagrations and the 
sewers of apathy and disillusion. That each community needs its 
Board of Youth just as it needs a Board of Health has been sug- 
gested by Watson. Health and guidance services to youth could 
certainly be co-ordinated with the plans for health and guidance of 
children as a whole. Recreation, vocational preparation, prepara- 
tion for marriage, and other needs of youth might better be 
handled separately. An over-all program would therefore include 
the following: 

1. Health and guidance centers which would make available 
help for the child and his parents from pregnancy through the 
whole growing-up period of the child. Both prophylactic and 
therapeutic work would be available. 

2. Extension of activity programs from nursery school through 
adolescence, through the extension of nursery schools themselves, 
the establishment of clubs for out-of-school hours of elementary- 
school children, and training and recreation centers for adolescents. 

Education of parents and teachers so that these services could be 


co-ordinated with home and school facilities would be an impor- 
tant part of the job of workers in both kinds of centers. 

Postscript Under Bomber Patrols 

Most of this chapter was written with the war only a threaten- 
ing shadow. As I conclude the writing, war has been declared, 
first by Japan, then by Germany and Italy. Tuesday * many people 
in the New York area were intensely disturbed by the air-raid 
alarms ; by Wednesday, healthy children, even from families who 
were sending no sons into the army or navy, were already showing 
the effects of tension. I had been working for some weeks with 
Robert, a sensitive and eager boy just three. An impressionable 
child, he had become very constrained as a result of his oversensi- 
tive response to pressure in his comfortable though rather tense 
home. At first he had conversed only with yes and no. Although 
he would excitedly touch fingers to finger paint, looking up with 
a smile of delight, he could go no further. His play with toys was 
equally constricted. After a few sessions of play, together with 
discussions with his mother by our parent consultant, he had 
begun to paint with real freedom ; in fact, he got into the paint in 
an all-over way, backs as well as fronts of hands, and up to his 
elbows. He played with the toys, alternating rigid lines of cars 
and people with messy piles of unorganized playthings. He had 
begun to talk in phrases and occasional sentences instead of yes 
and no. Now, the first day after the anxiety of possible air raids, 
the progress was all lost. Again he would not paint, he would not 
play, he would not talk. The parent consultant remarked that his 
mother had said that morning that "it was hard not to get terribly 
irritated with the children when one was so upset about what was 

There are thousands of Roberts in this country — no, millions. 
For many of them the hazards of war — insecurity, anxiety, ten- 

* December 9, 194L 


sion — are merely a slight exaggeration of the hazards of our 
so-called peace. ''We ain't got nuthin' for keeps." ''There isn't any 
place for myself." "I don't like anybody, much . . . because I'm 

A recent national conference of workers with young children 
took as the keynote of the conference, "Life, liberty, and happi- 
ness for children, now." This means, at least, in addition to a 
decent home in which to eat, sleep, and grow, adequate recreation 
and work opportunities for all children, adequate health guid- 
ance, together with the actual food and the correctional work to 
give point to such guidance, adequate mental-health guidance, 
both for children, directly (which means too the training of more 
workers, more psychiatrically trained pediatricians and nurses, as 
well as more nursery schools and guidance centers), and for 
parents, through co-ordinating mental-health services with medical 
services now available and additional ones needed. 

England has had to add eight or ten child-guidance centers to 
its provision for child care, since the outbreak of war, because of 
the difficulties and strain experienced by children in wartime. Why 
should we wait until we also are flooded with problems of dis- 
turbed, enuretic, aggressive, war-shocked children? All of the 
provisions for child care which bombs may force upon us sooner 
or later are needed now, and will be needed not only by the 
bombed-out or evacuated children of San Francisco or New York, 
but even more by the children of the sharecroppers in Arkansas, 
the miners in West Virginia, the factory workers in Ohio. 


The Morale of Youth Groups 

RONAT n T TPPTTT Research and Statistical Sery- 

KONALD LlFFlil ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^f America 

THIS chapter will attempt to interpret the findings of those 
studies which have focused upon the behavior of face-to- 
face youth groups. The discussion of attitudes among 
college students is the subject of a separate section.* 

There are rather great limitations imposed upon the present 
discussion by the fact that only within the past few years have 
social scientists and group workers become interested in studying 
intensively the interpersonal dynamics of primary child and youth 
groupings. Rather than make any effort to summarize separately 
the findings of the several studies, the aim of the following dis- 
cussion is to present a series of derived generalizations about 
"youth morale." These statements and interpretations are an at- 
tempt to tie together under headings which have seemed appro- 
priate to the writer the various strands of data he has run across 
which are relevant to the topic of this volume. The volume of 
data upon which the various generalizations are based varies 
greatly, and of course the realm of youth groups to which a 
particular generalization will be applicable will vary also. 

Definition of Youth-group Morale 

The majority of the definitions of morale — which are multi- 
plying so rapidly — tend either to emphasize "personal morale" and 
deal with individual attitudes, hopes, etc., or to discuss "group 
morale" in terms of goals, the meeting of frustration, trust in 

* See Chapter XII, "Student Morale," by Joe and Eugenia Belden. 



leadership, etc.* The writer finds these two aspects of the defini- 
tion so interdependent that no clear-cut distinction will be at- 
tempted in the present discussion; rather, morale will be defined 
in terms of the following subheadings of the chapter : 

1. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with group life. 

2. Interpersonal relations and group structures. 

3. Origin of the forces making for group cohesion and unity. 

4. Meeting of group emergencies and frustrations. 

5. Group and individual goals, productivity, and time perspec- 

If these categories do not touch on certain major emphases in 
the reader's definition of group morale, it is unfortunately the 
case that few research workers who have been studying the pri- 
mary group process in youth groups have been oriented by the 
"morale concept" in carrying on their observations and experi- 
ments. "Leadership" too would most certainly be included as a 
category if another chapter were not dealing with this area.f As 
it is, the relation of adult leadership in group functioning in all 
of the above-mentioned areas will be obvious at every turn of the 

Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with Group Life 

Generalization 1 : A goodly proportion of American youth 
groups, up through the college ages, adjusts with evidences of un- 
questioning satisfaction to dominating adult leadership ft which is 
''benevolent" and friendly hut nevertheless initiative-destroying 
and completely controlling most areas of potential freedom — in- 
cluding that of the formation of policy. 

* For a definition combining the two aspects, see Chapter I, "The Nature of 
Democratic Morale," by Gordon W. Allport. 

t See Chapter VIII, "Morale and the Training of Leaders," by Alex Bavelas. 

tt "Leadership" as used in this discussion is an all-inclusive term to denote 
the behavior of all persons occupying "central roles" in the life of children's 
groups — whether adult or child, democratic or dominative. 


In practice, if not in our more lucid moments, many of us as 
leaders of youth groups in the classroom, on the playground, or 
in the club rooms, are tempted to use symptoms of ''group satis- 
faction" as the chief criteria as to whether there is a healthy state 
of morale in the groups we are dealing with. 

In one of the writer's classes a general discussion was under 
way on the topic, ''What do adults do to keep high school students 
from growing up ?" The participants were adolescents and a num- 
ber of their high-school teachers. One of the girls on the panel 
came to the point of the discussion rather suddenly with the re- 
mark, "They [adults] try to keep us happy and think they are 
playing fair." A teacher on the panel responded, "If you are happy 
in school, doesn't that mean you are learning lots of things ?" The 
girl came back quickly, "It doesn't mean we are growing up!" 
The teacher pushed the point a little further : "Well, if the teachers 
weren't here, do you think you would grow up better?" "I don't 
know," was the reply. When at this point one of the college stu- 
dents from the floor remarked that maybe the rebels were the 
healthy children in some school systems, he was frowned out of 
court by the participating teachers on the panel. 

During the course of an experiments^ with several clubs of 
sixth-grade boys who had both democratic and authoritarian club 
leadership, one of the boys remarked to an interviewer : "I like 
him — he's a swell leader. I'd rather have somebody plan a job for 
me any day than to have to plan it out by myself." Between 60 
per cent and 70 per cent of the behavior of this particular leader 
fell in categories which could be labelled "direct control of child 
behavior" and "nonconstructive criticism." * 

In another experiment with a class of college sophomores ^^ an 
attempt was being made by the instructor to get the class to as- 
sume new areas of self -responsibility. At the end of the second 
week a committee of students approached him with the request 

* For a further discussion of the behavior of children in democratic and auto- 
cratic groups, see also Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt 


that he resume his practice of taking roll at the beginning of the 
class. They were finding it too hard to get out of bed and to class 
on time for this rather early morning class, when they knew no 
record of their attendance was being taken. 

Mowrer ^^ notes in his observations on group life in the cottage 
of a children's institution that authoritarian adult practices call 
forth docilely dependent and nondiscontented behavior on the part 
of some of the children observed. Such an observation is in line 
too with the findings of Lewin, Lippitt, and White ^^ that three of 
their five clubs under authoritarian leadership showed a submis- 
sive nonrebellious response to a strongly dominated club atmos- 
phere; even in personal interviews with the leader absent about 
half of the club members gave no evidence of piled-up tension as 
the result of such domination. The observations of Bavelas^ as 
well, reported elsewhere in this volume, indicate that children 
come voluntarily to play without rebellion under adult leaders 
whose behavior is made up largely (from 50 per cent to 70 per 
cent) of "direct control" over the child members of the group 
(e.g., he "gives orders," "refuses permission," "makes a strong 

These and other studies lead to the generalization that in our 
present American culture groups of children ranging from the 
preschool ages up through the college years seem often to react 
with satisfaction to adult domination of their group life. There 
are still other observations to indicate that many of these youth 
react even with considerable dissatisfaction to what group workers 
and progressive educators would call democratic leadership. 

In order that the terms authoritarian, democratic, and laissez- 
faire or let-them-alone leadership may be used in a more meaning- 
ful context during the rest of this discussion. Figure 1 has been 
inserted at this point to supply an "operational definition" in terms 
of actual observed behavior under these three descriptive phrases. 
The figure indicates the number of incidents of leader-behavior 
in each of the categories of leader-child contact during the course 












50 100 150 ZOO 250 

PSSOLure scoRe 



Fig. 1. An "operational definition" of democratic, authoritarian, and 
laissez-faire leadership of a group of sixth-graders. 


of six club meetings. These examples come from three of the Iowa 
clubs studied by Lewin, Lippitt, and White.^^ 

It seems evident that the presence or absence of satisfaction 
with group life on the part of the group members does not serve 
as a symptom for discriminating between dominated and demo- 
cratically led child groups in our culture. The particular focus of 
the groups' satisfaction and dissatisfaction will need to be ex- 
amined further in relation to other criteria of group morale. 

Generalization 2 : Groups of youth given nearly ''complete 
freedom'' seem to evidence more symptoms of frustration and dis- 
satisfaction than those groups under authoritarian domination. 

We haven't been doing much in the club, just loafing along. I'd 
rather be given something to do. 

Our leader lets us do mostly what we want to do. He doesn't 
give us many ideas. 

The Club is pretty good but we ought to organize better. 

I don't like our clubmaster. He lets us do what we want to do 
and that's no fun. He doesn't make any suggestions. 

These comments are examples from interviews'^ with eleven- 
year-old boys about their laissez-faire club leaders who, though 
supplying their groups with materials and technical information, 
were withholding leadership in discussion and other guidance. 

We aren't given any definite topics for discussion. I would pre- 
fer to use a text and have something definite to study each day. 

The weakness of the course was that the instructor left it up 
to me and the rest of the students. ... I believe the instructor 
should get up there and talk. 

I think we should have things more definite rather than being 
given suggestions and left on our own. 

And these are excerpts from the statements of college sopho- 
mores '^ about a college course which many progressive educators 
would have rated as only ''mildly democratic." 

There is considerable evidence, then, statistical as well as quali- 
tative, to bear out the interpretation that giving out ''areas of 


freedom" to youth who, as a group, do not have the social tech- 
niques to deal with freedom or, as individuals, the personal tech- 
niques to ''structure the unstructured field," results in greater 
disruption of group and personal morale than subordination to a 
dominating leader who "makes things definite" and ''gives you 
things to do." 

Group observations have noted a rather definite cycle of bore- 
dom and outbreaks of horseplay in the atmosphere of a group 
under conditions of total freedom. Perhaps having something to 
do serves as a channel for release in autocratic atmospheres. But 
beyond this there is in addition evidence of less tension in groups 
under a "benevolent autocracy." Clearly, then, freedom for the 
child or the child group must be thought of in positive rather 
than in negative terms — the extension of the child's control over 
his environment and his adjustment to larger responsibilities 
rather than the mere withdrawal of adult permissions or of re- 
strictions upon activity. 

Generalization 3 : The groups which show highest dissatis- 
faction with authoritarian leadership are those able to contrast 
this experience with contiguous or simultaneous democratic group 

We may raise the question, in the light of Generalization 1, 
as to what kind of educational experience youth groups can be 
given which will bring about intelligent rebellion against authori- 
tarian domination whenever it is imposed upon them. Several 
recent observations would seem to offer one clue to this problem 
of stimulating a readiness for rebellion. 

One group in the study by Lewin, Lippitt, and White started 
out with an authoritarian leader, next had a democratic adult, and 
ended their club history with another authoritarian leader. The 
group showed a completely submissive, dependent response to the 
first authoritarian leader. After an experience of genuine demo- 
cratic freedom, however, the group showed only half as much 
dependence on its second autocratic leader, tripled the amount of 


activities looking toward escape from the present situation, and 
gave evidence of considerably more frustration (e.g., interper- 
sonal aggressiveness doubled). The first individual interviews 
with the boys — just after their first experience with autocracy — 
indicated considerable contentment with their child life and no 
insight into the leader's behavior pattern. The final interviews — 
after the democratic experience and a renewed autocracy — tell a 
different story: 

Mr. D. A. [second autocrat] was just the opposite of R. L. 
[democratic leader]. I think R. L. was the finest ... he let us 
choose what we wanted to do . . . he'd mention things and then we 
could decide on them. D. A. knew who should do things. He 
thought of things we couldn't have thought . . . but he knew how 
he wanted things done. 

I like R. L. best of all. If we were started on something, we 
could finish it without being interrupted. If he had an idea or we 
had an idea, then we'd vote on them and take the best idea. . . . 
D. A. [second autocrat] had things to do that were interesting 
all right . . . but he was too strict. 

It is interesting to note in reading the interviews of this group 
that the boys reacted with dissatisfaction to their second auto- 
cratic leader but did not recall their first authoritarian leader as of 
the same sort. Actually the behavior patterns of the two leaders 
were very similar. 

A relationship between the club leadership and the behavior of 
the adults in the boys' own homes was in several cases also dis- 
covered. Boys coming from either emotionally warm, consistently 
lenient or emotionally cold, inconsistently strict homes reacted 
most rebelliously to domination by the club leader. The former 
type of boy was reacting against domination on the strength of 
his experience with parental democracy; the latter was rebelling 
because all adults were to be distrusted, and you "should see how 
far you can go with them." 

Might it not be that planned experiences in genuine classroom 


democracy and autocracy, followed by analysis in discussion of 
the contrasting experiences, would be one of the best educational 
projects for building in youth a tough-fibered intelligent resistance 
to domination ? Would it, one may ask, make things too tough for 
lots of teachers, parents, recreation leaders, and college professors? 
Well, and why not? 

Interpersonal Relations and Group Structures 

The "sociometric questionnaire" ^* has been a significant im- 
petus in revealing some of the important relationships between 
lines of friendship and rejection and group functioning. Other 
observers of group structure have focused their attention on com- 
munication groupings, activity subgroupings, and the evidences 
of status hierarchies. A research toehold has been won in this 
area — but most of the climbing is yet to come. 

Generalization 4 : Spontaneity, friendliness, ''depth of inter- 
personal relationships,'' and a minimum of interpersonal irrita- 
tions result from a group situation where children are given an 
optimum (not a maximum) of freedom. 

Curfman,'^ who made a careful experimental analysis of the 
effects of contrasting leadership on two clubs of children in a 
recreation center, includes in her interpretation of results the 
following : 

The children in the authoritarian group seemed to behave more 
as automatons than as personalities. . . . There was little conver- 
sation and long periods of silence . . . not more than three or four 
times throughout the entire series of meetings did the conversation 
concern anything but the task at hand ... it was doubtful if the 
group knew each other any better on the last day than they did 
at the first club meeting, judging from the results of the personal 

The children who presented themselves at the first meeting of 
the democratic group gradually emerged as personalities, each 


making a definite contribution to the total behavior pattern. The 
active interplay of egos lent a quality of animation. . . . There was 
a constant stream of conversation which strayed frequently out- 
of-field with accounts of personal oddities, ambitions, experiences, 
etc. Friendships developed which led to plans for getting together 
outside the club. 

This finding by Cur f man concerning the greater breadth and 
the more intensely personal quality of the conversation in the 
democratic atmosphere is upheld by»the findings of Lewin, Lippitt, 
and White, who used a similar category in their own observations. 
Similarly, Kephart discovered in an experiment with self-govern- 
ment in a cottage of a children's institution ^' ^^ that interpersonal 
problems arose much less frequently in this type of social organ- 
ization than in the other cottages. 

The development of close interpersonal relationships in the 
child group means, of course, that channels of social control from 
within the group have been established. Jennings ^ shows this fact 
clearly in her important study of child leadership, and Mowrer ^® 
comments from his study of a cottage of "problem children" : 

In the self-government situation the children became much freer 
in their relationships with the adults, able to share their phantasies 
and to speak about matters which, because of previous anxieties 
or resentments, would have been impossible to discuss. Soon cot- 
tage meetings came to be used as an occasion for reporting com- 
mendable as well as objectionable behavior, and an additional mo- 
tive for good behavior, in the desire for group praise, was thus 
added to the already existing influence of group disapproval. . . . 
Children seem to react to the autocratic atmosphere . . . either by 
a surrender of individuality and a lifelong seeking after and de- 
pendence upon so-called ''leaders" however demagogic, or by iden- 
tifying themselves with this system and struggling, by means foul 
or fair, to become "leaders" themselves. 

Yet it does not follow from the above observations that *'the 
greater the freedom, the more beneficial the results in child inter- 
personal relations," as other findings reveal. The findings on 



groups under laissez-faire leadership, for example, reveal a height- 
ened interpersonal irritability as compared to the more "adult- 
sheltered" democratic clubs. For each particular child group one 
must think in terms of an optimum rather than a maximum free- 
dom from adults. 

Generalization 5 : Dependence on an adult dominator residts 
in a member-leader type of group structure which inhibits the 
formation of spontaneous member-member subgroupings of high 
interdependence (in communication or activity). 

Two types of subgroup structure have been observed in several 
of the group studies '^' ^^' ^^ — subgroupings based on interde- 
pendence of activity, and structure based on conversational sub- 
groupings. The observations reveal that in the atmosphere of an 
authoritarian group the main channels of interdependence are in 
the relationship of each group member with the dominator. This 
circumstance is revealed, for example, in the frequency with 
which the children make dependent ''direction-demanding" ap- 
proaches to the leader as well as the frequency with which the 
members make demands on him for attention as compared to de- 
mands on their fellow members. 

Table L Comparison of the behavior of an average member in different 

social climates 

Social climate 

Aggressive autocracy- 
Submissive autocracy 






from leader 


from 4 fellow 






The type of leader-member group structure suggested by the 
high dependence on the dominator in the table above is borne out 
by other observations which indicate that in such a social structure 


few member-member subgroupings of a stable type develop. 
Rather, the individual member's relationship to the ''central per- 
son" pervades the entire group structure. The implications of this 
finding for the prediction of change in group morale when the 
leader is removed will be discussed in a later paragraph. It should 
be noted in the table, however, that the members of the demo- 
cratic and laissez-faire groups seek (and receive) most of their 
"social response" from fellow members rather than the dominator. 

Generalization 6: Too much freedom or too little freedom 
in the leadership of child and youth groups both seem to residt in 
the rise of ''status consciousness" and tendencies toward the de- 
velopment of a ''status hierarchy" in the group structure. 

Observations of groups given "too much freedom" have indi- 
cated that the members had a strong need to "get things organized" 
and to "know where I stand" in the group organization. One 
group of eleven-year-olds in an atmosphere where they were very 
much let alone, spent a great deal of time giving one another mili- 
tary ranks and then quarreling over which ranks were higher and 
"who could tell who." It was noted that several boys from very 
firm "adultish" homes were especially preoccupied with the prob- 
lem of just where they stood in the group and were most meticu- 
lous about "ofHcial relationships." 

In the social climate of the authoritarian group, the bases for 
■striving toward self-centered status seem quite different. The ob- 
servations of Curfman, Mowrer, and Lippitt and White indicate 
that probably a psychology of status-climbing develops not in the 
"submissive autocracies" but only in the "aggressive autocracies," 
where frustration is strong. In these latter situations a higher 
percentage of personal pronouns, "I, me, mine," as compared to 
collective pronouns "We, our, us," has been found, together with 
more frequent attempts to beat one another in seeking the atten- 
tion of the leader and in gaining the privileges of bossing the rest. 
It is interesting in this connection to note that the two boys who 
were picked on as scapegoats in one club were boys who in the 


original sociometric test, before the experiment began, had been 
selected as leaders by their fellows. Getting the best of someone 
higher up seemed to offer a satisfaction which could not be gained 
from picking on the weakest members of the group. 

Origin of the Forces Making for Group Cohesion 
and Unity 

In the writer's opinion too little attention has been paid to the 
distinction between what might be called "negative" and '^positive" 
morale, i.e., the distinction between groups which stick together 
because of hostile pressures from without the group and groups 
whose source of cohesion lies chiefly in the mutual clicking of 
their personalities or their joint enthusiasm for certain goals 
(other than the defeat of an out-group). Wright ^^ discovered 
some very interesting results when he placed children together in 
a negative frustration field. 

Generalization 7 : Whether the group's interpersonal unity is 
derived from mutual resistance to external pressures or from 
spontaneous inner sources of cohesion is a fact of considerable 
importance both in determining the extent to which the group will 
resist disrupting forces and persist in its efforts toward goal attain- 
ment, and in determining what channelization the tension re- 
sulting from group frustration will take. 

Each of the phases of the above generalization will be men- 
tioned in the following section on emergencies and frustrations. 
It is of interest at this point, however, to raise a question con- 
cerning the seeming lack of either positive or negative forces of 
cohesion in some of the groups showing a submissive reaction to 
adult dominations; but, because the mechanism of giving up 
seemed to diminish to a minimum any felt needs for status, strong 
disruptive forces did not develop either. It was as though these 
group members were to quite an extent individuals living along- 
side one another rather than with one another in their group rela- 


tionships — and were held together largely by the material privileges 
of group membership and dependence upon the adult dominator. 

Meeting of Group Emergencies and Frustrations 

Generalization 8: When the individual having leadership 
status is removed from the child group, the purposeful activity of 
the authoritarian groups tends to disintegrate; whereas the demo- 
cratic and laissez-faire groups are little affected. 

To the writer one of the best criteria of satisfactory or unsatis- 
factory democratic morale in a youth group is found in the man- 
ner in which the group functions in the absence of its adult leader. 
The whisper, "teacher is out of the room," is an important symp- 
tom in our educational system. 

In an analysis of three groups showing a submissive "con- 
scientious" response to adult domination, the portion of time 
spent in seriously working dropped from 74 per cent while the 
leader was in the room to 29 per cent while he was out of the 
room. "Distracted work efforts" increased from 6 per cent to 
20 per cent. The qualitative observations of these periods when 
the leader had been called out of the room describe a gradual 
increase in physical activity, an increasing turning away from the 
club work for short periods, and a rise in the amount and loudness 
of the conversation as the period of absence lengthened. The speed 
with which boys loosened up, to be sure, revealed great individual 
differences. For certain boys the leader appeared to be psychologi- 
cally present for quite a while — even after he had departed 
physically. The two groups showing an aggressive reaction to 
autocracy showed even a greater proportionate drop in work 
motivation during the absence of the adult, and their substitute 
activities were likewise a much more aggressive type of "release" 
than those of the submissive autocracy. As contrasted to these 
60 per cent and 70 per cent drops in motivation, the democratically 
led clubs dropped only 8 per cent in serious work during the 


periods of absence of their adult leader; and in the laissez-faire 
clubs, as would be expected, the adult's presence or absence made 
little noticeable difference. "Cohesion through mutual dependence" 
on a central person is a frequent phenomenon in American youth 
groupings, one which to the writer constitutes a danger signal tO' 
our morale. 

Generalization 9 : Groups united by positive cohesive forces 
show greater persistence when meeting failure in striving toward 
group goals than groups united by negative external pressures. 

French's very significant study of the reaction to the frustration 
of group goals in organized (presence of positive interpersonal 
relationship) and unorganized (no basis of interpersonal rela- 
tions) groups of youth of college age ^' ^ reveals greater motivation 
in meeting difficulties on the part of the organized groups. 
Similarly, the club records from Lippitt's ^^ study reveal the man- 
ner in which a democratic club and an aggressive authoritarian 
club met work frustrations. In the first case the group spontane- 
ously organized its efforts for a new attack, whereas in the second 
case recriminations and reactions of personal blame so disrupted 
the group effort as to destroy the goal-directed motivation. 

Comparative observations of a group united by rebellion against 
their leader ^^ and a club united by a keen interest in mutual work "^ 
are to the point here. Although in the former case frustration 
seemed to bring out group disruption along the potential lines of 
cleavage (scapegoat, minority group, etc.), in the latter cases the 
group actually resisted the efforts of the experimenter to set up 
lines of cleavage which would offer the chance for group disrup- 
tion. This study of Gordon's is discussed more fully in the next 

Generalization 10: In meeting frustrations, child groups 
united by positive cohesion offer more resistance to disruption and 
cleavage, and usually relieve frustration tensions through more 
appropriate channels, than do groups held together by negative 


In Gordon's study, girls' marionette clubs were organized on a 
basis which would encourage lines of in-group cleavage. Six girls 
came from one school and three from another. The three, given 
tasks which were labeled as less important, were made subordinate 
to the "majority group." From the conversation of the girls it was 
clear that lines of differentiation had been successfully established, 
yet, on the other hand, the whole group was both highly motivated 
by its group goal and interdependent in its communication and 
work. When group frustrations were introduced, the group proved 
remarkably resistant to disruption. To the observers the situation 
presented a striking picture of discrimination against a clearly 
set-up minority group which did not result in much group disrup- 
tion, and this because of the ''positive cohesive forces" derived 
from a very attractive group goal. 

In the study of 12 club atmospheres by Lewin, Lippitt, and 
White,^^ a controlled group frustration was introduced into each 
type of social structure. A strange adult, entering the club during 
the absence of the leader, criticized the work of individual mem- 
bers and the group as a whole. Several channels of release of 
tension were here possible: (1) acceptance of the criticism as 
warranted and the establishment of a self -critical attitude; (2) 
occurrence of a group cleavage, so that group blame could be 
expressed toward a scapegoat or minority group; (3) a general 
pattern of in-group irritability with "everyone against everyone" ; 
(4) attack against an out-group (the club meeting in the adjacent 
club space); (5) attack against the source of frustration, the 
strange adult; (6) taking it out on the leader when he came back; 
(7) attack against inanimate objects (furniture, etc.). For other 
groups there are doubtless other channels available. 

Figure 2 gives a sample analysis of the manner in which three 
clubs handled their tension in this situation of group frustration. 
The analysis of each club meeting is broken down into ten-minute 
units ( Normal = leader and boys present, L. out = leader out, 
Str. in = stranger in). The reader will probably agree that taking 
it out on the stranger himself, or on inanimate objects (the de- 




Meeiing of 16 


" i vrf 

piniinrj^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 n 

I M I M 




I I I I . Ll I I 


L. out 

L. out 
S+r. in. 

Sir. in 


I < > t 
Sir. ouf 

3 32 


Frustration (- 
Meeting of t. ,/. 
Democratic $> "o 
Club °- 






Meeting of 
Aggressive ^6 

*%» ^ ^ ^^0( 



ll I I I I I I 

M I I I I I 

— — — ^ ,11111 t-WI,^^— _^1I 

I ' I ' 1 1 1? ;-.„.— ..j^ — )L>. '>.'vjv-~Jl 


Str in 

Str. in 

L.back Break-up 



Str. in 

Str. in 

Str. out 

Child-child aggression '^'-'^ Child oui-group aggression 

— — — Child-leader aggression -o-oo-o Inanimate object aggression 
'^^^ Child-stranger aggression ' ' 1 1 In- group friendliness 

Fig. 2. Channels of group tension release in clubs of eleven-year-old boys 
under different types of leadership. 


struction of a large club sign in this case), as was the case in the 
democratic club (see figure 2), are more constructive channeliza- 
tions of frustration tensions than such in-group aggression or un- 
instigated out-group attacks as were the predominant outlets of the 
submissive autocracy and the aggressive autocracy. Although self- 
criticism did not occur frequently enough to place on the graph, 
it did occur in the reactions of several of the members of the most 
submissive autocracies. The boys who showed this most unhealthy 
reaction to unjustified criticism were boys coming from what 
might be called ''adult-value-centered" homes where there existed 
also, as it happened, a warm relationship between parents and 
child, so that a strong conscientiousness about living up to adult 
expectations had developed without, however, any exercise of 
individual evaluation of these expectations. 

If group frustrations can be as effectively released against 
"depersonalized" objects (the club sign) as is evidenced in this 
particular example, the question may be posed as to whether it may 
not be possible for educators and group therapists to provide more 
productive and creative channels of group outlet having equal 
substitute value. This statement does not imply that the writer 
believes an attack upon the stranger to have been a nonconstructive 
channel in the situation described above ; it was certainly the most 
appropriate in that case. But there is great educational need for 
the development of a "hierarchy of appropriateness" of substitute 
group releases which can be utilized in the progressive leadership 
of youth groups as they face inevitable frustrations. 

Group and Individual Goals, Productivity, and 
Time Perspective 

In the writer's opinion too much of our thinking about morale 
has been focused upon such factors as resistance to disintegration 
(see Generalization 10 above) rather than upon such factors as 
productivity, enthusiasms for member responsibility, personal 


sacrifice for group goals, and so on. The data in such areas as 
group creativity are almost nonexistent. 

Generalization 1 1 : More "we-centered" constructive sugges- 
tions for the improvement of group practices and group policy 
arise from, youth groups under democratic adult guidance and hav- 
ing spontaneous cohesion than from groups in a freer (laissez- 
faire) or less free (authoritarian) climate. 

French^ found a higher level of participation by all members in 
meeting group problems in his organized groups than in his un- 
organized groups. Lewin, Lippitt, and White had in their analysis 
a category, "contributions to group thinking," v^hich indicated 
that the democratic and laissez-faire groups were much more v^e- 
centered in their thinking than clubs under authoritarian leader- 
ship. Although the group-centered orientation of the laissez-faire 
members was high, the number of constructive decisions arrived 
at was low, because of the lack of social techniques needed for 
carrying through the formation of policy. Strong evidence in favor 
of the generalization above comes from the data of Anderson ^' ^ 
on integrative and dominating teacher behavior and its effect upon 
the co-operation and productiveness of the classroom group. 
Bavelas, in his study reported more fully elsewhere in this volume, 
found that as certain leaders went through a training process to 
carry out more democratic procedures of leadership in recreation, 
the child groups improved both in ''the efficiency of work organ- 
ization" and "the quality and output of the work." 

Generalization 12 : Significant gains in positive democratic 
group morale (enthusiasm for the responsible use of new free- 
doms, motivation to productive group thinking, etc.) have been 
made by providing for youth groups a genuine experience under 
authoritarian leadership followed by comparative analysis of their 
democratic and authoritarian experience. 

Miss Mariann MarshalP^ in a progressive camp school was 
faced one day by the following questions from her group : "If 


the dictators died, would everything be all right in Europe?" 
"What does democracy — or whatever it is — mean?" The ensuing 
discussion led to a culminating decision ; ''Let's try having a dic- 
tator for a day; then we'll try the other kind." The following day 
the teacher carried through a genuine authoritarian schoolteacher 
pattern. There was no attempt to ''imitate Hitler," but rather an 
attempt to interpret the authoritarian pattern as adapted to the 
situation of a child group in the classroom — this is in contrast to 
the foolishly uneducational "dictator 'days" which some schools 
have attempted, where the imitation of an unreal, for the children, 
political pattern rather than a genuine childhood autocracy has 
been attempted. 

Following this experience, the children held a discussion on 
their reactions. Such comments were forthcoming as : "It felt 
funny down here (indicating his chest) ; I couldn't breathe very 
well." "I feel as if I'd been dragged through a hole." "It was all 
right in the morning, but I felt sick in the afternoon when I had 
to do art and you kept telling me what to do all the time." "I was 
mad at you [the teacher]." "I felt like hitting somebody." "I'll 
never vote for a dictator again." 

As a result of this experience Marshall observed significant 
changes in the functioning of her classroom group. Much more 
importance was attached to handling freedom wisely and respon- 
sibly, and group controls functioned more significantly. Clearly 
a positive growth in "democratic literacy" at the behavior level 
had taken place. 

One of the groups studied in the Iowa club experiment had a 
democratic leader followed by an authoritarian adult and finally 
another democratic person. The data reveal a significant drop in 
dependent approaches to the adult in the second democracy as 
compared to the first, more friendliness and appreciation for their 
leader as a person rather than just a "provider," a sharp drop in 
in-group aggressiveness from first to second democracy, and a 
significant rise in friendliness and willingness to depend on one 
another for suggestions and approval rather than on the leader. 


Although they had been lukewarm toward the first democratic 
experience, the boys were enthusiastic about the second after they 
had their experience with a benevolent autocrat. 

One genuine school "dictatorship day" with which the writer 
is familiar supports the observations described above. There was 
a clear growth in the enthusiasm for handling freedom responsi- 
bly and for co-operating with reduced ego involvement in group 
decisions. Here is a challenge for teachers and group workers. 

Generalization 13 : An adequate time perspective — both in 
the past dimension (traditions, shared experiences) and the future 
dimension (hopes, expectations, plans, determined goals) is im- 
portant for a high and stable group morale. 

An entire chapter of the present volume is devoted to an analysis 
of the importance of individual and group time perspective for 
the development and maintenance of high morale.* A brief com- 
ment should suffice here. 

One of the dimensions of behavior on which the authoritarian 
and democratic leaders differed in the study by Lewin, Lippitt, 
and White was that of giving time perspective to the child group. 
A typical example will clarify this difference : 

Authoritarian Club : 

Leader : We are going to start making a mask for the club. 
Jim : How do we do that ? 

Leader: I'll tell you how as we go along. John, you take this 
board and pound ten nails in it, and Jack go get a pail of water. 
John to Jim : I wonder what this board is for ? 

Democratic Club: 

Leader : You have mentioned several different things we might 
do for our next meetings. Shall we decide now which one we'd 
like to do? 

Jack: I vote for the mask like the ones in the pictures we 
looked at. (Other boys chime in to make it a majority vote.) 

* Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt Lewin. 


Dick: How big will we make it? Is it out of clay or what? 

Leader : Would you like me to give you a general idea of how 
they generally make masks? (All nod and leader outlines general 
steps of the mask-making process.) 

One of the surest ways of ensuring a persistent "self-feeding" 
motivation in group activities has been found to be the setting up 
with the group of the steps into the future. ''Signposts of prog- 
ress," they serve thus as renewers of motivation and interest. 
Shared experiences and certain group traditions also seem to serve 
as important focal points in the developing and maintaining of 
group cohesion. 

Generalization 14: The pattern of adult stimidation and 
guidance which will result in optimum productivity and positive 
group cohesion must usually differ significantly with the particular 
youth group and its activity — even with children of the same age. 

It is important to realize at every step of our work with youth 
groups that there is no such thing as the democratic pattern of 
group leadership. Even working with five different clubs of the 
same age group, as the Iowa experimenters did, it was discovered 
that the same pattern of adult leadership was too free for some 
and frustratingly inhibiting for others. One group from a uni- 
versity experimental school accepted the responsibility of voting 
on group decisions as a matter of course; for another club from 
a different background of experience voting was a meaningless 
formality. After the vote was over, the attitude of the minority 
was, "All right, now you go ahead and do what you were going 
to do, and we'll do what we voted to do." It was clear that the 
behavior of a leader toward a genuine extension of freedom in 
these two groups had to be quite different. 

There has been, as far as the writer knows, no investigation 
of the way in which the type of group activity conditions the type 
of adult behavior which could be called genuinely democratic in 
that situation. What is genuinely democratic football coaching 


like? How different is democracy in the craft shop and in the 
classroom for this same group that was on the football field? 

It has been found ^^ that children coming from different types 
of home background see the behavior of the same leader quite 
differently — to the extent that for some it is too easy-going and 
for others too inhibiting. How to take these different "attitudinal 
spectacles" into account is one of the major concerns of a genu- 
inely democratic leader. What seems to be vitally needed is a scale 
of democratic literacy up which leaders can climb with their 
groups — starting with them at whatever level they find them. This 
would mean that a leader would not be judged as "democratic" 
or "undemocratic" according to the level at which the child group 
was functioning at a particular time but rather that he would be 
judged in terms of the rate at which he was making himself pro- 
gressively unnecessary to responsible group functioning. 

Generalization \S: In order to maintain and stimulate a 
growing positive democratic morale in groups of children and 
youth we need to develop criteria by zvhich we can know when 
we are leading at the ''upper fringe' of stimulation of democratic 
competence for a given group rather than at the ''lower fringe." 

Probably it is safe to say that most of the giving of new areas 
of freedom on the part of teachers, parents, and club and recrea- 
tion leaders is motivated by symptoms of discontent with the 
status quo on the part of the group rather than by a positive 
interest in seeing how much new freedom the group can be helped 
to handle responsibly and without undue strain. The difference in 
leadership between the level of this "status-quo democracy" and 
"upper- fringe democracy" is great. 

A significant experiment in the field of intellectual stimu- 
lation carried out by McCandless^^ has important implications 
for our practices of building democratic morale in youth groups. 
It had been found over a period of years that children at the upper 
end of the intelligence distribution in preschool groups showed 
fewer upward gains in intellectual functioning (I.Q.) than was 


the case with the other members of the group. McCandless de- 
veloped the hypothesis that this fact was due to the particular 
''ceiling of stimulation" which the teachers had set in the situa- 
tion — a ceiling adapted to the stimulation of the average group 
member. Thus for about two hours a day he took this high group 
of four-year-olds as a special project group and raised the level 
of stimulation greatly, at the same time developing criteria of 
overstimulation (signs of frustration and fatigue, emotional irri- 
tability, etc. ) by which he could be guided in staying at, but not 
going over, the upper level of intellectual stimulation from which 
this particular group could profit as total personalities. 

To the writer it seems high time that we thought in similar 
terms about the stimulation of democratic group functioning on 
the part of classrooms, clubs, teams, and recreation groups. A 
democratic morale for our youth cannot grow and wax sturdy on 
tidbits of freedom meted out with reluctance by those responsible 
for the fiber of our future democracy. 

The War and Group Morale 

Since this chapter was written American youth have become 
members of a nation at war. At first the writer felt this might 
call for some revisions or additions to this chapter. Further 
thought led to the conclusion that war, for the groups we have 
been talking about, is another type of emergency situation. It is 
another type of demand for personal sacrifices and identification 
with certain new group goals — but the new group interests and 
situational demands only accentuate more cogently the need for 
newer active consideration of the bases of democratic youth group 
morale which have been revealed in recent researches and sum- 
marized here. 


Morale and the Training of Leaders 

ALEX BAVELAS ^^*^^ Welfare^ Research Sta- 

tion, State University of Iowa 

THE connection between leadership and group morale is 
too obvious to require comment. It can hardly be over- 
looked in the observation of any type of group life or 
co-operative endeavor. No ancient army, or, in our time, political 
faction has willingly foregone the opportunity to strike a blow 
with impunity at the opposing group's most vital spot — its leader. 
The enemy broadcasters in this present war concentrate their most 
vicious attacks upon Churchill and Roosevelt. In the area of civil- 
ian defense, it is well recognized that the establishment of any effi- 
cient community program depends largely on finding the proper 
leadership and the winning over of the ^ieaders" in the com- 

A survey of what has been written about leadership and group 
morale leaves one with contradictory and somewhat confusing 
details. It is true that some groups ''fold up" when their leaders 
are lost ; it is true also that other groups seem to be little affected, 
while still others appear actually to rally and to redouble their 
efforts. It is true that getting a new leader raises the morale of 
some groups to new levels ; it is also true that groups may change 
their leaders many times, with their morale sinking lower with 
each change. 

The importance which leadership has for the group is not a 
phenomenon peculiar to authoritarian societies. Not infrequently, 
in discussions of social systems, emphasis on leadership is regarded 
as synonymous with totalitarianism, and the democratic ideal with 
leaderless equalitarian groups. One may speculate as to how far 
this idea is a result of totalitarian propaganda. Actually, de- 



mocracy, in theory or in practice, has never minimized leadership. 
The president of the United States has always had more power 
than did the German Kaiser, although the manner in which the 
power was used was essentially different. Throughout the social 
organizations of this country, from boys' clubs to political parties, 
it has been traditional to place, for a limited time and in a restricted 
area, both the power and the responsibility of leadership upon an 
individual. The downfall of the German Republic is a good illus- 
tration of the fallacy of seeing the ideal democracy as a "liberal" 
leaderless society. 

While democratic as well as authoritarian societies are dis- 
tinguished from anarchic individualism by a recognition of the 
importance of strong leadership, there are striking differences 
between democratic leadership and authoritarian leadership. These 
differences lie not so much in the amount of power which the 
leader may hold, but in the function and position he occupies in 
the group. 

In the authoritarian setting, the leader of a group is not usually 
a member of the group itself, but is often a member of a '"higher" 
class. He is set over the group without consultation of the group's 
wishes. Responsible only to those who are organizationally above 
him, he is not accountable for his actions to the group. He allows 
the group to know only what he feels is good for them ; reverses 
are not reported, and the future is made as rosy as is suitable for 
his purpose. His stay in office does not basically depend upon the 
support of the group. He jealously keeps the power of decision 
and formation of policy in his own hands, and criticisms of his 
decisions by the group are considered acts of rebellion. 

The typical democratic leader is a member of the group he leads 
and has been ''elected" by that group. Deriving his power to act 
from the group, he is responsible to the group for his actions. His 
term of office is usually predetermined, and only by the group's 
support can he remain in the position of leadership. He is only 
one element in the policy-determining system of the group and 
usually insists that the members understand the problem at hand 


and help to make the decision required. He serves to clarify issues 
and to focus the attention of the group on important aspects. He 
expects criticism from the group — criticism which is regarded not 
as a crime but as a civic virtue. 

Any discussion of the relation between leadership and morale 
must therefore take into consideration the particular function of 
the leader in the particular group structure. It has also to take 
into account the specific situation in which the group finds itself. 
Scientific knowledge in this field is rather meager. The bulk of the 
data is anecdotal and is difficult to evaluate. 

Rather than dealing with generalities it may be appropriate for 
our purpose to analyze in detail a concrete case where the change 
of the morale of a group as a function of leadership was created 
experimentally under controlled conditions.* 

Retraining of Leaders with Low Morale 

Large organizations, such as the W.P.A., Boy Scouts, 
Y.M.C.A., school systems, factory organizations, all require 
leadership for the organization as a whole (head leader), and 
leadership for the smaller groups which actually make up the 
body of that organization (subleader). This experiment deals with 
the latter type of leadership, although we believe that the former 
does not present fundamentally different problems. 

Poor leadership can be eliminated either by careful selection 

* The experiment was conducted as a co-operative project of the Child Wel- 
fare Station of the State University of Iowa (George D. Stoddard, Director), 
the W.P.A. of the State of Iowa (George J. Keller, Iowa State Administrator), 
and the Jewish Community Center, Des Moines, a nonsectarian service affiliated 
with the Community Chest (Mrs. Max Mayer, Director). We gratefully ac- 
knowledge the co-operation of Mrs. Max Mayer, who gave impetus to the ex- 
periment by offering the facilities of the Center during the "Home Camp" period 
for a scientific study, and the co-operation of the associate director, Louis Wil- 
liams, and the other members throughout the experiment. The study owes much 
to Helen Cresswell, State Director, Division of Community Service Programs, 
W.P.A., to Fred O. Erbe, Chief, Public Activities Programs, and to other staff 
members of the W.P.A. This investigation has been carried out under the scien- 
tific direction of Kurt Lewin. 


and, if necessary, dismissal of personnel, or by training. The dif- 
ficulty of predicting leadership ability is known to be great. Dis- 
missal involves much waste and expense. In recognition of this 
situation, the training of leaders has been widely attempted. Fre- 
quently, however, it has not been very satisfactory. Also, there is 
no actual scientific knowledge about either the percentage of poor 
leaders that can be improved by training, or about how far the 
improvement can go. 

The following experiment tries to test under controlled condi- 
tions the efficiency of certain methods for rapid retraining of 
leaders in a particular field. The leaders were picked so that their 
age and habits of long standing should present particularly diffi- 
cult cases for retraining. The results of this experiment are useful 
in a discussion of group morale from at least two points of view : 
(a) the effect of the training on the morale of the retrained lead- 
ers, and (b) the effect of the shift in methods of control used by 
the trainees on the morale of the groups which they led. 


The selection of the mediocre leaders was made on the basis of 
five sets of information given by those officers of the W.P.A. who 
were familiar with the leaders' present work. It is technically 
necessary in such experiments to have a ''control group," which is 
not trained. This control group should be composed of individuals 
similar to the experimental group. The pairs were equalized on 
age, sex, length of time on W.P.A., length of time on present 
W.P.A. project, rating of technical skill, rating of leadership 
ability, and as far as possible on the relevant factors in their life 
history. The objective measurements, taken later on these leaders 
when at work, verified to a remarkable degree the pairings which 
were made. (See Figures l-a, 2-a, and Z-a.') 

All the subjects felt rather keenly the personal-status implica- 
tions of working on the W.P.A. Although their relationship with 
the two W.P.A. leader trainers was good, they would speak with 


considerable resentment about the timekeepers — or ''stool pi- 
geons," as they were referred to when speaking to one on the 
''inside." One of the most serious factors contributing to the 
general insecurity of these leaders was the strain of "not knowing 
for more than two weeks" in advance how long their job would 
hold out. They often said that if their job were more "sure," they 
could do much better work. In the minds of the leaders the job 
depended in a great measure on co-operating fully with the ad- 
ministration of the center, and there were signs of tenseness. 

Being on the experiment was unquestionably regarded at first 
as an undesirable situation. Up to the third day of training there 
were veiled questions about the project which revealed consider- 
able suspicion. One of the women was so afraid that they were 
being "examined" and would probably lose their jobs, that she 
broke down and cried after the second training meeting. 

By the fifth or sixth meeting of the group, this attitude had 
reversed itself, and each of them felt it a distinct advantage to 
be "in on it." Factors which contributed to this change of heart 
were these: the feeling that they gained knowledge about their 
job ; that somehow their job would be more secure and that there 
might be a possibility for promotion ; and finally the new experi- 
ence of being a member of a genuinely co-operative group work- 
ing toward a high social objective. Just as much change of heart 
took place in the leaders who were not included in the experiment ; 
instead of being glad to have been left out, they became increas- 
ingly jealous and even aggressive toward the trainees. 

Leader A : A was the only man in the trainee group. He was a 
playground supervisor. His behavior before training was that of a 
typical "commanding" leader. He maintained a gruff exterior, 
maintaining by word and action that "the boys" had to be shown 
that you meant "business." His lifelong ambition was to be a po- 
liceman. He had once had a job as a special guard at the state fair, 
a job to which he always referred with considerable pride. He had 
made application for a job as prison guard, and his spirits could 


be seen to go up and down with the fluctuation of his chances of 
getting that job. 

Leader C: C taught the making of artificial flowers. A very- 
quiet but determined woman, she prided herself upon being ''hard" 
and seeing things "straight." The other workers always praised 
her for what she had "been through." Her husband gone, she had 
persisted in doing what she could to bring up properly her two 
sons. She was not sorry for herself and "didn't ask favors from 
anyone." When she led her classes, she was subdued both in her 
manner and voice. This quietness was reflected in the behavior of 
the children. No one spoke loudly or even in a "normal" tone. 
Another striking fact about C was her "poker face." Throughout 
the observations before training she was never observed to smile. 
This conduct seemed to be a part of her "teacher role," for at 
lunch with the other leaders she was definitely more relaxed. 

Leader E: E was the younger of the two women and a more 
approachable person. A relative newcomer to the center, she was 
somewhat more insecure socially than the rest. Before any train- 
ing had been given, she would encourage interaction between the 
children more than the other two leaders. The children could ap- 
proach her much more easily and did so. In general, she seemed 
to be the most promising of the three at the beginning of the 


The experiment proceeded in the following manner : Six leaders 
were paired by means of rating scales and life-history data. The 
pairs were then split to form an experimental group of three 
which was trained, and a control group which was not trained. 
All six leaders were tested by observing and quantitatively record- 
ing their actual behavior with the children "on the job." Such 
records included the effects of this behavior on the way the chil- 
dren formed work groups. The experimental group was then 
trained for three weeks (twelve days), not more than two hours 
on each day. During these three weeks the experimental and the 


control groups continued their work at the recreation center. At 
the fourth week, both the trained and the nontrained leaders were 
tested again ''on the job" by the same methods as at the begin- 
ning of the experiment. 


Behavior with the children. The treatment of the children by 
these leaders was not unfriendly, and sometimes the leaders showed 
a measure of personal involvement. Every leader was relatively 
well-trained in the skills of his particular field — flower-making, 
clay-modeling, playground supervision. In the craft classes the 
leader saw to it that every child followed the same uniform pattern 
of work. The productions of the children were closely supervised 
from step to step. When a child encountered difficulties, the leader 
would help him, usually by doing the operation himself. 

It was interesting to notice that the lack of democratic feeling 
between the leaders and the children was more noticeable when 
the leader was not in the craft room or on the playground. During 
the lunch hour or before the center was officially open, or at any 
time when the leader was not strictly ''on the job," he showed a 
decidedly authoritarian attitude. These leaders had all gone 
through a period of training by the W.P.A., and the emphasis on 
a democratic and friendly attitude seemed to have changed their 
"natural" inclinations to some degree when they were "on the 
job." The whole atmosphere was different while the person was 
working as a leader. It seemed as if the "power field" of the 
leader immediately grew larger and stronger if he stepped out of 
his leader role, even temporarily. 

Figures l-a, 2-a, and 3 -a present the quantitative data about the 
ways in which the leader controlled his children. 

Leaders A and B (Figure l-a), who did playground work, con- 
trolled the children predominantly (60 per cent) by direct "leader- 
initiated commands." The somewhat milder form of direct control 
which consisted of giving commands after having been ap- 



proached by the child occurred relatively infrequently (16 per 
cent). Less dominating and more evocative than these two direct 
methods of control is the guiding of the child by praising or by 




* i^2^ gg 



Fig. 1-a 

Fig. l-b 

Fig. 1. Retraining of Leader A. The frequency with which leader A 
uses authoritarian methods of direct control drops as a result of retrain- 
ing from 77 per cent to 4 per cent. Instead, he uses a democratic, initia- 
tive-stimulating method, 73 per cent. 

making the leader's preference known. A and B used this method 
seldom (12 per cent). The democratic, initiative-stimulating 
method of placing the responsibility of a wise choice upon the 
children themselves was practically never used (5 per cent). In 
summary, before training A and B used the authoritarian methods 
of direct control in about 80 per cent of their action. 



Leaders C and D show a similar predominance (66 per cent) 
of ''direct" methods of control (Figure 2-a). Having to deal with 
handcraft (flower-making) rather than with the traditionally 




Fig. 2-a 

Fig. 2-h 

Fig. 2. Retraining of Leader C. The frequency with which leader C 
uses authoritarian methods of direct control drops as a result of retrain- 
ing from 77 per cent to 7 per cent. Instead, he uses a democratic, initia- 
tive-stimulating method, 73 per cent. 

"tougher" playground work, they used mainly the somewhat 
milder authoritarian form of giving commands after they were 
approached. Directing the group with praise and by vesting the 
children with responsibility occurred in 12 per cent and 22 per 
cent of the cases, respectively. 

E and F, who were also leaders in handcrafts, show a pattern 



quite similar to that of C and D. E and F, however, show a tend- 
ency to divide their behavior more or less equally between the 
authoritarian direct control (51 percent) and the more democratic 





Fig. 3-a 

Fig. 3-b 

Fig. 3. Retraining of Leader E. The frequency with which leader E 
uses authoritarian methods drops as a result of retraining from 51 per 
cent to 11 per cent. Instead, he uses democratic methods, 89 per cent. 

control through praise and giving of responsibility (49 per cent) 
(Figure 3-a). 

Amount of co-operative work in the children's groups. The 
effect of the method of control used by the leader can be seen re- 
flected in the structure of the groups with which he worked. One 
person on the observation crew took continuous records of group 
structure from minute to minute. In this way, it was possible to 


determine how frequently the children worked co-operatively in 
subgroups of two or three, or worked each for himself. 

For the experimental group, which was retrained, the average 
size of subgroup observed was: for leader A, 1.1 ; leader C, 1.3; 
leader E, 1.0. The data for the control group are: leader B, 1.1 ; 
leader D, 1.2; and leader F, 1.3. The average size of subgroups 
for all leaders — trainees and nontrainees — is slightly above one. 
Practically all the time, in other words, the children worked singly. 

Morale of the leaders. There was every indication that the 
morale of the leaders was low. Many of them, in fact, actually 
disliked their work, felt insecure for the reasons mentioned above, 
and were extremely suspicious of the organization. Openly they 
stated that most of the people they knew felt that this work was 
drudgery, that it had to be done just well enough to keep one's job. 
The facial expression and bodily postures of these leaders while 
they worked indicated a mixture of apathy, worry, and unhappi- 
ness. This may be clearly seen in the film records, taken at the be- 
ginning and the end of the experiment. 


Before discussing the method of training, we would like to 
view the effect it had on the leaders and children after a period 
of three weeks. 

Behavior with children. Figure \-h shows the methods of con- 
trol used by leaders A and B after training. Leader A had three 
weeks of retraining; leader B had no retraining. B's methods have 
not changed, have even, indeed, become a bit worse. The fre- 
quency with which A uses authoritarian control has dropped from 
77 per cent before training to 4 per cent after training. Instead, 
he uses a democratic method of stimulating initiative (73 per 

A similar shift may be seen in the retrained leader C as com- 
pared to the nontrained leader D (Figure 2-h). D's methods have 
not changed or, if anything, have become a bit worse. The fre- 



quency with which the retrained leader C uses direct commands 
has dropped from 77 per cent before training to 7 per cent after 
training. Instead, he uses a democratic method (73 per cent). 

Leaders E and F follow the same pattern of shift as the pairs 
above. F, who has not been trained, has become definitely worse. 


led by\B 

t (trainees) 
F (control) 


led by I ^ 

F( trainee i) 
F (control) 

Fig. 4. Average Size of Subgroups for Retrained Leaders. The increase 
in the size of co-operative work subgroups is much larger in the 
groups of the retrained leaders A, C, E, than in the groups of leaders 

B, D, F. 

The frequency with which leader E uses authoritarian direct con- 
trol has dropped from 51 per cent before training to 11 per cent 
after training. The frequency with which E uses democratic 
methods of control has, on the other hand, risen from 49 per cent 
before training to 89 per cent after training. 

The methods of teaching which the nonretrained leaders used 
showed no change. The trained leaders, for their part, shifted 
from a ''classroom" technique, characterized by dependence of the 


children and uniformity of procedure, to "group methods" which 
created an atmosphere of productivity and co-operation. The suc- 
cess of this ''group method" was evidenced in various ways: (a) 
a doubHng of the number of children attracted to participate, 
(b) the enthusiasm and persistence of the group, (c) the "hold- 
ing power" of the group for individuals, (d) the efficiency of the 
work organization, (e) the high degree of self-discipline, and 
(/) the quality and output of the work. 

Amount of co-operative work in children's groups. The data on 
the structure of the groups indicate a significant shift in the aver- 
age size of subgroups in which children worked. 

For the retrained leaders, the values are as follows : leader A, 
2.4; leader C, 2.3; leader E, 2.8 — that is, an average of 2.5. For 
the nonretrained leaders, the values are: leader B, 1.5; leader D, 
1.8; leader F, 1.8 — that is, an average of 1.7. 

Both groups thus show an increase in the average size of sub- 
group. One reason, probably, is that the children became better 
acquainted with each other. The average size of the subgroup was, 
however, in every group led by the retrained leaders, larger than 
in any group led by nonretrained leaders. 


One of the most striking results of the retraining was the 
change from a definitely low morale to a definitely high morale. 

At the start, as mentioned above, all the leaders on the experi- 
ment were low in morale as to their present work. It was not, for 
one thing, work in which they were personally very deeply in- 
volved ; on the contrary, it was work done only as well as it had to 
be done in order to keep the job. Typical of the attitude of most 
was this statement taken from the stenographic record of the 
third discussion meeting : "The leaders here work without thought 
to really helping the children. They come at eight, quit at twelve 
for dinner, and quit at four for the day." Typical of the feeling 
that it was no use to try is another statement from the records of 


the same meeting. "When I came here I had a lot of ideas for 
helping the community. The first year I was here I went where 
angels fear to tread ; the second year I had my wings clipped ; and 
the next year I knew better than to do anything but what I was 
told to do." 

Toward the end of the experiment, these same leaders showed 
evidence of being very deeply involved in their work. Not only 
did they go to considerable effort and expense to help their groups 
get materials, but they were willing to commit themselves to long- 
range plans with their clubs. One leader was highly elated that a 
group of girls had asked her to be the leader of their club outside 
of hours. Such extra work she would carefully have avoided 

The attitude of the group towards being part of an experiment 
likewise underwent radical change. At first the idea of being 
a guinea pig was thoroughly unpopular. At the third meeting 
traces of suspicion about the whole project were still present. At 
about the fourth meeting, however, there was a rather rapid swing 
to the other extreme — to such a degree, indeed, that confidences 
poured out regardless of the presence of the two stenographers, 
of whom the group had originally been suspicious. Some of these 
man-to-man statements were derogatory of the administration of 
the center and of the other leaders. Some were stories of past ex- 
periences. Whether factually correct or not, these stories indicate 
the state of mind of the leaders at that time. 

Very soon after the fourth meeting the trainees began to show 
strong "we" feeling. There were many instances of mutual aid 
in regard to both the training work and their individual club pro- 
grams. Toward the end of the experiment all the leaders wanted 
to continue, avowedly feeling that they had "just begun." 

Still another important change in the morale of these leaders 
was related to their future perspective. In the end each of them 
had enthusiastic plans for getting a better job, or getting more 
education, or even going into another more needful community. 
One leader made determined eflforts to get a chance to organize a 


recreation center in the resettlement area in Alaska. Another was 
getting books on play schools and studying ''modern" methods of 
caring for young children. A third wanted to train other leaders. 


The changes in morale, far from being confined to the leaders 
alone, affected strongly the morale of the groups which they led. 
Before the experiment began, there were no groups of constant 
membership ; at the end of the experiment there were four groups 
of about twelve to eighteen members each which met daily with 
high consistency of membership. The success of the trainees with 
the children was so striking that the other leaders, in a kind of 
self-defense, tried repeatedly to lure children away from these 
groups. The failure of such attempts, even when they were bol- 
stered by threats, indicates how cohesive had become these groups 
led by the trainees. 

All the groups led by the trainees showed great initiative in 
reaching new levels of productivity. Although **the big show," a 
musical comedy put on by the whole center under the direction of 
the dancing teacher, was always completely planned by her, a 
number of girls from a group led by a trainee worked out and 
practiced a dance which they tried to get permission to perform 
in the show. Thus the increase in morale, far from being confined 
to the activities led by the trainees, spread into other areas as well. 
A playground group invented a game of bowling and voluntarily 
went to a great deal of work to build a backstop to protect the 
glass in a nearby door. Another group made plans to use the 
money they had in their club treasury to ''adopt a baby for Christ- 
mas." Their money they got by making flowers, for which the 
boys got customers — the first time in the history of the center that 
boys had been connected with flower-making. 

Perhaps the best example of group morale was the club which 
was making puppets. They decided on this project in the full 
knowledge that the leader knew no more than they about puppets. 


An attempt by the leader to get help from a leader not on the 
experiment who knew how to make puppets was indignantly re- 
fused with the words, "I'm not going to do myself out of my 
job!" Thereafter the children and the leader experimented to- 
gether and got the information they needed from library books. 
In spite of such obstacles, this group completed some clothing, 
began to paper their stage made of two orange crates, and by the 
end of the experiment were beginning to get people to buy tickets 
to their puppet show. 

The Training Method 

Democratic methods are not easily learned without actual prac- 
tice in social situations. Many training courses for leadership in 
groups for children, young people, parents, or in any other field, 
arrange for "real life" application, but neglect to make the course 
itself the very first source of experience in democracy for the 
trainee. It is not an unusual thing to find groups being taught 
democracy in a completely authoritarian manner. 

It was the intention of the present experiment that the trainees 
should be able to make use in their later work of their personal ex- 
periences as members of a democratic group during training. The 
experimenter, therefore, was in the role of group leader; in fact, 
his conduct had to be illustrative of the type of leadership the 
trainees were learning to use. 

Such an arrangement was found to be efficient in at least three 
ways : it gave the trainees "subjective" data about what it means 
to work in a group which is led democratically ; it proved to be a 
main factor in convincing the trainees about the value of such 
methods of leadership ; and it built up within the training group a 
sufficiently high morale to withstand the considerable adverse pres- 
sure which was brought to bear upon them during the training 

The policy of maintaining group democracy throughout the 
training meant that although the trainer had a definite program. 


the particular course of each meeting was not predetermined. No 
systematic series of 'lessons," his program was, rather, a consid- 
eration of high points which should not be overlooked. In many 
of the problems discussed, particularly those involving local or 
organizational factors with which the trainer was not familiar, 
the group made its own way and developed the specific techniques 
required. It is sufficient to say that the training method included 
all of the points which had been listed in the original program of 
the trainer, and in addition some points for which the group itself 
must be credited. 

The following is an analysis of the training as it actually took 
place. For purposes of description, it is convenient to distinguish 
various aspects of the program. It must be remembered, however, 
that this does not imply a chronological order, and that the var- 
ious units overlapped extensively. 

Attitudes versus Techniques. The attitudes, objectives, and 
philosophy of recreational group work, it was decided, should 
be thoroughly explored before any serious attention was given to 
techniques of leadership. In the beginning it was the policy of the 
trainer to avoid discussion on "what to do in a particular situa- 
tion," to encourage instead discussions of underlying principles. 
The result was that techniques which the leaders actually used 
later in working with groups never became a "set of tricks," but, 
rather, remained flexible and easily modifiable to meet specific sit- 

''Sensitizing" the leaders. First the group was asked to make 
a list of the qualities a leader should have. After some discussion 
the following five points were the ones set forth : tolerance, pa- 
tience, understanding, good discipline, and skill. In order to make 
the group aware of the haziness of these concepts in their own 
minds, and in order to determine whether these widely accepted 
concepts actually provide any tangible means for judging the 
quality of the actual conduct of leaders, these five points were 
used as a check list without any addition or criticism from the 


The group was allowed to try this check list on another leader — 
the result being complete disagreement. The behavior of the leader 
under observation was labeled differently by each of the different 
observers. A more detailed discussion of leadership behavior en- 
sued, after which further check lists were again tried out by 
direct observation. In this way, the concepts about leadership 
not only were clarified in the minds of the trainees, but, at the 
same time, became more realistic. 

Along with the clarification of concepts, there was an elabora- 
tion of the leader's possibilities for action. During the observa- 
tions, examples were collected of what different leaders did, ex- 
amples which afforded a basis for discussing what different types 
of leaders might have done. Such discussions as these served to 
make vivid to the leaders the many possibilities of action which 
are presented to the leader at every point of group life. 

Finally, after repeated requests, the leaders were given reading 
material in group leadership. Some of the most spirited of the 
early discussions arose from such reading. 

Broadening and Restructuring the Goal Region. The group 
made a concrete formulation of the objectives of their work: 
recreation leadership with children. No criticism was made by the 
trainer, the only stipulation being that the final statement of these 
objectives should be acceptable to all. The final list named three 
objectives: the production of good craft articles, the entertain- 
ment of the children, and the keeping of good discipline. 

The ways in which these objectives could be attained, once 
elicited from the group, were documented without any attempts 
at evaluation by the trainer. At this point, in the minds of the 
trainees, the objectives and the ways of reaching them were iso- 
lated — ^practically independent — areas. 

When the trainer then induced the group to think of other pos- 
sible objectives in their work, the group responded by bringing 
out a great number of such goals. Many of the objectives men- 
tioned were clearly broader in meaning, more inclusive, more 
"important" than others. 


Next, of course, the need for integrating the many objectives 
which were now on the table quickly arose, and a complete re- 
structuring followed. Various goals were interrelated, made sub- 
ordinate, etc. For instance, ''entertainment" and ''good discipline" 
were given at first as unrelated and partly contradictory objectives. 
At a later stage, after a discussion of the manner in which low 
discipline and little entertainment often go with lack of interest, 
it became clear to the trainees that one way to get both good 
discipline and gratifying entertainment was to achieve an atmos- 
phere of high interest. 

The restructuring of goals led to a re-evaluation of the ways in 
which various objectives of group work could be attained. Event- 
ually, the discussion led into a study of the "paths to the goals" — 
in other words, techniques. 

Development of Techniques. Various procedures contributed 
toward the building up of suitable techniques. The leaders ob- 
served the trainer leading a group, for example; such observa- 
tion was followed by a discussion and criticism of his methods. 
For another thing, they watched each other at work, discussed 
and evaluated the procedures they saw used. The trainer for his 
part "cruised" the center at odd hours to watch the leaders at 
work, often finding it possible to discuss some particular event 
just after it had occurred. Then at the end of each afternoon, 
there was a thirty-minute "clinic" wherein problems of leadership 
which had occurred that afternoon were discussed. 

The leaders, moreover, were given the experience, as a group, 
of being themselves the "children" under different conditions of 
leadership. The trainer deliberately employed autocratic techniques 
or laissez-faire techniques in situations which made the shift from 
the democratic methods seem natural. Although at first the train- 
ees were not aware that the trainer was "acting," later they be- 
came markedly sensitive to changes of atmosphere. Their increased 
sensitivity went along with a more self -critical attitude while they 
themselves were on the job. 

The trainees were also shown the film records of the experi- 


ments in democratic, autocratic, and laissez-faire atmospheres,^ 
as well as the films made of themselves before the training pro- 
gram had started. These films served as a means of bringing the 
techniques and effects of certain types of leadership into sharp 
contrast. In addition, the pictures probably helped to convince the 
trainees of the practicability and the worth of the change of 
method they were attempting. 

Integration of work with broader social objectives. At many 
points along the training program, the trainer encouraged the 
bridging of the objectives of ''group work in recreation" with 
two different levels of objectives : values for the child as an indi- 
vidual, and values for the community and society as a whole. The 
effect of embedding the objectives of the job in this larger setting 
was noticeable in terms of increased self-respect and, consequently, 
higher morale. 

Sensitivity of morale to leadership. Morale, far from being an 
extraordinary property which must be added to certain types of 
groups, is a characteristic of the atmosphere of all groups. Re- 
lated to group goals, time perspective, clearness of planning, group 
structure, work organization, etc., it is affected to some extent by 
a change in any of these and other properties of the group. 

Group morale is affected by changes in any part of the group. 
Because a leader is an important subpart of the group he leads, any 
change in the leader will, therefore, affect the morale of the group. 
There seems, on the other hand, to be no definite relation between 
the various levels of morale and any single aspect of leadership, 
such as power, knowledge, or the ability to make quick decisions. 

The rapidity and depth of change in group morale that the 
leader may effect is illustrated by the experiment reported above. 
The change in morale which took place in the leaders' own group 
is one example. After only a few days, the members of this 
group showed evidences of heightened morale; after three weeks 
they had definitely changed from a very low to a very high 
morale. A second example is the change of morale which took 
place in the children's groups led by the trainees. These changes. 


likewise very definite, paralleled the changes of morale in the lead- 
ers. The change of attitude, technique, and morale on the part of 
the leader, was immediately reflected in the morale of the group. 
Since later measurements of leader behavior were not made, we 
cannot determine how permanent was the influence of this short 
period of training. 

How deeply and how rapidly changes of morale may spread 
through an entire country and how sensitive the morale of even 
so large a group of people is to the quality of its leadership, is 
borne out by still other examples. Ordway Tead ^ draws a clear 
picture of one such change: ''On March 4, 1933, when Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt stepped to the microphone to deliver his in- 
augural address as President, he faced a country which was 
plunged into confusion and discouragement. As his voice rang 
out clear and confident, as he said that the thing most to be feared 
was fear itself, as he set forth the outline of policy he proposed 
to follow, there came an almost instantaneous response of public 
support and public trust. ... A leader was felt to be at the 
helm !" 

An instance of rapid and surprisingly deep change of morale 
is the following. In the experiment reported above, the trainer led 
a pickup group of children for forty minutes, to give the trainees 
an opportunity to observe techniques in begmning the develop- 
ment of a group program. These children had been asked to meet 
''for a while," with no word of any possible continuation as a 
group. The involvement of the group in what they had started 
was so great, however, that the following day at the same time 
they were back for another meeting. Even though no leader could 
be found for them for several days, they nevertheless went ahead 
getting more members, selecting a club name, and organizing 

The results of the experiment caution against an overevaluation 
of the factor of personality in leadership. The leaders who were 
used as subjects had been poor leaders for years, and they changed 
in the short period of three weeks into very good leaders. Al- 


though the importance of personality in leadership cannot be de- 
nied, the limits it imposes are less hard and fast than commonly 
supposed. The experiment shows, on the other hand, that atti- 
tudes, techniques, and morale are decisive for leadership, and that 
by changing a person in these respects one can change his effect 
as a leader. 

The effect that a certain type of leadership will have upon the 
morale of the group depends, of course, upon the type of group in 
question. To heighten morale in an autocratic group requires tech- 
niques different from those required to heighten morale in a demo- 
cratic group. What are described as "autocratic methods" in this 
experiment, be it remembered, would probably in a totalitarian 
state be considered very democratic. The totalitarian states, no- 
tably Germany, have themselves developed authoritarian methods 
for creating high morale — techniques based partly upon the 
"leader myth," both in regard to Hitler as the source of all lead- 
ership power and in regard to the more general "leader principle" ; 
and partly upon methods which resemble, at least on the surface, 
democratic techniques. Within certain specific areas, a kind of 
status democracy has even been developed; in the army, for in- 
stance, comradeship is now emphasized, with the more familiar 
du replacing the formal address. 

Since morale depends upon all the properties of a group, how- 
ever, it should be clear that, whatever the temporary level of 
morale may appear to be, there will be a difference in morale be- 
tween groups led in an authoritarian manner and groups led in a 
democratic manner.* In the experiments on group atmosphere,^ 
there was very little to differentiate the autocratically led group 
from the democratically led group in morale so long as the leader 
was present. But when each group was left leaderless for a short 
period of time, the autocratic group very quickly stopped working 

* For other discussions of behavior in democratic and autocratic groups, see 
Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt Lewin, and Chapter VII, 
"The Morale of Youth Groups," by Ronald Lippitt. 


and waited ; the democratic group continued its work in the same 
way as when the leader was present. 

To appraise the depth and endurance of the morale of a group, 
one has to be aware of the wide discrepancy possible between 
superficial techniques and real spirit. Morale is one aspect of social 
well-being where it is extremely dangerous for a leader to build 
upon a foundation of falsehood. 


Propaganda and Morale 

S. S. SARGENT Barnard College 

Columbia University 


ii f ^OR the flag, for the home, for the family; for the future 
of all mankind!" So runs the theme of George M. Co- 
han's new song hit composed for America in World War 
11. Is this propaganda? And will it help build American morale? 

In most current discussions of morale little attention is given 
to propaganda and the role it plays, or should play, in building and 
maintaining American morale. To most people morale seems 
good, and propaganda seems bad ; therefore, the two should not 
be related. A few years ago the writer asked each member of a 
forum audience to write on a card his definition of propaganda. 
Over two-thirds of the 65 respondents indicated their suspicions 
of propaganda either because they thought it warped facts or 
served special interests or both.^ It has often been noted that 
Americans speak of promotional efforts they favor as "education" 
or perhaps "publicity," reserving the term "propaganda" for 
causes with which they do not sympathize. 

The recent popularity of propaganda analysis may also have 
something to do with current reticence about speaking of morale 
and propaganda in the same breath. Thousands of subscribers to 
Consumers Research and Consumers Union have become aware 
of the tricks of advertisers and have learned to depend upon 
scientific analysis in selecting and buying their products. The In- 
stitute for Propaganda Analysis, which recently discontinued its 
publications until the end of the war, announced in the final issue 
of its bulletin that its monthly circulation has been 10,000 and 
that, in addition, 18,000 copies of annual volumes have been sold. 
Since a large proportion of subscribers were libraries, schools, 



colleges, editors, clergymen, lecturers, and the like, the influence 
of the Institute upon American thought has been considerable. 
The most concrete illustration is the widespread use of the Insti- 
tute's "Seven Devices" in analyzing potential propaganda. With- 
out doubt many persons feel that stressing a connection between 
morale and propaganda may lead to the analysis and criticism of 
morale-building efforts, an effect which would be unfortunate in 

The relationship between propaganda and morale is, however, 
an important question which cannot be overlooked. It demands an 
answer for the very simple reason that propaganda has been used, 
is being used, and will continue to be used in boosting American 
morale — both civilian and military — to a point which will make 
victory possible. Government bureaus, business organizations, so- 
cial groups, and private individuals are striving to build national 
morale. The technique they are using is propaganda, though they 
prefer not to have their efforts so characterized because of the un- 
pleasant connotations of the term. If they understand American 
attitudes and if they know the potentialities and limitations of 
propaganda they may be successful, singly or together, in con- 
tributing greatly to American morale. If they do not, they may 
bungle the job. There is always the possibility that our major 
morale-building functions may gradually become centralized in a 
great patriotic sales campaign run by advertising and publicity 
men — a sort of streamlined Creel Committee with slogans, post- 
ers, parades, up-to-date Four-Minute Men, handouts, leaflets, and 
all the other paraphernalia of highly emotionalized appeals. Such 
a reversion to the rather primitive propaganda methods of World 
War I might conceivably prove disastrous to national morale in 
World War II. Social scientists, particularly psychologists, so- 
ciologists, and political scientists, have an important function to 
perform in studying the situation and helping to guide our morale 
effort into the most constructive channels. 


Two Sources of Morale 

Broadly speaking, civilian morale may be heightened either by 
environmental changes or by people's changed interpretations of 
their environments. That is to say, it may be heightened by the 
impact of events or by changed evaluations of and attitudes 
toward situations, whether or not the latter have themselves 
changed. Such events as the bombing raids and the threat of in- 
vasion did wonders for British morale, which had been only luke- 
warm during the ''Sitzkrieg." Invasion of her frontiers and the 
German approach to Moscow raised Russian morale to unex- 
pected heights. American morale, confused and divided at the 
time, was welded and galvanized into action by the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. ("Remember Pearl Harbor" is the only slogan of signifi- 
cance produced thus far since America entered the war.) In all 
these cases the effect on morale was an indirect consequence of 
military events. 

Obviously the determination of civilian morale cannot be left 
to the mercy of more or less unpredictable military and naval 
events; each belligerent nation undertakes the task of consciously 
and deliberately attending to its morale. A government does so 
by guiding its people's opinions and attitudes — hence their actions 
— in desired directions. This is the job of propaganda. 

Propaganda is not necessarily bad, though it can often be criti- 
cized on various counts. Essentially it consists of an attempt to 
bring about desired attitudes by means of suggestion. Though 
distinctions can be made between propaganda and education, 
these tend to become unimportant in wartime because of the all- 
compelling need to produce specific results like confidence, hope, 
enthusiasm, and willingness to make sacrifices. The more a social 
process is designed to bring about particular attitudinal states, the 
more it tends to become propaganda. 

In wartime, workability becomes the criterion for propaganda. 
Such important yardsticks as f actuality, degree of emotionality, 
candor, and even long-range social utility tend to be ignored and 


_ ^ _ ■ — — — — _- 

all attention centers on immediate efficacy. If a piece of propa- 
ganda (even though it contains wishful thinking, unverified 
rumor, and the like) seems likely to raise morale and thereby to 
help win the war, it is used; if it doesn't, it is rejected. This may 
seem to be an unduly Machiavellian interpretation. Yet the story 
of propaganda in World War I, as related by Lasswell and others, 
leads one to suspect that as the war proceeds such a pragmatic 
view will become increasingly the order of the day. 

Selection, evaluation, and interpretation of news is an important 
function of propaganda, though news reporting per se belongs in 
a different category. When a censor holds up bad news and lets 
it trickle out in small judicious doses, or when a writer does an 
article on the significance to Americans of Japanese conquest of 
Singapore, he is putting out propaganda; in each case an attempt 
is made to produce a desired effect upon public opinion. Propa- 
ganda may be used to aid American morale by stating and inter- 
preting war aims, by fostering good will toward allies and hatred 
toward enemies — in fact by any appeal to reason or emotion which 
may evoke confidence, enthusiasm, and determined effort. 

How successful can such propaganda be in achieving its goal? 
Doob has shown that successful propaganda follows the "prin- 
ciple of related attitudes." The propagandist seeks to arouse "pre- 
existing attitudes which will serve as the basis for the desired in- 
tegration." ^ Putting it in another way, we may say that propa- 
ganda is maximally effective only when it operates within bound- 
aries determined by widespread attitudes and common recognition 
of facts. 

It thus becomes necessary to analyze the content of American 
attitudes, by polls and other scientific methods if possible, so that 
those who are seeking to promote morale can utilize the findings 
in their work. Although this has been done to a slight extent, and 
results of some studies appear in later chapters, the surface has 
only been scratched. '^ 

* See Chapter XI, "American Morale when the War Began," by Donald 
Rugg; also Allport.^ 


American Predispositions 

Some American attitudes are clear — attitudes toward Hitler, 
Mussolini, the Japanese, and their military aggressions. But there 
are many less obvious attitudes which play a part in current think- 
ing ; frequently vague, they are found in the fringes of conscious- 
ness rather than at the center. They are, nevertheless, tremen- 
dously important; those who would build American morale must 
know them and know how to deal with them. Some are given 
here with their implications ; the catalogue is not complete, nor is 
the evidence entirely conclusive, but it may at least furnish some 
important hypotheses for effective propaganda work at a time 
when complete evidence is hard to obtain. 

Americans hate war. Seeing war as a major human and eco- 
nomic disaster, they doubt that it can settle the world's problems. 
Disillusioned by the consequences of World War I, they have 
since 1920 been more pacifist than militarist — as shown, for ex- 
ample, by country-wide opposition to compulsory military train- 

In the presence of such a deep-seated attitude, one could predict 
that propaganda which glorifies war — which tells how noble it is 
to die for one's country — will be unsuccessful as a morale-build- 
ing technique. A recruiting poster that urges young men to enlist 
by saying, ''Come on, get into the fight!" may swing over a few 
of the more hot-blooded, but by and large this type of appeal will 
call forth little enthusiasm. The successful propagandist, on the 
other hand, will agree that war is a dirty business. But he will 
stress the fact that America, having been forced into it against 
her will, must now do her best under the circumstances to win a 
military victory in order to insure continuance of freedom and 
democracy and the achievement of other positive goals. 

Americans do not believe that the end of the war will usher in 
the millennium. They expected some sort of Utopia after the 
"war to make the world safe for democracy"; they know what 


. .p 

happened at Versailles and afterwards. Propaganda which depicts 
the "parliament of man, the federation of the world" as the out- 
come of the present conflict is likely to be received with an "Oh 
yeah? We heard that one before." If concrete plans and promises 
are made, however — plans which are reasonably possible of ful- 
fillment — that kind of propaganda should have morale-inducing 
power. In December, 1941, President Roosevelt promised to re- 
establish the invaded democracies of Europe. Before the war is 
over the United Nations may need, for the sake of morale, to 
state clear policies of freedom for colonies as well as former 

Americans do not hate the German or the Italian people, or 
even the Japanese people. They do hate the fascist-military re- 
gimes in power in those nations. Whether a war can be waged 
and won without hate is a moot point. But so far, at least, an 
attempt is being made to treat loyal aliens justly. We have not 
banned the writings of Goethe or the music of Verdi. 

From present indications it seems unlikely that atrocity stories 
purporting to show that German, Italian, or Japanese soldiers or 
civilians are inhuman brutes would be believed by the American 
people. Our people would welcome, on the other hand, the real 
story of how dictators seized and extended their power, how they 
stifled freedom, persecuted minorities and indoctrinated youth, 
and what attempts fascist groups have made to gain power and 
sow dissension in the United States. 

Americans do not believe their allies in this war are angels. 
Most notably is this fact true in the case of the Soviet Union; 
many are the protests against an "alliance with Communism." But 
it is also true in a milder degree in the case of Great Britain ; many 
Americans believe she is fighting to save her empire and for no 
other reason. Propaganda which clothes our allies in shining rai- 
ment, which speaks of them as "warriors for liberty," and "de- 
fenders of the faith," is probably foredoomed to failure. It can, 
however, be re-emphasized that none of our present allies has 
ever threatened American democracy and that their continuance 


is essential to our own preservation and to the permanence of 
democracy in the world. 

Americans doubt that everyone is sacrificing alike in this war, 
or is likely to do so. Sons, brothers, and sweethearts go off to 
camp and across the seas, perhaps never to return; their sacrifice 
is out of all proportion to the rest. The soaring taxes, prices, and 
food shortages of 1917-1918 come to mind as Americans begin 
to feel the pinch now. They dimly recall the war profiteers and 
the more recent exposes of munitions-makers; they are not con- 
vinced that such errors will be avoided in this war. They are will- 
ing to suffer if they know everyone is bearing a share of the 
burden. But they have to be shown. They note with some misgiv- 
ings the reports of the Truman Committee and other investigating 
groups; they wonder whether the historian of the future may 
uncover a fine collection of unsavory details about graft and 
profits and special privilege in America during World War II. 

What is the best propaganda in this area ? Obviously the propa- 
ganda of facts themselves. If it can be shown that all groups, 
classes, sections, and individuals are contributing their utmost, 
that the draft is really selective and really democratic, that govern- 
ment contracts are not resulting in vast profits — this is the most 
powerful propaganda of all. As the old adage has it, "Actions 
speak louder than words." 

Americans do not believe their democracy is perfect. Too many 
have suffered these past years — from depression, from unemploy- 
ment, from discrimination, and the like. Propaganda which glori- 
fies the status quo before the war will draw a blank, particularly 
with groups like youth, labor, and Negroes, who have suffered 
the most. As Louis Wirth suggests, our propaganda efforts with 
minority groups can stress the diverse origin of our peoples, our 
democratic traditions, our common aspirations.^ It can make a 
realistic comparison between life in even an imperfect democracy 
and life under dictatorship. But the most powerful propaganda 
of all is that which can point to evidence here and now of our 
practise of democracy. This will carry many times more weight 


than the most elaborate blueprints for a better social order at some 
distant future time. 

Emotions, Facts, Goals 

Three features of current American attitudes, in addition to 
the attitudes themselves, stand out with reference to the building 
of morale by consciously directed effort. They are : first, a sus- 
picion of purely emotional appeals ; second, a demand for factual 
evidence ; third, a desire for realizable goals. 

Americans can be touched by appeals to emotions, yes, but cer- 
tainly not to the degree they were in 1917-1918. The slogans, 
songs, pep talks, and other devices used successfully by the Creel 
Committee will have to be replaced by a type of propaganda which 
uses a judicious mixture or reason and emotion, which presents 
facts and figures to buttress the appeals for action. Already there 
are some indications of the use of these newer techniques of prop- 
aganda,* but the total picture is not yet clear. 

Considerable suspicion of censorship and propaganda in the 
news is a recent indication of the American demand for facts. As 
Rugg has pointed out elsewhere in this volume,t results from 
polls taken last November showed that 40 per cent of those in the 
sample were dissatisfied with the government's policy of dispens- 
ing news. An essential of morale is confidence in one's leaders ; 
one of the best ways to destroy that confidence is for Americans 
to discover they are being kept in the dark, or being fooled by 
"doctored" news. Censorship of news for military reasons is 
agreed upon, but omission and distortion of news for any other 
reason — if discovered, as indeed it is likely to be — will prove 
destructive to morale. 

All the warring nations, says Saunders in a recent article,* have 
failed to produce good morale because they have been unable or 

* See, for example, an eight-page illustrated leaflet entitled "Our America," 
put out by the Treasury Department to encourage the sale of Defense Bonds. 
t See Chapter XI. 


unwilling to provide significant positive goals for which their 
people can strive. All are defending something rather than fight- 
ing for an ideal. This situation has not changed since the United 
States entered the war. Perhaps the most important issue con- 
fronting those today who are seeking to build and maintain civil- 
ian morale is this : can goals be set up which harmonize with the 
common aspirations of Americans, which have the stamp of 
sincerity upon them, and which have a reasonable chance of at- 
tainment? If these conditions can be fulfilled, the task of morale- 
building becomes relatively easy. 


News and Morale: A Miniature Experiment 
THEODORE NEW CO MB University of Michigan 

(On leave with the Foreign 
Broadcast Monitoring Sennce) 

ONE of the most debated issues, in the effort to keep Ameri- 
can morale at a maximum, is the censorship of news. 
Most American news and radio programs, like all that 
we hear from Germany, Italy, and Japan, tend to play up favor- 
able news. Our great victories and the smashing blows dealt to 
the enemy make up the largest headlines. On the other hand, Dr. 
Bateson, in discussing American and English character, suggests 
(see Chapter V) that we should not soft-pedal disasters. What is 
the effect of good news or bad news on American public opinion? 
The miniature experiment here presented cannot hope to answer 
the general question but it points to a line of investigation which 
might well be pursued on a much larger scale by such a govern- 
ment agency as the Office of Facts and Figures. 

The experiment was designed and executed by a class in Public 
Opinion and Propaganda.* It deals with the effects of reported 
events in Europe upon the willingness of students in a small 
women's college to approve of increased American aid to Britain. 

The time was late April, 1941, more than six months before 
American entrance into the war. Student opinion in this college, 
following in general the results of nationwide polls, was gradually 
veering toward favoring more aid to Britain. But opinion was still 
divided. Those who favored aid most strongly felt that the 

* The following students participated actively in the experiment : Nancy Cole, 
Petie Cummings, Anne Eaton, Joan Hyatt, Helen Masenheimer, Eleanor Met- 
calfe, Jean Short, and Nancy Victor. 



change was too slow. "Too many people think Britain's is already 
a lost cause," was a common diagnosis by such students of what 
they regarded as the pathetically slow course of public opinion. 
There had been Dunkirk, and then in rapid succession the retreat 
in North Africa, and the failure in Greece. 

Those who were alarmed at the too rapid rise of "intervention- 
ism" offered a precisely reverse explanation. "They're jumping 
on the bandwagon because the succession of British defeats con- 
vinces them that Germany can't be beaten without us. One re- 
sounding British victory would stop the American procession to 
war," was the verdict of many of this group. 

For some weeks the class had been conducting, by sampling 
methods, more or less regular opinion polls regarding the issue of 
aid to Britain. It should be possible, reasoned the class, to discover 
whether British defeats made for more or less "interventionism" ; 
we needed only to wait for another German victory and repeat the 
poll. About the German defeat which was needed for purposes of 
experimental control they were less sanguine. The solution finally 
arrived at was an obvious one : let's create, experimentally, both a 
German victory and a German defeat. 

The matter was arranged as follows. Each of two instructors 
appeared, armed with mimeographed ballots, at each of two 
student dining rooms just after the evening meal had begun. (All 
students took meals in these four rooms, choosing any table in 
any room for any meal. ) Each instructor requested all students in 
each room to fill out the ballots, using practically verbatim the 
following words : 

I have come to ask your help in the matter of the Bennington 
College public opinion polls. Previous polls have been conducted 
by the method of interviewing a carefully chosen sample, but not 
all, of the student body. Some of you, therefore, but not all of 
you, have already been interviewed. The method is being altered 
this time, so that we are asking all of you to participate, and all at 


once. I have come here primarily to explain just why this is 

In recent weeks world events have crowded themselves upon the 
headlines so thick and fast that it is hard for any one to know 
whether or not he is keepifig abreast of the latest developments. 
Between today and tomorrow some world-shaking event may radi- 
cally change your opinions. Thus it simply will not do to have 
some of you give your answers today, and some tomorrow. The 
dining room seems to offer the only opportunity of presenting the 
same questions to all of you at the same time. 

As an example of this, let me tell you that only an hour ago 
the news came over the radio that : [German forces have captured 
Alexandria, in Egypt, and may be expected to take possession of 
the Suez Canal within a few days, or even a few hours. . . . The 
Russian government has denounced its treaty with Germany, and 
has announced that it will attack Germany with all its military 
might if German forces make any move whatever against Syria 
or Turkey. According to London this will end the German threat 
in the Mediterranean].* Since some of you have probably heard 
this already, it seems better to pass on the information to all of 
you than to complete the poll while some of you have heard it and 
others have not. 

Will you therefore indicate your opinion on the papers which 
are being passed around ? They are anonymous ; please do not in- 
dicate your name, but only your major and class in college. 

The ballot itself read : 

You are asked to make three responses to each of the following 
items : first, your opinion three weeks ago (when the first poll was 
taken) ; second, your opinion one week ago; third, your opinion 

Indicate your opinion by encircling A if you agree, D if you 
disagree, ? if you are uncertain. 

* Each instructor included the first passage appearing in brackets in one din- 
ing room, and the second passage appearing in brackets in the other dining room. 



Three weeks 

One week 



A ? D 

A ? D 

A ? D 

1. I am in favor of aiding Britain 
by providing American con- 
voys for British shipping. 

A ? D 

A ? D 

A ? D 

2. I favor giving Britain any and 
every kind of help she needs 
now, before it is too late to 
save her from defeat. 

A ? D 

A ? D 

A ? D 

3. It's already too late for the 
British to hope to defeat the 
Germans, and so there is no 
sense in our going any further 
in joining up with a lost cause. 

The procedure was unusual. No instructor had ever before ap- 
peared in the dining rooms to make such a request. Were the 
reasons offered for the novel procedure accepted as plausible? 
For the great majority of students two lines of evidence suggest 
an affirmative answer. First, the announcement was followed in 
each of the four rooms by a deep hush, and then by excited talk- 
ing. In two of the rooms (those in which the ''German defeat" * 
was announced) there was applause and noisy rejoicing. Secondly, 
inquiry by the class, one week later, indicated that less than 10 
per cent of students claimed not to have been taken in by the 
announcements. Since it is almost certain that some of these later 
claims were spurious, and that no one who suspected the announce- 
ments at the time would have claimed later not to have suspected 
them, it seems safe to say that only a very small percentage did 
not accept the announcements at face value. 

* The "German defeat" or "British victory" announcement was not a military 
operation, strictly comparable to the alleged German occupation of Alexandria. 
It involved the possible entrance of Russia into the war — a contingency likely to 
be complicated by emotions other than those related to Britain or Germany. 



The first tabulation of results (Table I) revealed almost no 
differences between the pairs of rooms in which contrasting an- 
nouncements had been made. Not much was gleaned from this 

Table I. Degrees of agreement, by number and percentage, with three items in 
two groups in which contrasting announcements were made. 

"German Victory" 


"German. Defeat" 




























Item 1 







































Item 2 








































Item 3 








































tabulation except a steady self -reported shift during the preceding 
three weeks toward favoring more aid to Britain, as indicated by 
responses to Items 1 and 2. Item 3 was evidently so strongly 
worded that very few accepted it, and little self -reported shift 
occurred for this item. That these recalled shifts are reason- 
ably accurate is indicated by the responses to Item 1 gathered ex- 
actly three weeks earlier: 21 per cent agreed, 62 per cent dis- 
agreed, and 17 per cent were uncertain on the earlier date. These 
figures are to be compared with later, self-reported attitudes for 
the same date by the entire group of 24 per cent, 55 per cent, and 
21 per cent, respectively. Items 2 and 3 had not previously been 



Although the responses of the two groups, thus tabulated, 
show no differences, a further observation is conspicuous: most 
of the self -reported shifts in attitude (all of which are in the 
direction of favoring more British aid) occurred during the week 
immediately preceding the experiment. This fact obviously sug- 
gests that the experimental announcements had a good deal to do 
with the very recent shifts. This conclusion receives confirmation 
from another poll, held three weeks after the experiment, with the 
results shown in Table II for a 40 per cent sample * of the student 

Table IL Number (and percentage) of various responses 
to items included in experimental poll, as given three 

by 100 subjects 
weeks later. 

Item 1 

Item 2 

Item 3 









body; i.e., with no particularly stirring events in Europe to which 
the attitude shifts could plausibly be attributed, there was a lesser 
degree of favoring aid to Britain three weeks after the experiment 
than at the time of the experiment. Some, if not most, of the pro- 
British shift at the time of the experiment is thus to be attributed 
to the experimental announcements. 

The most interesting aspect of this finding is that it occurred 
in both groups. In other words, announcements of presumably 
opposite import had the effect of increasing the degree of favoring 
aid to Britain. Psychologists may interpret this as an instance of 
"dynamogenesis." Whatever the interpretation, it is evident that 
in a given attitude atmosphere opposed kinds of stimuli may, if 
sufficiently intense, have similar effects. f It suggests too, though it 

* Samples were selected so as to represent accurately the entire student body 
with respect to class and college major. Previously gathered evidence indicated 
that this gave very accurate results. 

t There are other instances of this phenomenon in the literature of attitude 
measurement, e.g., Kulp.^ 



does not prove, that among these subjects attitudinal readiness 
was such that for most of them change in only one direction — 
more aid to Britain — was possible. 

To return to the experimental data, analysis showed that the 
four dining-room groups were by no means of similar composi- 
tion. One of them was composed largely of juniors and seniors, 
and another largely of freshmen. These two groups, unfortu- 
nately, had heard opposite experimental announcements. A fur- 
ther tabulation was therefore made, as shown in Table III, of the 
experimental responses, classified by class groups. (Percentages 
have been corrected, in this table, to include only those having 
opinions. Responses to Item 3 were so nearly uniform in all 
groups, as thus computed, that they are not presented in this 

Table III. Percentage o 

i those having 

opinions who favor 

more aid to Britain. 































Three weeks ago 

One week ago 












With the responses thus segregated by classes, certain differ- 
ences appear between the groups which heard contrasting an- 
nouncements. First, the response differences between those groups 
hearing contrasting announcements are greater for upper class- 
men than for freshmen; the two groups of freshmen do not differ 
at all in response to Item 2. Secondly, where differences do appear 
(i.e., in response to Item 1), the differences are in opposite di- 
rections for the two class groups. That is, freshmen hearing the 

1 82 


report of "German Victory" are somewhat more favorable to 
British aid than freshmen who heard the report of ''German De- 
feat." But, on the contrary, upperclassmen who heard the report 
of "German Victory" are decidedly less favorable to British aid 
than those who heard the report of "German Defeat." These dif- 
ferences appear more clearly in Table IV, where they are ex- 
pressed in terms of ratios. 

Table IV, Differences between groups hearing contrasting announcements, 

expressed in terms of ratio between percentage of those favoring British aid 

in "German Victory" group and in "German Defeat" group. 


Three weeks ago 
One week ago . . 


Item 1 Item 2 




Item 1 Item 2 



The fact that these differences appear not only for the experi- 
mental responses, but also for the self -reported earlier attitudes, 
demands brief comment. Judging by the 40 per cent sample re- 
sponses obtained three weeks earlier to Item 1, both the "German 
Defeat" freshmen and the "German Victory" upperclassmen 
made very accurate self-reports of their attitudes as of three 
weeks earlier (27 per cent of freshmen and 12 per cent of upper- 
classmen having opinions at the earlier time favored convoying). 
But the other two groups, i.e., the "German Victory" freshmen 
and the "German Defeat" upperclassmen, exaggerate the degree 
to which they had favored convoying at the earlier period. That 
these reports represent distorted recall seems clear. The motiva- 
tion must have been strong to make it appear that attitude shifts 
had been gradual, rather than dictated exclusively by the an- 
nouncement just heard. What seems to have happened is that those 
who were most influenced by the announcement were most moved 
to exaggerate their earlier degree of favor for convoying. This 



Statement is not in contradiction with the previous statement that 
self -reported shifts are reasonably accurate; the previous state- 
ment had to do with the total group, for which the various degrees 
of distorted recall tend to cancel each other. The present statement 
has to do with selected groups, for which distorted recall is rather 
obvious. The writer is inclined to interpret this distortion as 
additional evidence for the efficacy of the experimental announce- 
ments, for these particular groups. 

It is worth noting that responses to Item 3, though showing no 
differences in percentage of agreement, show differences in per- 
centage of uncertainty which are congruent with the above results. 
These are shown in Table V. Here, as in response to the other 

Table V. Experimental Responses to Item 3, in percentage. 




























Three weeks ago 

One week ago 
















A, ?, and D refer to agreement, uncertainty, and disagreement, respectively. 

items, there are no differences between the two freshmen groups, 
whereas the difference between the two upperclass groups is 
marked. One quarter of those in the ''German Victory" group are 
uncertain as to whether the British cause is hopeless, while not one 
junior or senior in the "German Defeat" group is uncertain. The 
lesser uncertainty and the greater disagreement with this item on 
the part of the ''German Defeat" group is clearly related to the 
nature of the announcement which it heard. 

Why are freshmen and upperclassmen differentially affected by 
the nature of the announcements which they hear? And, in par- 


ticular, why are the contrasting effects of the two announcements 
greater for upperclassmen than for freshmen ? The following sug- 
gestions cannot be documented here, but there is ample evidence 
for them in material previously gathered by the writer in the 
same college community.* In a college where great stress is laid 
on the contemporary world, upperclassmen are very much better 
informed concerning contemporary events than freshmen. And 
in a college where individual prestige is closely related to de- 
gree of concern over the outcome of such events, upperclassmen 
feel themselves more directly involved ; they care more. The lesser 
degree of favoring aid to Britain on the part of upperclassmen 
than of freshmen does not mean that they were more indifferent 
to a German victory. On the contrary, as shown by other evi- 
dence, they feared it more. But they were sufficiently aware of the 
complexity of the problem to be also aware of the dangers to this 
country of intervening in a cause which was already hopeless. 

In short, upperclassmen wanted a German defeat more des- 
perately than did freshmen, but they had been more discouraged 
than had freshmen by the succession of German victories. Their 
very superiority in information and understanding had been in 
part responsible for their discouragement. Thus it happened that 
the news of a ''German defeat" stimulated the upperclassmen who 
heard it to favor far greater aid to Britain. The chief inhibiting 
factor, their discouragement, had been thus far reduced.! 

Which of the two initial hypotheses was the more nearly cor- 
rect? Obviously a "resounding British victory" did not have the 
effect of ''stopping the procession to war" for either freshmen or 
upperclassmen. For both groups, indeed, it tended to have the 
opposite effect. But it is axiomatic for those who study differen- 
tial influences upon public opinion that "the public" cannot be 
considered a single "mass." Rather, a given sort of influence has 
one effect upon this group, another upon that. The chief signifi- 
cance of the present experiment seems to be that one of the differ- 

* See the writer's forthcoming Personality and social change. 

t Upper classmen may also have been more favorable toward Russia. 


. ^ 

entia which must be borne in mind in considering varying effects 
of the same influence upon different groups is degree of informa- 
tion, understanding, and concern. 

To the extent that conclusions from such a Hmited group are 
appHcable to other groups, and to the extent that the conditions 
of April, 1941, are still present, the following deductions may be 
drawn: (1) the belief that Germany can be defeated without 
American aid is not an important deterrent to favoring increased 
efforts by America to defeat Germany; and (2) those who are 
best informed and most concerned (and who, perhaps, wield more 
than average influence) are primarily deterred from favoring in- 
creased efforts by America to defeat Germany by their discourage- 
ment in the face of continued German successes. By release from 
discouragement and futility, the latter group, even more than the 
total group, was stimulated to favor such American efforts. 

Part Three: The State of American 

XL American Morale When the War Began 
XI L Student Morale 

XII I. Morale and the Jewish Minority 

XIV. Morale Among Negroes 
XV. Morale in Canada 


American Morale When the War Began 

nr^xTAT r» T?TTrr ^ff^^^ ^f Public Opinion Research, 

DONALD RUGG Princeton University 

TODAY the course of American foreign policy has been set 
irrevocably by the impact of recent events. Our nation 
stands united in all-out opposition to the Axis, firm in its 
resolve to triumph over the forces of fascism. This new-found 
unity sprang from righteous indignation at an unprovoked attack 
upon our outposts, an attack which ruled out any alternative but 
war. United now in our goals, we are willing to make whatever 
sacrifices our leaders demand of us ; possessed as we are of a com- 
mon will to victory, our morale is at present excellent. Whether 
it will continue to be high, whether we will avoid complacency as 
a result of imagined impregnability, or become dispirited as a con- 
sequence of initial defeats, whether the transformation from 
business as usual to a complete war economy will entail dissatis- 
factions which will endanger our unanimity, are questions whose 
answers are not yet in. While we cannot predict with certainty the 
future state of morale, we can review the condition of morale at 
the time of our entrance into the war, as well as trace its develop- 
ment since the original outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Such an 
historical survey may provide us with an understanding of the 
conditions which must be met if our morale is to be sustained at 
its present high level. 

Just as the Japanese attack on Hawaii was no single, isolated 
incident, but part of a larger Axis plan of aggression, so our 
morale was not suddenly born, full-grown like Minerva, as a con- 
sequence of this attack. True, instant unity and tremendously 
heightened morale did result, but these could be likened to a 



swiftly completed superstructure which was erected on an already 
existing foundation of antipathy for Axis philosophy and actions, 
and a broad sympathy for the Allied cause. It is the purpose of the 
present chapter to examine the nature of this foundation, to ana- 
lyze the state of prewar morale in terms of : (1) what the Ameri- 
can people wanted to happen with reference to the present world 
struggle; (2) what we expected would happen; and (3) what we 
thought we should do about it, both with respect to the general 
aims and objectives which should guide our policies, and also with 
respect to the specific implementation of these aims. 

The data on which this study of morale is based have been col- 
lected by the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton Uni- 
versity. They are the results of public-opinion surveys made by 
this office and by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup 
Poll). In the tables which follow. Institute questions will be 
labeled **A.I.P.O.," while those devised by this office will carry the 
legend *'O.P.O.R." The surveys conducted by both organizations 
use the method of stratified sampling, which means that the vari- 
ous population groups are represented in the poll sample in the 
same proportions that they occur in the total voting population of 
the country. Thus the poll sample is an accurate miniature which 
reflects the opinion of the populace as a whole. For each question 
dates are given. They indicate the day on which this question (as 
part of a larger questionnaire) was sent out to the interviewers. 
The opinion represented would be that which was current during 
the following week to ten days, by which time the interviewing 
would have been completed. 

What the American People Wanted to Happen 

From the very beginning of the war, American sympathies have 
been overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies. In September, 1939, 
84 per cent of the people wanted to see England and France de- 
feat Germany, whereas only 2 per cent favored the Germans 
(Table I) ; 14 per cent made no choice, probably in the attempt to 


preserve a strictly'neutral attitude — a popular reaction at that time. 
As the war progressed, and the United States became increasingly 
interventionist, it is safe to assume that the majority of these 
no-opinion voters swung to the side of England and France. 

Early in 1940, a similar question on the Sino-Japanese conflict 
elicited nearly as overwhelming a majority wanting to see China 
triumph (Table I). The no-choice vote was somewhat larger in 
this case, probably because at that time this war seemed more 
remote to the average American. 

When Germany declared war against Russia, the great majority 
of Americans, despite their dislike of the communist form of gov- 
ernment, expressed sympathy with the Russian cause. Again the 
percentage of those unwilling to make a choice was high, presum- 
ably because many found it difficult to determine whether com- 
munism or fascism was the lesser evil. Nearly three- fourths of the 
population, however, guided by the considerations of Realpolitik, 
expressed hope for a Russian victory (Table I). This attitude re- 
mained stable over the period from June to September. 

Table I 
Which side do you want to see win the war? (A.I. P.O., Sept. 19, 1939) 

England and France 84% 

Germany 2 

No choice 14 

In the present war between Japan and China, which side do you want to see 
win? (A.I.P.O., Feb. 20, 1940) 

China 76% 

Japan 2 

No choice 22 

In the present war between Germany and Russia, which side would you like 
to see win? (A.I.P.O., June 24, 1940 and Sept. 9, 1941) 

June Sept. 

Russia 73% 70% 

Germany 4 4 

Neither 18 19 

No opinion 5 7 


What We Expected Would Happen 

We have seen that the American public strongly desired the 
defeat of the Axis partners. Good morale, however, entails not 
only the desire for victory, but also the faith that victory will 
ultimately be achieved. It is pertinent, then, to inquire what people 
expected would happen, as well as what they wanted to happen. 

Chart I shows graphically the trend in the percentages of a 
national cross section who thought that England would win the 
war (together with the counterparts of this question — the per- 
centages believing Germany and Italy would win, and those who 
were undecided), and the percentage who, at different periods, 
thought the United States would eventually enter the war.* 

Confidence in an English victory has fluctuated with events, de- 
clining sharply at the time of the French debacle and the German 
successes in the Balkans. Usually, however, there has been a quick 
return to a more optimistic attitude following these periods of 
pessimism, and, by the fall of 1941, confidence in the ultimate 
victory of Allied arms had reached a 70 per cent level. In late 
November, just prior to our entrance into the war, 86 per cent 
foresaw an eventual German defeat; in December, after we had 
declared war, this figure climbed to over 90 per cent. 

At the outset of the war, about half the population believed that 
the United States would eventually become involved. This per- 
centage fell off somewhat in the following weeks, when the theory 
of a "phony war" was current, then rose, only to drop again when 
the French defeat made it appear that the war would soon end. 
Since that time, however, this curve has risen steadily until, in late 
October, it reached a high point of 83 per cent (Chart I). 

Table II shows opinion on the probable victor in the Russo- 

* This chart was prepared by the Office of Public Opinion Research from 
trend data which have been compiled on these as well as many other important 
war issues. The curve representing Dow-Jones market averages (these points 
were selected to correspond to the dates of the "Which side will win" question) 
is included because of its interesting correlation with the trend line of "Eng- 
land will win." The numbers at the top of the chart refer to the list of events. 


J It, 

German war. At the beginning of the war, people were not san- 
guine about Russia's chances; past experience made it appear 
Hkely that the German military machine would continue to roll. 
Yet by September, although the undecided vote was still high, 
there was much greater confidence in a Russian victory. Even 
among those who did not foresee an eventual Russian victory, a 
majority (60 per cent) believed that Russia would be able to con- 
tinue fighting for six months or more (Table II). 

Table H 

Which side do you think will win — Germany or Russia? (A.I.P.O., June 24, 
1941 and Sept. 9, 1941) 

June Sept. 

Germany 48% 20% 

Russia 22 41 

Stalemate 9 9 

Undecided 21 30 

If "Germany," "Stalemate," or "Undecided," ask: 

Do you think Germany will defeat Russia in the next six months, or do you 
think Russia will keep on fighting for six months or longer? 


Germany will win in six months 13% 

Russia will keep on fighting 60 

Don't know 27 

Table III shows that, just previous to the actual onset of 
hostilities, a majority of people felt that a clash between the United 
States and Japan was inevitable. There was, at the same time, 
almost unanimous confidence that the outcome of such a war 
would be a victory for the United States ; indeed, a majority pre- 
dicted that the war would be a short one, and relatively easy for 
us to win (Table III).* 

* Much of this rather easy optimism was dispelled by the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. An A.I.P.O. ballot sent out three days 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor found 50 per cent (whereas the figure in 
Table III was 20 per cent) saying that it would be a long war, and 64 per cent 
(35 per cent in Table III) that it would be a difficult one for us to win. Un- 
doubtedly this change in attitude was a healthy sign, for it indicated that a 
rather dangerous overconfidence had been replaced by a more realistic concep- 
tion of the magnitude of the task confronting us. 


Table III 

Do you think the United States will go to war against Japan in the near 
future? (A.I.P.O, Nov. 25, 1941) 

Yes 52% 

No 27 

Undecided 21 

If this country should get into a war against Japan, do you think we would 
win, or lose? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941) 

Win 92% 

Lose 1 

Stalemate 1 

Undecided 6 

If the United States goes to war against Japan, do you think it will be a 
long war, or a short one? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941) 

Long 20% 

Short 57 

Qualified answer 3 

Don't know 20 

Do you think a war between our country and Japan would be a difficult one 
for us, or a comparatively easy one? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941) 

Difficult 35% 

Easy 48 

Qualified answer 3 

No opinion 14 

In summary, people in this country were virtually unanimous 
in desiring Germany's defeat, and at the same time were confident 
that this would eventually be accomplished. Hitler's attempt to 
divert American sympathies by engaging in a Holy War against 
communism completely missed fire. Despite its dislike of com- 
munism, the public accepted Russia as an ally and hoped that she 
would be able to stall the new German Blitzkrieg. For a long time, 
the American people have fatalistically held the conviction that we 
would eventually enter the war (and, more recently, have come to 
regard our entrance as a sine qua non of an Allied victory), 
though at the same time they have been reluctant to endorse a 
policy of full military participation. The implications of this 
dilemma of contradictory expectations and desires will be con- 
sidered more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say here that, 
although we were amazed by the suddenness of the attack on us, 
we had really expected the war to come sooner or later ; it was with 





















o -^ 




a sense of relief we realized that now we knew just where we 
stood. Anticipated too was a war with Japan, in which we felt 
that our military and general economic superiority would insure 
a not too difficult victory. Many foresaw, however, that the war 
would be no pushover, and the sobering disaster at Pearl Harbor 
kept the rest from succumbing to a dangerous overconfidence. 

What We Thought We Should Do About It 

While our sympathies have been outstandingly pro-Allied ever 
since the outbreak of the war, our willingness to go the limit to 
insure an Allied victory has evolved very gradually. Our attitude 
toward participation in the struggle has pursued a course from 
complete neutrality to a declaration of war, as Chart II indicates. 
In September, 1939, the issue which most concerned us was 
whether we ought to modify our neutrality to the extent of selling 
war materials to England and France. In the month following the 
French armistice, the basic issue was whether we ought to give up 
our neutrality entirely in order to aid the British. By midfall, 
1940, we were wondering whether we ought to resist Hitler by all 
possible aid short of war. After the Axis successes in the Baikans 
the problem became : shall we resist Hitler at any cost ? By Novem- 
ber the question had taken a more ominous form : when will we 
fight? The answer came in December.* 

Although American public opinion has become increasingly 
interventionist since 1939, the degree of interventionism shown in 
a poll is distinctly a function of the way in which the issue is pre- 
sented, and varies with the contingencies involved. Chart III 
shows graphically this variation in interventionist sentiment with 
variation in contingencies. 

It will be seen from this chart that, although more than 70 
per cent of the people were agreed that our primary job was to 

* The author is indebted to Dr. Hadley Cantril of the Office of Public 
Opinion Research for this analysis of changing issues. For a more complete 
account, see his article.^ 

Chart 3. Variations in war sentiment. 

As far as you, personally, 
are concerned, do you think 
the U.S. has gone too far in 
opposing Germany, or not far 
enough? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 
19, 1941) 

If our present leaders say 
that the only way to defeat 
Germany is for this country 
to go into the war, would 
you be in favor of this coun- 
try's going into the war 
against Germany? (O.P.O.R., 
Nov. 19, 1941) 

Congress has voted to change 
the Neutrality Act to permit 
American merchant ships 
with American crews to 
carry war materials to Bri- 
tain. Do you approve, or 
disapprove? (A. I. P.O., Nov. 
25, 1941) 

The Army has asked Con- 
gress to change the law 
which says drafted men can- 
not be sent to fight outside 
North or South America or 
this country's possessions. 
Do you think Congress 
should give the Army the 
right to send drafted sol- 
diers to any part of the 
world? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 

Should the United States en- 
ter the war now? (A. I. P.O., 
Nov. 22, 1941) 

Not far 
enough and 






68% -^rt 

-► 66% 

be de- 




31% -^ 

Go in 




13% -^ 

Some people say that the 
biggest job facing this coun- 
try today is to defeat the 
Nazi government. Do you 
agree or disagree? (O.P.O.R., 
Nov. 19, 1941) 

Which of these two things 
do you think is the more im- 
portant: That this country 
keep out of war, or that Ger- 
many be defeated? (O.P.O.R., 
Nov. 19, 1941) 

If you were asked to vote 
today on the question of the 
United States entering the 
war against Germany and 
Italy, how would you vote — 
to go into the war, or to 
stay out of the war? 
O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941) 

Do you think the United 
States should at this time 
send part of of our Army to 
Europe to help Britain? 
(A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 1941) 


defeat the Axis and 68 per cent considered this task more im- 
portant than our keeping out of war, only 31 per cent said they 
would vote to go to war if a referendum were held, only 24 per 
cent thought we ought to enter the war, and the very small minor- 
ity of 13 per cent approved of sending an expeditionary force to 
aid Britain. There was, then, no single index of the degree of inter- 
ventionism at the time these questions were asked. The majority 
of us were in accord on the general objective of aiding the Allies, 
and thus insuring the defeat of Germany; but there was usually 
less unanimity on proposals providing specific implementation of 
this objective, particularly if such proposals stated or implied that 
our armed forces were to be sent abroad. Strongly interventionist 
in terms of general objectives, we were isolationist on the matter 
of direct military participation. It should be noted, however, that 
if our participation were to become or were made to appear a 
necessary condition of defeating Germany, 70 per cent of the 
population said they would agree to our entering the war (Chart 
III, question reading: 'Tf our present leaders, etc."). As it hap- 
pened, there was no need for our leaders to argue this point. 

In any analysis of morale, it is important to know not only the 
over-all percentages of agreement with objectives, but also whether 
there are groups which differ significantly from others in the de- 
gree to which they endorse these objectives, since such divergent 
groups could easily prove a stumbling block to national unity. In 
general, the South and Southwest regions of the country have 
been most interventionist, the Middle West least so; men have 
been more interventionist than women, upper-income groups 
slightly more so than lower, well-educated people more than the 
poorly educated, and Protestants more so than Catholics. The dif- 
ferences, varying with the particular issue concerned, have very 
rarely been more than 20 per cent. Their average would probably 
be in the vicinity of 10 per cent or less. 

Although the scope of this chapter does not permit any complete 
documentation of these group differences, an illustrative compari- 
son is presented in Table IV, which contains an analysis of re- 


J Mi . — _ 

ligious differences on several questions about the war and United 
States policy in relation to the war. It will be seen that the dif- 
ferences between Protestants and Catholics ranged from about 
4 per cent to 15 per cent, with Catholics consistently more isola- 
tionist. Catholic attitudes toward Japan, however, have not dif- 
fered significantly from those of Protestants, inasmuch as there is 
no religious conflict involved when Catholics look to the Far East. 
Some reasons for the greater isolationism of Catholics with refer- 
ence to the European struggle were these: (1) the fact that the 
Church advocated among nationals of each side support for their 
respective countries; (2) fear of greater secular influence if the 
Allies should win; (3) a traditional dislike of England growing 
out of the long struggle of the Catholic and Anglican churches. 

Table IV. Religious Differences in Attitudes on War Questions. (These ques- 
tions were all included in a ballot sent out September 17, 1941.) 

Which is more important for the United States to try to do: to keep out 
of war ourselves or to help Britain (defeat Germany) even at the risk of get- 
ting into the war? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Keep out 40.3% 25.3% 28.6% 

Help (defeat) 55.4 68.3 65.5 

No choice 4.3 6.4 5.9 

So far as you personally are concerned, do you think President Roosevelt 
has gone too far or not far enough in his policies of helping Britain (in oppos- 
ing Germany) ? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Too far 29.1% 21.1% 22.6% 

About right 44.6 55.2 48.6 

Not far enough 20.0 16.6 21.3 

No opinion 6.3 7.1 7.5 

Should the Neutrality Act be changed to permit American merchant ships 
with American crews to carry war materials to Britain? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Yes 37.6% 48.4% 48.6% 

No 46.8 36.3 37.0 

No opinion 15.6 15.3 14.4 

In general, do you agree or disagree with Lindbergh's viewpoint on aid to 
Britain and foreign policy? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Agree 19.7% 13.4% 15.2% 

Disagree 57.3 65.1 63.6 

No opinion 23.0 21.5 21.2 


If you had to choose, which kind of government would you prefer to live 
under — the kind in Germany or the kind in Russia? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Germany 18.9% 11.2% 9.7% 

Russia 30.2 35.7 41.5 

Unable to choose 40.2 43.5 39.0 

No opinion 10.8 9.6 9.8 

Some people say that if the United States is to be a free and democratic 
country, the Nazi government in Germany must be destroyed. Do you agree or 
disagree ? 

Catholic Protestant No Church 

Agree 67.0% 72.6% 70.2% 

Disagree 24.6 20.9 21.3 

No opinion 8.4 6.5 8.5 

This outline of group differences should not obscure the fact 
that the similarities of opinion are much more striking than the 
differences. What is really surprising is not that there were dif- 
ferences, but that they were so small. With our entrance into the 
war, we can expect a considerable narrowing of these differences. 
The absence of any serious dissension on the part of a sizeable 
minority group in the country is, of course, an essential condition 
of good morale. 


Prosecution of our war objectives has inevitably entailed in- 
creasing centralization of power in the executive branch of the 
government, a process which has been accelerated with our en- 
trance into the war. Such increase of power means, of course, 
that there is less opportunity for the control of legislation and 
government action through the normal democratic channels. That 
people feel the newly acquired authority to be exercised in the 
best interests of themselves and of the country as a whole is in 
this situation necessary for high morale. Confidence in the leaders 
is, then, an important component of morale, particularly in war- 
time. To investigate this element of morale two questions were 
used specifically by the O.P.O.R. The results obtained are given 
in Table V. To give a combined index of confidence, the results 


Table V 

In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling 
his job as president today? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941) 

Approve 72% 

Disapprove 21 

No opinion 7 

Some people say that President Roosevelt is taking advantage of the war 
situation to carry out some of his pet plans which have nothing to do with 
defense. Do you agree, or disagree, with this? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941) 

Agree 23% 

Disagree 55 

No opinion 17 

Don't understand question 5 

If "Agree," ask: Do you approve, or disapprove, of President Roosevelt's 
taking advantage of the war to carry out his plans not connected with defense? 

% of "Agree" % of Total Population 

Approve 12% 3% 

Disapprove 82 19 

No opinion 6 1 

{77% did not answer this part of the question) 
Degree of confidence National Democratic * Republican * 

High 51% 70% 27% 

Medium 39 28 49 

Low 10 2 24 

* Political affiliation was determined in this case by the way the person voted in the 
1940 election. 

were grouped in this way : Those who answered "Approve" on the 
first question and "Disagree" or "Agree-Approve" on the second 
were considered to have high confidence in the President. Low 
confidence was defined as a combination of "Disapprove" on the 
first question, and "Agree-Disapprove" on the second. Persons 
who were favorable to the President on one question but not on 
the other were classed as having "medium" confidence. The na- 
tional totals in terms of degree of confidence, and a breakdown of 
these by political affiliation (determined by vote in 1940) are 
given in Table V. It will be seen that almost exactly half the popu- 
lation were favorable to the President on both questions, and are 
consequently rated as having high confidence, whereas only 10 per 
cent fall into the "low" category. A sizeable group of 39 per cent 
is found, however, in the medium category, indicating something 


less than wholehearted approval of Roosevelt in the country as a 
whole. As would be expected, Democrats and Republicans differ 
sharply in the amount of confidence they have in the President. 
While these figures may not seem to show as great a degree of 
confidence as would be desirable for high morale, it should be 
remembered that the questions concern the President's conduct of 
domestic as well as foreign policy. Other questions have shown 
that many more people approve his handling of the defense pro- 
gram and foreign policy than endorse all his domestic policies. 
With our entrance into the war, and the dwindling of many 
domestic issues into distinctly secondary place, it is probable that 
many people who were withholding approval of Roosevelt because 
of dissatisfaction with his conduct of domestic affairs are no 
longer doing so. Table V does indicate a fairly substantial base of 
support, which was undoubtedly broadened as the exigencies of 
the war situation took precedence over the more minor sources of 
dissatisfaction with the President. 


Another important element in morale is the feeling that one is 
being accurately and adequately informed as to the general situa- 
tion and his government's activities in relation to it.* Although 
people are aware of the need for secrecy in areas where the divulg- 
ing of information might play into the enemy's hands, they are 
resentful of any attempts to hoodwink them or to conceal or edit 
news for the purpose of influencing their opinion. In answer to an 
O.P.O.R. question ("Do you think the government is giving the 
public as much information as it should about the war?"), polled 
in late November, 1941, 48 per cent of the sample answered 
"Yes," 40 per cent said "No," 3 per cent gave qualified answers, 

* For other references to the necessity of accuracy in information, see Chap- 
ter IX, "Propaganda and morale," by S. S. Sargent ; and Chapter IV, "Morale 
and national character," by Gregory Bateson. 


. _ 5 >; ■ 

and 9 per cent didn't know. Such incidents as the occupation of 
Iceland, the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, and the activities of the 
Navy in the Atlantic — none of which was revealed until after 
its occurrence — were mentioned by some respondents as the source 
of their dissatisfaction with the way news was being handled. The 
amount of dissatisfaction revealed by the results of this question 
clearly pointed to a need for clarification, by the government, of its 
policy on the release of information. The need for secrecy could 
be stressed and, at the same time, reassurances given that no mis- 
information or deliberately misleading information would be 


Two of the best indices of the state of morale are the extent to 
which people are willing to make sacrifices in the interest of attain- 
ing the objective, and the extent to which they are personally par- 
ticipating in an effort to achieve the objective. 

Table VI shows that over 60 per cent of the people were will- 
ing, in November, 1941, to see wage-fixing measures put into 
effect, provided that at the same time price-control legislation 
was adopted. About 40 per cent said they had bought or intended 
to buy Defense Bonds. Only about 30 per cent, however, favored 
compulsory buying of Bonds and Stamps. 

The question on helping in the defense program showed that a 
good majority who were willing to help had very few definite 
ideas of just how they could fit into the defense effort. In any 
event, there is plenty of willing personnel for civilian defense; the 
problem of how to utilize it effectively is obviously one for govern- 
mental agencies. 

* A poll on this same question in the week following our declaration of war 
on Japan and Germany found that 77 per cent of the people thought the govern- 
ment was giving enough information about the war (9 per cent said it was giv- 
ing out too much), while only 14 per cent were still dissatisfied because of too 
little information. 


Table VI 

A recent law in Canada keeps wage and salary rates from going higher than 
they are now and also keeps all prices, including prices of farm products, from 
going higher. Would you approve, or disapprove, of such a law in the United 
States? (A.I.P.O, Nov. 25, 1941) 

Approve 63% 

Disapprove 28 

No opinion 9 

Have you any definite plans to buy any Defense Bonds or Stamps? 
(A.I.P.O,. Nov. 22, 1941) 

Have already bought 14% 

Yes 24 

No 62 

Would you favor a law for buying Defense Bonds and Stamps which 
would make it compulsory for everybody to invest 2 cents out of every dollar 
of their salary, wages, or other income in Defense Stamps and Bonds? 
(A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 1941) 

Yes 30% 

No 64 

No opinion 6 

Would you favor a law which would make it compulsory for everybody to 
buy Defense Bonds or Stamps, in proportion to income? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 

Yes 29% 

No 64 

No opinion 7 

Would you like to do something in your spare time without pay to help 
national defense? (A.I.P.O., July 10, 1941) (Asked of those whose present 
work is not connected with national defense) 

Already am 6% 

Yes 67 

No 19 

Undecided 8 

If "Yes" or "Undecided" : Can you think of anything that you, yourself, 
could do to help the defense program? 

Yes 28% 

No 61 

No answer 11 

The willingness of people to do more, to make more sacrifices 
than are being asked of them, is strikingly illustrated by the re- 
sults of an A.I.P.O. poll, made shortly after we entered the war.* 

* In this connection, it is significant that, from the very beginning of the 
war, the public has been ahead (about five months ahead on the average) of 
Congress in approving successively more interventionist policies. Cf. Cantril.^ 


On this poll, 

75 per cent of the people said the government should have the 
right to tell factory owners and business men what they can make 
and what prices they can charge. 

66 per cent said the government should have the right to tell 
workers what jobs they are to work at, what they will be paid, and 
how many hours they should work. 

38 per cent of the people whose work is connected with the war 
effort believed the company for which they work could turn out 
more work with its present group of employees. 

68 per cent were in favor of drafting single women between 
the ages of 21 and 35 for training in wartime work. 

92 per cent of those whose work is directly or indirectly con- 
nected with the national defense program were willing to work 8 
hours more a week at their present job (this means 92 per cent of 
approximately 21 per cent of the total population who said their 
work is directly or indirectly connected with national defense). 

From these figures it is evident that people are willing to do 
much more than they are being asked to do, willing to work longer 
hours, take whatever jobs they are asked to, have wages regulated 
by the government. In other words, the government has from the 
public a mandate to do whatever is necessary to win the war, 
regardless of the disruptions and dislocations of normal civilian 
life which such a program may entail. 


From the beginning of the war in Europe, the American people 
have wanted to help England and at the same time have wanted to 
keep out of war. As event has followed event, it has become more 
and more apparent that it would be impossible both to help Eng- 
land and to keep out of war. When forced to make a choice, a clear 
majority of the people were, by the fall of 1941, willing to choose 
war if that was the only way the Axis could be defeated. But even 
up to the time we entered the war, almost half the American peo- 


pie Still thought some means could be found to defeat the Axis 
without our having to become fully involved. Though willing to 
have us enter the war if absolutely necessary, these people were 
not yet convinced that the time for us to go in had come. They 
were, however, sufficiently undecided to be willing to follow the 
advice of their leaders. 

At the time this country entered the war, the unity of opinion 
with respect to the major objective — defeat of the Axis — was 
high. The attack on Pearl Harbor drew even more Americans 
together in the desire to defend themselves against the common 
enemy. People were confident of victory, confident of their leader. 
Morale, high on December 6, was even higher on December 8. 
It is important, however, to place this state of morale in perspective 
and to realize that it existed during a period when this country 
was on the defensive. When this country, as a major power of 
the United Nations, begins to take more aggressive action, when 
casualty lists increase, when sacrifices mount, and when Axis 
propaganda attempting to divide the United Nations intensifies, 
our present unity is apt to be strained. 

The danger points to be watched, as indicated by poll results, 
are the following: 

First, everything possible must be done to maintain and to 
increase the confidence people have in their sources of informa- 
tion. On this matter young people are especially skeptical. If the 
aims of the United Nations are to be clearly distinguished from 
the Axis aims, then the methods used by the United Nations to 
communicate with their peoples must clearly differentiate them- 
selves from the means of the Axis. 

If confidence in the news is established, then a second danger 
point may more easily be overcome, namely the failure to provide 
for the common man a clear conception of what he is asked to 
fight for. As this chapter is written, no clearcut positive program 
has uniformly impressed the common man. When he thinks of 
the purposes of the war, he tends to think mostly in terms of 
negative purposes — defeat of the Axis. 


A third danger point, and one which also relates to the con- 
fidence people have in their news sources, is the inadequate con- 
ception people have of the real magnitude of the job ahead of them. 
There are strong indications that most people are still relatively 
complacent, that awareness of the magnitude of the task ahead is 
not found in a significantly greater degree among the more edu- 
cated people or among those who before the war were most 

Finally, people must be convinced that the sacrifices they are 
asked to make are sacrifices genuinely needed, and that others of 
the group are sacriiicing to the same extent as they are. Under 
these circumstances people are, as we have seen, willing and eager 
to do anything which the government says is necessary to win 
the war. 


Student Morale 
JOE AND EUGENIA BELDEN University of Texas 

Up TO the minute when Japanese bombs crashed into Pearl 
Harbor, American college youth had been practically un- 
moved by any call to join the war. Although sympathetic 
with the English and the Russians, as many studies of student 
opinion had indicated, collegians had failed to mobilize their spirit. 
The complete revolution the student mind has undergone since the 
United States was attacked has been revealing of those character- 
istics some people thought were lost. Undergraduates, long criti- 
cized for their pacifist clamorings, have united and are ready for 
the personal sacrifices that war demands of everyone, but espe- 
cially of youth. 

The nature of the attack upon this nation undoubtedly brought 
about the determination and unity that is being expressed every- 
where in countless ways. An examination of student attitudes 
prior to United States participation may be useful as an appraisal 
of student morale, perhaps not so much to determine what the 
problems might have been, were we still at peace in the Pacific, but 
to keep us aware of attitudes which may become important again 
if events are too discouraging. The previous chapter has shown 
that old prejudices may re-emerge. Here, then, is a prewar view 
into the state of student morale, a picture taken with a national 
sampling recurring at monthly intervals for three years. 

On the American college campus stood a figure at the same 
time amenable to and defiant toward the world into which he must 
go, a youth reared in a postwar period, chastened by a depression, 
and not exactly sure what was worth dying for. Gone was the 
raccoon-coated Joe College of the roaring 'twenties. In the wake 



of the economic upheaval of 1929 many a small college had to 
close its doors, but the state universities bulged with young men 
and women who, unable to find work, were looking for an educa- 
tion at the lowest possible cost. A new type of student filled the 
\ campuses, more representative of all Americans. His bull sessions 
\ now included labor, social theories, and the N.R.A. A new serious- 
Jness had set in. 

C Out of the first war and later out of the depression also were 
^'^ngendered much discussion and agitation about the "isms." It 
became almost fashionable to be labeled a "pinko." But American 
students generally never became the radical street-demonstrators 
of European universities, and even Martin Dies was able to 
find few college communists to expose. Left imprinted on college 
thought, however, was a stamp of pacifism, the indirect effect of 
the disillusioning 1930's. 

The debacle in Europe and the cry for national defense soon 
drowned out the appeals of such groups as the Veterans of Future 
Wars and other more serious organizations like the Youth Com- 
mittee Against War. With antiwar theories no longer a popular 
philosophy, leaders of the National Student Council for De- 
mocracy and Education of the American Youth Congress, the 
American Student Union, and others were compelled to reorient 
their policies and programs. The war-sourness left on the campuses 
by the students of ten, even five years ago, although not always 
evident on the surface, none the less still underlay student opinion 
on the war. 

Undergraduates of the early 1940's were ill-schooled for this 
seismic era. "Looking at the majority of collegians," ran a recent 
commentary,^ "one finds an American Youth of high hopes and a 
sane, optimistic outlook, in spite of a topsy-turvy world." 

Some students themselves admit that they came to college "be- 
cause my parents made me," "because of social pressure," and "to 
get married" (about 2 per cent of the co-eds). But the majority 
is there "to get an education" or "to prepare myself for a job." 
Most students maintain that they enjoy their courses and have 


definitely decided what their Hfe work is to be. "An ominous 
future apparently does not deter college men from hoping for 
economic advancement. A majority would like to go into business 
for themselves, prefer taking their chances in the competitive 
struggle to being handed life-long security with no opportunities 
for personal success. Students believe that their moral standards 
•are about the same, perhaps higher, than those of young people in 
their home towns who did not go to college. Only 12 per cent say 
they never go to church. Two in every five declare they attend 
regularly. But 46 per cent confess they go to religious services 
less often than they did when they lived at home. Three-fifths . . . 
believe that collegians do not drink too much. Forty per cent say 
they never drink, and many others indulge only in occasional 

These conclusions are derived from actual face-to- face inter- 
views with thousands of collegians during the three years that 
Student Opinion Surveys of America has been in operation. The 
organization is a nonprofit national poll sponsored by the Uni- 
versity of Texas through its student publications board and con- 
ducted in co-operation with 168 college editors* who exchange 
local surveys for national tabulations to be published in their 
newspapers. Uniformity and accuracy are insured by having all 
questionnaires and instructions as to interviewing techniques sup- 
plied by the national headquarters and by assigning the statistical 
requirements for each school. The polls are modeled much after 
the Gallup survey, sampling a minutely selected cross section of 
the 1,400,000 college students, controlled in proportion to the 
number of men and women, working and nonworking students, 
freshmen and upperclassmen, distributed geographically over the 
six census districts. Nearly a hundred different topics have been 
used, ranging from dance bands to American neutrality. This sys- 
tematic and recurring compilation of statistics on student opinion, 
perhaps the most extensive effort ever undertaken to fathom the 

* December, 1941. 


undergraduate mind, provides an excellent background against 
which student morale may be defined in the months of crisis pre- 
ceding the American declaration of war. 

Since the European conflict started, the question of how to stay 
out had been the first consideration of most people all over the 
country. The government itself appeared to be exerting every 
caution against rushing post-haste into anything. Americans were 
ready to fight, if the fighting day arrived, ''but the man on the 
street does not seem to have a grand conception of the issue," 
reported the Fortune Survey of August, 1941. "He does not march 
under such banners as 'making the world safe for democracy' or 
preserving to all people 'the four freedoms.' Up to a point his 
reasoning checks closely with that of the noninterventionists and 
'appeasers.' He has come to believe that war is necessary to win 
his own security — to win, indeed, his right to be an isolationist." 
Still, he would not give his consent to United States "participa- 
tion" in war openly as a belligerent. Collegians were responding 
to the national direction in the same tempo, and perhaps even more 
slowly than was generally believed. 

A high wartime morale in the student world should be ex- 
tremely important, for not only are colleges and universities sup- 
plying most of the new crop of officers and pilots, but they must 
produce as well the technicians with the knowledge necessary to 
operate with precision a modern war machine that becomes more 
scientific every day. A wide appraisal of college opinion as ex- 
pressed in the Student Opinion Surveys and compared with na- 
tional public opinion on the eve of Japan's thrust left this un- 
mistakable conclusion : college youth pressed toward the same 
ideals as their elders but were several steps behind in their re- 

"At present, opinion among college youth appears to be running 
behind the rest of the country as regards the war," the Institute 
for Propaganda Analysis reported in summarizing the results of 
Student Opinion Surveys in its October, 1941, bulletin. "The last 
Gallup poll of general opinion in which the public was asked to say 


whether it thought the U. S. would go in or stay out of the war 
showed 82 per cent beUeving we would go in. This was in April, 
1941. The last sampling of student opinion . . . showed only 
about 60 per cent of the students believing the U. S. would go in. 
Three-quarters thought it more important to stay out and help 
Hitler's enemies. (Eighty-one per cent had opposed the Selective 
Service Act in February, 1940.) But there was nearly an even 
division of opinion on repealing the Neutrality Act to allow U.S. 
ships to take cargoes to Britain. The majority was slightly against. 
Even here student opinion was behind adult opinion. A Gallup poll 
of general opinion, announced on October 23, showed 54 per cent 
favoring repeal, 37 per cent opposed, and 9 per cent undecided." 

After further examination of campus sentiment as expressed by 
college editors, the Institute concluded that '*. . . from the stand- 
point of the propagandists for all-out aid or active intervention, 
student opinion is not crystallizing rapidly enough. From the 
standpoint of the opponents of intervention it is slipping away 
from them." 

Students were becoming more and more convinced that the 
United States could not avoid war, as indicated by the trend 
manifest in the figures below. In April, 1941, 76 per cent thought 
we were "in effect already at war with Germany," a Student 
Opinion Surveys poll showed. 

Students Believing the U. S. Could Stay Out of War 

Date Percentage 

December, 1939 68 

December, 1940 63 

February. 1941 49 

October, 1941 42 

Despite this foreboding, in many ways student morale has been 
high regarding the ultimate future of America. Nearly three- 
fourths of the students interviewed say they believe democracy 
will survive even if the British Empire falls. That the Allies will 
eventually be the winners they also have little doubt. This was 
before the war hit America; there is little reason to believe that 
attitude has changed. 


; r 

Contributing toward this feeling-tone of courage over the war, 
however, has been the bland attitude with which the average un- 
dergraduate contemplates his personal future. A majority would 
tell you, even after the Nazis' apparent intentions were known, 
that their opportunities for getting ahead in the world appeared to 
be better than those their parents had. In April, 1939, to be sure, 
while the taste of the great depression was still in everybody's 
mouth, a bare majority of 52 per cent believed their prospects for 
success were better than those of thirty years ago. But in Novem- 
ber, 1941, with unemployment an almost forgotten word, the 
optimistic group had swelled to 71 per cent.* The boom which our 
double-quick defense plans had created seemed to overshadow the 
threat of Hitler's Panzers to the world. Though half of the stu- 
dents felt ''less secure personally than they did two or three years 
ago," the other 50 per cent felt more secure or just about the same. 

It seems almost incredible that at least half of the undergradu- 
ates — up to early December — were apparently unaffected by the 
world-wide changing events since the Anschluss. Or it may be that 
the American defense effort had brought a new sense of comfort. 
Then too, many an American long ago had convinced himself 
that ''it can't happen here." 

America, declares Norman Cousins,^ regards itself as a country 
of destiny, immune from danger, out of reach. We think in comic- 
strip terms, entertaining vague hopes that a crisis will solve itself; 
peculiarly American is the manner in which the automatic happy 
ending has been used again and again until, he fears, it has be- 
come "part of the public consciousness," affecting attitudes not 
only in our daily tasks but in our thinking about national and 
world affairs. 

From such wishful thinking students are not exempt. But are 
they wholly to blame? President Roosevelt himself told male un- 

* The Fortune Survey for December, 1941, provided a timely comparison 
v^ith adult opinion: during the last year there was a sharp decline among those 
who believed opportunities for their sons looked better than those they had 
had themselves. Most people said opportunities looked bad or about the same. 


dergraduates at the time the Selective Service system went into 
effect that they were more useful in the classroom than in the 
army; draft boards have been given special instructions for de- 
ferment of many students; a Gallup poll in April, 1941, showed 
that the voters would approve deferment of students until they 
complete their education. The public had failed to steel itself into 
an all-out effort, and students knew it. Perhaps student opinion 
had been conditioned too by events themselves, such as the failure 
of the German air offensive over England, the stubborn Russian 
resistance, and the apparent apathy of their elders at home. Or 
have we here a recurrence of Scarlett O'Hara's Tll-think-about-it- 
tomorrow attitude of which the undergraduate world has so often 
been accused? 

Wide contact with students, however, impresses one with two 
important factors which, aside from whatever immaturity may 
exist in the student mind, must be considered in any inspection of 
prewar student morale. First, with many students there was still 
left a nausea from World War I and a feeling of mockery over 
the futility of war. Brought up in an atmosphere permeated with 
the idea that the A.E.F. really did not save the world for anything, 
the response of students to a plea to save the world for freedom, 
with nothing real to fight for yet, was naturally slow. Now that we 
have the Pacific incidents, reaction is quite the opposite. 

Second, the defense program was calling on college men, along 
with all other American youth, to make the highest personal con- 
tribution, that of placing their lives in the service of their country. 
An answer to the draft call was not popular, especially when the 
young men entering the service knew not whether they would be 
in for one year or ten years, whether they would spend their time 
in a tent on home soil, or whether they would have to fight in 
Belgium, Africa, or the Malay Peninsula. Compulsory military 
training made students recoil doubly, for they realized that in most 
cases college education means little when they are submerged to the 
rank of privates along with the soda jerker, the oil-well driller, 
and the grocery clerk who never finished high school. 


Student Opinion Surveys revealed this antipathy. Universal 
military service had been opposed in every poll before the war. In 
November, 1941, only 4 per cent believed that "simply being a 
student is no grounds for deferment," whereas a majority (54 
per cent) favored complete deferment until their education was 
finished.* Should the United States declare war and send out an 
expeditionary force, 64 per cent of college men that same month 
declared they would rather wait for the draft than volunteer. 
What they would actually do under future circumstances was, of 
course, another matter, as the rush to the recruiting stations has 
amply demonstrated. But never had Student Opinion Surveys 
tabulated anywhere near a majority in favor of joining the armed 
forces — with one exception, "if this country were in danger of 

While America-Firsters would have found that only a small 
minority would accept their purposes, neither would the all-out 
interventionists have found the bulk of the students on their side. 
In one of the national college surveys before the United States was 
in the war, these percentages were tabulated : 

Which of these statements comes closest to expressing your attitude about 
the place of the United States in the world today : 

1. The United States comes first ; it is none of our business what 

happens elsewhere in the world 11% 

2. While the United States comes first, we cannot escape being con- 

cerned with what goes on with the rest of the world 47 

3. The United States is one of the leading nations of the world and 

as such must take active participation in the affairs of the world 37 

4. Something else 5 

The students, in other words, liked the idea of their country's 
being a leader in the family of nations, but they were not quite 
sure whether it should assume the responsibilities that fall to 

American college youth was willing and able to fight for de- 

* Other proposals were : defer only those being trained in fields vital to na- 
tional defense — science, medicine, 24 per cent; make students subject to draft 
between high school and college, 12 per cent; something else, 5 per cent; unde- 
cided, 1 per cent. 


mocracy — if necessary. But if we apply G. Stanley Hall's definition 
of morale — 'When we face reality gladly and with a stout heart 
even if it is grim and painful, and never doubt that it is good at 
the core and all evil is subordinate to good, that even if we are 
defeated and overwhelmed in a good cause all is not lost; when 
we feel that we live for something that we would die for if need 
be"^ — if this be high morale, then the average collegian on De- 
cember 6, 1941, had not reached the state of mind desirable in a 
nation at the crossroads. As remarked not long ago,^ our minds 
told us that this was a crisis requiring brave action, but our hearts 
were not in it. 

After Pearl Harbor 

That was before the United States was actually in the war. 
Overnight, "defense" has taken a new meaning, and morale has 
bolted forward. While college students had previously been re- 
luctantly willing to serve, they are now eagerly seeking ways to 
get into action. A national survey completed since Congress de- 
clared war on the Axis shows that : 

Seven out of every ten approve of drafting women to do non- 
military defense work; co-eds themselves significantly are more 
in favor of such a draft than are the men ; 

More than four in every five favor drafting men who are not 
in the armed forces to take over nonmilitary duties in their com- 
munities ; 

Only 9 or 10 per cent are unwilling to give several hours of 
their time daily to work on local defense committees, and most of 
these say it is because they have no time left after work and 
studies ; 

Most interesting of all, however, is the revelation that the 
majority of college men would have preferred to have the draft 
age lowered to 18 rather than raised to 44, as Congress recently 

This sudden enthusiasm, or, better still, indignation against the 
Japanese and their partners, may well be based on the manner in 


which the country was plunged into war. Military reverses, civilian 
curtailments, impediments on education, and other physical or 
moral setbacks that we have begun to see even in one month of 
war, may in the future have a negative effect on the morale of 
college youth. An ounce of precaution would here perhaps be worth 
the proverbial pound of cure. Our defense programs should be 
so planned that young minds which have experienced none of the 
rigors of warfare before may not revert, even subconsciously, to 
the false security pattern of the 1920's and the 1930's. 


Morale and the Jewish Minority 
OTTO KLiNEBERG Columbia University 

THE morale of any nation necessitates unity within that 
country. From this point of view the presence of minority 
groups — racial, cultural, religious, political — has fre- 
quently been regarded as a threat to national morale. As Louis 
Wirth ^^ expresses it : "The existence of such groups in our midst 
calls attention to the fact that our society has not yet been fully 
knit together into a single, integrated, national unit." 

Yet, on the other hand, it may be argued that, although these 
various minorities create a lack of uniformity within the national 
group, such a circumstance does not necessarily mean a lack of 
unity. It is obviously possible for an individual to be distinguished 
from others by the food he eats or the clothes he wears or the 
religious ritual he follows, without constituting a menace to the 
common purpose or to the common pursuit of that purpose. 
Although it may be true that those who owe allegiance to a country 
which is at war with the United States represent in individual 
cases real or potential enemies, this rule undoubtedly does not 
apply to the large bulk of the ethnic minorities within this country. 
In the case of the latter, the threat against national morale lies 
not so much in their own differentiation from the majority as in 
the attitudes which the majority holds towards them. It is the 
prejudice, not the existence of the minorities, which represents the 
principal divisive factor. 

In this latter category the Jews seem clearly to belong. That 
Jews do not and cannot represent, in more than the rarest indi- 
vidual instances, fifth columnists, saboteurs, or enemies of the 
United States in the present crisis, can be said without much fear 



of contradiction. This is so not because there is any special sense 
of honor among Jews which is not shared equally by others, or 
because they have any peculiar love for democratic institutions 
which is more typical of them than of others, but because they 
have everything to lose in an American defeat, and every reason 
to wish for an American victory. If they are Americans, they 
probably share with other Americans in equal degree the feelings 
of patriotism for the United States and its institutions ; but even 
when they are foreign-born, and even when they have lived the 
larger part of their life in what is now an enemy country, they 
must still feel a sense of identification with American democracy 
and with the promise that it holds for them as individuals. If their 
presence in the United States constitutes a problem for civilian 
morale, it is not because of their own attitudes, but because of the 
attitudes of others towards them. 

The problem of civilian morale and the Jews can, therefore, be 
considered under the following general heads. First, to what extent 
is anti-Semitism found in the United States, and in what ways 
does it constitute a threat to national unity ? Second, what are the 
prospects in this regard for the future? Third, what effects, if any, 
does this situation have upon the morale of the American Jews 
themselves ? 

The Extent of Anti-Semitism 

Probably no one would deny that there has always been in the 
United States a certain amount of anti-Semitism. Our present 
concern is rather with the question as to whether it has been on 
the increase during the past few years, particularly since the acces- 
sion of Hitler to power in 1933. To answer this question with 
any certainty is difficult, since the evidence is, for the most part, 
of an indirect and often of an anecdotal character. There has ap- 
parently been an increase in the number of organizations and of 
publications openly supporting the position of anti-Semitism,^^ 
and there is some indication that criticism of the Jews has entered 
with increasing frequency into discussions in "high places," includ- 


ing the Congress of the United States.^ In this last connection, 
however, it is important to note that anti-Semitism has been fre- 
quently associated with isolationism,"^ and that at least this aspect 
of the problem has more or less been solved, at least temporarily, 
with the actual entry of the United States into the war against 
Germany and her allies. 

As a partial offset against these indications of growing anti- 
Jewish prejudice, it should be pointed out that there are also many 
organizations devoted to combating anti-Semitism in the United 
States.^^ These include a number of religious groups, as well as 
lay organizations acting upon the conviction that any kind of in- 
tolerance, including that directed against the Jews, interferes with 
the strength and unity of American democracy. To give the names 
of all of these organizations or those to which they are opposed, 
would be fruitless, since any estimate of the relative strength of 
the two groups is subject to a tremendous possibility of error. It 
does seem reasonable to state, however, that parallel with the in- 
crease in the one group has come an increase, and an added feeling 
of responsibility, in the other. 

At a slightly more objective level, mention may be made of two 
specific phenomena which appear to indicate that Americans are 
not willing to accept completely the anti-Semitic position. The first 
of these is the large chorus of denunciation which met the sug- 
gestion by Charles A. Lindbergh, in his speech at Des Moines on 
September 11, 1941, that the Jews were among those trying to 
lead the United States into the war. So clear was the reaction 
in the American press and in influential organizations such as the 
American Legion that the Lindbergh speech was regarded in many 
quarters as responsible for definite disintegration among the isola- 
tionist forces. A check of American sentiment on this issue by the 
Institute of Public Opinion, reported in The New York Times of 
October 25, asked for answers to the following question : "What 
persons or groups do you think are most active in trying to get us 
into war?" The answers, in decreasing frequency, made reference 
to (1) the Roosevelt Administration and the Democratic Party, 


. ^ 

(2) big business, industrialists, profiteers, (3) British organiza- 
tions and agents, (4) American organizations with pro-British 
sympathies, (5) Jews. Only 1 person out of every 16 interviewed 
mentioned the Jews as belonging in this category. 

A second indication that Americans are prepared to repudiate 
at least the more obvious manifestations of anti-Semitism is to be 
found in the results of the last general elections in 1940. As Na- 
thaniel H. Goodrich ^ expressed it: 'The completeness with which 
voters expressed their rejection of the attempts to make anti- 
Semitism a campaign issue cannot be ignored." Probably the most 
spectacular of these candidates was Joseph E. McWilliams of New 
York, leader of the Christian Mobilizers, and a collaborator with 
the German-American Bund. McWilliams, defeated in his attempt 
to obtain the Republican nomination for Congress in Yorkville, 
failed also to obtain a sufficient number of valid signatures when 
he tried to run as an independent candidate. There were other out- 
spokenly anti-Jewish candidates for election in many parts of the 
country, some in sections where there are few Jews, some where 
there are many ; they did not succeed in election to public office. 

Since all of this is in the nature of indirect evidence, it is diffi- 
cult to draw from it any conclusions as to whether anti-Semitism 
is on the increase. There is, however, another type of evidence 
available which may be somewhat more satisfactory. It consists of 
the attitude studies which have been undertaken by psychologists, 
and which, in many cases, include material relevant to the amount 
of prejudice shown against specific minority groups, including the 
Jews. Inasmuch as these investigations cover a span of years, it 
should be possible, by examining them in chronological order, to 
determine whether there has been any marked change in the 
amount of anti-Semitism in the United States. Even with this ma- 
terial, however, conclusions must be tentative, since the individual 
studies were conducted on populations which are not strictly com- 
parable, with attitude scales that differ considerably, and with 
much variation in the minority groups included in the compari- 


sons. At the same time, it appears worthwhile to examine the ma- 
terial for any clear trends which may emerge. 

In 1928, E. S. Bogardus ^ reported the results of an extensive 
investigation in which 1725 Americans in California answered 
questions as to the degree of "social distance" at which they would 
like to keep members of 40 different ethnic groups. The scale of 
social distance used in this study consisted of seven different steps, 
indicating that members of the particular group would be admitted 
(1) to close kinship by marriage, (2) to my club as personal 
chums, (3) to my street as neighbors, (4) to employment in my 
occupation, (5) to citizenship in my country, (6) as visitors only 
to my country, and (7) would be excluded from my country. 
When the 40 groups were ranked according to the percentages 
which would admit them to close kinship by marriage, German 
Jews ranked 26th and Russian Jews 28th in the list of 40. The 
order varies somewhat for the other categories of the scale, but 
the positions with reference to the first question seem to the in- 
vestigator to be most diagnostic. 

Also in 1928, Thurstone -^^ published the results of an investi- 
gation of the ''nationality preferences" of 239 students at the Uni- 
versity of Chicago, using his own scale of attitude measurement. 
In all, 21 ethnic groups were included, among which the Jews 
ranked 11th or exactly at the mid-point of the list. In 1932, N. C. 
Cole ^ in Colorado applied a simpler scale to 190 girls and 160 
boys, who were simply asked to indicate which of a list of ethnic 
groups they disliked. The results showed that Jews ranked 12th 
in a list of 14 groups, only the Chinese and the Mexicans being 
disliked more frequently. 

The editors of Fortune ^ report that a poll conducted by the Na- 
tional Conference of Jews and Christians in October, 1935, indi- 
cated that 95 per cent of those questioned thought there was less 
anti-Semitism in their communities at that time than there had 
been at the beginning of the depression. A month later, the follow- 
ing question was asked in a Fortune Survey : "Do you believe that 
in the long run Germany will be better or worse off if it drives 


out the Jews?" The answers were as follows: worse, 54.6 per 
cent; don't know, 31.4 per cent; better, 14.0 per cent. The large 
size of the "don't know" category indicates that a substantial pro- 
portion of the community had not made up its mind about the 
problem, or was indifferent to it. In any case, the results appear 
to show that only a relatively small proportion of those polled 
had very definite anti- Jewish feelings. 

In 1936, E. Monjar ^^ used a modification of the Bogardus tech- 
nique of social distance in the case of 269 students in Los Angeles, 
reporting the Jews to rank 4th in a list of 10 groups. Monjar 
concludes that for native white Christian students there are four 
principal levels of social distance; Nordics; Jews and Italians; 
Armenians, Japanese, and Mexicans; Filipinos and Negroes. 

In 1939, H. Meltzer ^^ used the method of paired comparisons 
in connection with a study of ethnic preferences in 2,058 white 
children in St. Louis, Missouri. His results showed the Jews to 
rank 12th in a list of 21 groups which were included in the study. 
This, be it noted, is almost exactly the same position which they 
held in Thurstone's 1928 study, in which they ranked 11th out of 
a list of 21. 

Also in 1939, a Fortune Survey, at the suggestion of the Car- 
negie Corporation study, The Negro in America, included this 
question: *Ts there any group — racial, religious, economic, or 
social — in your city (county) which represents an important prob- 
lem?" Of the total sample of 5,108 people interviewed, 22.5 per 
cent said ''Yes," 59.0 per cent said ''No," and 18.5 per cent indi- 
cated that they did not know. When they were asked to specify the 
group which constituted the problem, they mentioned the Negro 
most frequently, although this was not true of all parts of the 
country. The frequency with which the Jews were mentioned also 
varied with the region studied. In the New England and Middle 
Atlantic States, the Jews were mentioned by 3.6 per cent of those 
interviewed; in the East North Central States by 3.2 per cent; 
in the West North Central States by 3.2 per cent; in the West 
South Central States by .8 per cent; and in South Atlantic and 


East South Central States by .5 per cent. In the Mountain and in 
the Pacific areas the Jews were not mentioned as a problem group. 
In general, this careful survey seems to indicate a relatively small 
degree of awareness of the Jews as a problem group. It is to be 
noted, however, that the type of question used in the Fortune Sur- 
vey is less likely to elicit an unfavorable response than one in 
which a specific question is asked about a particular minority 
group. As Horowitz ^ has pointed out, the prejudice may exist 
without having particular * 'salience" or importance for those who 
admit that they have the prejudice. 

This list is by no means exhaustive, and many other studies 
could be cited. If there were, however, any clear and unmistakable 
trend towards an increase in anti-Semitism, even a brief review of 
this type should have given some indication of it. The fluctuations 
in prejudice, on the contrary, seem irregular and not very marked. 
The Jews occupy a position midway between those ethnic groups 
which are most liked and those most disliked. Material of this kind 
might be supplemented by other indications of the extent of such 
prejudice — opportunities for employment, admission to profes- 
sional schools, etc. — but it seems unlikely that even in these areas 
there has been any marked change during the last few years. Anti- 
Semitism has been a continuing phenomenon, presumably varying 
somewhat in degree. The current crisis has probably made Ameri- 
cans more aware of the problem, just as it may have suggested to 
politicians the possibility of making greater capital out of it than 
was formerly thought advisable ; there is little indication, however, 
that the situation with reference to Jews in America has undergone 
any radical alteration. 

At the same time, it cannot be overemphasized that any kind of 
prejudice against any ethnic minority in the United States repre- 
sents a threat to the unity and integration of the total American 
community. Prejudice constitutes a rift, not only between the ma- 
jority and the minority, but also between those individual members 
of the majority group who hold different conceptions of the mean- 
ing of democracy and who battle over their respective viewpoints. 


During the heated argument over isolationism and intervention, 
for example, the problem was certainly confused by the injection 
of the Jewish question. There were those who saw in isolationism 
the only true Americanism ; there were others who saw in it merely 
a tool of Nazism, and this latter view was strengthened by the fre- 
quency with which isolationism and anti-Semitism appeared to be 
conjoined. In any event, the anti-Semitism of some of the isola- 
tionist leaders certainly served to becloud the issue. 

As was pointed out so often at the time, the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor may have served no other useful purpose, but it did 
at least unite the nation. A by no means unimportant conse- 
quence was the immediate public abandonment by isolationists of 
their position, and apparently with it of their thesis that Jewish 
international bankers and warmongers were behind the interven- 
tionist policy. So far, at any rate, few in the United States have 
suggested that the bombs on Pearl Harbor were part of a gigantic 
Jewish plot to embroil the United States in the war. 

The Prospects 

That Jews might have a great deal to lose in the event of Ameri- 
can participation in the war was the tenor of several of the state- 
ments by isolationist leaders during the past few months. Lind- 
bergh, for example, in the Des Moines speech referred to above, 
suggested that the Jews would be the first to feel the consequences 
of intervention; other speakers too have stressed the likelihood 
that the Jews might again serve as the most convenient scapegoat 
for the misfortunes of war. Since even a victory could be won 
only with much privation and loss, the consequent unhappiness of 
millions of Americans, according to this view, would lead them to 
express their aggression against a convenient minority such as the 
Jews. That a defeat would greatly increase the scope and severity 
of such aggression goes without saying. On this assumption, the 
isolationists have said, Jews more than any others must hope that 
we stay out of the war. 


But now we are in the war. What are the prospects for the 
Jews ? As was indicated above, the nature of our entry into the war 
makes it unHkely, at least for the present, that any direct responsi- 
bility for our participation will be attached to the Jews. In the long 
run, however, the situation certainly has its elements of danger. If 
frustration leads to aggression,^ not necessarily in every case but 
certainly with some probability, the losses which the war will 
inevitably entail do render more likely an increase in the prejudice 
against those individuals or groups who can be singled out for the 
position of scapegoat. And this means the Jews — although, to be 
sure, other minority groups, such as the Negro and the foreign- 
born, will by no means be safe from similar danger. 

The situation, on the other hand, also holds a certain promise. 
Our participation in the war has meant a greater unity of all Amer- 
icans — Americans varying, to be sure, in physical appearance and 
cultural and religious background, but filled with a common de- 
termination to preserve freedom for the individual. It is true that 
this freedom for which democracy stands has not been granted 
equally to all individuals, and that in particular it has been denied, 
at least in part, to members of minority groups. It is true that a 
complete democracy can be regarded as achieved only when dis- 
crimination against individuals who belong to such minorities has 
been eliminated. For this very reason, however, there is hope for 
minorities in this present battle for democracy. Against the back- 
ground of the fascist alternative, the rights and privileges in- 
cluded in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the various 
Amendments stand out in bolder relief. We are made more con- 
scious of our democracy and of its implications now that we are 
forced to defend it against an enemy. For the Jews in particular, 
there is hope in the fact that those who have stood most clearly for 
anti-Semitism, both in Europe and in the United States, are 
equally clearly the enemies of the democratic way of life. In the 
fight against fascism, there is a good chance that we shall fight it 
in all its aspects. 


Morale Among the Jews 

Enough has already been said to indicate that, at the present 
time, morale among the Jews constitutes no special problem. Until 
recently, however, the situation from this point of view could have 
been regarded as very serious. The spread of official anti-Semitism 
throughout the Nazi-dominated world had made many an Ameri- 
can Jew feel his own position as an American to be also in jeop- 
ardy. Salo Baron, for example, wrote in 1940^: "The panic in the 
Jewish community, however, on top of developments increasingly 
discouraging since 1914, but especially since 1933, has all the 
earmarks of a destructive feeling of utter hopelessness and prone- 
ness to give up the battle." Though Dr. Baron refers here mainly 
to the attitude of American Jews toward what was happening in 
Europe, it seems fair to assume that the panic was spreading to 
include even their own prospects in this country. 

The situation has changed, however — although precise informa- 
tion on a question of this kind is difficult to obtain. The increase in 
American unity and the clearer alignments have undoubtedly re- 
duced or eliminated whatever panic there may have been, and 
largely restored to American Jews their self-respect, their con- 
fidence, and their feeling of belonging to the whole American 
community as full participants in the struggle against a common 
enemy. With the in-group thus clearly defined and markedly 
strengthened, the Jews will certainly feel that they belong in it 
and that they have a real stake in the preservation of American 


Morale among Negroes 
KENNETH B. CLARK HamptoH Institute 

MARGINAL men have marginal morale. And in our society 
the American Negro has been made socially and psy- 
chologically marginal. It is, therefore, impossible to 
approach the problem of civilian morale among Negroes during 
a time of national emergency without a clear picture of the usual 
everyday struggle of Negroes in their attempt to participate in and 
contribute to the society which is now threatened. In a considera- 
tion of civilian morale, it is not only pertinent but imperative that 
one be concerned with the racial tensions of our American society 
and the dynamic force of these tensions upon the attitude and 
behavior of Negro and white Americans. 

Such a chapter as this, dealing with Negro morale per se, would 
be superfluous and completely unnecessary were it not for the fact 
that the Negro has not yet been permitted to function uninhibitedly 
within the political and social organism of the state. Because of 
this restriction, we must continue the necessary distortion of think- 
ing in terms first of white morale and then of Negro morale, 
rather than of the morale of the American people. Such a fact is 
undoubtedly relevant to a discussion of the problem of American 
civilian morale in general and specifically the morale of the Negro. 

The Nature of Morale 

Before one is able to make an analysis of the civilian morale of 
the Negro, it is necessary to examine closely the meaning of the 
concept of morale. Is ^'morale" something peculiar to times of 
national emergency, and relatively independent of the qualities of 



the society during "normal" conditions? If this were wholly 
true, we should be concerned not with morale essentially, but with 
the problem of the immediate motivation of people's behavior in a 
given direction by means of the intrinsic qualities of the emergency 
itself or by force or the threat of force. Such immediate manipula- 
tion is apparently much easier to execute, particularly in dealing 
with minority groups, but should not be confused with the prob- 
lem of morale. 

The morale of a group is a highly focused reflection of the at- 
tributes of the society under which the people live. During periods 
of national emergency when it is necessary to harness the power of 
each individual for the common good, when a high social motiva- 
tional level is required if the immediate goals of the society are to 
be achieved, then it appears that the degree of response obtained 
from the group indicates the level of its morale. 

This intrinsic relationship of morale to normal social conditions 
is clearly indicated by the fact that during periods of national 
emergency individuals become more deeply concerned with the 
problems of their everyday existence. They begin to examine the 
society under which they live; they are confronted with the 
dilemma of choosing between conflicting ideas. At such a time, 
too, ordinary indecision becomes generally less tolerable ; ideas and 
personal convictions must be transformed into action. The psy- 
chological — and often physical — integrity of the individual appears 
to be at stake. The individual tends toward a more frequent and 
penetrating questioning of the principles and practices of the so- 
ciety of which he is a part. During these periods of national 
emergency, their inconsistencies, inadequacies, values, and advan- 
tages all loom the larger and call forth more vigorous reactions. 

The qualities of civilian morale during times of national emer- 
gency are a direct consequence of the desirability of the social con- 
ditions under which the civilian group ordinarily lives. During 
those periods of intense stresses and strains of the society the con- 
cept of the ''good life" becomes clothed in the concept of "morale." 
Such a continuum of morale and ordinary life is reflected in the 


definition of G. Stanley Hall : "It is simply this — to keep our- 
selves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, indus- 
trial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition. . . .* When we 
feel that we live for something that we would die for if need be — 
this is morale." 

Any analysis of morale among Negroes may well use this defini- 
tion as its basic reference point. For the crucial question in such 
an analysis seems to be: to what extent do Negroes believe that 
they live for something in our American culture which they "would 
die for if need be"? 

The Negro's Place in American Life 

Negro life in America is fraught with tensions due to race. 
Scarcely an area of the Negro's ordinary social or personal activity 
exists untouched by some aspect of these problems. The very pat- 
tern of racial segregation in America with its attendant compli- 
cated ritual of interracial etiquette bombards the Negro constantly. 
Such institutionalized or crystallized forms of racial segregation 
appear to be intensely imbedded in the mores of certain areas of 
the United States. 

Segregation takes, of course, many forms. Racially segregated 
schools, with the Negro schools usually inferior in equipment and 
standards, are required by law in 19 states and the District of 
Columbia.^ Travel throughout the southern states is impossible for 
a Negro except under segregated conditions in a Jim-Crow car or 
bus, or in a segregated Pullman compartment, or in his private car. 
Adding their sting to the inherent humiliation of this type of 
segregation are the usually inferior conditions of the segregated 
coach for Negroes. Hotels, well-known restaurant chains, ordi- 
nary white eating places, and wayside tourists' homes maintain a 
fixed policy of denying accommodations or the use of their facili- 
ties to Negroes — often in defiance of the Equal Rights laws of 
the particular state. Some insurance companies deny all Negroes 

* Author's italics, 


the Opportunity of availing themselves of the more desirable types 
of insurance policies. White hospitals will not admit Negro pa- 
tients, often will not even give a Negro emergency treatment. In 
the realm of religion itself, the white church is guilty of a system- 
atic segregation or exclusion of Negroes from white congrega- 

In the area of recreation this pattern of separation of the races 
is quite as definite. Negroes are either segregated in the balconies 
of some theaters or completely excluded. Some southern cities 
provide separate and inferior parks for Negroes — or none at all. 
While the rigidity of this pattern of segregation is more noticeable 
in the South, it is unfortunately not altogether absent in the 

Combined with these institutionalized forms of racial segrega- 
tion are the more permeating aspects of interracial relations and 
etiquette which not only complement the forms of segregation 
mentioned above but also contribute independently to the general 
humiliation and resentment of the Negro. In the South it is com- 
mon to observe seemingly innumerable signs with the words 
'White" or 'Tor White Only" and ''Colored." These signs ap- 
pear in stores, railroad stations, on boats, and in army camps. 
The psychological implications of the omnipresence of these signs 
go beyond a consideration of the problem of morale into the realm 
of the basic dynamics of the interracial problem of America. 
These signs cannot be dismissed merely as innate reactions of the 
white people toward Negroes. Rather, they, together with other 
manifestations of racial prejudice, can be most fruitfully inter- 
preted as stimuli for both the white and the Negro peoples to 
maintain in themselves the mental attitude necessary for the con- 
tinuance of such a system of racial segregation. 

This interpretation appears to be substantiated by the existence 
of Jim Crow facilities in general. In certain stores in the South, 
for example, the management maintains separate drinking foun- 
tains side by side — one for Negroes and the other for whites. 
Sometimes there is a white porcelain fountain for whites and a 


black porcelain one for Negroes. The fact that black porcelain is 
generally believed to be more expensive than white porcelain does 
not detract from the implicit humiliation of this form of discrimi- 
nation; it merely affords the Negro the opportunity of making 
a compensatory response of ridicule for the stupidity and irony of 
the whole Jim Crow situation. The following extract from a paper 
written for a class in racial psychology by a Southern Negro 
college girl illustrates the operation of this mechanism : 

I know that you have to take, whether or not you want to, some 
very unpleasant insults and cracks from the majority (whites;. 
Some we find are quite amusing and very ignorant. . . . For in- 
stance: Last summer I was in a railroad station in which there 
were two different fountains, one for the colored, and one for the 
white. Of course, I tasted the water from both to see if there was 
a difference, hut there wasn't.''^ 

The prevalence of statues, pictures, and other representations of 
the Negro Aunt Jemima, mammies in general, and Uncle Tom 
slave types; the perpetuation of the stereotype of the Negro in 
children's school books (Little Black Sambo) ; the distortion of 
Negro news in the white dailies ; the continual presentation of the 
Negro stereotype in novels, moving pictures, and over the radio — 
these are potent factors in determining the nature and expression 
of racial relations in America. 

Still another indication of the pathological quality of Negro- 
white relationship throughout a large part of America, particularly 
the South, is the existence of a differential personal etiquette in 
the relations between an individual white and an individual Negro. 
In these person-to-person relations it is tacitly assumed that the 
Negro will be deferential to the white, however subtly. The 
postulate finds its most extreme expression in the custom whereby 
whites consider it perfectly natural to address practically any 
Negro, in spite of age or position, either by his first name or by 
such terms as *'boy,'' and "sister." In certain portions of the 

*A11 italics by the author. 


country, indeed, it is a rather rigid aspect of the mores that no 
Negro may be addressed by any white with the title of "Mr." or 
"Mrs." On the other hand, however, it would be a gross breach of 
interracial etiquette were a Negro to address a white person by his 
first name or without the title "Mr.," or even without adding 

Patent, then, is the psychological import of these and other 
manifestations of the differential status of whites and Negroes, as 
defined by our American culture, for the problems of civilian 
morale among both whites and Negroes. It should be noted that 
this presentation is by no means complete.^ The greater intensifica- 
tion among Negroes of the difficulties of the ill-housed, ill-clothed, 
and ill- fed one-third of our nation we have not dealt with here 
because it has been pointed out often by Negro and white econ- 
omists, sociologists, and public administrators, and because it has 
social significance beyond the limits of race. 

The fact that each of the above indices of racial conflict do not 
apply to every region of the United States with equal intensity, 
does not in any significant way destroy the validity of their con- 
sideration in an analysis of civilian morale among Negroes. That 
they exist in any part of the country and that their existence con- 
tradicts the basic premises of democracy make it necessary that 
they be considered as integral aspects of the problems of civilian 

Negroes in National Defense 

Even more direct a determinant of morale than social discrimi- 
nation is job discrimination. Specific intensification of such dis- 
crimination against the Negro has come in national-defense indus- 
tries, in the United States Army, and in the Navy, Marine, and 
Air Corps. 

The Kansas City Star for March 17, 1941, carried a news story 
with the following headline: LIMIT NEGRO AIR JOBS- 
NEGROES. In the story below the headline, the president of that 


particular airplane manufacturing company was represented as 
saying that ''under no circumstances would Negroes be employed 
as aircraft workers or mechanics in the plant." He was directly 
quoted as follows: "There will be some jobs as janitors for 
Negroes. Regardless of their training as aircraft workers we will 

not employ them in the plant." 

For an understanding of the present morale of the Negro it is 
significant to know that the National Association for the Ad- 
vancement of Colored People distributed thousands of reprints of 
this story among Negroes under the following caption: Is this 

LARS TO Defend? Could Hitler Be Worse? 

As for the armed services, we may quote from the report of 
the Committee for Military and Naval Defense of the Hampton 
Institute Conference on the Participation of the Negro in Na- 
tional Defense (November, 1940), in which it was stated: ''The 
Negro, to date, has not been accorded equitable participation in 
any branch of the arms and services of the army, navy, and 
marine corps of the United States. ... In contrast to the re- 
stricted opportunities for Negroes in the United States Army, we 
regret that the navy limits the enlistment of Negroes to the mess- 
man branch where the ceiling of promotion is that of officers' 
stewards and cooks. . . . We deplore the fact that whereas 
Negroes were included in the fighting personnel of the United 
States navy in all of the wars of this country, at present they are 
denied this opportunity. The navy and the marine corps represent 
the most undemocratic and un-American aspect of our govern- 

The crux of the problem seems to lie in the traditional social 
caste which is the basis of officer-man relationship in these ser- 
vices, particularly in the Navy. The rigid limitation of the number 
of Negroes permitted to attend West Point and the absolute ex- 
clusion of Negroes from the Naval Academy at Annapolis must 
be taken as related to this basic condition. 

Segregation of the Negro or his complete exclusion is the stated 


policy of each branch of the armed forces of the United States. 
The following extract from a letter written to two Hampton stu- 
dents who had applied (at the request of a Naval Reserve recruit- 
ing agent) for flight training in the United States Naval Reserve, 
unequivocally states the position of the Navy Department with 
reference to the acceptance of Negroes : 

We beg to inform you that it has been the policy of the Navy 
Department, for some time past, to accept applications for enlist- 
ment from Negroes in none but the messman branch, . . . The 
principles which dictated the adoption of that policy apply equally 
to the appointment of negroes [sic] as officers either in the regu- 
lar Navy or Naval Reserve. . . . That, frankly, covers the Navy 
Department's attitude on this question. Negro officers aboard ship 
would form a small unassimilable minority which, despite anything 
we could do, would inevitably form a source of discord that would 
be harmful to the Service. 

... we regret that for the reason stated above, we can neither 
lend encouragement nor offer support to your application for 
flight training in the U. S. Naval Reserve. 
Very truly yours. 

Naval Aviation Cadet Selection Board, 


Lieutenant, U.S.N.R. 

These conditions of segregation and exclusion in all branches of 
the defense efforts of the United States must be considered as 
specific stimuli giving rise to responses of Negroes which deter- 
mine the tone of their civilian morale. Knowing this, one is able 
to understand the observable morale pattern. 

How the Negroes Feel 

The basic factor of Negro morale, an analysis of the relevant 
material indicates, is frustration, complicated by deep-seated bitter- 
ness and resentment at the mockery of democracy of which so 
much of their lives is a constant reminder. The evidence for this 


conclusion is not always clear and absolute. A systematic analysis 
of the Negroes' pattern of morale often betrays much confusion 
and inconsistency of ideas and feelings. Surely this condition is 
not surprising, however, when we remember that the stimuli to 
which they are exposed are likewise fraught with contradictions 
and inconsistencies. Then, too, as in all groups, honest differences 
of opinion, perspective, and approach among Negroes make it 
impossible to generalize concerning the morale of the Negro 
population as a whole. There are probably as many different levels 
and shades of morale among Negroes as among whites. The sig- 
nificant problem for analysis, therefore, would be concerned with 
differences in proportion of Negroes at the higher or lower levels 
of morale, and the extent to which there are common factors of 
^'racial agreement" clustered around a core of common racial ex- 
periences and aspirations of Negroes which in themselves are 
either conducive or inimical to high morale. 

In order to make an objective analysis of the civilian morale of 
Negroes it was necessary to tap those primary sources of informa- 
tion which reflect or lead Negro thought. The files of the estab- 
lished Negro organizations — the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League 
— yielded rich sources of information which were used for the 
basic data of this report. Editorial opinion in two Negro maga- 
zines. The Crisis and Opportunity; relevant speeches of outstand- 
ing Negro labor, political, organizational, and intellectual leaders ; 
and the literature of a number of smaller and specific organiza- 
tions were all analyzed in this attempt to present a picture of the 
pattern of civilian morale among Negroes. Samples of the Negro 
press were likewise examined, their relevant contents indicating no 
essential disparity with the data obtained from the sources utilized. 

Upon the basis of these data it is possible to make : first, a spe- 
cific analysis of the civilian morale of the Negro during this 
immediate period of national emergency ; and, second, an analysis 
of the general morale of the Negro population as a whole, against 
which the specific attitude of the Negro must be interpreted. 


The attitude of Negroes toward the present war efforts of the 
United States is varied. If the purposes of various organizations, 
as outlined in their propaganda literature, are to be accepted as 
expressions of these attitudes, there is no more homogeneity of 
opinion among Negroes than among whites. Their attitudes before 
America entered the war ranged all along the scale — from support 
of an outright American declaration of war against the Axis 
powers; through advocacy of aid to all countries engaged in the 
fight against Hitlerism ; on toward moderate pro-democracy-anti- 
Axis leanings ; and finally either to organized expressed isolation- 
ism, which was probably determined to some extent by an anti- 
British, anti-imperialist attitude, or to the extreme of expressed 
pro-Hitler and pro- fascist sentiment. To make any quantitative 
estimate of the prevalence of any one of these attitudinal patterns 
among Negroes as a whole is difficult. A qualitative analysis and 
description of the points of view of each may, however, give a 
general perspective to the immediate morale of the Negro popula- 

The New York Chapter of the Committee to Defend America 
by Aiding the Allies published a small leaflet entitled "Colored 
People Have a Stake in the War." Negroes should be vitally con- 
cerned with the outcome of the war, runs the basic argument of 
this appeal, since the treatment which Negroes would receive at 
the hands of the Nazi and Fascist dictators would be "far worse 
than the treatment England or the United States has given us, 
even where that treatment falls far short of the democratic ideal." 
One of the three authors of this leaflet, Frank R. Crosswaith, is 
the Negro educational director for the International Ladies Gar- 
ment Workers Union. In a personal interview he expressed his 
belief that the Negro trade unionists are vitally concerned about 
the outcome of the war ; that, when the contrast is made between 
democracy — "with all its faults" — and fascism, they are bound to 
hope that the principles of democracy may triumph and survive. 
The average Negro trade unionist, he goes on to say, realizes that 
it is only through democracy that he has a chance to "right every 


wrong against him and achieve real equality with other human 

The Negro Provisional Committee to Defeat Hitler represents 
a group of Negroes whose approach to the present conflict is 
crystallized in the belief that ''Hitler and Hitlerism represent 
the main danger to the possible fulfillment of the Negro's aspira- 
tion." * The full program of this group is geared toward the end 
of mobilizing the forces of the American Negro in the fight 
against Hitlerism. In line with this program the committee un- 
equivocally endorsed the foreign policy of President Roosevelt, 
"in all-out aid to Great Britain, [and] the forces which would 
bring about the defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism." The core of this 
broad anti-Hitler program is thus a primary concern with the fu- 
ture welfare and improvement of the lot of the Negro. The follow- 
ing quotation clearly indicates this fact : ''We stand for the full 
democratic right of the Negro people along with all other Ameri- 
cans. . . . We must guarantee a greater future for America and 
the aspirations of the Negro people." 

It appears, from the available evidence, safe to say that the 
bulk of Negro thinking and feeling about the present emergency 
is not so directly or so out-and-out anti-Hitler in orientation as the 
program and contentions of the above two organizations indicate. 
Rather, a close examination of the literature and activities of the 
established non-partisan Negro organizations (National Associa- 
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, and the National 
Urban League) reveals that their main effort has been an intensi- 
fication of their usual fight against injustice and discrimination — 
an attempt to integrate the Negro into all phases of National 
Defense, and a constant demonstration of those phases of Amer- 
ica's present treatment of Negroes which are all too similar to 
the fascist policy toward minority peoples. Primarily they are con- 
cerned with full social justice for the Negro, only secondarily with 

* Personal communication, Nov. 13, 1941, from Alan B. McKenzie, Acting 
Secretary, Negro Provisional Committee to Defeat Hitler, 2460 Seventh Ave., 
New York City. 


the Specific issues between the democracies, on the one hand, and 
the Axis forces on the other. 

Elmer Carter, in commenting on the discrimination and exclu- 
sion of Negroes from national defense industries, writes : ^ 

This is the picture of democracy which has become fixed in the 
minds of the thousands of Negro young men eligible for the 
draft, subject to the call for service in the armed forces of the 
nation. This is the United States of America which presumes to 
condemn Hitler for racial persecution and oppression. 

In the March, 1941, issue of Opportunity, this editor writes in 
a similar vein : 

Does the young Negro American, deprived of the right to earn 
an honest living in industry, limited and segregated in the armed 
forces of the nation — does he think the American way of life is 
worth fighting for and perhaps dying for? 

That editorials on this theme are the rule rather than the excep- 
tion is significant; for the past year at least one has appeared in 
every issue of this magazine. The editor himself, recognizing the 
tendency, stated that "he started to write an editorial without a 
'squawk' ! But he knows he failed." That these "squawk editorials" 
are an inevitable aspect of the Negro's continual struggle for jus- 
tice he implied but did not state. 

One of the most controversial of the relevant editorials written 
by Negroes appeared in the March, 1941, issue of the Crisis, of 
which Roy Wilkins is editor. It was an editorial captioned, "Nazi 
Plan for Negroes Copies Southern U.S.A." Mr. Wilkins, in com- 
menting upon an article entitled "The Nazi Plan for Negroes" by 
Hans Habe, which had appeared in the March, 1941 issue of the 
Nation, compared point by point the six principles outlined by Mr. 
Habe — those set up by the Germans as their policy toward dark 
peoples — with the actual "treatment of Negroes in many parts of 
the United States of America, particularly the southern states." 
After this point-by-point comparison the editorial concluded : "The 
Crisis leaves to its readers the question of whether there is a great 


deal of difference between the code for Negroes under Hitler and 
the code for Negroes under the United States of America — the 
leading democratic nation in the world." 

The Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Nation took issue with 
the Crisis editorial, pointing out that here in America Negroes 
still have the right of protest and that it is necessary to differenti- 
ate between injustices toward minorities which are sanctioned by 
the government and those which do not have governmental ap- 
proval. In refutation of these arguments the Crisis published in its 
May issue another editorial. The following extracts indicate its 
basic arguments : 

The truth is that the South has set up a government of its own 
on the Negro. It disdains to pay any attention to the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights. By and large, it has won acquiescence in 
this policy from the rest of America. . . . 

When the Crisis speaks of the similarity of the Nazi code and 
the practice in America, we speak not of the principles of Amer- 
ica, but of the everyday habit. . . . 

To put the final touch to our argument, the southern states are 
mentioned favorably not only in Hitler's Mein Kampf, but in 
several Nazi pronouncements since that party has been in power. 
The Nazis like the South's treatment of the Negro. ... In other 
words, the South approaches, more nearly than any other section 
of the United States, the Nazi idea of government by a ''master 
race" without interference from any democratic process. 

This argument of pointing out the similarity between the Nazi 
policy for darker peoples and the American treatment of the Negro 
does not, of course, necessarily indicate pro-Axis sentiment. On 
the contrary such a point of view may be a part of a liberal, truly 
democratic policy. Both the N.A.A.C.P. and the Crisis have been 
in the forefront in the Negroes' struggle for complete integration 
in America's effort to aid the democracies and to prepare for de- 
fense against aggression. In commenting on the War Depart- 
ment's announcement of the formation of an Army Air Corps 


squadron with an all-Negro personnel, for example, a Crisis edi- 
torial (February, 1941) states: 

This is a step in the right direction in the sense that it does open 
up to Negro Americans a branch of the armed service from which 
they heretofore have been barred. But it is by no means the an- 
swer to the demand of colored people for full integration into all 
branches of the arms and services of the nation. 

That there was some definitely expressed ''isolationist" senti- 
ment among Negroes is clear. But the fact that the basis of this 
isolationism differed essentially from the isolationism of whites, 
as represented by such an organization as the America First 
Committee, is not often stated. The isolationism of the Negro 
appears to be a restricted racial isolation patent in such phrases 
as "This is a white man's war," and "What have we got to fight 
for?" Often this attitude approaches the point of genuine neutral- 
ity, sometimes apparently even without bitterness, but with some 
degree of racial fatalism or defeatism. 

Ernest E. Johnson, a prominent Negro newspaperman, writing 
in an avowedly antiwar periodical, expressed somewhat this point 
of view when he said : ^ 

In the present upsurge of emotion (National Emergency) we 
find the American Negro less impassioned than any other people 
or group in these United States. . . . We look to our flag not with 
a just pride, but with wonder, confusion, frustration. . . . We will 
probably do our share in the present emergency insofar as we are 
permitted, but not without the conviction that our effort is a point- 
less one so long as the concept of government for which we would 
be fighting has not yet been brought home to us as it has to other 
loyal Americans. 

An extreme isolationist point of view is taken by the organiza- 
tion called Negroes against War Committee. George S. Schuyler, 
executive secretary of this committee and author of one of its 
pamphlets,* states : 

* "Why We Are against War." 


Thousands of Negro youths will be killed and many thousands 
will be wounded in mind and body. And, yet, there is no evidence 
that discrimination and segregation because of color will be ended. 
... As a matter of fact, war will bring about a more rigid strati- 
fication of the Negro American life. 

This pamphlet includes the argument that the British and the 
Germans are alike in regard to their attitude toward darker peo- 
ples. In support of this statement, British imperialistic policy and 
practices in Africa and India are cited. Mr. Schuyler concludes 
with a series of questions among which are the following : 

Why should Negroes fight for democracy abroad when they are 
refused democracy in every American activity except taxpaying? 
Why should Negroes help pay for warships for Britain when 
Negroes cannot even man those warships? Or even get jobs build- 
ing them ? 

Such a point of view, although subtly anti-British and intensely 
concerned primarily with the past injustices and future welfare of 
the Negro, is, nevertheless, neither overtly nor implicitly pro-Axis 
in sentiment. 

There is, however, some evidence of definite pro-fascist, pro- 
Nazi, and pro-Japanese groups among Negroes. Although the 
present influence of such groups appears to be negligible, the 
extent of their potential power in the face of the seething dis- 
content of the masses of Negroes cannot be lightly dismissed 
without careful analysis of their basic arguments or appeal. Here, 
again, the motive force appears to be resentment against the gen- 
eral treatment of the Negro. In an attempt to give meaning to their 
experiences of segregation, discrimination, and all their attendant 
social ills, these groups resort to anti-Semitism. From this basis 
of an anti-Semitic sentiment stems their approach to the pro- 
fascist and pro-Nazi point of view. The leaders of these groups 
are the street-corner speakers of Harlem. They do not publish but 
orally convey their messages to fairly large groups of people who 
gather to hear them nightly. 


The Hour, a confidential newsletter, published in New York, 
presented in its August 23, 1941, issue a report on pro- Axis propa- 
ganda in Harlem. This periodical quotes (and the author has per- 
sonally verified) some of the leaders of this group as follows: 
*'Adolph Hitler offers the only solution for the Negro people." 
''Jews are responsible for the present war." ''The Japanese is the 
friend of the Negro. Racially we are both the same. Japan has 
done wonders for China. ... It has fought communism and it 
has fought the British. We nationalist Negroes are fighting them 
both." "This war is a white man's war." "Jewish warmongers are 
at the bottom of this war." 

A confidential report ''' on these pro-axis leaders indicates that, 
according to the evidence, these street-corner orators have no 
direct connection with pro-axis propaganda agencies ; rather, their 
eulogy of Hitler "is vicarious revenge on the Jewish merchants." 

The above survey of the relevant attitude of the Negro during 
the period of National Emergency has indicated, then, a variation 
in the immediate pattern of response ranging from all-out aid to 
the democracies through to pro- fascist and pro-Hitler sentiment. 
In any attempt to understand the basic dynamics of the civilian 
morale of the Negro, however, these differences should not be 
overemphasized. For it must again be remembered that each point 
of view is primarily concerned with the goals and struggles of the 
Negro against immediate oppression, and only secondarily with 
the broader issues of theoretical democracy versus foreign fascism. 
Yet the fact that Negroes, through common racial oppression, 
have been forced to restrict their field of vision, to consider all 
issues ethnocentrically (in spite of the conclusions arrived at) is 
an ominous sign of the basic pattern of their civilian morale. 

* Submitted to Walter White, Executive Secretary of N.A.A.C.P. ; exam- 
ined by the author at the New York offices of N.A.A.C.P., and quoted with 


Factors Underlying Negro Morale 

In the light of the above survey it is possible to make a more 
detailed analysis of the facets of the morale pattern among 
Negroes. The basic factor, as stated above, appears to be a deep- 
seated frustration complicated by bitterness and resentment. Other 
related factors are undoubtedly hope, psychological conflict, sus- 
picion, and a more or less fatalistic apathy and indifference, this 
latter particularly among the masses of the more underprivileged 
and exploited Negroes. 

In order to understand the nature of the frustration among 
Negroes, one must realize that Negroes are a part of the general 
population who in time of war are stimulated to exert maximum 
effort for the common victory: to join the Navy; to join the 
Marine Corps ; to join the various branches of the Air Corps ; to 
donate blood for emergency blood banks; to join the various 
branches of the Army ; in short, to participate fully in democracy's 
efforts to save itself from destruction by its foes. The Negro, 
like other loyal Americans, responds naturally to these stimuli. He 
wants to do everything within his power to show that he too is 
an American with rights to preserve. By and large, he is prone to 
forget past injustices in his attempt to come to the aid of his 
threatened country. 

But in his very attempt he finds himself still balked. Although 
he has been stimulated in the same manner as whites, he is not 
permitted to respond fully. The old frustrating patterns of Jim 
Crow which had built up within him seething resentment in his 
civilian life meet him, probably even more rigidly, when he enlists 
in the Army. From the Marine Corps he is excluded completely. 
He is a servant in the Navy. And, a crowning indignity, he is not 
even allowed to give his blood which might probably save a fellow 
American wounded on the field of battle. This blockage of a 
normal response to a general stimulation, plus the Negro's ina- 
bility to understand such obvious inconsistency between demo- 


cratic principle and democratic practice, build up in him feelings of 
despair, futility, and frustration. 

The resentment of the Negro follows logically from his frustra- 
tion. He resents the fact that he is frustrated. He resents the 
agencies which are responsible for, or aid and abet, this blockage. 
His resentment over immediate injustices has roots deep in his 
past, fed by the festering resentment against his past treatment 
in the industrial, social, and political life of the nation. In times of 
war he tends to focus the bulk of his resentment against what he 
considers the arrogant attitude of the Army and Navy in refusing 
to accept the offer of his life and service on the basis of equality 
with others. He probably goes further ; he may resent any oppor- 
tunistic use of the Negro during times of national emergency and 
war while his basic problems are ignored during intervals of peace 
and reconstruction. Above all, he resents the seeming inaction of 
the officers of government in counteracting those forces which 
tend to perpetuate, often in defiance of the American Constitu- 
tion, these contradictions of the principles of democracy. 

One of the basic issues of the present war is totalitarian treat- 
ment of minorities as opposed to democratic treatment. Of the 
implications of this issue for their future in America Negroes are 
definitely aware. Many of the Negroes who unequivocally ex- 
pressed themselves in favor of the democracies, even before the 
United States entered the war, appear to have done so primarily in 
terms of their attitude on this issue. Yet the factor of suspicion 
in the morale of the Negro creeps in precisely at this point. His 
general suspicion of the motives of whites in their intercourse 
with him and other minority peoples cannot but influence his 
present attitude toward America at war. Even in the event the 
democracies win, he is suspicious of the postwar treatment of the 
Negro. Transferred and generalized, his attitude of suspicion 
toward those whites who have exploited and debased him applies 
now to the government itself and to the very concept of democracy. 
Both the government and democracy he looks on as symbols of 
whites — and he is suspicious of whites. 


Conflict, in the psychological meaning of the term, appears to 
be a real factor in the morale of the Negro. In the face of the wel- 
ter of contradictory stimuli, Negroes as a whole appear at present 
unable to decide definitely which methods to employ, which phi- 
losophy of struggle to accept, or which leaders to follow. At the 
core of this conflict, however, appears the stable feeling of ethno- 
centricism- — a feeling of racial militancy. Upon analysis, this 
racial militancy (not to be confused with a more narrow ideologi- 
cal racialism, e.g., Garveyism) appears in itself stable enough to 
constitute the basis upon which the potential power of the masses 
of Negroes may be galvanized for unified action, thereby dissipat- 
ing what now appears to be a situation of general conflict. The 
question, then, is : will truly democratic and wholesome forces 
discover and utilize the clue to this vast reservoir of potential 
strength, or will it be ignored and left to be tapped by antisocial, 
reactionary, and destructive forces? In the answer to this ques- 
tion may lie the secret of stability in the future course of de- 
mocracy in America. Directly related to this point is another phase 
of the Negro's existing conflict — namely, his attempt to maintain 
some form of expressed or genuine loyalty to the American gov- 
ernment in the face of obvious and systematic prejudice and dis- 
crimination against him. 

One cannot ignore hope as a factor in the morale of Negroes. 
But upon closer examination, this hope reveals itself to be two- 
edged, both positive and negative. The Negro hopes that out of the 
present war will arise such conditions as to make mandatory the 
fuller participation of Negroes in the political and economic life 
of America. This may come about, he hopes, in either one of two 
ways. First, this being primarily a "white man's war," a long and 
destructive war may so weaken all combatants that they will be 
unable to subjugate the darker races. Second, a victory for the 
forces of democracy may actually result in the development of 
a more liberal treatment of minority peoples. The feeling is wide- 
spread that the inevitable wartime disturbances of the usual social 
patterns — sometimes bordering even upon disintegration — may be 


the source from which a positive, dynamic, and honest attitude 
toward them will arise. 

Each of these facets just described was culled from the writ- 
ings and expressions of patently articulate Negroes. Undoubtedly 
there are masses of Negroes who are inarticulate. These are the 
most underprivileged — the industrial serfs and the sharecroppers. 
An attempt to interview them meets with a stolid, inexpressive 
exterior. To be uncommunicative to strangers has become a 
condition of their very survival. Inasmuch as these Negroes are 
primarily concerned with the day-to-day struggle for immediate 
survival, one can expect from them little if any expression of 
morale conditioned by national or international events ; they show 
only apathy and indifference. 

The Prospects for Negro Morale 

This picture of morale among the Negroes tends for the most 
part to be an unfavorable and negative one. But it appears from 
the evidence that this is not immutably so. The possibilities for 
raising the morale of the Negro to a point compatible with a 
truly democratic way of life, in the framework of which his own 
contributions to American culture may be increased, seem good. 
For it is important to remember that the Negro is constantly 
seeking to be able to contribute his share to the common good. 

The morale of the Negro cannot be raised by asking him to be 
content with an inferior, Jim Crow, or unjust role in the war 
efforts of the nation. Even if this policy be accepted for purposes 
of convenience, it should be recognized for what it actually is; 
namely, a storing-up of those tensions of resentment and bitterness 
which must some day explode in an expression of the ultimate in 
detrimental, unwholesome morale. 

The building of an adequate morale in the Negro group en- 
tails a sudden, dramatic, and honest reversal of the present 
American policy of racial exploitation and humiliation. Such a 
program adopted and prosecuted in good faith by the government 


of the United States would change almost immediately the present 
pattern of Negro morale from the negative and confused to the 
positive and dynamic. In order to achieve such an end it would 
be necessary for the officers of the legislative and executive 
branches of our government to attack the problem with zeal, 
honesty, and definiteness. It would be necessary to utilize every 
medium of propaganda and education — moving pictures, radio, 
newspapers and magazines ; thus could one build favorable racial 
attitudes and establish racial unity rather than permit a perpetua- 
tion of unfavorable racial stereotypes and misconceptions. 

To begin this attack within the armed forces of the nation 
would be essential. The readjustment of the individual's ordinary 
social patterns and habits when he enters a branch of military or 
naval service may well include — and with little loss in efficiency — 
his adjustment to the presence of Negro fellow Americans fight- 
ing by his side for the preservation of those principles of democ- 
racy which they all alike hold vital and significant. Such a 
development would undoubtedly have an influence upon the tradi- 
tional pattern of racial relations in America; and objective indices 
indicate that this influence would be favorable and desirable. 

Psychologists in their researches have accumulated data which 
strongly suggest the possibility of change in the attitude of the 
American white toward the Negro — the possibility that such at- 
titudes may be changed from those of blind and irrational prej- 
udice with its attendant economic, social, and political injustices, 
to the wholesome, normal attitudes which stem from understand- 
ing and a sincere respect for the rights of every human being. If 
the civilian morale of the Negro is to be raised, some such change 
is imperative. 


Moralt in Canada * 

J. D. KETCHUM University of Toronto 

J. s. A. BOis Psychological Institute, Montreal 

THIS is not a factual report on civilian morale in Canada ; 
there is probably no one in the country able to make such 
a report. We have no Gallup Poll,t nor is any other sys- 
tematic sampling of public opinion in progress. In addition, the 
fact that we are at war prevents the release of certain relevant 
data — for instance, detailed figures on the response to army re- 
cruiting campaigns. 

The article is, accordingly, little more than a discussion of the 
problem of morale as it affects Canadian civilians in general. 
Those aspects of it which are peculiar to French Canadians are 
taken up separately.* While I have canvassed the opinions of 
several other persons interested in the question, the views ex- 
pressed must be regarded as my own. 


On the record in general, there is no apparent weakness in 
Canadian civilian morale. All political parties are agreed on the 
necessity of fighting the war through, and open opposition by 
minority groups is at present almost entirely lacking, except for 
the passive resistance of such bodies as the British Columbia 
Doukhobors. It is true that we have wartime regulations which 
penalize opposition, and that a considerable number of noncon- 

*Two contributions make up this chapter, Prof, Ketchum's being the first 
part, and that of Dr. Bois the latter ; see page 262. 

t This chapter was written in November, 1941. A Gallup poll has since been 



formists are interned; but our police are not so highly efficient 
that they could suppress all evidences of agitation, were it in any 
sense widespread. As a matter of fact, prosecutions under the 
Defense of Canada regulations average only about twenty cases 
a month — a figure which includes many charges of membership 
in the banned organization called Jehovah's Witnesses, and also 
technical infringements such as taking photographs in a forbid- 
den area. 

On the positive side we have the fact that up to September 1, 
1941, 320,000 men had enlisted for active service overseas, in 
addition to large numbers serving with the Royal Air Force and 
other British forces. This figure, quite independent of the 170,000 
drafted for preliminary training and Home Defense, would be 
equivalent to a voluntary enlistment of some 3,200,000 men in 
th€ United States. Women have responded quickly and almost 
universally, and are doing an astonishing amount of voluntary 
work, most of it now efficiently organized. 

Over $2,000,000,000 — some 40 per cent of the national in- 
come — is being spent during the present fiscal year on the Cana- 
dian armed forces, on purchases of war material in the United 
States and elsewhere, on financing British purchases in Canada, 
and on Canada's share of the great British Commonwealth Air 
Training Plan. Taxes, already three times as high as before the 
war, are still rising, and many hundreds of millions have been 
secured in the form of war loans. While the impact of these vast 
expenditures has been softened by increased employment — na- 
tional income is running about 11 per cent higher this year than 
last — the restrictions and sacrifices which they entail are begin- 
ning to be sharply felt in many classes. They are accepted, 
however, if not with enthusiasm, at least with complete public 


On the other hand, the picture is not quite as satisfactory as 
these facts would suggest. Recruiting for the army, in spite of 


energetic campaigns, is admittedly very slow. Newspaper files of 
1914 and 1915 contain photographs of long lines of men waiting 
to enlist; I have seen no such pictures this time. Against this 
observation, however, must be weighed the fact that the Royal 
Canadian Air Force and Navy, which possess more glamor and 
are already in action, have all the recruits they can use, at least 
in most categories. 

The Victory Loan of 1941 finally went over the top, but 
only after rather painful lagging and in response to a greatly 
stepped-up campaign costing $2,000,000 exclusive of commis- 
sions. Appeals to reduce consumption have had fair success in 
the case of certain commodities such as bacon, none at all as re- 
gards general buying; department-store business is booming as 
never before. An elaborate effort to cut consumption of gasoline 
by 50 per cent brought a reduction of 15 per cent; an appeal for 
6,000 blood donors in one large city resulted in less than 2,000 
volunteers. No doubt Dr. Goebbels would put our ''morale quo- 
tient" at only 30. 

The removal of the original 5 per cent limit on war profits is 
reliably stated to have been due to a "sit-down strike" on the 
part of certain industrialists, who refused to tender for govern- 
ment contracts on these terms; organized labor has also shown 
itself in several instances determined to secure tangible benefits 
from the war situation, even at the cost of serious interruptions 
in defense production. However adequate the grounds for such 
actions, they suggest that "winning the war is all that matters" 
is not yet a universal conviction; and the failure of Ottawa to 
take direct measures to secure troops, restrict spending, and pre- 
vent strikes seems to reflect governmental recognition of the fact. 


If this be the view of the government, it is supported by wide- 
spread criticism of the general level of Canadian morale. Indeed, 
the same newspapers which denounce Ottawa for not conscripting 


manpower and outlawing strikes often provide it with the best 
excuse for not doing so by lamenting in the next column the 
apathy and indifference of the general public. This tendency to 
bewail the low morale of others has several interesting aspects. 

(a) In part it is probably a healthy manifestation, the sign of a 
quickening pulse in the body politic, inseparable from the slow 
and piecemeal process by which a democracy stirs itself into action. 
It is inevitable that the man who has left his car in the garage 
should question the patriotism of those v/hom he sees driving to 
work, and that the soldier's wife, trying to support herself and 
her children on the maximum allowance of $79 a month, should 
bitterly criticize dollar-an-hour workers who go on strike for 
more. These anomalies should decrease as our war effort ap- 
proaches totality. 

(b) A second form of criticism is more serious; it is of that 
sectional type which reflects our still imperfect national unity. One 
cannot go far in the more "British" areas without hearing that 
the French Canadians, the Jews, the foreigners or some other 
group are not doing their part in the war. Such attitudes indicate 
a weakness in our democracy which only time and education can 
fully remedy. 

(c) Finally, there is a great deal of criticism — mainly by older 
people, certain editorial writers, and spokesmen of veterans' 
organizations — which seems to me to rest upon a serious miscon- 
ception of the nature of this war, and a complete failure to recog- 
nize the great social changes which have occurred since 1914. 
These critics, alarmed by what they feel to be the emotional apathy 
of the Canadian people, are convinced that the shortcomings in 
our war effort will only be removed when the feelings of the 
population are aroused to fever pitch. This point of view demands 
careful attention, for it will probably be equally in evidence in 
the United States. 



It is quite true that Canadians in general are taking this war 
far more coolly and unemotionally than they did the last. There is 
to all appearance less hatred of the Germans here today, after all 
that they have done, than there was after their invasion of Bel- 
gium in 1914. Wc have had scarcely a trace of the petty per- 
secution and gross violence against enemy nationals which 
characterized the last war; German music and literature are not 
boycotted as they were then, nor has German been dropped from 
the school curricula. Women are not sending white feathers to 
young men still in civilian clothes, or stopping strangers on the 
street to ask why they are not in uniform. There are frequent 
complaints that Canadians do not hang out flags or otherwise ad- 
vertise their patriotism, and that soldiers marching through the 
streets arouse scarcely any attention, let alone a cheer. 

Such facts are naturally regarded by the older and more ''Brit- 
ish" sections of our population as indications of a dangerously 
low level of morale ; and, while no one urges that we should start 
German-baiting or spy-hunting, most morale-raising efforts are 
aimed at securing the same black-and-white definition of the sit- 
uation, the same emotional participation, which underlay both 
the magnificent sacrifices and the less creditable manifestations of 
the earlier struggle. An exception should be made in the case of 
the material issued by the Bureau of Information at Ottawa, 
which is for the most part restrained and dignified; but the ma- 
jority of broadcasts, speeches and editorials reflect the belief that 
our chief need is for a more passionate upsurge of feeling than 
has yet occurred. 

1941 WAS NOT 1914 

Deliberate efforts to arouse the emotions of the public, and to 
paint this war as a holy war against satanic foes, began in No- 
vember, 1939, with a series of nationwide broadcasts by a news- 
paper publisher. They have continued in one form or another ever 


since. Their success in two years has been very small, and I do 
not expect it to be greater in the future. Heavy Canadian casualty 
lists may bring a more intense emotional response, but I doubt it ; 
the losses of the Royal Canadian Air Force are already well over 
the thousand mark. 

To say that the war is too far ofif explains nothing ; it was much 
farther away in 1914, when no plane could fly the Atlantic. The 
truth is that the patterns of thought of our present population are 
so drastically different from those of 1914 as to make the tradi- 
tional type of propaganda almost useless. If a higher level of 
morale is to be achieved it will have to be by new methods, appro- 
priate to the changed psychological milieu in which they have to 
operate. Some of the more significant changes in our national 
mentality are listed below; almost all will apply with equal or 
greater force to the situation in the United States. 

(a) We are better educated. The present population of Canada 
is far better educated, far more intelligent in the ordinary sense 
of the word, than that of 1914. We have had an average of three 
more years of schooling than the population represented by the 
1911 census, and almost all this increment has been at secondary 
and university levels. In addition, the vastly increased scope of 
press, radio, movies, magazines, and travel has made us far better 
informed about the world in general. We are less suggestible, 
more critical; better aware of the lights and shadows in all na- 
tional groups, less willing to believe that whole nations are ever 
either ''good" or "bad." 

{h) American influence is greater. Since 1914 the influence of 
the United States has tremendously increased. We share the closest 
of commercial relations, we listen to the same radio programs, 
watch the same movies and read the same literature ; hundreds of 
thousands of tourists feel almost equally at home on either side of 
the border. In many respects we are one nation; had the United 
States accepted the German definition of this war, many Canadians 
would have felt some disquiet as to our own alignment. As it is, 
the manifold communications between the two countries preclude 


that isolation from outside influences which is essential if intensive 
propaganda is to be effective ; the statements of a Canadian broad- 
caster can be checked against American interpretations by merely 
twisting a dial. Short of drastic interference with such freedom 
of communication, is is improbable that the psychological tempera- 
ture of Canada can ever again be raised more than a few degrees 
above that of the United States — rather a striking contrast to the 
situation in 1914-1917. 

(c) Propaganda is more difficult. Since 1914 the great American 
advertising business has made the task of the propagandist almost 
inconceivably more difficult. In the first place, twenty-five years 
of high-pressure advertising have caused ulterior aims to be sus- 
pected and appropriately discounted in even the most innocent 
statements of fact, while in other than commercial fields the very 
suggestion of propaganda is enough to arouse a negative attitude. 
Secondly, those who wish to affect public attitudes to the war find 
themselves almost entirely without the necessary weapons — sharp 
and powerful verbal symbols. What the advertisers have done to 
abuse and destroy the delicate mechanisms of communication can 
only be paralleled by what the early timber barons did to our 
forests. Every vehicle open to the war propagandist — speech, 
poster, letterpress, cartoon — has been exploited to the point of 
exhaustion; ringing words and phrases which once pierced the 
very soul of the listener now drop at his feet with a muffled plop. 
The radio voice which tells us that our lives and liberties are in 
danger has no more intrinsic authority than that which warns us 
against unpleasant breath; the terrible issues of this war come 
to us wrapped in cellophane. Under such conditions only great 
personalities can any longer challenge the listener's attention ; and 
Canada, unfortunately, possesses neither a Churchill nor a Roose- 

{d) The mores have been weakened. Since 1914 the progres- 
sive decay of primary groups has greatly weakened traditional 
moral sanctions in almost every area of life, while their total dis- 
appearance in international conduct has become a commonplace. 


The invasion of Belgium in 1914 aroused a moral indignation 
which was a powerful factor in making the war a kind of crusade, 
but recent aggressions against China, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland — to mention only a few — are dismissed by many with 
a shrug of the shoulders. Such actions have lost their power to 
shock us; and when they cease to shock us, they are no longer 
morally wrong. For considerable sections of our population ex- 
pediency, rather than abstract rightness, is becoming the criterion 
of others' conduct. 

(e) War has lost caste. On the other hand, those persons whose 
moral sentiments are still lively are precisely the ones who are 
most affected by the changed moral status of war. Ever since 1919 
powerful voices in the churches, the universities, the labor unions, 
the women's and youth organizations, have been driving home the 
idea that war can never be right in any absolute sense. The cir- 
cumstances of its outbreak have left few doubts as to the entire 
justification of this war ; but while we have few who oppose it on 
moral or religious grounds, we have many who can no longer 
bring themselves to complete emotional identification with it. 
Such incidents as the bombing of German cities tend to compel the 
admission that the moral difference between ourselves and the 
Germans is one of degree only ; this is a poor foundation for any- 
thing like a holy war. 

(/) Individual responsibility has declined. Most important of 
all is the steady but little-recognized shift of our whole social 
order from a community to an institutional basis. The rapid 
growth of cities at the expense of rural areas is as familiar a 
phenomenon here as in the United States, and all the most thickly 
populated areas of the country are now largely dominated by 
urban patterns of living and thinking. This revolutionary change 
has had two results which are of cardinal importance to morale. 

In the first place, barring the creation of crowd solidarity by 
such means as wholesale bombing, we can no longer count upon 
the contagious spread of warlike spirit from a few convinced citi- 
zens to the whole population. It was the still existing community 


life of 1914 which underlay the 100 per cent recruiting records in 
many small towns, the sacrificial giving for war purposes, the 
conscientious self -discipline in thrift campaigns, and also the mob- 
bing of German shopkeepers and boycotting of German music. 
The tone of life in our urbanized culture is profoundly different; 
we no longer know our neighbor in the vital sense which would 
permit us to urge him to enlist or warn him against defeatist opin- 
ions. Effective condemnation or approbation of others has largely 
vanished; our motto is, "You mind your own business and I'll 
mind mine." 

In the second place, leadership in the institutional groups in 
which most of our present life is lived is vested in functionaries 
appointed for the purpose, and more and more we are content to 
let them run the show and take the responsibility for it. Compare 
the operation of a large city church with that of its rural proto- 
type, or machine city politics with those of the cracker-barrel era. 
Since 1914 the community, the watchdog of the mores, has re- 
ceded, and with it has gone the sense of personal, individual re- 
sponsibility. From running a club to fighting a world war, we are 
now largely content to "let George do it.'' 


Factors such as the above are a real challenge to all who still 
believe democracies capable of fighting for themselves. Properly 
understood, they serve both to explain the apparent ineffectiveness 
of much of our propaganda in the past two years, and also to pro- 
vide a framework in terms of which a more intelligent campaign 
may be projected. On the basis of what has been said, and particu- 
larly of paragraph (/) above, two predictive generalizations may 
be hazarded : 

(a) We shall probably not see in this war that great upsurge of 
warlike feeling for which many persons are hoping, save in the un- 
likely event that the United States should set the pattern. This 
lack will be anything but a loss, provided that we can still achieve 


results comparable with those in Britain, where people are not ex- 
cited about the war either, but are working coolly, unitedly, and 
determinedly to win it. What was done there by the imminence 
of armed invasion will have to be done here by imaginative and 
persuasive education, closely integrated with the planned, compre- 
hensive use of all our resources. 

(b) Though our people are less capable of spontaneous initia- 
tive than they were in 1914, they are probably more prepared to 
do whatever authority requires of them. It will have been noted 
earlier that the shortcomings in our war effort are entirely in the 
realm of voluntary response, and are quite compatible with the 
ready acceptance of heavy burdens and restrictions imposed by law. 
I think much heavier demands will be complied with just as will- 
ingly, provided that they fall equally on all sections of the popula- 
tion; indeed, most people would prefer such methods. One often 
hears it said: "If they need our money, why don't they take it, 
instead of putting on all these damned campaigns?" Though this 
docile attitude is the subject of widespread censure, it is entirely 
in keeping with the character of our present institutionalized life, 
and of obvious value in a war which requires the utmost in far- 
sighted planning. 


The relative failure of verbal appeals only throws into higher 
relief the proverbial dominance of facts and actions over mere 
ideas and feelings. For, in spite of our obvious shortcomings, in 
spite of apparent' apathy and inertia, there can be no doubt that 
morale in the true sense — that of all-out concentration on the task 
of winning the war — has been steadily growing in Canada, at least 
since the fall of France. Its growth has had but little relation to 
the intensity of our propaganda efforts; it has been largely a 
function of two other factors, both more effective now than they 
were in 1914. First is an increasingly clear perception of the hard 
facts of the situation, and of their unmistakable implications. Our 


higher general ediicatibn, though hampering to traditional propa- 
ganda, is here an undoubted help. Second, there is increasingly 
widespread participation in war activities, thanks to the total 
character of present-day conflicts. No matter how our morale may 
appear to lag, this latter factor will ultimately have its effect. It 
is not so much that we are working for the war because we be- 
lieve in it; it is rather that we are coming to believe in the war 
because we are working for it. Blood donors may visit the clinic 
reluctantly and only under social pressure; but that simple act 
will do more for their morale than all the war publicity ever is- 
sued. Some interpretative propaganda is, of course, still needed, 
especially to emphasize the equal importance of many tasks not 
obviously connected with the war ; but much of the energy directed 
to telling us facts which we already know, and trying to arouse 
emotions which are no longer appropriate, might better be em- 
ployed in so organizing our national life as to give each individual 
something meaningful to do for the war. 


What has been said seems to be born out by investigations on a 
group of university students who, though contemptuous of all 
bellicose posturing, show a remarkable rise in conviction about 
the war. 

As will be seen in Graph I, Figure 1, before the Blitzkrieg 
opened the morale of this group was anything but high, in spite of 
at least five months of intense anti-German propaganda. The 
marked shift towards conformity shown in Graph II must be 
credited to the unequivocal logic of intervening events. The 
"phony" war was over and done with. Graph III, however, shows 
a still more marked rise in "entire conviction" — due in part, no 
doubt, to the steady pressure of innumerable propaganda agencies, 
but much more to the fact that all the men have now had at least a 
year of military training, while the girls are almost all engaged in 
some form of war work. Students are, of course, in no sense rep- 




J L 

i 1 1 

1 1 

1. April 4, 1940 

_(jus+ before the Blitzkrieg) 

U.Dec. 16, 1940 

rafter fall of France, etc.) 

1 i 1 

"en+irely" 19.5 | 

"pretty well" 26.8 

"not quite "25.8 

"not at all" 25.2 | 

1 no answer 4.7 

"entirely" 578 

"pretty we II "27 8 


ite" 16.7 

"not qu 


at all" 

1 no < 

"entirely" 67. 8 


"pretty well "20.6 

CO 1^ 

l"not qui^ 

["not at ( 
1 no answe 

r 1 


J I I I I 111^ 

Fig. 1. Conviction in regard to war. Out of 180 arts students (30 per cent 
men), who were asked to state, "I am convinced that it is in Canada's best 
interests to put everything she has into this war, and to continue the fight, 
whatever it may cost, until Germany is defeated," the indicated per- 
centages answered, on three successive occasions, by filling in the blank, 
that they were ''entirely convinced," "pretty well convinced," *'not 
quite convinced," or "not convinced at all." The changes in the "entirely" 
and "not at all" categories are highly reliable statistically (d> 3 <s d). 


resentative of the general population, and such pointed changes in 
their attitudes reflect the influence of factors which are almost 
certainly at work in much wider areas. 


Canadian morale is not yet all that we could wish for, but it is 
improving and will almost certainly continue to do so. Morale- 
raising efforts, couched largely in the stereotypes of the last war, 
have been conspicuously ineffective in arousing the emotional re- 
sponse sought for, have probably, indeed, contributed to the con- 
fused attitudes and mutual criticism which have tended to 
characterize the civilian front. With a clearer understanding of 
the social changes which have created our present mental patterns, 
these efforts should become more intelligent; in the meantime, 
morale is inevitably being generated by the mere fact that we are 
actually participating in the war on a vast and increasing scale. 
Timidity in our national leadership is probably quite unjustified; 
for the same factors which are responsible for our apparent in- 
difference to the war are also the best guarantee that we will do 
everything which has to be done, if and when it is unmistakably 
demanded of us. It is to be hoped that our American friends, when 
the need arises, may be able to profit by our experiences and mis- 
takes in this important field. 

J. D. Ketchum 


French Canada and the War 

In ordinary circumstances French Canadians are practically 
ignored by the rest of the country. It is generally known that they 
speak a language different from that of other Canadians and that 
they are eager to preserve that language. But what are the charac- 
teristic features of their mentality, what their reactions to world 
events — these are questions of little interest to outsiders. 

The war has changed all this. News writers, politicians, and 
sociologists now occasionally focus their attention on the Province 
of Quebec. Their appreciation may be based on plain misinforma- 
tion (or is it prejudice?) as in the case of Life Magazine; or on 
an evident desire to be agreeable, as in that of the United States 
Secretary of the Navy, who said in Montreal a few weeks ago: 
*T especially congratulate and felicitate this great Province of 
Quebec on its noteworthy contribution to Canadian effort to help 
defeat the Hun, and may I employ the sterling example which you 
men of Quebec have provided to cry shame upon the numerically 
few but noisy isolationists, who cry out for an impossible isola- 
tion for us, while Quebec, having far more profound reasons for 
an isolationist posture, is setting an inspiring example to the free 
men of other bloodstreams in Canada and in the United States." 

It is not only strangers who interpret in such widely different 
terms the behavior and the morale of French Canada in the present 
conflict. Voices which can be accepted as reliable expressions of 
French Canadian public opinion broadcast in their turn messages 
that do not agree. Cardinal Villeneuve and Premier Godbout 
speaking in Toronto assure the rest of Canada of their compa- 
triots' devotion to the common cause, while the St. Jean Baptiste 
Society, the recognized French Canadian national association, 
sends to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and publishes in the 
press a resolution which demands a slowing down in our war 

A mere observer would be very presumptuous if he claimed 
that his own view is truer to facts than any of such widely circu- 


lated pronouncements. A careful survey of French Canadian pub- 
lic opinion, based on a representative sampling of the whole popu- 
lation and repeated at regular intervals to show the trends as they 
are modified by the rapid changes that occur in this warfare — 
truly mobile on the home front as on the fighting line — would be 
the only scientific means of solving the problems. Short of this, 
one has to depend on some basic characteristics of the French 
Canadian Weltanschauung and on impressions one has gathered 
here and there in the papers or in casual interviews with people 
of all classes. To put these findings in order, we may adopt the 
division given by the editor of the present yearbook in his article 
on "Five Factors in Morale." * 

A positive goal: something to look forward to amd to work for. 
This motivation is rightfully taken as fundamental. And on this 
very point the average French Canadian sees things differently. 
From his early infancy to his old age he is constantly and per- 
sistently conditioned to the other world, not to this one. In rural 
communities life is centered around the church, and in the cities 
numerous organizations keep reminding the young and the old 
that "the image of this world passeth and eternity lasteth forever 
and ever." If an outsider expects this very real other-worldliness 
of outlook to be often expressed in so many words, he will fail 
to find it. If he looks for it in definitely higher public or private 
morals on all points that he considers of paramount importance, he 
may be sadly disappointed. 

But it is there all the same, as a powerful source of mass energy 
which, when it is geared to a social movement, may give it an 
overwhelming momentum. French Canadian women ignore birth 
control because they don't want to miss going to heaven; most 
families boast of having a son or a daughter in a religious order 
because this is an ennobling accomplishment ; laymen of all classes 
go and spend three days of "closed retreat" in silence, prayer and 
meditation, because they value the salvation of their souls beyond 
everything else; all educational institutions, from grade school to 

* Chapter III. 


university, are professedly Catholic in their program, training and 
outlook, because science without religion is dangerous; national 
labor unions are termed Catholic and have a chaplain, because la- 
bor questions are moral issues which must be decided in the light 
of religious principles. 

The consequence is that a war, to be consistent with such a 
philosophy of life, must be viewed as a religious and a defensive 
war — religious because moral issues are worth fighting and dying 
for ; defensive because peace is the primary objective. 

What I maintain here is evidenced by the enthusiasm with which 
French Canadians sent the very first Canadian troops to fight be- 
yond the seas. It was in 1870, when the Papal States were invaded 
by Garibaldi. Pontifical zouaves were recruited in the Province 
of Quebec, and with the blessing of Bishop Bourget of Montreal 
they left for far-away Rome. They arrived late on the scene and 
had little to do with actual fighting. But on their return home 
they were welcomed like crusaders of old. Any visiting American 
can see their names displayed on tablets in St. James Basilica, 
Montreal. Even to this day zouaves of the original contingent 
are revered in their respective communities, and new regiments 
have been recruited and maintained in various towns. These have 
no other purpose but to keep alive the memory of the expedition of 
1870 and to add color to the public religious demonstrations. Up 
to the present war they had their annual camping and drilling. 

The present conflict is a clash of moral values, rightly called by 
Prime Minister King a crusade. But French Canada does not con- 
sider it as such, and a politician, even if he deserves as much per- 
sonal respect as Mr. King, has little chance of being accepted as an 
authoritative leader on religious issues. If the Vatican ever takes 
sides against Nazism, as it formerly condemned communism, Que- 
bec would surely awaken to a sense of moral responsibility. It is 
most probable that, when President Roosevelt revealed Hitler's 
plan to ban all religions in order to establish his own Nazi church, 
he helped give French Canadians a war aim consistent with their 


Togetherness: sense of belonging in a group with a common 
purpose. In spite of the federation of the provinces, French and 
English in Canada live in two worlds with little communication 
between them. As an American sociologist well conversant with 
the situation in Quebec, Professor Everett C. Hughes of the Uni- 
versity of Chicago, wrote recently to the author : ''It isn't merely 
that they differ, but rather that they are looking at quite different 
things in the news and in the world generally, and think in dif- 
ferent terms." 

The terms in which one thinks are acquired in the family en- 
vironment and at school. We have seen that the home environment 
of the young French Canadian is permeated with a vivid con- 
sciousness of the hereafter. His educational world, from grade 
school to university, is a system complete in itself, having little or 
no communication with the English Canadian world of learning. 
Even today there is no direct relationship between the distribution 
of cycles in the two programs of studies. For instance the matricu- 
lation of the English high school has no equivalent in the French 
system. At the university level an English Canadian student may 
reach the highest degrees without knowing the language of his 
French fellow citizen any better than would an American student 
in New York or Toronto. There is little or no exchange of stu- 
dents or professors between the English and the French univer- 
sities. No national system of schools imposes a common Canadian 
mentality. In English and French classrooms, sometimes less than 
a block distant from each other, textbooks of Canadian history are 
used which give to each group of pupils a widely divergent view of 
the evolution of the country. 

Some legal holidays in Quebec differ from those of the rest of 
the Dominion; one is celebrated on the same day, but while it is 
called Victoria Day in English Canada, it is Bollard Day for the 
French. As a consequence a Torontonian or even an English 
Montrealer who goes as a tourist to the thoroughly French parts 
of the Province feels, as much as an American, that he is visiting 
a strange land. For the average Canadien, moreover, they are both 


in the same category; they are des Anglais. There is a correspond- 
ing attitude on the EngUsh side : the author has attended many a 
meeting of English Canadian scientists where Canadian social 
problems were discussed without any references whatsoever to the 
fact that one-third of the population is French. A test of general 
intelligence published in Toronto, exclusively in English of course, 
is entitled Dominion Test of General Intelligence, as if this instru- 
ment could apply in its original form to all individuals in the 

Politically, of course, Canada is one. But psychologically the 
average French Canadian does not look upon Ottawa as his capital. 
The center of his cultural world does not lie within the boundaries 
of English-speaking democracies either. France is still the source 
of his intellectual inspirations. Rome is the center of his interna- 
tional universe. Canada, and by this I mean French Canada, is his 
only spiritual home. The British Empire as such has no appeal to 
him. For a whole generation imperialism has been considered as a 
real danger to his liberties, until today he will readily speak in 
terms of the British Commonwealth of Nations but will resent the 
attitude of his English-speaking fellow citizens who have kept the 
legally obsolete term, British Empire. 

On that motley background of conflicting attitudes of the French 
and the English toward the political framework of the British 
world, a salient feature arrests the attention of the observer : the 
French in Canada have a profound respect for Their Majesties 
and the Royal Family. This corresponds to a political reality, as 
the King is personally the bond which unites the various sister 
nations together. And the visit of King George and Queen Eliza- 
beth in the spring of 1939 provided French Quebec with an oppor- 
tunity to express with real enthusiasm its attachment to the Crown. 
The heart of every French Canadian man, woman, and child was 
stirred with unforgettable emotion when Her Most Gracious 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth, in her parting message, spoke to them 
with a genuine ease in their own language. 

In Canada, as in Britain, the Crown is above politics, and poli- 


ticians have often made themselves a target for French antipathy 
when they have played the Quebec vote for or against certain 
measures. If the feeling of togetherness is not v^hat it should be 
in Quebec, much of the blame rests with party politics. 

Awareness of danger: alarm and concern; sense of important 
values seriously at stake. The impact of a brutal attack from out- 
side brings into a solid block a nation otherwise divided. The 
awareness of an immediate danger works the same, though less 
spectacularly. Because they are geographically far from the scene 
of actual combat, French Canadians are not fully conscious of the 
threat of Nazi domination. The psychological factors which we 
have already reviewed make that distance even greater, and the 
recital of German atrocities evokes scant reaction ; it is like read- 
ing in the papers about an earthquake in Afghanistan or a famine 
in China. 

The democratic ideals and way of life are at stake. But what 
do these mean to French Canadians ? Little. It is an historical fact 
that after the Cession they adapted themselves to British parlia- 
mentary institutions and conquered one by one the privileges they 
now enjoy. Some of their leaders, both in politics and outside, are 
keenly aware of the protection of the British flag. "Should this 
flag cease to wave victoriously over Canada, we would sustain a 
formidable setback liable completely to wreck our social structure," 
declared the head of the Quebec Bar in Toronto recently. 

But at the very time when this is said, there are at work in 
French Canada various currents of opinion and new social doc- 
trines which are not easily reconciled with the ideals of capitalistic 
democracy. Corporatism is an example. It would be unfair to 
assimilate any of the French Canadian varieties of corporatism to 
the fascist type. It is true, nevertheless, that it gradually becomes a 
concrete objective which distracts the masses from the existing 
socio-economic system. Social Credit is another instance. Born in 
England and adopted in only one province, far-away Alberta, this 
theory has had a strange appeal for certain classes of our popula- 
tion. As late as in 1939 a survey of public opinion, conducted in 


French Canada by the Psychological Institute of Montreal, re- 
vealed that Premier Aberhart of Alberta was spontaneously men- 
tioned as an outstanding figure in Canadian life — this in answer 
to a question demanding a rating of a list of prominent personages 
in politics and business, among which his name did not appear. 
Although the acceptance of Social Credit has logically no relation 
to a lack of willingness to pursue the war effort, it has for French 
Canada a special significance. It is a reaction against banks and 
big business. And finance is associated with les Anglais. A reform 
in financial policies involves a change in the controlling power 
of national life. When one is looking for such fundamental 
changes, one is not ready to sacrifice all for the existing system 
and for English predominance in the world. 

A realistic sense that something helpful can be done: awareness 
of steps to be taken. Social machinery to facilitate action: skill in 
using the processes of democratic co-operation. In the case of 
French Canadian morale as regards the present war, these two 
factors may well be considered jointly. As war goes on, some of 
the following considerations may prove out of date, but some will 
surely be confirmed by the very changes that are likely to occur. 

Early in the fall of 1939 a meeting was held in Maisonneuve 
Market, Montreal, where a group of young nationalist extremists 
received the applause of thousands of listeners when they advo- 
cated a policy of selfish trade on a cash basis with embattled 
Britain. Without any intervention of the authorities, that attitude 
has disappeared today. Official figures have been published which 
show that French Canada has done its share in enlistment for over- 
seas service, for War Savings Certificates, for loans, and for all 
Auxiliary Services. Strikes in war industries are no more frequent, 
probably less so, in Quebec than in the rest of the Dominion. Taxes 
are paid willingly, and the restrictions concomitant with the war 
effort are accepted without a grudge. 

But there is still a lurking feeling that French Canadians are 
not having their full share in the framing of Canada's war policies. 
Wrongly or not, they picture themselves as unwelcome in the 


higher circles where far-reaching decisions are taken. Unaware 
that their educational system has not prepared them for technical 
posts, they resent the slowness of their promotion in the various 
services, both within the army and outside. 

In the Auxiliary Services they have no organization which they 
can justly consider as their own. For instance the Y.M.C.A., the 
Salvation Army, the Canadian Legion, and the Knights of Colum- 
bus keep huts where soldiers are welcome in camps, in cities, and 
right close to the battle front. No purely French Canadian associa- 
tion has anything of the kind. Even when he relaxes from his 
intensive training, the French recruit lives in an atmosphere that is 
strange to him. Nothing of his home has followed him, and he has 
no opportunity to welcome his English-speaking buddy into his 
own world. 

The machinery which, according to a growing number of 
English Canadians, would greatly facilitate action and distribute 
equitably the task of defending the country at the outposts of 
democracy, is conscription of manpower for service overseas. 
Now, this very word conscription provokes a most unpleasant 
reaction in the vast majority of French Canadians. Is it that they 
are afraid of fighting? Not at all. From the early settlers, who held 
the plow handle with one hand and the musket with the other, to 
the officers and privates of the deservedly famed Vingt-deuxieme 
Battalion in World War I, they have lived up to a high standard 
of gallant bravery. But they are an independent race; they resent 
coercion. Feeling that they have had little to say in the conduct of 
Canadian war policies, they are ready to seize this opportunity to 
assert themselves. They are all the more eager to do it on the 
question of conscription, inasmuch as during the last war that 
same measure was sprung upon them without the necessary prep- 
aration. For years they have been building an attitude of resistance 
against it — and their political leaders have encouraged them to do 
I so. Now the whole group is taking pride in saying no. 

Will this state of affairs end in a clash that will disrupt Canadian 
unity or crush the valiant three million Frenchmen who hold the 


valley of the St. Lawrence ? I do not think so. The education which 
makes a French Canadian what he is has instilled into him a keen 
sense of duty. When the American revolutionists tried to bring 
him to their side against England, he was loyal to his new masters. 
He fought to stem the American invasion of Lower Canada in the 
War of 1812-1815. If he asserts himself with energy, he does not 
easily become a rebel. He has, moreover, the Norman shrewdness ; 
experience has taught him to accept the inevitable and prepare 
patiently for better days. If he momentarily follows politicians 
and yields to their schemes, he knows how to recognize his real 
leaders at the hour of crisis. 

The reader of these pages will realize how trying are these days 
for French Canadians. They can be excused when they fail to 
jump quickly to the aid of les Anglais who have ignored them so 
consistently. There is some truth in the rather blunt statement 
made to me by an elderly workingman, father of two sons who 
are now with the Canadian Corps in England: "Of course, we 
don't want the British to be beaten ; but I don't mind their getting 
a good thrashing !" 

Sincerely desirous to fulfill their duty toward themselves as a 
group and toward their country as a whole, the Canadiens are 
grouping along cautiously on their way to the battle front. They 
will carry on without flagging or failing, hoping that their con- 
tribution to the rebirth of a free world will be acknowledged and 
will give them a better chance to live their own life in Canada, 
their only home. As one of their poets wrote it in verses which 
became the national anthem, they know that valor is the guarantee 
of freedom. 

Et ta valeiir, de foi trempee, 
Protegera nos foyers et nos droits.^ 

J. S. A. Bois. 

* From the original version (French) of "O Canada.' 

Part Four: Morale in Industry 


Morale During Unemployment 


WHEN Army, factories, and offices are clamoring for men, 
unemployment seems remote. There are still, however, 
some millions of unemployed men. Lack of raw ma- 
terials has closed down many consumer-goods industries, and not 
all have been able to change over to defense production. It is not 
primarily because of these workers who need jobs that this chap- 
ter is written. Neither is it the purpose of this discussion to sound 
a warning about possible postwar unemployment, important as it 
will be to plan to prevent such a breakdown. 

This study is based on the hope that we may learn something 
about sustaining morale through a time of hardship by turning 
back to a recent crisis in American life to see how our citizens 
responded during a previous period of stress. We shall attempt to 
find out what factors enabled some men to keep up their morale 
while others, facing an external situation no more serious, lost 
faith and courage. 

We go back to January and February of 1934. Unemployment 
had risen to an unprecedented high point. The hopes engendered 
by the early months of the New Deal and the N.R.A. had waned; 
the Blue Eagle was no longer soaring; and no social security or 
W.P.A. program cushioned the shock. Many felt that our tradi- 
tional economic system was in its death throes. 

That winter, in New York City, an Adjustment Service ^ was 
organized to give aid and counsel to men and women seeking to 
find some way of improving their lot in this difficult situation. 
In all some sixteen thousand people were given interviews, tests, 
and guidance. From the records of that organization we hope to 



find out some of the diflferences between those morale was high, 
despite their difficulties, and those who more quickly lost their 
faith and courage. Our study, except for a few comparisons, has 
been limited to unemployed men. The most serious limitation in 
numbers was occasioned by the fact that one of the tests most 
important for our study was not given until the latter part of the 
career of the Adjustment Service, and the demand for complete 
records limited us necessarily to 538 cases. Among these, how- 
ever, there were all degrees of apparent optimism and despair. 
Subjects ranged in age from the late teens to more than sixty, 
with a median at twenty-six. Some had had less than eighth-grade 
schooling, while others had done postgraduate study. The median 
man in our group was a high-school graduate. They had formerly 
held jobs which ranged in pay from less than $10 a week to over 
$90 a week, with a median best job (for jobs held a year or 
longer) as high as $35 a week. When they came to the Adjustment 
Service, some had been unemployed for only a few weeks and 
others for more than four years. About one in four was married. 
In religion, 39 per cent were classified as Jewish, 33 per cent 
Protestant, 21 per cent Catholic, and 7 per cent without religious 
affiliation. They had held almost every type of job from unskilled 
labor and office boys to managers, executives, actors, engineers, 
writers, dentists, and professors. They were predominantly New 
York City young men, who had once had white-collar jobs. 

The data of the Adjustment Service were collected with a view 
to swift, inexpensive appraisal for vocational and educational guid- 
ance. They do not represent the selection of factors which one 
would choose if the work had been set up initially to study morale. 
There are, nevertheless, in the case records and on the Hollerith 
cards a number of facts which bear upon some commonly held 
hypotheses concerning morale. We know for each client his age, 
birthplace, lineage, length of unemployment, marital status, num- 
ber of dependents, religous affiliation, years spent on the job held 
longest, index of employment stability, maximum weekly salary 
on job held for at least one year, number of years of schooling, 


type of course taken at school, club memberships and offices held, 
avocational activities, the client's statement of reason for coming, 
the counselor's appraisal of the essential service needed, the modal 
occupation, the occupation recommended, and scores on tests of 
intelligence, vocabulary, mechanical ability, nervous stability, atti- 
tude toward employer, occupational interests, and radicalism. Some 
clients were given medical and psychiatric examinations. Some 
were given an art- judgment test. For those who had held two or 
more different jobs we have their statement of reasons for pre- 
ferring one job above another. 

From the standpoint of the present study the data are weak in 
that they do not tell us much about early family life, nutrition, 
glandular factors, friends, group democracy, and personal emo- 
tional experiences, all of which might bear upon ability to sustain 
morale under trying circumstances. 

Indices of Morale 

Morale is a multiple-meaning term, and our study is limited to 
two aspects of it. Morale may (1) stress "a condition of physical 
and emotional well-being in the individual that makes it possible 
for him to work and live hopefully and effectively,"* or may (2) 
place emphasis on the group, its purposes, leadership, integration, 
implying each individual's sense of "belonging" and sharing in 
group goals and group activity. It may be, as our study will later 
suggest, that these two emphases are closely related, but they start 
from different materials of observation. Our data relate largely to 
the first, or ''individual-organic" aspect of morale. 

The first index of morale which we have used in this investi- 
gation is the Hall Scale for Measuring Occupational Morale.^ 
Dr. Hall had developed this scale in his study of attitudes of un- 
employed engineers. Eight items could be answered on a five-point 
scale ranging from ''strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Re- 

* Report of a conference on psychological factors in morale, National Re- 
search Council, November, 1940. 


sponses were scored from 1 (representing highest level of morale) 
to 5 (for answers indicating poorest morale). The statements of 
the Hall Scale were as follows : 

1. Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability. 

2. There is little chance for advancement in industry and busi- 
ness unless a man has an unfair pull. 

3. Real ambition is eventually recognized and rewarded, 

4. Ambition is all right for youngsters, but a man gets to realize 
it is all the bunk. 

5. Any man with ability and willingness to work hard has a 
good chance of being successful. 

6. The world owes every man a living. 

7. When conditions are as bad as they are during a business 
depression, it sometimes seems foolish for a man to use energy 
looking for work. 

8. There is not much sense in trying very hard to "make good." 

Those men with high morale on this scale had somehow man- 
aged, in spite of adverse conditions, to sustain their faith in am- 
bition, ability, willingness to work hard, and a chance to succeed. 
Those with low morale had succumbed to the very natural tend- 
ency to feel that efforts no longer counted, that only luck and 
pull got people ahead, and that the world owed them a living. 

The Hall Scale for Occupational Morale reflects attitude toward 
the job in this competitive economy. It seemed likely that some 
men might retain occupational morale, in the sense of the Hall 
Scale, but be disheartened about other aspects of life. Conversely, 
some who believed the old individualistic economic system had col- 
lapsed, might face that prospect with hope and good cheer. We 
therefore sought a broader measure of morale, and developed what 
is here called a ''Life Satisfaction Index," using items selected 
from the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and the Strong Voca- 
tional Interest Test. These tests had been given during the counsel- 
ing program, and we have merely re-tabulated the responses to the 
selected items to obtain our Life-Satisfaction Index. 


The largest grotip of items was selected from the Bernreuter 

8. Do you often feel just miserable? 
14. Do you consider yourself a rather nervous person? 
26. Do you frequently feel grouchy ? 
39. Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences? 
51. Are your feelings easily hurt? 

54. Do you often feel lonesome when you are with other people ? 
72. Are you troubled with feelings of inferiority? 
104. Do your feelings alternate between happiness and sadness 
without apparent reason ? 

It seemed that poor morale was more likely to lead to answers 
indicating feeling miserable, nervous, and grouchy, worrying too 
much, having one's feelings easily hurt, all accompanied by a sense 
of social isolation, inferiority, and unhappiness. In a previous re- 
search ^^ we found very high correlation between level of happiness 
and consistency of mood; wide amplitude of variation between 
happiness and sadness was characteristic only of the predomi- 
nantly unhappy. Therefore, question 104 above, about alternation 
of mood, seemed promising. A preliminary item analysis of these 
and other items from the Bernreuter, Strong, and Hall tests 
showed that the above items discriminated consistently in the di- 
rection of the total Life Satisfaction battery. 

In Part VII of the Strong test we found two items indicative 
of that phase of morale which reduces worry and hurt feelings: 

Worry consid- Worry very Do not worry ( ) 

erably about little ( ) 

mistakes . . . . ( ) 

Feelings easily Feelings hurt Feelings rarely 

hurt ( ) sometimes . . • ( ) hurt ( ) 

It seemed reasonable to conclude that those who worry consider- 
ably about mistakes, and whose feelings are easily hurt, are po- 
tentially weaker in morale than those who are more tough-minded. 
Parts IV and V of the Strong test record the subject's liking 


or dislike for 52 kinds of activity (for example: making a radio 
set, handling horses, giving first-aid assistance, raising flowers and 
vegetables, making a speech, organizing a play, doing research 
work, taking responsibility, looking at shop windows, drilling 
soldiers, or meeting new situations) and for 53 kinds of people 
( for example : progressive people, conservative people, energetic 
people, people who are natural leaders, emotional people, gruff 
men, witty people. Socialists, men who chew tobacco, carelessly 
dressed people, Negroes, foreigners, and people who have made 
fortunes in business). It seemed that a high level of joie de vivre 
would be reflected in liking more kinds of people and activities, 
whereas the unhappy, defeated, frustrated, and resentful unem- 
ployed would probably project some of their own dissatisfaction. 

The four groups of items: (1) liking for activities; (2) liking 
for people; (3) tough-mindedness ; and (4) freedom from symp- 
toms of misery, worry, loneliness, inferiority, and instability of 
mood, have been combined for our study into a single Life Satis- 
faction Index. Table I shows the composition, scoring, range, 
mean, standard deviation, and reliability for this index. The 
Bernreuter questions carried a weight of 4.5, each of the Strong 
liking sections a weight of about 3.0, and the two questions on 
tough-mindedness of 1.0. Seven other questions which appeared 
promising and which were included in preliminary explorations 
were eliminated because item analysis showed inconsistency. The 
composite index resulted in scores ranging from 2 to the maxi- 
mum possible, 40, which was achieved in only two instances. The 
reliability of .82 obtained for both the Hall Scale and for the Life 
Satisfaction Index seems adequate for the group differentiations 
here proposed. 

Although the four groups of items are all in the general area 
of life satisfaction, they are not closely correlated with one an- 
other, as is shown by the intercorrelations reported in Table II. 
Although the "liking for activities" and ''liking for people" sec- 
tions have been included in the composite, it appears that they 
show a negligible correlation with the other measures. The fact 



Table I. Composition and Reliability of Life Satisfaction Index. 


of items 

Basis for scoring 





Liking for activi- 

Strong, IV 


L-D ; scored as ap- 
proximate deciles 
of the distribution 





Liking for people 
Strong, V 


L-D ; scored as ap- 
proximate deciles 
of the distribution 





Strong, VIII 


for unhappy 

1 for doubtful 

2 for euphoric 





Freedom from un- 
happy symptoms 


for unhappy 

1 for ? 

2 for euphoric 










Table II. Reliabilities and intercorrelations of morale measures. 

Life Satisfaction Index : 

1. Liking for activities 

2. Liking for people 

3. Tough-mindedness 

4. Freedom for unhappy 
symptoms (Bernreu- 

5. Total Life Satisfac- 
tion Index 

6. Hall Scale for occu- 
pational morale 

















































that ''liking for activities" shows a correlation of less than .20 
with ''liking for people" indicates that the tendency to mark likes 
or dislikes is not very general or very consistent. Taken with the 
fairly high reliabilities found in Table I, the data seem to show 
that liking for people is consistent ; liking for activities is consist- 
ent; but neither is a satisfactory index of the other or of general 
euphoria. In our interpretation the low correlation with symptom 
questionnaires is no argument against including these sections in 
our composite. The characteristics measured by these two portions 
of the Strong test are distinct from one another and from the atti- 
tudes reflected in the other parts of the index, but they are 
psychologically and socially important. People who tend to dislike 
most of the activities which bring satisfaction in daily life, or 
who tend to dislike most of the kinds of people one meets and 
works with each day, are properly included among the morale 

The highest relationship among the parts of the Life Satisfac- 
tion Index is found between the tough-mindedness questions on 
the Strong test and the Bernreuter items about feeling miserable, 
nervous, grouchy, worried, lonesome, sensitive, etc. Here the cor- 
relation is .54. 

The Hall Scale for Measuring Occupational Morale shows little 
relationship to the Life Satisfaction Index (r = .25). What little 
correlation appears seems to come from the Bernreuter questions 
and may represent a common factor in both tests; namely, the 
desire of the subject to make a favorable impression. 

Limitations of Self-Report 

It must be recognized that all of our measures are self-reports. 
This fact, although it is practically inescapable in attempts to get 
at subjective attitudes, does introduce certain errors. We must 
assume in the light of many previous studies that some distortion 
takes place as a result of the need of some subjects to protect their 
ego. Some faults they are loathe to admit to themselves, and many 


Others they might be reluctant to state on psychological test blanks. 
The investigators did what they could to allay fears and defensive 
attitudes. The whole procedure was voluntary. The tests were sug- 
gested as a part of a counseling procedure designed to help the 
subject make an honest evaluation of his strong and weak points. 
Subjects were urged not to take tests at all unless they were free 
to be quite frank. Undoubtedly many co-operated wholeheartedly. 
Some, discouraged because they were out of work, may even have 
exaggerated their faults. It has been previously noted in other 
studies that the unemployed were more apt to blame themselves 
than to blame the social order for their failures. Yet we would 
expect, a priori, that these self -reports would be colored by the 
omission of some admissions which might seem to the subject to 
discredit him, and by efforts to put the best foot forward. 

We may recognize this limitation and still find group compari- 
sons meaningful. For some reason or other some subjects did 
report more dislikes, fears, worries, than others, and more dis- 
trust of jobs and employers. The effect of the defensive errors in 
self-description would be to raise the general score a bit in what 
would seem the desirable direction, and to obscure a little the dif- 
ferences which a truly valid measure might reveal. If, for ex- 
ample, all young people really had high morale and all old people 
had poor morale, but the people with poor morale tended to fudge 
on admitting their state, then the result would be some blurring 
of the sharp distinction which ought to exist between scores of 
the young and the old. Hence we conclude that the principal effect 
of the errors in self -reporting will be to make observed differences 
among objectively defined subgroups less than the true differences 
would be. 

In case both the morale measure and the factor being studied 
in relation to morale are contaminated by possible self -protective 
tendencies, the obtained correlation will be spuriously high, and 
the more surely valid and significant observations will be those 
in which the relationship appears, nevertheless, negligible. 

Applying our logic to Table II, where all measures are based 


upon self-report, the most impressive fact is that the interrelation- 
ships are so small. Occupational morale, for example, as measured 
by the Hall Scale, is quite independent of the other indices. These 
results do not support those industrial psychologists who have 
attributed poor morale on the job largely to personal maladjust- 

Case Summaries Show Validity 

Case studies were made of 16 men chosen from the highest 
level of morale, and compared with 16 from the lowest level — as 
measured, in both cases, by the Life Satisfaction Index.* The data 
collected in the Adjustment Service are far from adequate for a 
thorough, intensive case study, but when the available data are 
put together in unified portrait they do permit some characteriza- 
tion. The 16 cases of low morale all carry internal evidence of per- 
sonal maladjustment, insecurity, anxiety, unrealistic ambitions, in- 
decision, confused plans, distrust of others, and general dis- 
couragement. Among the cases of high morale, however, there 
were two in which the self -report of high satisfaction was suspect. 
One was an epileptic who wanted to be a professional baseball 
player. He was apparently well liked, but seemed perhaps to be 
bolstering his own self-assurance. Another, who never answered 
"dislike" to any activity and who answered half of the Bern- 
reuter questions with a question mark, was clearly maladjusted. 
We may conclude that the low-morale cases are probably not di- 
luted with those who should rate higher, but that the high groups 
probably include 10 per cent to 15 per cent of cases which do not 
belong there. 

Some flesh and blood to fill out the statistical skeleton may ap- 
pear in the two following cases, fairly representative of the high 
and low scores on life satisfaction. (Names and other identifying 

* Acknowledgment is made to Mrs. Florence Rosenblatt Miale, who brought 
to the case records unusual competence in psychological analysis, including 


data have been disguised, but the essential features of each case 
are unaltered.) 


Carl Lynd is an 18- year-old boy who has had two years of high 
school (general course), and a semester of typing and stenography 
in evening school. Carl states that he wanted to study a trade but 
took the commercial work because the trade was impossible. He 
has had two jobs. One was as newspaper delivery boy, with earn- 
ings from $4 to $7 a week, from June to September, 1931, the 
summer after he graduated from elementary school. After the 
newspaper delivery job he was unemployed until July, 1933, when 
he had a job delivering dresses at $10 to $14 a week, which lasted 
between one and two months, and which terminated because there 
was "no work." He had been unemployed since then when he 
came to the Adjustment Service in January, 1934. 

Test results, except for clerical ability, which is in the 70th per- 
centile, are poor. Intelligence and vocabulary are in the 37th per- 
centile, mechanical aptitude in the 3rd, finger dexterity in the 5th. 

The major vocational problem, and perhaps the major person- 
ality problem, is one of indecision. Carl states his problem to the 
Adjustment Service as : "What am I best suited for and what 
shall I study in evening school ?" He exhibits no faint glimmer of 
occupational choice except in answering the question : "What oc- 
cupations have you frequently daydreamed of entering?" to which 
he replies : "Airplane mechanic and pilot also." When asked to list 
six occupations in which he believes he could find satisfaction, he 
leaves all the spaces blank. Carl says that neither of the jobs he 
has had appealed to him, and when asked to what he attributes 
any lack of job success he repHes: "I feel I wasn't suited for it 
because I just didn't like that type of work." Asked "What are 
your present occupational ambitions? What positions would you 
like to be holding ten years from now?" he answers "I don't 
know. A position with a substantial income." 

A similar spirit prevails in Carl Lynd's responses to the Bern- 
reuter questions. He says that he is slow in making decisions, that 
his interests change rapidly, that ideas often run through his head 


SO that he cannot sleep, that he often finds he cannot make up his 
mind until the time for action has passed, that some particularly 
useless thought keeps coming into his mind to bother him, that he 
lacks self-confidence, that he finds difficulty in making up his mind 
for himself, that he likes to get many views from others before 
making an important decision, that he is troubled by the idea that 
people on the street are watching him. And although he states on 
one questionnaire that he likes to bear responsibilities alone, on 
another he encircles "Dislike" for "Taking responsibility." Simi- 
larly, on one questionnaire he says that he usually enjoys spend- 
ing an evening alone, but on the other marks "Dislike" for "Being 
left to yourself." 

The Hall inventory reveals extreme personal pessimism. He 
underlines "Strongly disagree" for "I feel that my life has been 
fairly successful so far," and for "I am probably luckier than 
most people," and "Disagree" for "Misfortunes are seldom as 
bad as they seem," and "My life is happier that that of most peo- 
ple I know," whereas he agrees with the statement "There is more 
misery than happiness in life." He agrees, too, that what this coun- 
try needs is a strong dictator. 



Robert Hughes is an electrician, married, 25 years old, of Eng- 
lish Protestant background. He became an electrician at the age 
of 17 after two years of vocational high school. Having worked 
at his first job, at $35 a week, for four years (until the end of 
1929), he was discharged because there was "insufficient work." 
His next job, which lasted a year, was at $36 a week, as an in- 
staller for a light and power company. He resigned because he 
"could not get along with superior." He states, however, that this 
was the job which he liked best of those he has held, "because I 
understood the work I was doing, it was rather dangerous at times 
and at the same time it held my interest." After this he worked 
for two years, at $27 a week, as collection and meter man and 
investigator for an electrical company, and from the time this 
job terminated (again because of "insufficient work") in March, 


1933, until December, 1933, he held four jobs, two as salesman on 
commission, which he left because the returns were too small, one 
as electrician at $16 a week for a few weeks ("insufficient work" 
again), and one two-week job as toy demonstrator ($15 per 
week). He came to the Adjustment Service in January, 1934. 

Mr. Hughes is very much interested in electrical work and in 
chemistry, and his ambition is to be an electrical or chemical en- 
gineer. Tests indicate good knowledge of his trade, excellent me- 
chanical aptitude (a score in the 94th percentile in the Minnesota 
Spatial Relations test) and good intellectual ability (84th percen- 
tile in the classification test, 60th percentile in vocabulary). He 
scores high (85th percentile) in finger dexterity, 62nd percentile 
in tweezer dexterity, and 54th percentile in the Mechanical As- 
sembly test. 

On the opinion inventory, Mr. Hughes agrees with the state- 
ments, "I feel that my life has been fairly successful so far," "I 
am probably luckier than most people," and "My life's happier 
than that of most people I know." He strongly disagrees with 
the statement, "There is more misery than happiness in life," and 
agrees that "Perseverance and courage eventually win over mis- 

Responses on other blanks reveal a similar high confidence in 
himself and in life. His answers on the Bernreuter and Strong 
blanks are almost entirely those that indicate a well-adapted, out- 
going personality. The answers are not so consistently "perfect," 
however, as to suggest a lack of differentiation or a refusal to face 
weaknesses. He admits to moodiness and indicates that ideas some- 
times run through his head so that he cannot sleep. Although he 
likes to be with people a great deal, prefers to work with others 
rather than working alone, and is talkative at social gatherings, 
he tends to keep his feelings to himself, and does not find that 
people are more stimulating to him than anything else. Although 
he never answers "no" in the list of positive personal character- 
istics in Part VHI of the Strong blank, there is not a complete list 
of "yes." A number of items in the Hst, like "Am always on time 
in my work," "Can correct others without giving offense," "Have 
good judgment in appraising values," and "Stimulate the ambition 
of my associates" are answered by checking the more modest 


question mark. He has a wide variety of avocational interests in- 
cluding active sports and games. His hobby is conducting chemical 

Robert Hughes' handwriting is that of a person who works 
well with material, who lacks originality, but has a quick mind and 
an excellent eye for detail. His social adjustment is quite common- 
place but very well adapted. He can get along with people in an 
unoriginal but warm and easy fashion, and his attitude to life is 
positive and optimistic, even though his optimism is not on a very 
profound basis. Making a good first impression is important to 
him, and he usually succeeds in it, but he is rather easily fa- 
tigued, and may do much better at the beginning of a job than 
later on. 

Further Evidence for Validity 

From the Adjustment Service records certain data are available 
to show that the Occupational Morale Scale and the Life Satisfac- 
tion Index do in general measure what they purport to test. 

Chart 1 shows the relationship of morale measures to the 
client's essential problem as judged by the counselor in the Ad- 
justment Service on the basis of all the interviews, examinations, 
psychological tests, work records, and other evidence available. 
Results for both morale measures are shown in separate graphs, 
the Life Satisfaction Score on the left-hand portion of the chart, 
and the Hall Occupational Morale Scale on the right-hand 
portion. Although in both graphs the bottom of the scale is the 
lowest possible score and the top of the scale the highest possible 
score, the two scales are not directly comparable. Scores on the 
Occupational Morale Scale appear higher on the page than do 
scores on the Life Satisfaction Index, but that does not mean that 
they represent a higher level of morale. Comparisons are mean- 
ingful only within the Life Satisfaction graph or within the Occu- 
pational Morale graph; never between the two, except in matters 
of trend. 

The shaded area in each column represents the interquartile 
range, and the heavy line near the center of the shaded area is the 





01 » <«> rv 






Chart 1. Morale and service classification. 


median. Twenty-five per cent of the responses fall below the 
shaded area — twenty-five per cent above it. The graph, therefore, 
portrays the standing of the middle half of the cases in the column 

The first columns for each graph in Chart 1 include all men 
whose problem was classified as one of 'Threshold Guidance." 
These were young adults just entering on their occupational 
career and uncertain what line to follow. The second column in 
each graph portrays scores for the largest group of cases — those 
called "Adult Indecision." These were men with some years of 
work experience, who were uncertain as to whether they should 
stay in their former type of work or try something more promis- 
ing. Their morale, both on the Life Satisfaction score and the oc- 
cupational attitude score, was higher than that of the Threshold 
Guidance cases. Still higher was the morale for the third column, 
labeled ''Confirm Own Plans." These men had already laid out a 
course for themselves, but welcomed a chance to check their ideas 
with the counselor. The column marked "Placement Advice" repre- 
sents scores of men who presented no problem of vocational un- 
certainty, but who needed only guidance in how to go about finding 
job contacts. The test service group, highest of all categories in 
Life Satisfaction score, represents men sent over from the state 
work-relief program for testing prior to placement as teachers in 
the program for adult education. Inasmuch as they not only 
knew what sort of work they wanted, but had a definite job in 
sight, it is little wonder that their morale was high. The last 
column represents the scores of about a dozen men who were 
recognized to be primarily personality problems. Their malad- 
justment reflects, as it should, in the Life Satisfaction score, but it 
is interesting to see that their faith in traditional conservative 
doctrines of ambition and effort as the ladder to job success was 
higher than that of any other group. 

Although the differences in Occupational Morale score in 
Chart 1 are not statistically significant, their direction is a chal- 
lenge to the hypothesis of some industrial personnel authorities ^ 


that radical economic views grow out of personal emotional con- 
flicts. This question of the relation of opinions to morale will be 
explored later at more length. We shall return also at another time 
to some of the other complications of Chart 1. For the moment, 
we are interested mainly in the fact that even with so small a num- 
ber of cases, a Chi Square test indicates that a difference as great 
as that between Life Satisfaction scores of the personality- 
problem men and the other men in the study would be expected 
by chance less than 5 times in 100. The index does agree with 
counselor judgment. 

One study which sheds further light on the meaning of our 
two morale indices is based on the reasons given by these men for 
preferring one job rather than another.* This study was necessarily 
limited to men who had held two or more jobs. They were asked 
which they liked best, and why. The morale scores of men stress- 
ing each type of work satisfaction appear in Table IILf 

The highest average Life Satisfaction score was that of the 
group who could give no reason for their preference except that 
they liked the work and found it interesting. Their satisfactions 
were apparently intrinsic. Second in personal morale were those 
who stressed particularly the service value. These findings may 
have rather direct implications for morale-building during and 
after the war. Whatever can be done to make work in and of 
itself more satisfying will strengthen morale. Partly this is a 
matter of restructuring jobs to make them more interesting and 
meaningful, and partly a matter of educating youth to get a maxi- 
mum of enjoyment from hard work. At the opposite end of the 
scale, those who preferred the "soft" jobs were the lowest in per- 
sonal morale. 

The meaning of the Hall Occupational Morale score becomes 
clearer when we note, from Table III, that the highest group con- 
sists of those who look at jobs primarily from the conventional 

* The writer acknowledges the aid of Jerome Seidman in making this study. 

t Some individuals who stressed more than one reason appear under more 
than one category in the table. Note that high morale in the Occupational 
Morale scale is indicated by a low score. 



angle of money, prestige, and a chance for advancement. They 
have been thoroughly sold on the ethos of capitalism. A relatively 
low score on the Occupational Morale scale was made by those 
who valued most contact with nature or freedom to work in their 
own way. One can imagine that neither of these types would fit 
well on the assembly line or in the mail and files department of a 
large office. 

A third check on the validity of the Life Satisfaction Index is 
presented in Chart 2. Eighty-nine men were referred to a psy- 
chiatrist because, at some time during their contact with the Ad- 

Table III. Relation of morale scores to reasons for preferring jobs. 

Reason for preference 



Morale scores 

Life satisfaction 

Score Rank 


Score Rank 

1. Better chance for advance- 

2. Congenial personal associa- 

3. Greater responsibility 

4. Variety ; novelty ; glamor of 
new experiences 

5. General: like it; interesting 

6. Chance to learn, make con- 
tacts, get experience 

7. More money 

8. Opportunity to serve soci- 
ety ; useful 

9. Outdoors ; healthy ; closer 
to nature -. . 

10. Higher prestige 

11. More freedom; work in 
own way 

12. Could do it better ; easier , . 






























Differences on each scale between groups ranking 1, 2, 3 and those rank- 
ing 10, 11, 12 are significant at levels where p is less than .05. 


justment Service, some counselor or tester had suspected that there 
might be some deeper disorder of the personaUty. Again we discover 
that these were the men shown by our Life Satisfaction Index to 
have lower morale. Only once in 100 times would so great a differ- 
ence appear in chance distributions. Again we observe that these 
men with problems leading to referral were not significantly differ- 
ent from the other men in their Occupational Morale scores. It 
should be added that although some 18 per cent of the clients were 
referred for possible psychiatric help, that figure does not indicate 
any exceptional degree of maladjustment. Psychiatrists reported 
only one psychosis in the group; one man was called ''prepsycho- 
tic" ; four were classed as "psychoneurotics." All together these 
represent less than 2 per cent of the group — a better than normal 
expectation. The group referred to psychiatrists was almost en- 
tirely composed of persons whose difficulties put them well within 
the normal limits of personality variation, but only 4 per cent 
of them made morale scores up alongside the top 20 per cent 
of the unreferred group. 

The importance of personal emotional adjustment for good 
morale is frequently stressed in literature on mental hygiene to- 
day. Two case summaries will help, perhaps, to make it plain that 
high morale on the Life Satisfaction Index is not merely a mat- 
ter of favorable economic and social conditions. Those factors in 
heredity and early home relationships which build emotional se- 
curity rate as of primary importance for later morale. 



Hartford Lewis is a newspaper man of 43, married (five years 
ago to a writer who is now unemployed also), with many years of 
experience in newspaper, magazine, and editorial work. He is of 
Puritan New England stock. Intelligence-test scores are extremely 
high. His education ended with high school in 1909, after which 
he did low-grade clerical and factory work until 1912, when he 
became a reporter for a New England newspaper. To take this 





<n -u ta ro 




Chart 2. Morale and psychiatric problems. 


first newspaper position at $8 a week, he left a $20-a-week job as 
assistant manager of the printing department of a manufacturing 
company. He did this, he writes, "for the 'glamour' of newspaper 
life." He continued working for small newspapers until World 
War I, when he left a $35-a-week job as political writer to enlist 
as an ambulance driver. After 1919 he had several editorial jobs 
at salaries ranging from $25 to $125 per week. Mr. Lewis' last 
regular job, from December, 1930, to August, 1931, was as con- 
tributing editor to an encyclopedia at $75 a week. Except for a 
one-month temporary job on a magazine in the summer of 1932, 
he was unemployed from August, 1931, until January, 1934, when 
he came to the Adjustment Service. He did free-lance writing 
during this period but does not indicate what financial returns 
there were, beyond the definite implication of lack of success. 

Mr. Lewis states his problem to the Adjustment Service as fol- 
lows : "My aptitudes for the work I am doing and a general pic- 
ture of my future in the writing field." It is noted by counselors 
and psychiatrist that he is very depressed. He speaks of a great 
difficulty in meeting people, which he attributes to traumatic war 
experiences (not specified), and is afraid his "nervousness" may 
affect his writing. 

His Bernreuter responses reflect his emotional disturbances. He 
indicates inability to stand criticism without feeling hurt, moodi- 
ness and grouchiness, shyness, difficulty in sleeping because of 
unwelcome thoughts, easily hurt feelings, a sense of inferiority, 
lack of self-confidence, much worry. 

Mr. Lewis' handwriting is that of a very depressive person with 
marked compulsive trends — a person with no genuine relatedness 
to others, with a negative attitude toward life, irritable, resentful ; 
a person whose intellect is highly developed at the expense of 
other aspects of development — with strong self-destructive tend- 
encies, and a fear of change, of struggle, of life. The handwriting 
also indicates metabolic and circulatory disturbances. 

He complains of poor health, mainly chronic "stomach trouble," 
but also rheumatism, kidney trouble, and bladder trouble, and has 
had earache, bronchitis, severe influenza, and severe gonorrhea. 
The physical examination revealed a disturbance in blood pres- 
sure. He seems to drink considerably, stating on the health ques- 


tionnaire that he ordinarily drinks six glasses of beer and six 
glasses of spirits per day. 

In view of much of the foregoing, the psychiatrist's report, 
which follows, seems somewhat understated : 

"Hartford Lewis suffers from being a physician's son. He was 
brought up in the typical doctor's manner, namely, about as poorly 
as possible, and this condition was emphasized by too much New 
England and Pilgrim background, so that the poor man has had 
a chip on his shoulder ever since. His development, delayed as it 
was, was rudely interrupted and stirred up by his war service, 
where he was pressed into leadership which did not fit him at all. 
He has grown quite a little sense, but has still a more or less hid- 
den fear of inadequacy in front of more successful people. His 
"nervousness" is not serious enough really to interfere with his 
work, and I do not think it will affect his writing in any way. 
Since he has to assume family obligations, his problems at the 
present time seem to be more economic than anything else, and 
he might be compelled to change his attitude a little bit from the 
sense of being forced to ask for assistance, even if it is against 
his grain." 



Benjamin Hirsch is 23 years old, of Russian Jewish lineage. 
Though he is just finishing his senior year in night school at a 
municipal college, he has had four and a half years of full-time 
work experience. His father is a tailor working part time, and it 
seems that both father and son have worked hard at the job of 
putting Ben through college. His visit to the Adjustment Service 
in December, 1933, one month prior to his graduation from col- 
lege, is clearly related to his impending graduation and the need 
to decide what to do next. He seems to be a solid and responsible 
person. His personal and occupational records indicate a work 
history that was deliberately subordinated to the task of com- 
pleting college. His real job was that of managing to pursue his 
studies, which he must have done mainly in the late afternoons 
and evenings while holding regular jobs. Ben's first position. 


which he held from February, 1928, when he finished high school, 
until the following June, when the firm went out of business, was 
as a clerk, at $14 a week, for a clothing manufacturer. He at once 
obtained a similar job, at $15 a week, which he held for three 
years, until September, 1931, when he was laid oflf. From Novem- 
ber, 1931, to October, 1932, he worked at $15 a week in an auto- 
mobile repair shop. He has been attending school during the day 
since his loss of this job. 

The problem that Benjamin Hirsch presents to the Adjustment 
Service concerns a choice between research and teaching. His in- 
telligence is very high (93d percentile), and his vocabulary and 
clerical ability scores are good. There are no evidences in the case 
material of any personality problems or special difficulties. He 
exhibits a high degree of self-sufficiency, but at the same time he 
enjoys social relationships and makes friends easily. The coun- 
selor classifies him as an extrovert, and considers him suited to 

The opinion inventory discloses an individual who, although 
avoiding extremes, at the same time does not avoid forceful ex- 
pression of his opinions. He strongly agrees that there is no jus- 
tification for a strong radical party in this country, but at the same 
time strongly agrees that employees should organize into unions 
as a way of getting fair treatment. His judgment seems selective 
rather than doctrinaire. Although he has had to work at an un- 
inspiring job for little money in order to help pay his way through 
college, he considers himself luckier than most people. 

Correlation With Morale Scores 

Eleven of the variables studied are measured in units which 
justify the use of the Pearson product-moment coeffiLcient of cor- 
relation to express relationships. The results are presented in 
Table IV. . 

The highest correlation is that of .62 between the Bernreuter 
score for nervous stability and the Life Satisfaction Index. This 
agreement is, however, partially spurious because of identical 
questions and similar approaches in the two instruments. The cor- 



relation of .42 between the Hall Occupational Morale Scale and the 
Hall Scale measuring Attitude toward Employer is affected by the 
similarity in form of the two sets of questions, but no items are 
identical in the two scales. It would be expected, however, that a 
valid scale of personal morale should correlate with emotional 
adjustment, and that occupational morale should be related to a 
favorable attitude toward employers. 

Table IV Some correlations with morale indices. 










Maximum weekly wage on previous job 
held for at least one year 

Index of employment stability (per cent 
of total working time spent on long- 
est job) 

Number of avocational interests checked 

Other test scores : 
Intelligence (Pressey Classification) .. 

Vocabulary (O'Connor) 

Mechanical Assembly 







Art Judgment (Meier-Seashore) 

Nervous Stability (Bernreuter) 

Attitude toward Employer (Hall) 




Correlations starred are three or more times their standard deviation. 

The index of radicalism is based on five questions in the Hall 
scale covering attitude toward a revolution for this country, 
toward government ownership, socialism, a strong radical party, 
and the desirability of drastic economic changes. As we have seen 
earlier, the Hall Scale of Occupational Morale implies faith in 
the chance to get ahead under traditional capitalist controls, so 
the negative correlation between occupational morale and radical- 
ism was to be expected. The tendency for low personal morale to 


be reflected in radical opinions is much less marked; the correla- 
tion of — .12 is less than three times its standard error. 

So far as the other measures are concerned, correlations are all 
low. Only one ability test — the Mechanical Assembly test — shows 
a relationship to morale as high as three times the standard devia- 
tion of the correlation coefficient. The correlation of .18 between 
mechanical skill and occupational morale may mean that men who 
had learned trades were more confident of their chance to get 
ahead by hard work than were the white-collar men. The direction 
of other correlations suggests a possible tendency for morale to 
be higher in the older group, among those with higher previous 
earnings, with more stable work history, and with more avoca- 
tional interests, but none of the coefficients is large enough to 
warrant confidence in the relationship. A study of the actual dis- 
tributions in some of these measures will bring out the facts more 


Chart 3 shows the morale scores of various age groups from the 
late teens to those beyond 45. It is apparent that there is no rela- 
tionship between morale and age over most of the range, but the 
men over 45 years of age, on the other hand, did have a morale 
score higher than that of the rest of the population. Although the 
difference on the Life Satisfaction Index is not significant statis- 
tically, on the Hall Scale for Occupational Morale the difference is 
greater than would be expected once in one hundred times by 
chance. During depression years, we conclude, men beyond 45 
maintained their traditional faith in American opportunity for 
ability to bring advancement, better than did younger fellows. The 
younger group more quickly accepted the idea that luck and pull 
and hard times generally made effort useless. This finding accords 
with a more general truth that young people more readily take up 
new viewpoints; older people hold on to the attitudes formed in 
youth, even when conditions may change. 




^ IN> Ci> 


<n «b <i> i» 



Chart 3. Morale and age. 


The implication for morale today is that, so far as maintaining 
a readiness to fight for the traditional American symbols and 
values is concerned, older men are likely to respond more whole- 
heartedly than youth. Opinion polls during the period preceding 
our entry into the war made this quite clear.* If, however, we 
were to think of morale in terms of effort to build a new and 
better world after the war, it is quite likely that proposals for 
social change would find more support among young people and 
would encounter most resistance in men past 45. This hypothesis, 
if confirmed, would challenge our present custom of assigning in- 
fluential roles in government almost exclusively to men beyond 
their forties. In a period of stability this may be a wise policy; 
in a period of rapid change the older leaders may find it hard to 
readjust enough, or swiftly enough. 

D. C. Miller,^' ^' ^^ comparing 100 University of Minnesota 
alumni of high morale with 100 alumni of low morale, found 
higher morale for men and women over 30 years of age. Rund- 
quist and Sletto,^^ on the other hand, in a group of men on 
relief, found lower morale in the older group, a fact we are un- 
able to bring into accord with other results. Sailer's study ^^ found 
37 per cent of men over 30 claiming to belong in the highest hap- 
piness category, whereas only 10 per cent of young men under 21 
reported themselves as on that level of life satisfaction. 

Hall ^ in another study observed unemployed engineers, using 
the Occupational Morale Scale which we have employed, and 
studied the effect of age when economic conditions are held ap- 
proximately constant. The results of this especially relevant study 
are reported in Table V. It will be remembered that high morale 
is indicated by a low figure. The influence of age is not clear-cut. 
On the whole the lowest morale is shown by the mid-group: age 
31-40. Hall reports no figures corresponding to our group of men 
beyond 45 when morale was higher. The factor of economic need 
clearly reveals itself as a morale depressant. 

* Cf . Chapter XI, "American morale when the war began," by Donald 



One curious fact is that in each age group the Occupational 
Morale scores obtained by Hall showed more discouragement than 
did our Adjustment Service clients. Not even Hall's ''Group A," 
with no immediate economic need, scored as high in Occupational 
Morale as did our unemployed men. That this is not an occupa- 
tional difference is indicated by a mean score of 2.20 obtained for 
our men whose occupation was ''Professional : scientific," a group 
including engineers, chemists, etc. Perhaps the difference is due 

Table V. Occupational Morale in Relation to Age and Financial Condition 
(after O. M. Hall). 


Median morale score by age groups 




over 50 

A. Unemployed but in no immediate 

B. Unemployed ; getting help from fam- 
ily or friends 

C. In desperate straits ; getting work 

D. In desperate straits ; no work relief 
at time of study 




Adjustment Service Clients 




(10 cases 

to the general state of the nation. Hall's results were obtained a 
year or so earlier, in the very depth of the depression, and before 
New Deal activities had begun to stimulate hope. Another influ- 
ential factor may have been selection : conceivably, more of those 
men whose morale was high enough to expect something better 
ahead came voluntarily to the Adjustment Service. 


Although most of our study was based upon the records of men 
only, a comparison was made with morale scores of 92 women 




•^ ro M 

01 «h 

Chart 4. Morale and sex and marital status. 


clients of the Adjustment Service. The dotted lines on Chart 4 
show that the men scored a little higher on Life Satisfaction, the 
women very slightly higher on Occupational Morale; but neither 
difference is large enough to require hypotheses beyond chance. 
In Chart 4, where the men and women are grouped by marital 
status, some significant differences do appear. 

In another study of happiness some years ago,^^ we found that 
whereas 36 per cent of the "Happy" group were married, the 
percentage dropped to 13 per cent of the median group and 8 per 
cent of the most unhappy population. The vital significance of love 
adjustment for misery or joy has been sung by all the poets and 
hardly needs statistical confirmation. The most striking difference, 
in the study just cited, between the happy and the unhappy groups, 
was in the greater proportion of the unhappy men and women 
who yearned to spend a few hours with a certain companion of 
opposite sex. 

In other studies. Miller ^' ^' ^^ found that college graduates who 
had married had higher morale, but thought this might be largely 
a reflection of age; Sailer ^^ discovered that while 16 per cent of 
single men rated themselves in the highest category of life happi- 
ness, as many as many 38 per cent of married men thought they 
had reached this acme of bliss. 

The married men in our present investigation had a higher 
Life Satisfaction score than did single men, and the difference 
is so large as would occur by chance only 4 times in 100. In one 
sense this result seems surprising. Unemployment must be a more 
serious threat to a married man than to one still without family 
responsibilities. There are, however, several plausible lines of ex- 
planation. Most of the scores of newspaper editors who com- 
mented on this finding when it was released in September, 1941, 
took the line that the comforting support of a wife is invaluable 
in times of distress. This is undoubtedly true in many cases. 
Other explanations may also contribute. Many of the unemployed 
men wanted to be married ; their lack of a job enforced a most dis- 
tressing delay. Further, it is likely that those men with more opti- 


mistic outlook found girl friends more responsive. Again it is 
almost certain that young men with high morale would be more 
likely to go ahead with marriage in spite of uncertain times than 
would those who had been easily disheartened. 

It is a little surprising that the 20 men who had been widowed, 
separated, or divorced should score higher in Life Satisfaction 
than did the single men. The difference is not statistically signifi- 
cant, but on the basis of other studies, we should have expected 
lower morale in those whose marriages had been broken. The 
higher score of the ''Separated" group on Occupational Morale 
may arise in part from the fact that they tend to be older than 
the single men, and we have already found higher scores on the 
Hall Scale for those over 45. 

Chart 5 shows relationship of morale to number of dependents. 
Although it might have been anticipated that those with more 
responsibilities would suffer more from being out of a job, again 
the reverse fact appears. Men with three or more dependents have 
the highest morale, on both scales, and in the case of the Life 
Satisfaction Index a difference of that magnitude might be ex- 
pected by chance not more than 20 nor less than 10 times in 100. 
Again we may choose between an explanation which says that 
families help to sustain morale and one which argues that per- 
sons of high morale are more likely to acquire dependents. Rund- 
quist and Sletto ^* found higher morale in students who lived at 
home in an intact family. In that study the family was probably 
the cause rather than the effect of the better morale. 

There are certainly limits, it must be admitted, to the size of 
family which is a blessing during unemployment. In another 
study ^"^ comparing those families on relief who showed great 
competence in meeting the hard situation of poverty, with others 
who were demoralized and helplessly dependent, it was found that 
families with more than five children were much more common 
(7 to 2) in the low-morale group. 





CI «k w N 



Chart 5. Morale and number of dependents. 



Since the Adjustment Service operated in New York City, a 
substantial number of clients had come as immigrants to the 
United States; many more were the first generation born in the 
United States from parents who had been born abroad. Chart 6 
indicates that there were no significant differences in morale re- 
lated to being native-born or foreign-born. There is no justifica- 
tion here for any expectation that descendants of older American 
stock will keep their courage up in emergencies any better than 
will those born abroad or whose parents were born abroad. 

In our study of relief families ^^ we found a somewhat larger 
proportion (8 to 3) of families of American ancestry in the high- 
morale group rather than in the low. Those of Austrian back- 
ground were also predominantly (6 to 1) in the high-morale 
category. No differences appeared among Russian, Italian, or 
Polish families. 


The low correlations reported in Table IV indicate that morale 
is not primarily a reflection of intelligence, vocabulary, mechanical 
skill, or artistic aptitude. In connection with that table, however, 
we suggested that some relationships appear in the charts that are 
not evident in the correlation figures. The relationship of morale 
to intelligence, as measured by the Pressey Classification Test, is 
shown in Chart 7. 

Life Satisfaction score is somewhat higher in the small group 
with highest intelligence, but the difference is not statistically sig- 
nificant, and there is no general trend in that direction. The Oc- 
cupational Morale score is lowest for the dullest men and highest 
for the brightest, the difference between these two groups being 
so great that it could be expected less than 5 times in 100 by 
chance alone. The trend, in the Hall Occupational Morale scores, is 
also consistent. Our findings distinctly suggest that the men with 
highest mental ability were best able to meet their difficulties in 





<n «k w N 



Chart 6. Morale and ancestry. 





01 4ik <*> lU 

Chart 7. Morale and intelligence. 


good spirit. This runs counter to Miller's observation ^' ^' ^^ that 
twice as many men of low morale as of high morale came from 
the upper intelligence levels. 

Results from the test of mechanical skill are reported in Chart 
8. On both of our morale indices we find a better situation among 
those men with higher scores on the Mechanical Assembly test. 
In the case of Occupational Morale the difference between groups 
with highest and lowest mechanical skill is greater than would 
occur once in 100 times by chance. This finding is consistent with 
an observation made on a group of educators some years earlier.^^ 
Competence in fixing a burned-out fuse was claimed by 35 per 
cent of the happiest group of adults, but by only 8 per cent of the 
most unhappy.* Tentatively we might propose that morale is 
fostered by having enough manipulative skills to give one a sense 
of adequacy in meeting the ordinary breakdowns of our me- 
chanical age. 

Although the Meier-Seashore Test of Art Judgment was given 
to only about 80 of our subjects, it is interesting to observe 
(Chart 9) that the highest medians on both morale measures are 
again found in the group scoring highest in artistic judgment. 
Differences are smaller and less consistent than they were when 
groups were sorted by mechanical ability. The general hypothesis 
that high competence in almost any area is associated with better 
maintenance of morale still seems defensible. 


Bakke has described in case studies the "mental effects of un- 
employment." ^ Initially men started out with confidence that alert, 
active hunting would soon turn up a job. Then, though the hope 
died, the habit persisted, and men kept on searching blindly, dog- 
gedly. Finally, losing all confidence in themselves, they became 
sullen, despondent, inert. 

* Sailer " found no significant relationship between happiness and assertion 
of ability to repair fuse, fix an auto, and repair things around the house. 





<n ^ 6i> iM 

Chart 8. Morale and mechanical skill. 





VI » <•> IM 

O ™ 








m g> 

Chart 9. Morale and art judgment. 





Chart 10. Morale and unemployment. 


With this hypothesis in mind we explored the relationship of 
morale to period of unemployment. The results, reported in Charts 
10 and 11, surprised us. In Chart 10 no reliable difference appears 
between four to five hundred unemployed clients of the Adjust- 
ment Service and eighty to ninety clients who still had jobs. Of 
course those men with jobs would not have come to the Adjust- 
ment Service unless they wanted some guidance; their jobs, then, 
it may be presumed, were unsatisfactory. Perhaps in many in- 
stances there was an anxiety lest they should become unemployed 
in the near future. Hall's earlier study of engineers * showed an 
Occupational Morale score of 2.60 for 74 men employed but an- 
ticipating layoff, whereas 91 men, unemployed but in no imme- 
diate financial need, averaged 2.50, a score showing slightly bet- 
ter morale. The evidence indicates that worry about a blow which 
may fall is, in some instances, as demoralizing a^s the actual situa- 
tion after the blow has fallen. Yet students still in school, on both 
indices of morale, made higher scores. The usual commencement 
warnings about plunging out into the cold cruel world seem to 
have some point. 

In Chart 11, the surprising fact revealed is that the period of 
unemployment seemed to be unrelated to morale. Those out of 
work three years and more seemed quite as hopeful as those who 
had been unemployed for only a few weeks. Hall's study gave the 
more expected result : Occupational Morale declined continuously 
from a score of 2.64 for those out of work less than 20 weeks, to 
2.91 for those out of work more than 60 weeks. The approxi- 
mately comparable figures for our study would be 2.21 for those 
out of work less than 26 weeks, and 2.36 for those out of work 
more than 7S weeks. The difference in general level of morale be- 
tween Hall's findings and ours, mentioned above in discussing re- 
lationship to age, seems greater than the difference within either 
study due to length of time without a job. Although both sets of 
observations reflect a slight tendency for longer unemployment to 
lower morale, the general effect is less marked than would have 
been anticipated from selected case studies. Adaptation takes place 





01 *> M M 




Chart 11. Morale and period of unemployment. 


fairly quickly. This generalization may fit in with the reports from 
England that during prolonged periods of bombing, breakdowns 
were few. People do get accustomed to hardship, deprivations, 
and even to threatened destruction. 


Most studies have confirmed common-sense expectations that 
good health is an important foundation for good morale. Or, with 
some truth, the relationship might be reversed : good morale prob- 
ably aids in keeping well. Sailer found that the level of general 
happiness was higher in those young men who reported superior 
health at present, superior health in childhood, athletic ability 
above average, and freedom from physical handicaps. Those who 
had been troubled with constipation, who had physical or nervous 
handicaps, who rated themselves poor in athletics, and who re- 
ported getting tired easily, were low in Life Satisfaction. 

Miller's study of college graduates found, in contrast to the 
usual expectation, no association between health and morale. Our 
own findings, shown in Chart 12, agree with Miller's. The criterion 
was, of course, crude. Some clients who reported physical diffi- 
culties or whose report led the counselor to suspect physical 
disorders, were referred for health examinations. The overwhelm- 
ing majority were accepted without medical review. Those who 
were sent to doctors were, on both morale indices, slightly lower 
than the unreferred, but differences were small. Those reported 
by the doctors to have definite physical handicaps which would 
seriously limit the work clients could do, bore up, in morale, quite 
as well as those who were given a medical rating of **fit for any 

One factor may have been that an actual physical disorder is 
sometimes a welcome ''out" for an unemployed man. It relieves 
the sense of unworthiness and inadequacy which accompanies 
being able-bodied but idle. This hypothesis would help to account 
for the apparent discrepancy between earlier studies of normally 




^ ro ca 


01 4k <«> ro 

Chart 12. Morale and health record. 


employed persons and these studies of the unemployed. We might 
conclude that health is ordinarily an important factor in good 
morale, but that under depressed conditions, when illness is more 
acceptable to the ego than other apologies for inadequacy, the re- 
lationship between health and morale is obscured. 

A similar lack of relationship between health and morale appears 
in our study of families on relief. ^^ Health was rated "good" in 
15 of the 35 high-morale families and in 16 of 35 low-morale 
families. In the high-morale group were 9 with serious cardiac 
illness, 2 with tuberculosis, and 9 with other ailments each ap- 
pearing once. Mental disease was more common in the low- 
morale group, but physical disorders did not seem, in themselves, 
important factors for morale. 


The extent of one's schooling proves to be an important factor 
in morale. Those men who finished college surpassed high-school 
graduates in both life satisfaction and occupational morale (Chart 
13). Schooling, indeed, it is interesting to note, is more closely 
related to happiness than is intelligence. The higher optimism of 
the better educated must arise in part from their school expe- 
rience: it is not a simple consequence of the colleges' selecting 
higher native ability. If morale during the period of sacrifices 
necessitated by war follows a course parallel to morale during un- 
employment and depression, we may anticipate most despair among 
those who never finished high school. 

Rundquist and Sletto ^* divided their group of men on relief 
into those with ninth-grade schooling or less and those who had 
gone beyond ninth grade. Their finding, like ours, was that the 
group with more education had higher morale. Sailer's subjects 
were not unemployed but he likewise found among the emotionally 
depressed 33 per cent of the young men with less than high-school 
education and only 11 per cent of those who had finished college. 
In the Watson-Kirsch study of morale among families on relief,^^ 



LIFE Satisfaction score 








Chart 13. Morale and years of schooling. 


those with high-school education were much more apt (6 to 1) 
to be found in the high-morale group, than those with less. 

Not only length but also type of education has a bearing on 
morale. In Chart 14 the outstanding fact is the high morale of the 
group educated for teaching. This may, of course, be an artifact, 
since a number of Adjustment Service clients were teachers re- 
ferred for testing preliminary to placement in a state work-relief 
program for adult education. It may also be true, however, as 
Hoppock has reported,^ that teachers have an unusually high level 
of satisfaction with their life and work. 

Another striking fact, shown in Chart 14, is that occupational 
morale for other professional workers is unusually low. Appar- 
ently men educated for professions but out of a job more rapidly 
lost faith in traditional American doctrines of business success. 

Perhaps the most important fact to be noted in Chart 14 is that 
a general, academic education of the liberal-arts type is not a 
strikingly good morale-builder. Many teachers educated along 
traditional classical lines argue otherwise. They look down on 
trade school, on business and other merely "practical" courses. 
They praise the general subjects — languages, literature, mathe- 
matics, history, etc. — as ''education for life rather than merely for 
making a living." Yet when it comes to the test, their claim seems 
unproven. Boys with training in commerce or trade training had 
that inner something which keeps up morale during crisis, quite 
as evidently as did the boys who had taken the academic, college- 
preparatory subjects. 


A number of relationships between occupation and morale are 
worth exploring. Do persons who have been "permanent fixtures" 
maintain morale during unemployment better than do those who 
have been rolling stones? Does unemployment depress more se- 
verely those whose wages were formerly high or those who never 




mA t» ia 



<n * <«> iN> 






Chart 14. Morale and type of education. 


earned much? Do people in certain types of work tend to be un- 
usually successful in maintaining morale? 

Consider first the question of stability of previous employment. 
The low correlations (r = .10 and .04) between morale and the 
"index of employment stability," reported in Table IV above, 
lead us to expect little relationship. Chart 15 shows "Time on 
Longest Job." The highest Life Satisfaction score is found in 
those men who have spent ten years or more on one job ; but the 
difference is so slight as might occur once in five times by chance 
alone, and could, moreover, be accounted for in terms of our pre- 
vious observation that older men achieved a better score for Life 
Satisfaction. On the Occupational Morale Scale no clear relation- 
ship to length of time on a single job can be seen. The data seem 
to rule out either long-term or short-term jobs as indicators of 

Chart 16 presents morale scores for groups whose maximum 
previous earnings range from less than $20 a week to more than 
$80. The only significant deviation is found in the superior Life 
Satisfaction score for the group who once had high salaries. At 
least three plausible explanations may be considered. Perhaps 
those with former salaries in the upper range, having saved more 
money, are therefore meeting the situation of unemployment with 
less immediate financial strain. Perhaps, also, those who have held 
good positions are more likely to have relatives, friends, and busi- 
ness contacts that are reassuring. Finally, and most important 
from the psychological angle, the experience of success in the past 
lays a foundation for courage in meeting new emergencies. 

When jobs formerly held by men who came to the Adjustment 
Service are classified, four major groups are found to be repre- 
sented; their morale scores appear in Chart 17. Differences are 
not large or significant, but in both measures the people whose 
work has been in commerce or the professions show a higher 
morale than is found among workers in manufacturing, mechan- 
ical, or clerical pursuits (/> is less than .05). 

In Chart 18 occupations are classified by socio-economic level 









.0) o 

Chart 15. Morale and time on longest job. 




^ ro <•> 








Chart 16. Morale and maximum wage previously earned. 







Chart 17. Morale and usual occupational area. 





Chart 18. Morale and usual occupational level. 


from unskilled to managerial. The professional category is di- 
vided between scientific (engineering, medicine, research, etc.) and 
linguistic (law, journalism, education, etc.). Those who have com- 
monly held managerial and executive posts show highest morale 
on both scales. Professional groups come next, with the linguistic 
professions markedly above the scientific in Life Satisfaction. 
Lowest morale is indicated by the labor groups : unskilled, semi- 
skilled, skilled, and white-collar. A difference as great as that be- 
tween professionals and managers on the one hand, and laborers 
on the other, would be expected by chance only 2 times in 100. 
That morale problems due to unemployment are more serious 
among working-class people may be asserted with some confidence. 
Private employers and public agencies concerned with civilian 
morale during the war may need to be especially alert to sources of 
discouragement among workers at lower occupational levels. 

The facts are brought out more sharply in Table 6, in which 
occupations are grouped in narrower categories. Highest in aver- 
age Life Satisfaction scores, despite unemployment, are: (1) 
writers, (2) salesmen, (3) graduates fresh from school. Teachers, 
social workers, store owners, and bankers also rate high. At the 
other end of the scale, the average scores of factory workers 
indicate most personal maladjustment during unemployment. 
Insurance and real estate, as occupations adopted by many men 
when other jobs gave out, show a level far below that of other 
types of salesmen. Clerks, stenographers, ofifice help, and people 
in semiskilled trades and personal service also rate low in Life 
Satisfaction scores. 

Two findings from another study ^^ may be reported in this con- 
nection because they too tend to show relationship of certain 
occupations and socio-economic levels to morale. A comparison of 
35 families on relief but maintaining high morale, with 35 families 
also on relief but badly disintegrated, showed 6 families in which 
the occupation of the main breadwinner was ''salesman," and all 
6 fell in the high-morale group. 

Another difference which appeared between families of high 



Table VI. Level of Life Satisfaction in various occupational groups 

Occupational Group 

1. Editors, reporters, writers, advertising agents, 
copy writers, layout, radio speakers, lawyers 

2. Salesmen in stores or salesrooms, sales canvas- 
sers, solicitors, traveling salesmen, telephone 

3. Students and others not yet employed 

4. Teachers, professors, librarians, social workers. 

5. Retail storekeepers, bankers and brokers, res- 
taurant owners 

6. Engineers : civil, electrical, chemical, mechanical, 

7. Factory operatives in iron, steel, machinery, ve- 
hicles ; building-trades mechanics and helpers ; 
auto, aviation, and railway mechanics ; railway 
and traction operatives 

8. Sales managers; production managers and offi- 
cials ; purchasing agents and buyers ; managers 
and executives ; office managers and supervisors ; 
credit men ; mercantile supervisors ; personnel 
and employment workers 

9. Unskilled labor: porters in stores and ware- 
houses ; elevator operators ; miners 

10. Deliverymen ; chauffeurs, bus drivers, truck 

11. Bookkeepers; accountants; cashiers, tellers; 
bookkeeping- and billing-machine operators .... 

12. Artists, commercial artists, art teachers, sculp- 
tors, models ; designers, draftsmen ; musicians, 
teachers of music ; photographers 

13. Actors, showmen, theater and amusement work- 
ers ; recreational workers 

14. Operatives in electric light and power; telegraph 
and radio operators; moving-picture operators, 
radio and phonograph mechanics; jewelry 

15. Operatives in printing, paper, allied lines, proof- 
reading, bookbinding; decoration, paper hang- 
ing, drapers, windowtrimrners 

16. Chemists, physicists, technicians, bacteriologists, 
assayers, metallurgists; pharmacists, osteopaths, 
chiropractors, veterinarians; dentists; scientists 
not otherwise classified 

of cases 














median score 






















Occupational Group 

of cases 

median score 

17. Stenographers; stenographic secretaries; typists 

18. Office clerks; shipping and stock clerks; office 
boys messengers and runners 





19. Semiskilled workers: restaurant workers; do- 
mestics, orderlies; hotel-keepers, managers, 
clerks ; shoemakers ; bakers ; barbers, hairdress- 
ers ; cleaners, pressers, dyers 

20. Insurance agents, salesmen; real estate agents, 
salesmen, managers ; securities salesmen 

21. Factory workers; clothing and ready-to-wear 
apparel ; clay, glass, stone ; chemical industries 
and soap ; leather and shoes ; textile operatives ; 
miscellaneous industries 


20 94 

and low morale was in their housing and physical environment. 
Of 35 families meeting their problems effectively, 17 had good 
physical conditions in which to live, whereas only 3 of the 35 low- 
morale families had decent housing and neighborhood. Obviously, 
former income and living standards played a part in the ability of 
these families to weather the storm. 

On general psychological grounds higher satisfaction might be 
expected in occupations offering more pay, more stable employ- 
ment, more prestige, and greater opportunity for independent 
work.* Both Miller ^'^'^^ and Sailer ^^ report this expected rela- 
tionship. Our contribution is the discovery that the difference in 
attitude persists during actual unemployment. The proportion (13 
per cent) of men who once held managerial, executive, or profes- 
sional jobs who hit the highest level of Life Satisfaction score is 
three times that (4 per cent) of employees in clerical, skilled, semi- 
skilled, or unskilled jobs. Apparently the maintenance of conditions 
for high morale during pre-emergency periods is one of the best 
ways in which to provide stamina for carrying on when the going 
becomes rough. 

* A summary of variables related to work satisfaction is given by the writer 
in Hartmann, G. W., and Newcomb, T. (eds.) ^ 


The case which follows may serve to emphasize the significance 
of previous success for readjustment in time of crisis. 


Mortimer Hecht is a man of 38, American-born of Russian 
Jewish parents. His intelligence is high (88th percentile), his 
vocabulary fair (70th percentile). Scores on the Clerical Ability 
test are good (71st and 95th percentile) ; he did well also on the 
Spatial Relations test (87th percentile) and on the Wiggly Block 
test (81st percentile.) 

Mr. Hecht is married and has a child aged 8. Handicapped by 
increasing deafness, he came to the Adjustment Service in Janu- 
ary, 1934, after a year's unemployment, but when he had just 
started a C.W.A. job. This man's occupational history, up to the 
depression, could easily be made to read like a Rotary Club suc- 
cess speech, epitomizing the glories of this land of opportunity. 

Mortimer Hecht, child of immigrant parents living on the 
Lower East Side of New York City, went to work in 1910 at the 
age of 14, after one year of high school, for a real-estate com- 
pany. His job was that of office boy, at $4 a week. He worked 
for this company for 10 years, until 1921, studying almost all the 
while in evening classes : two years of architectural drawing, a 
year of accounting and business administration, a year of adver- 
tising and of business English. At the same time he was studying 
English usage by himself, and reading and studying subjects per- 
taining to real estate. And all the while he was advancing in his 
work : from office boy to clerk, then to bookkeeper, then to col- 
lector, and finally to manager, at $75 a week. In 1921, he left the 
firm to start his own business in real-estate brokerage and prop- 
erty management. Here all his study of and interest in architec- 
ture, engineering, accounting, advertising, administration, and 
English, as well as his rich, all-round work experience, served him 
well; and for 12 years, until the beginning of 1933, he earned 
from $70 to $100 a week. 

The success story ends, of course, with the Great Depression, 
yet his background of security and high achievement seems to 


have maintained this man's morale even after a year of unem- 
ployment. His appearance, it seems, is not prepossessing; the 
counselor reports him as "inarticulate and rather helpless" — 
which may merely reflect his defective hearing. Despite unemploy- 
ment and physical handicap, Mr. Hecht scores among the high- 
est clients of the Adjustment Service in his faith in himself, 
his confidence in the business situation, his liking for people, and 
his level of life happiness. 


The next four charts (Nos. 19-22) deal v^ith the relationship of 
interests developed through recreation and leisure time to morale. 
Many agencies today are seeking to make their contribution to 
defense by building civilian morale through recreation. We are 
interested, therefore, to see v^hether there is any evidence that, 
during the stress of unemployment, leisure-time activities did con- 
tribute to morale. 

The most marked relationships are found in Chart 19, which 
reports club participation. Though mere membership in a club or 
in several clubs v^as not a vitally important factor, officeholding 
was. Morale apparently increases likewise with the number of 
organizations in which the individual takes an active role. (Com- 
mittee service is included under the heading ''Hold Office.") On 
the Life-Satisfaction Scale, the morale average is lowest for the 
group belonging to no clubs, next for those who belong but hold 
no office, and then increases with number of groups in which the 
clients hold office. Differences as large as these would not occur 
once in 100 times by chance alone. Differences on the Occupational 
Morale Scale are in the same direction, but less marked. 

Chart 20 presents the number of avocational interests checked 
from a long list of suggestions. On both measures of morale the 
highest scores are obtained by the group with the widest range (16 
or more) of leisure-time interests. Those who responded poorly to 
the list of proposed interests were of the low-morale group. One 
might argue either that low morale caused the apathy, or that lack 




^ ro <«> 

o o o o 


<n <h ca ro 

Chart 19. Morale and club participation. 




^ fv> ca 


r ^ 
to o 

2 0^ 


Chart 20. Morale and number of avocational activities. 


of positive interests fostered the low morale. Quite possibly, 
indeed, the relationship is circular. 

Various types of avocation are distinguished in the next two 
charts. The heading ''Social and Directed" in Chart 21 includes 
baseball, tennis, dancing, basketball, bridge, parties, dramatics, and 
other group affairs. ''Unsocial and Undirected" activities include 
reading, swimming, movies, radio, motoring, studying, lectures, 
drawing, and a variety of activities which people often engage in 
alone or with one or two friends.* The chart shows higher morale 
associated with greater group participation. Differences as great as 
those found in Occupational Morale might occur by chance 10 
times in 100; differences as great as those in Life Satisfaction 
score would not be expected more than 1 in 100 times by chance. 
Again the relationship may plausibly be interpreted as circular. 
Those with low morale avoid social contacts, and those without 
social contacts lose morale. 

Chart 22 shows a few differences in relationship to the type of 
activity reported in answer to a question about "employment 
avocationally of aptitudes and interests." The numbers are small, 
but they would tend to support those who claim that music is an 
aid to the maintenance of morale. The results for drama, art, and 
the crafts are negative. Even the matter of music must be treated 
with some skepticism, since a deviation of that size would be ex- 
pected, by chance alone, as often as 5 times in 100, and a previous 
study ^^ showed ability to play the piano more common among 
unhappy than among happier students. In that earlier study, "Good 
music" was rated 5th among 16 suggested sources of satisfaction 
by the most unhappy group, and 6th in order by the happiest 
group. Sailer found 13 per cent of his happiest group able to play 
a musical instrument well, 6 per cent of his low-satisfaction group 
claiming such facility. In both the Watson and the Sailer studies, 
happiness was more markedly associated with ability to lead dis- 

* A third category, "doubtful," included 194 clients with no preponderance of 
social-directed or of unsocial-undirected. The doubtful group came about mid- 
way between the other two on morale scores. 





Ol ^ CO l» 

CN 0) 



Chart 21. Morale and character of avocational interests. 





«n 4^ w fo 






















Chart 22. Morale and type of avocational activity. 


cussion, talk to groups, to tell jokes effectively, to play bridge well, 
than with ability to sing or to play musical instruments. 

In the comparison of relief families exhibiting different levels 
of morale,^^ only 1 of the disintegrating families showed partici- 
pation in organizations, whereas 9 of the high-morale group were 
active in various social organizations. Social participation is clearly 
a differentiating factor in all morale studies. 


Evidence concerning clubs, recreational interests, and church 
participation all points to the importance of social relationships for 
maintaining morale. A few comparisons between the exceptionally 
high-morale group and the exceptionally low-morale group of un- 
employed men on Life Satisfaction scores lend further support. 
For example, among 16 men of high morale, 14 answer **yes" to 
the question, "Do you make friends easily?" Only 4 out of 16 
comparable men of low morale so answer. 

The frustration experienced as a result of poor social adjust- 
ment is indicated in response to another question, *'Do you enjoy 
an evening spent by yourself?" The high-morale group, who made 
friends easily, answered ''yes." (11 yes, 2 ?, 3 no). The low- 
morale group show more ''No" answers (8 yes, 1 ?, 7 no). 


The subjects of this study included more than one hundred each 
of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious faith. No differences 
appear, in Chart 23, among the average Life Satisfaction scores of 
these three great groups. The small group of 35 who answered 
"no religion," "none," "atheist," or some such response, were 
markedly below the religious groups in happiness; so great a dif- 
ference would not be expected 1 in 100 times by chance alone. Dif- 
ferences on the Occupational Morale Scale were less extreme, but 
there is a high statistical probability (p less than .01) that the 


Protestant average exceeds the Jewish. This fact would indicate 
that trust in our traditional system of enterprise, and in the atti- 
tudes of ambition and hard work as adequate to get one ahead, is 
a little easier for non-Jewish boys than for Jewish boys to retain. 
Race discrimination in employment, both experienced and sus- 
pected, may easily have led more Jews to become discouraged. 

Hall* found high morale associated with favorable attitudes 
toward religion. Miller ^' ^' ^^ likewise found higher moral scores 
among those with strong religious convictions. Our own -^^ earlier 
study reported that church and church activities rated higher in 
importance for the happy group than for the most unhappy. The 
fact of church connection was reported by 65 per cent of the 
unhappy, 92 per cent of the median group, and 73 per cent of the 
happiest. Sailer's study ^^ has the most complete data on religion. 
Protestants were relatively more numerous in the high-happiness 
group, Catholics in the groups with lower satisfaction levels. Of 
those who attend worship "never" or "seldom," 13 per cent were 
in the happiest group; of those who attend "regularly," 29 per 
cent were up in the highest group for enjoyment of life. Those 
who answered that they had a strong interest in religion were three 
times as apt to be in the top happiness category as were those who 
reported no real interest in religion. On the whole, the evidence 
from research supports the assertion that religion aids morale, both 
in "good times" and in bad. 

Agreement with Sailer's observation in relation to religion and 
morale appeared in our study of 35 high-morale and 35 low-morale 
families from relief rolls. In the high-morale group there were 7 
Catholic families; in the low-morale group, 11. The difference is 
not, however, statistically significant. 


Case studies of individual men with high morale, compared with 
those of low morale, bring out another factor of major impor- 
tance. In only 3 instances out of 16 cases of high morale is there 





Chart 23. Morale and religion 


evidence of marked discrepancy between aspiration and realistic 
levels of achievement.* Turning to 16 cases of low morale, we find 
10 men whose ambitions are out of all proportion to their actual 
opportunities. The two cases which follow further illumine the 
factor of realism in relation to morale. It is hard to know whether 
the excessive demands of the low-morale group are cause, com- 
pensation, or both. 


Timothy Lake is a man aged 36, who has been out of employ- 
ment for 1 year, but who has lacked employment in what he con- 
siders his real occupation for 8 years. For the past 8 years his 
salary has averaged $23 weekly in two jobs as sandwich and soda 
man in restaurants. His real occupation he still considers to be 
that of vaudeville musician and dancer ; from 1919 to 1924 he 
earned from $25 to $150 a week in vaudeville. He gives as the 
reason for leaving his last vaudeville job (in 1924), "Talking 
pictures became popular." 

Mr. Lake seems to devote much of his energy to dreaming of 
past glories, and on the Strong Vocational Interest Test paints a 
self-portrait that is a picture of a dominant, influential, and suc- 
cessful person — or at least a person who is potentially so and who 
is prevented from realizing his splendid potentialities only by tem- 
porary reverses. 

The report of the counselor (who mentions as a probable cause 
of Timothy Lake's unemployment, "Personality traits inadequate 
— diffident") and Mr. Lake's own responses to the Bernreuter 
Personality Inventory paint a different picture. He states that he 
often feels just miserable, that he doesn't make friends easily, that 
he is slow in making decisions, cannot be optimistic when others 
about him are depressed, would feel very self-conscious if he had 
to volunteer an idea to start a discussion among a group of people, 
finds difficulty in starting a conversation with a stranger, and is 
troubled with the idea that people on the street are watching him. 

* The thesis that happiness depends on keeping a man's ambition close to his 
actual possibilities is unusually well developed in Pitkin." 


He also admits that his feelings are easily hurt, and that he lacks 
self-confidence. Against the query, "Are you easily moved to 
tears ?" he checks a question mark. 

His highest test scores are in tests of dexterity. He scored in 
the 88th percentile in the manual dexterity test, and in the 71st in 
finger dexterity. In the mechanical-assembly test, however, his 
score was considerably lower: in the 39th percentile. Intelligence- 
test scores are likewise lower : 28th percentile in the Classification 
test, and 47th in the vocabulary. 

Mr. Lake gives his nationality as American and his religion as 
Protestant. The counselor describes the family background as 
"middle class." Timothy's father was a carpenter who died at the 
age of 62. His mother died at 38. Mr. Lake describes his present 
marital status as "deserted," 10 years ago. He answers "no" to the 
question, "Do you feel that marriage is essential to your present 
or future happiness?" in the Bernreuter questionnaire, and states 
on the same blank that he is usually considered indifferent to the 
opposite sex. 

Alhough Timothy Lake's formal education ended after 3 years 
of high school, there were 2 years of evening study in the playing 
of piano, violin, and guitar with a private teacher, and 7 months 
of evening study of musical composition at a school. This was 
supplemented by home-study courses in salesmanship (course un- 
finished) and theatre make-up, and by self -training in "art, har- 
mony, ukulele, novelty musical instruments, vocal, dancing, 
Hawaiian guitar, mandolin." When asked his occupational ambi- 
tions, he answers, "To have an orchestra of my own," and, 
"Concert pianist." 

Mr. Lake has a strikingly long list of avocational activities and 
interests. Under hobbies he lists "making lamp shades, paintings, 
art novelties, growing plants and flowers, raising fish, making 
food combinations different from recipes, cooking, planning ac- 
tivities for pleasure of others." His favorite outdoor sports seem 
as social as his hobbies (except the vague "planning for pleasure 
of others") : "Swimming, boating, camping out. Enjoying the 
country and forest and the beautiful things of nature. Motoring 
and travelling." 

With all his application to study, and the multiplicity of his 


interests, there are interesting hints as to wide divergence between 
his goals and his reaHty. Mr. Lake is asked, "If you feel that you 
were not entirely successful on some of the jobs you held, to what 
do you attribute that fact ?" His answer is "Backwardness, lack of 
training, and not meeting the right people." Then he is asked, 
"Have you failed to gain promotion or attain some desirable end 
on account of an inadequacy in your education or training? If so, 
indicate the training in which you were lacking and the nature of 
the work you wanted to do." Mr. Lake's answer: "I wanted to 
devote my entire time to music and composing, but the landlady 
complained about practicing so much and I had to move and have 
become very discouraged." 

From graphological analysis of Timothy Lake is taken the fol- 
lowing: "A dreamer . , . wistful, hypersensitive, full of day- 
dreams, shocked by the ugliness of the world, longing for 'beauty' 
. . . full of ego dreams — unrelated to the real world . . . very im- 
pressionable . . . very anxious . . . there are breaks in the conti- 
nuity of his thinking and of his relationship to others . . . 
psychasthenic constitution . . . passive, but with aggressive re- 
actions; he doesn't use aggression purposefully — reacts irritably 
. . . tremendous ambition, great wish dreams . . . labile, quivering 
emotions ... an instrument for every wind that blows." 


Adolph Hauck is a man of 35 who has had only two jobs in his 
18 years of work. The first, from 1916 to 1929, was as a theatrical 
booking agent. The second, from 1929, to January 5, 1934 (he 
came to the Adjustment Service January 9, 1934), was in sales- 
promotion work for a magazine-publishing company. His salary in 
both positions was $30 per week. He is married, and his wife is 
employed as a nurse at $30 per week. The couple is living on the 
wife's salary and on savings. 

Mr. Hauck's intelligence and vocabulary test scores are in the 
30th and 35th percentiles. The score on the Wiggly Block Test is 
in the 10th percentile. Clerical-ability scores are better : above the 
70th percentile. He completed elementary school, attended eve- 


ning high school for 1 year, and studied shorthand and type- 
writing evenings for 5 months at a business school. 

Outstanding in Mr. Hauck's attitude is a lack of pretentious- 
ness. Asked if he had the required training and skill in what jobs 
he believes he could find the greatest happiness, he gives the fol- 
lowing list: ''Salesman, Court Attendant, Sales Promotion, 
Chauffeur, Investigator, Collector." The counselor describes him 
as an "unimaginative German type — good worker under direction 
— probably good routine worker." 

Questionnaire responses also reveal Mr. Hauck as a friendly, 
rather modest, stolid individual. It makes him uncomfortable to 
be unconventional; he dislikes finding his way about in strange 
places ; he tries to avoid bossy people ; gets stage fright ; is greatly 
embarrassed if he has greeted a stranger whom he has mistaken 
for an acquaintance; never argues a point with an older person 
whom he respects ; does not usually try to take added responsibili- 
ties on himself. He states that he makes friends easily, usually 
prefers to work with others, has no difficulty in starting a conver- 
sation with a stranger, is not troubled with shyness, does not lack 
self-confidence. He is not a moody person, nor do his interests 
change rapidly. 

On the whole Mr. Hauck seems to be a man who has accepted 
his limitations and set up his goals in the light of them. Because 
of his realistic and perhaps unimaginative attitude, he is able to 
accept a sort of life which might seem to offer very little to one 
with a higher level of aspiration. 

Other Problems in Morale 

We have indicated that our data do not permit analysis of the 
psychological complications underlying individual cases of low 
morale. In some instances, however, even a brief report suggests 
strongly the need for assistance from a counselor well trained in 

S. J. is 21 years of age and has completed 3 years of college. 
His father, born in Turkey of Jewish ancestry, owns a cafeteria ; 
his mother worked in a dressmaking shop. S. J. has worked as a 


delivery boy, and as a cutter in a slipper factory. He is highly 
intelligent (93rd percentile) but is short, fat, wears glasses, and 
seems lumpish. He seems to have lost, or never to have had, am- 
bition. He thinks he isn't good for much — has an idea he might 
be a stenographer. Though in college he majors in physics quite 
successfully, he has no vocational plans along this line. S. J. ex- 
plained to the psychiatrist about his "inferiority complex," and 
tests show timidity, dependence, and lack of social adaptability. 
He thinks his own life has been a dismal failure and our social 
order not much better. 

J. A. is 26, a high-school graduate, also of Jewish ancestry. 
His father owns a small business; his mother died about six 
months before the interview. J. A. likewise has high intelligence 
(89th percentile). He has worked as messenger, as clerk in a de- 
partment store, and as an "artist" doing lettering for a catalogue. 
He seems to have no objective. None of his jobs has been satis- 
factory. His family can offer him an education and have urged 
dentistry, but he isn't interested. His reaction to a list of 100 occu- 
pations was to dislike 70, and show indifference to 25 more. "Art- 
ist," "author," "poet," "sculptor," and "inventor" do have some 
appeal. Wise psychological counseling might help to release in 
this young man energies which are now consumed in inner con- 
flict, and in daydreams. 

W. L. is 36, unmarried, and living with his parents. He had 3 
years of high school, then jobs as clerk and bookkeeper. He says 
of himself : "Have lost confidence in myself. Cannot do anything 
well. Have difficulty in learning and remembering." His abilities 
are average or above, and his interests seem to be like those of 
other bookkeepers and accountants, but he reports dislike for 
these occupations. He thinks commercial art or electrical work 
might be better; he daydreams of jobs on the radio or traveling 

M. K., age 40, married and with 3 children, has been a success- 
ful ($70 a week) electrician, but has done only odd jobs since the 
depression. His intelligence is exceptionally high — ^97th percentile. 


His ambition is to be a writer or a leader in scientific research. 
He is nervous, unhappy, and lacking in self-confidence. 

Psychological factors are especially evident in the case of 
Michael O'Leary, given here in more detail. 

Michael O'Leary is a young man of 26, of Irish Roman Cath- 
olic origin, single (but engaged to be married), who is experi- 
encing considerable conflict over his desire to work in the field of 
commercial art and his conviction that he should work as an ac- 
countant. The counselor's summary of the problem is as follows : 

"Experienced in both advertising and brokerage lines. Prefers 
former but believes work opportunities are greater in accounting 
field. However, such work is hard and distasteful to him, whereas 
he thoroughly enjoys advertising. Desires our advice." 

Michael has had one year of college. His intelligence scores are 
very high. His occupational record alternates between work in 
advertising agencies (earlier as clerk for $20 a week, later as lay 
out man for $25) and bookkeeping and accounting for stock 
brokers ($25 to $30 a week). He has held 7 positions in the seven 
years since he left school. There were two periods of unemploy- 
ment — one of 2, the other of 6 months. There were also 3 months 
of work as salesman for a printing company at $5 a week plus 
commission, a job which he left for a temporary accounting job 
at $24 per week. 

Asked to what he would attribute any lack of success he may 
have had in any of his jobs, he answers, "Personality." His "self- 
sufficiency" score on the Bernreuter questionnaire is in the 99th 
percentile. He says that he is not much affected by the praise or 
blame of many people, that he usually ignores the feelings of 
others when accomplishing some end that is important to him, 
that his ambition does not need occasional stimulation through 
contact with successful people, that he prefers usually not to work 
with others, that he is considered critical of other people. 

Art samples are included in Michael O'Leary's records. They 
were done in response to the directions, "Make five simple sketches 
or drawings of anything you wish, but no two on the same sub- 
ject." Four of his drawings contain human beings. Two are heads 


with strikingly oriental qualities : one is a profile of an Egyptian- 
looking woman with austere headdress; the other head is of an 
old oriental-looking man with a long head and tremendous head- 
dress with sunlike radiations. A third drawing is of a man in atti- 
tude of combat, holding a sword in one hand and in the other a 
shield which covers all of his body but the head and one arm. 
A fourth drawing is of a tiny human figure in a position of sup- 
plication before two tremendous shrouded figures. The remain- 
ing sketch is of a bleak promontory against a vast empty sky. 

A psychologist experienced in the studies which C. G. Jung has 
made of the collective unconscious, is instantly interested. Has 
Michael, thwarted by the outer world, turned to strange depths 
within himself? Could he not be helped to utilize in better living 
his concern with ancient wisdom and his sense of the Infinite? 

These brief sketches, ending with a question, make an appropri- 
ate termination for this essentially preliminary study. From our 
charts and statistics we return for a look at complex human reali- 
ties and recognize that our knowledge is still too meager and 
superficial to bring us to the heart of the morale problem in many 
individuals. In a concluding section of this chapter we shall sum- 
marize our tentative conclusions, but with these and other cases in 
our minds, we shall avoid dogmatism and any pretense of full 
understanding. The most that we can hope for is that our quantita- 
tive comparisons may have indicated some lines of social policy 
which will do more good than harm. 

Concluding Hypotheses 

From factors which seem to be related to the maintenance of 
morale during hard times and unemployment, we draw some con- 
clusions which are put in the form of recommendations. The 
morale problems of the 1940's will not be identical with those 
which our clients faced in the 1930's, but from what we know 
about the psychology of morale in general, we shall try to make 
our conclusions applicable to coming periods of stress. They are 


not "proved" by our study; they remain hypotheses, somewhat 
clarified and supported, but still hypotheses. 

1. Emotional security in home and early childhood lays a neces- 
sary foundation for the maintenance of morale during crises. Our 
case studies, even more clearly than our statistics, point to the need 
in all communities for parent education and individual psychologi- 
cal guidance to prevent personality distortions. If educational 
budgets must be cut during wartime, we could better afford to 
forego some of the traditional school curriculum than to dispense 
with visiting teachers, psychological counselors, and guidance 

2. Success in the past is a good foundation for morale in the 
future. We found some tendency for higher morale scores among 
the more intelligent, the more dexterous, those with better artistic 
judgment, with better school records, and with higher salaries on 
previous jobs. It is a fair guess that homes, schools, and industries 
which minimize criticism, rebuke, and failure, and so adjust their 
demands that children and youth may have a series of successes as 
they grow, will contribute to social morale. Definite experimental 
demonstration of the importance of success for morale in young 
children has been published in studies by Jack,*^ Page," and Reich- 
enberg.^^ Reports of experiments both in laboratory and in indus- 
try agree in general that a period of successful achievement is 
one of the best morale-builders for discouraged workers. Unfor- 
tunately, during the 1930's many American youth had little oppor- 
tunity to build self-confidence by vocational achievement. One 
good by-product of the 100 per cent employment which will be 
needed to win the war and to rebuild after the war will be oppor- 
tunity for each to do something necessary at which he can make 
a successful contribution. The opportunities exist, but good per- 
sonnel work will be needed to make sure that each individual gets 
into the kind of work where he can find most success. 

3. Marriage and family life help in sustaining morale. Those 
housing developments, for example, which enable workers in de- 
fense industries to marry and to have their families with them 


near their work, would appear to be helpful in promoting the 
psychological well-being of America. In Britain, early experiments 
of breaking up families in order to get children out of danger 
from bombing have been largely abandoned. Keeping families 
together seems a better rule. Dependents add more to reassurance 
than they do to anxiety. 

4. Education is well justified as a morale-huilding process. 
While intelligence and good health are obviously desirable, school- 
ing seems to be more closely related to morale than is either native 
aptitude or physical well-being. Happily, we can do a great deal 
to improve education. We can provide opportunity for almost all 
young people, regardless of race or economic status, at least to 
finish high school. Our findings indicate that practical vocational 
education is just as good for building morale as would be the 
more traditional academic curriculum. 

5. Morale is fostered by work which is intrinsically interesting, 
which is recognized as rendering needed service. All-out war effort 
provides a favorable situation for meeting this demand. Morale 
problems may arise, however, where the work is tedious and of no 
clear value in our national struggle. The most severe difficulties are 
likely to occur after the war. Can we give to all peacetime occupa- 
tions that sense of being needed which is so stressed during the 

6. The greater the indecision, the lower the morale. The truth 
of this statement was shown in Chart 2, where those with more 
definite alternatives had higher morale. Those most *'up in the 
air" about life work were also the most discouraged. Again, it 
may be that the higher morale of the married men arises in part 
from the fact that a great choice has been made and the turmoil 
of uncertainty about a mate and home is ended. We recall also that 
the threat of an insecure job seemed as demoralizing as the fact of 
a lost job. The implication for policy is that government shall act, 
in this war period, with prompt and clear decision. If hard de- 
mands must be made, let them come without vague warnings 
which increase insecurity and injure morale. We must try to see 


that as few people as possible — for as little time as possible — are 
kept on the tenterhooks jof uncertainty. 

7. Anticipation of disaster may he quite as demoralizing as the 
blow itself. People actually unemployed showed no lower morale 
than those who feared it. The "strategy of terror" rests in part 
upon the expectation that we will be weakened by our fears quite 
as much as by actual disasters. So far as morale is concerned 
(disregarding here the necessary safeguards on enemy informa- 
tion), those in charge of propaganda may better tell the public the 
whole truth all the time, sparing nothing, than to permit a situation 
to develop in which people suspect that much worse news may be 
hidden from them. 

8. // morale is to he sustained, aspiration mitst not reach too far 
heyond realistic opportunities. Yearning for the moon is char- 
acteristic of the low-morale group. The traditional American edu- 
cational effort to stir ambition in every child can be defended, but 
the ambition should have a close relationship to his actual possi- 
bilities. One of the psychological weaknesses of dictators and 
revolutionaries is that, promising too much, they awaken false 
hopes. Aspiration for social gains (e.g., a new world after the 
war) should be kept realistic too. Epictetus may have gone too far 
with his doctrine that happiness could be achieved only by keeping 
desires from going beyond the matters which lie within one's own 
power, but this investigation suggests that he may have had a 
sound principle. 

9. Social participation is a major factor in maintaining good 
morale. The isolates break down first. Those who enjoy social 
recreations, who like people, who belong to organizations and get 
put into offices, have resources which carry them through times of 
distress with flying colors. 

10. Religion is properly regarded as making an important con- 
tribution to morale. It is likely that both religious interpretations 
and the social experience of worship contribute to higher morale. 
Keeping churches active is important for national well-being in 
many ways. 


1 1 . The kind of morale which sustains traditional values despite 
difficulties is more common in older men; the kind of morale which 
overcomes obstacles in struggles toward improved social conditions 
is more apt to he found in youth. The implication, suggested earlier 
in this chapter, is that during a period which is bringing swift and 
far-reaching changes, a larger proportion of young leaders should 
be brought into responsibility in the army, in government, and in 


Morale on the Job 
RICHARD L. HULL HouscT Associates, New York 



HE purpose of this chapter is threefold : to describe a tech- 

■ nique of measuring employee morale and attitudes which 

JL is currently being used in business ; to present some of the 

findings resulting from these studies of employee morale; and to 

suggest certain conclusions as to the nature of employee morale 

which appear to be evident in the data. 


Data for these studies have been secured by having all members 
of the employee populations under consideration anonymously 
answer self -administering, objective questionnaires containing 
some sixty to eighty separate questions. These items deal with 
general attitude toward the company or employer and with atti- 
tudes toward pay, hours, working conditions, supervision, the 
kind of work done, and a variety of other specific aspects of the 
job situation. 

Administration of questionnaires. The importance of an anony- 
mous reply is obvious. Employees who have unfavorable attitudes 
can hardly be expected to answer honestly and without reserva- 
tion if they feel that their individual schedules will be identified. 
Yet some control of the conditions under which the schedules are 
answered is necessary for maximum comparability of results. For 
these reasons, and in order to secure complete returns, the method 
of the group interview is the one used. A suitable space is set up as 
a testing room and groups of employees assembled there to answer 



their questionnaires. The forms are distributed by volunteers in 
a hit-and-miss fashion which makes it obvious that there can be 
no record of the particular copy which goes to any given individ- 
ual. Each group is given a detailed, standardized explanation of 
the purpose of the survey and instructions in the mechanics of 

Since the studies discussed here have been made by an inde- 
pendent research organization, it has been possible to give further 
assurance of anonymity by promising employees that the answered 
questionnaires will remain in the possession of the "outside" organ- 
ization, that no one connected with their company will ever see 
them, and that the report to their company will show only ''counts 
of the answers" and no individual replies. 

The Questionnaire. Because the basic elements of the employer- 
employee relationship are essentially the same in most organiza- 
tions, it is possible to use many of the same items in any survey 
situation. A typical questionnaire of seventy items may be made up 
of perhaps forty-five standard questions and twenty-five re- 
worded or entirely new questions. As will appear in the examples 
quoted, the items usually have multiple-choice answers. 

It is helpful to think of the items as being of three types: (1) 
Items concerning general morale; all questionnaires contain a 
standardized battery of ten such items which forms the basis for 
the ''morale score." (2) Items dealing with specific factors such as 
pay, hours, working conditions, and supervision. (3) Items of in- 
formation and identification. 

A measure of morale. Although the term "employee morale" is 
widely used, it remains a more or less undefined concept whose 
meaning, usually, is simply taken for granted. Such definitions 
as have been offered are of little help to the psychologist in the 
construction of items designed to measure morale. Thus it was 
necessary to proceed purely on the basis of subjective judgment. 

Morale was assumed to be a function of the worker's general 
attitude toward his job and toward his company as an employer. 
That this general attitude would be influenced by attitudes on 


Specific points such as pay, hours, working conditions, supervision, 
and personnel policies was recognized ; it appears, in fact, that 
morale is largely a composite of such specific attitudes. What was 
desired was a measure which would reflect this general, composite 
attitude but which would not deal directly with the specific at- 

A number of multiple-choice items designed for this purpose 
were constructed and used experimentally. From these, a battery 
of ten has been selected on the basis of intercorrelations of items 
and subjective appraisal. Each of these is provided with a series of 
five graduated answers designed to offer the respondent an op- 
portunity to express varying degrees of favor or disfavor. These 
ten questions, together with illustrations of the types of answers 
used, are : 

1. Generally speaking, how does [company name] compare as a 
place to work with other companies that you know about or have 
worked for? (Check ONLY ONE answer.) 

) It is one of the VERY WORST. 

) WORSE than average. 

) Just AVERAGE. 

) BETTER than average. 

) One of the VERY BEST, 

2. How much does the management of the company care about 
the welfare of people in jobs such as yours? 

3. Are there other companies in which you would rather work 
at the same earnings if you could get a job for which you feel 
equally qualified ? 

) I would rather work in ANY of the others. 

) I would rather work in ALMOST ANY of the others. 

) SOME of the others. 

) VERY FEW of the others. 

) NONE of the others. 

4. If you have ever been dissatisfied with your job here, how 
often was it the company's fault ? 

5. How much does the management do to have good working 
relationships between you and the people with whom you work? 


6. To what extent are you made to feel that you are really a 
part of the organization ? 

7. How fair do you feel the top management of the company 
is with people in jobs such as yours? 

( ) RARELY fair. 


( ) ABOUT HALF the time fair. 

( ) USUALLY fair. 

( ) Practically ALWAYS fair. 

8. How fair do you feel that the people immediately above you 
are in their treatment of you ? 

9. In your opinion, are there other companies which treat their 
employees better than [company name] does? 

10. Are you reasonably sure of being able to keep your job as 
long as you do good work ? 

( ) Doing good work doesn't have anything to do with hold- 
ing my job. 

( ) Holding my job depends a LITTLE on how good work 
I do. 

( ) If I do good work I can be FAIRLY SURE of holding 
my job. 

( ) As long as I do good work I can be ALMOST CER- 
TAIN of holding my job. 

( ) As long as I do good work I can be VERY SURE of 
holding my job. 

Although there is no acceptable external criterion of morale 
against which the items can be validated, it is assumed that the 
individual who answers these questions in a generally favorable 
way has relatively high morale and that the individual who an- 
swers in a generally unfavorable way has relatively low morale. 
Psychologists and industrial relations experts who have reviewed 
these studies grant that assumption. Strictly speaking, however, 
the term ''morale" as used in subsequent parts of this chapter can 
be defined only in terms of responses to the ten questions. 

For purposes of scoring, varying weights ranging from 0-1-3- 
5-6 to 0-3-6-9-12 were assigned to the responses for each item, 


the proportionate weights being determined on the basis of inter- 
correlations and frequencies, and the total weights being set in 
such a way as to provide a total range of one hundred points.* 

Each of the completed questionnaires is scored, using the as- 
signed weights for the ten answers checked, and the individual 
employee is thus given a morale score which is a reflection of the 
extent to which he checked favorable or unfavorable answers. 
Those occasional individuals who check the most favorable an- 
swer under each of the ten questions earn a morale score of 100. 
In rare instances individuals have checked the ten most unfavor- 
able answers and so have earned morale scores of zero. Where 
the third, or middle, answer is checked on each question, the score 
is 50. 

The items were written with the intention of having the middle 
answers represent a ''neutral" attitude, neither favorable nor un- 
favorable. To the extent that this is true, a score of 50 would in- 
dicate that the employee felt his company to be "just average," 
neither better nor worse than the general run of other places of 
employment. The majority of employees who have been tested 
have scored above this mid-point. 

Specific attitudes. The second type of question used in the 
schedules is designed to secure attitudes on specific topics. Typical 
examples are : 

How do you feel that the pay for your job compares with the 
pay for the same sort of work in other companies ? 

( ) My pay is lower than in any other company for the same 

sort of work. 
( ) Lower than in most other companies. 
( ) About the same as in others. 
( ) Higher than in most of the others. 
( ) Higher than in any of the others. 
Are you given a clear idea by the people above you as to how 

* In one employee population of 835 cases, intercorrelations ranging from 
-f-.30 to +.65 were observed, using equal weights of 1-2-3-4-5 for the several 
responses to each question. 


well they like your work and where they think you need improve- 

( ) I am told nothing about it. 

( ) I am told very little. 

( ) I am told fairly well. 

( ) I am told fully and completely. 

When there is a better job vacant, how often do you feel that 
the best-qualified person gets promoted to the vacancy ? 

( ) Rarely. 

( ) Sometimes. 

( ) Usually. 

( ) Almost always. 

( ) Always. 
Are employees ever bawled out or criticized when they do 
not deserve it? 

( ) Often. 

( ) Sometimes. 

( ) Rarely. 

( ) Never. 

If you had any cause for dissatisfaction, what would your 
chances be of getting a fair hearing and a square deal ? 

( ) Very little chance, if any. 

( ) Poor. 

( ) Fair. 

( ) Reasonably good. 

( ) Very good. 

Items of information and identification. Although the replies 
are anonymous, it is necessary to have certain information about 
the individual employees for purposes of analysis. Thus a schedule 
may contain questions as to department or work group, sex, length 
of employment, age, and previous employment. Typical wordings 

Have you ever worked for other companies or stores, or is this 
your first regular job? 

( ) This is my first regular job. 


( ) I have worked on other jobs but this is my first job in a 

( ) I have worked in one or more other stores. 
About how long have you worked here? 
( ) Less than one year. 
( ) More than one year but less than three. 
( ) More than three years but less than five. 
( ) Five years or more. 

Information of this type, it is explained, is necessary for purposes 
of research. 

The schedules also offer a convenient opportunity for securing 
information on questions such as : "Do you have difficulty in 
cashing your pay check?" or ''Would you prefer a shorter (or 
longer) lunch hour?" *'Do you think that you would care to join 
a Group Hospitalization Insurance Plan which would cost you 
about fifty cents per month if such insurance were to be offered 
to employees of this company?" 


Morale scores. The large majority of workers who have an- 
swered these questionnaires have had morale scores above 50, the 
theoretical mid-point on the scale. Although no complete summary 
of the total experience is available, the mean score observed for 
a sample of 43,962 cases which results from combining 141 separ- 
ate employee populations is 69.7. The condensed distribution of 
these scores is : 

Scores . Per cent 

to 9 J. 1 

10 to 29 2.4 

30 to 49 11.6 

50 to 69 31.1 

70 to 89 41.3 

90 to 100 13.5 

Figure 1 shows this distribution graphically. Included in this 
sample are employees of many types : office workers and factory 



workers, men and women, skilled workers and unskilled, from 
all sections of the country, and from large cities and small — but 
only the ''rank and file" of business and industry. Foremen, super- 
visors, and managers have been studied separately. 

Fig. 1. Percentage distribution of 43,962 employee morale scores. 

It cannot be assumed that the sample is representative of all 
workers since opportunities to secure data have been found only 
in those more substantial organizations which have placed rela- 
tively greater emphasis on personnel and industrial relations ; but 
it probably is fairly well representative of ''better" companies. 
This factor of selection may offer a partial explanation of the 
skew, the piling up toward the high end of the scale, shown in 
Figure 1 ; yet it would seem that the distribution must also reflect 
a sense of identification with and loyalty to the individual's par- 
ticular place of employment. The average worker apparently de- 
velops a bias in favor of his own company, just as the average 
citizen may be expected to be biased in his judgment of his school, 
his home town, and his family. 

A skewed distribution of the same general form has been ob- 


served in most employee populations studied, although the extent 
of the skew varies with the mean score of the group. Considering 
only those employee populations of over 1,000 employees each, 
average morale scores observed have ranged from 58 to 77 . The 
significance of such a range may be judged from the fact that this 
difference of 19 points is 28.8 times the standard error of the 
difference. Average scores as high as 88 have been found in 
smaller units. 

Far greater differences appear among the separate departments 
or work groups within a single organization. In any organization 
of moderate size having as many as ten or fifteen separate depart- 
ments or divisions, it is not unusual to find a spread of as much as 
25 points between the highest and lowest departments. Marked 
variations in average scores occur even among departments work- 
ing on essentially the same type of operation and with identical 
hours and pay and in general under identical personnel policies. 
In such cases the only important variable is found in the nature 
and quality of immediate supervision. These results would seem to 
offer conclusive proof that the immediate boss is a tremendously 
important factor in the determination of employee morale. 

As suggested above, the results fail to show any high relation- 
ship between morale scores and type of work done, nor does there 
seem to be any significant correlation between morale and gen- 
eral wage level. The results do suggest, however, that there is some 
relationship between skill and morale, that is, that a cross section 
of workers in highly skilled trades would give somewhat higher 
scores than a cross section of unskilled labor. 

There is a definite pattern in the relationship between tenure of 
employment and morale. In general, employees with less than one 
year's service have had relatively higher average scores than have 
those with from one year to five years of service. The trend then 
reverses at about the five-year point, with employees of more than 
five or ten years' service having scores somewhat above the aver- 
age for the entire group. 



The averages shown below illustrate the two most commonly 
observed patterns. 

Length of service 

Average morale scores 

Company X 

Company Y 

Under 6 months 




6 months to 1 year 


1 year to 5 years 


5 years to 10 years 


Over 10 years 

Since length of service and age are highly associated, the same 
general pattern obtains when age alone is considered, but there 
is a general tendency for morale to increase with age when length 
of service is held constant. 

Department managers, foremen, and other supervisors usually 
can be expected to have higher scores than those of rank-and-file 
employees; usually, indeed, the average morale score increases 
with the amount of responsibility involved. Some atypical situa- 
tions have been found, however, in which morale scores of super- 
visors have actually been lower than those of the workers super- 
vised. No data on relationship between the scores of individual 
supervisors and their subordinates are available, but the general 
results would indicate that the correlation would not be as high as 
has usually been taken for granted. In many cases, individual su- 
pervisors have had morale scores lower than the average rank- 
and-file score for any department within the company. Figure 2 
illustrates the degree of overlap in individual scores between a 
group of 16,000 rank-and-file workers and a group of 1,400 man- 
agers, supervisors, and assistants having authority over them. 
Mean scores for the two groups were 65.1 and 75.1, respectively. 

Specific attitudes. Answers to questions dealing with specific 
factors in the job situation show a pattern of significant variation 
from organization to organization, but much greater variation 
from department to department within a given organization — 



much the same situation as that described for the morale score. 
This would be expected, of course, in the answers to items bearing 
directly on the relationship between the worker and his depart- 
ment manager or foreman, such as, "Are employees ever bawled 
out or criticized when they do not deserve it?" But the same pat- 
tern also obtains in the answers to questions on topics not ordi- 


~* >\ 



Rank and file 




"" - 

Managers and 










/ / 

\ \ 
\ \ 
\ \ 




\ \ 
\ \ 


— "Vr-" "l 


1 1 





Fig. 2. Distribution of morale scores of rank-and-file employees and of 
managers, supervisors and assistants having authority over them. 

narily under the direct control of departmental supervisors, such, 
for example, as pay, hours, promotions, and appeal of grievances. 
Table I shows this variation in summary form for ten items 
in two comparable organizations, each of which has twenty- 
three major departments. The figure called Percentage of Satis- 
faction is a convenient summary which results from arbitrarily 
defining certain of the multiple-choice answers provided in the 
questionnaire as being indicative of satisfactory attitude. If, for 
example, the two more favorable answers under a question having 
five possible responses are defined as satisfactory, then the per- 
centage of satisfaction for that item is simply the percentage who 
checked either one or the other of those two answers. Thus, the 
result may be influenced both by the wording of the question and 
the stringency of the definition of ''satisfaction." For this reason, 



the figures are not to be regarded as absolute measures of satis- 
faction, and any comparisons of results from topic to topic must 
be made with extreme care. The principal value of the data lies in 
comparisons from group to group on a given topic. 

Table I. Variations in satisfactory attitudes in two comparable organizations 
of twenty-three departments each. 

Number of departments in which 

Percentage ot Satisfaction is 



















"Satisfactory" attitude 

Total % 










1. Employees are rarely or 

never undeservedly bawled 











out or criticized 












2. Employees are praised for 










good work 









3. When I talk with the peo- 

ple above me about my 

work I feel completely free 



. — 


. — 







to say exactly how I feel . . 












4. When given new work or 

new methods I get all the 












instruction that I could wish 











5. There is no favoritism 












shown in my department . . 












6. When there is a better job 

open, the best-qualified per- 

son almost always, or al- 











ways, gets promoted 












7. If I had cause for dissat- 

isfaction I would have a 

reasonably good chance of 

getting a fair hearing and 




. — 








a square deal 












8. The volume of work ex- 



. — 






pected of me is reasonable 












9. My pay is as high as, or 

higher than, the pay for the 

same sort of work else- 























10. The management here cares 

more about employees' wel- 

fare than does the manage- 

ment of most other com- 















— — 2 






— " 



Relationship of specific attitudes to general morale. The morale 
score provides a measure of general attitude toward the total 
job situation, this general attitude presumably being built up as a 
composite of many specific attitudes and experiences. Some in- 
sight into the nature of general morale as defined here may be 
obtained by examining the relationship between the various spe- 
cific attitudes and total attitude. Such an examination can be made 
either through the use of correlation techniques, or, more simply, 
by dividing the employees into "satisfied" and "not satisfied" 
groups on each of the specific questions, and comparing the aver- 
age morale scores of the resulting groups. If, on a given topic, 
there is a large difference in average morale scores between the two 

Table II. Difference in average morale score between "satisfied" and "not 
satisfied" employees — selected specific topics 





A fair hearing and square deal on griev- 




















The prospect of a satisfactory future 

Company's knowledge of the employee's 
qualifications and progress 


Recognition of and credit for constructive 
suggestions offered 


Friendly and helpful criticism of work or 
correction of errors 


Pay increases when deserved 


Recognition or praise for unusually good 


Selection of best-qualified employee for 
promotion when vacancies arise 


Amount of work required not unreasonable 
Pay at least as high as the going rate for 

the same type of work elsewhere 

Freedom to seek help when difficult prob- 
lems arise in work 


Freedom from unjust reprimand 

Satisfactory daily working hours 

The company's vacation policy 


Approval of the company's employee mag- 



groups, it can be said that the topic is highly associated with 
morale; if the difference is small, the topic is relatively unim- 
portant to morale. 

That such an analysis almost invariably shows factors having 
to do with psychological satisfaction for the individual — recogni- 
tion of his personality, etc. — to be at least as highly associated 
with morale as are material considerations, such as wages, hours, 
and physical working conditions seems extremely significant; in 
the majority of situations, indeed, factors such as fair treatment 
of grievances, credit for suggestions, and consideration on the 
part of the immediate supervisor have proved to be more highly 
associated with morale than are pay and hours. 

Although the exact order of importance of the topics will vary 
from organization to organization, the general pattern is suffi- 
ciently consistent to permit generalizations. Typical of the results 
usually observed are the findings from a composite group of more 
than ten thousand department-store employees located in various 
parts of the country. Table II shows the average morale scores of 
^'satisfied" and ''not satisfied" groups in this study and the differ- 
ence between the two figures for a number of items. 

Conclusions and Discussion 

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the 
data is that industrial morale as defined here and as measured by 
the battery of ten questions described is not determined simply by 
such material considerations as pay, hours, working conditions, 
vacations, and miscellaneous company benefit plans. The extent to 
which the employee enjoys the psychological satisfactions that 
come with recognition of and respect for his own personality, day 
by day and hour by hour on the job, is equally important. Al- 
though this is no new or original observation, it is nevertheless 
a fact to which business and industry have not given sufficient 

The second outstanding conclusion is that foremen, department 


managers, and others having direct supervision over workers play 
a tremendously large part in the determination of employee morale. 
This fact may be readily understood when it is remembered that 
the majority of the important intangibles mentioned are so 
largely in the hands of the employee's immediate supervisor. The 
worker who has the good fortune to be placed under a boss who 
is skillful in the art of handling people may be expected to have 
pleasant experiences and satisfaction on the job and, as a conse- 
quence, to develop relatively high morale. On the other hand, the 
worker who has the misfortune of being placed under a poor boss 
is not to be blamed if his morale is low despite whatever good in- 
tentions or fine paternalistic policies the top management of the 
company may have. 

The quality of immediate supervision, furthermore, appears to 
create a mental set which carries over to and influences attitudes 
on factors of the job situation which are not controlled by the 
supervisor. In one company, for example, there were a number of 
similar departments doing essentially the same type of work. In 
one, 54 per cent of the workers said that the people immediately 
above them were practically always fair in their treatment of em- 
ployees; only 11 per cent in a second department checked this 
answer. The percentages of satisfaction on undeserved repri- 
mands were 61 per cent and 14 per cent. On recognition of good 
work there was a difference of 51 per cent. In the first depart- 
ment 71 per cent felt that they would have at least a reasonably 
good chance of getting a fair hearing and a square deal on a 
grievance, whereas only 23 per cent answered so in the other. 

Although both of these departments had the same working 
hours and the same basic pay schedules, 61 per cent of the people 
in the first group and only 37 per cent of those in the second felt 
that their pay was at least as good as the going rate elsewhere, 
and there was a difference of 26 points in their average morale 

Under these circumstances it would seem impossible to create 
high morale in the second department by means of pay increases, 


shorter hours, longer vacations, better physical working condi- 
tions, or any of the other tangible considerations which are so 
often the points at issue in labor disputes. Yet it can readily be seen 
that those employees might express their low morale in terms of 
such demands. 

In the selection of its supervisors business has paid far too little 
attention to qualifications for personnel administration. A super- 
visor must have competence in the technical phases of the work 
which he is to direct, for there are measures of production, costs, 
spoilage, and physical operating efficiency by which his perform- 
ance may be judged. The absence of comparable measures of per- 
sonnel administration and the lack of recognition of the impor- 
tance of this part of the job have resulted in permitting untold 
numbers of bosses to remain in positions for which they are not 
completely suited, either by reason of temperament or lack of 
training. And, as a consequence, much poor industrial morale has 
been created even in situations where management has had the 
best of intentions toward its employees. 

Many corporations have established personnel or industrial- 
relations departments charged with responsibility for employee 
morale. The typical personnel executive, however, becomes a staff 
officer arid finds that the bulk of his time and effort is devoted 
to mechanical phases of personnel administration such as employ- 
ment records, wage, hour, and vacation policies, miscellaneous 
plans for insurance and benefits, social security records, and 
matters having to do with labor legislation. All of these things 
are important in business operations and all of them demand at- 
tention, but a complete personnel program must also extend into 
the field of personal relationships between the worker and his su- 
pervisor, must, in short, make provision for giving the individual 
worker a maximum degree of the intangible satisfactions. Such 
satisfaction is in the last analysis purely a line function and cannot 
be guaranteed directly by the personnel executive or his assistants. 
Each supervisor must also be the personnel officer for his own 


Labor Unions and Morale 


Teachers College, 
Columbia University 

A CARTOON in a British newspaper portrayed a worried work- 
man, whose factory had been exposed to daily bombings, 
L wishing that he could escape to some safe comfortable 
berth in the army. The heroes of this war are quite as truly men in 
overalls as men in other service uniforms. During World War I 
it required the labor of three men behind the lines to furnish equip- 
ment and supplies for an average soldier. Today, with mobile, 
mechanized warfare, that ratio has become eighteen workmen for 
each combatant.* The United States is serving as the primary ar- 
senal of the democracies, hence the morale of American workers 
has become an influence to mold destiny. 

Labor s Statement 

Both CIO and AFL have announced their whole-hearted sup- 
port of the war. On March 30, 1942, the American Federation of 
Labor proclaimed its excellent morale in full page advertisements 
in metropolitan newspapers. 

"We are the workers of America, its production soldiers. We 
are on the job. We have only one aim right now and that is to help 
America win. We are working night and day to produce the ships, 
planes, tanks and guns our armed forces need for victory. 


* Data from Labor's Monthly Survey, American Federation of Labor, Octo- 
ber, 194L 




The Problem 

So firm a stand is reassuring, but there are problems not solved 
by pronouncements. What about strikes? The forty hour week? 
Slow-downs? Wage demands? The character of labor leaders? 
The morale of the workers in the factories ? What happens when 
hours of work rise to fifty and sixty and beyond? What has hap- 
pened to morale in over-crowded regions where men cannot find 
houses for their families or schools for their children ? What will 
happen to worker morale when tires give out and men are forced 
to travel miles to work? 

One index of morale may be found in output figures — another 
in voluntary quits. Output figures are military secrets, but the gen- 
eral report is that they are more than satisfactory thus far. Turn- 
over is a more serious problem. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in January 1942, the latest report available at this writ- 
ing, the rate at which workers were leaving jobs had reached the 
highest level on record. This did not include men leaving for the 
armed services ; it was based wholly on 'Voluntary quits." The rate 
of quitting in the spring of 1942 was five times what it had been 
two years before. According to estimates of the Cleveland Trust 
Company, the January 1942 rate was the equivalent of the shift of 
a third of the working force each year. Obvious inefficiency results 
from the need to train new workers every few months. To some 
extent the job quitting may have arisen from the change-over 
process which has moved men with certain skills from one plant to 
another, but the next year should reveal how much dissatisfaction 
with working conditions may lie beneath this apparent restlessness. 

Most factories have taken some steps to promote better morale. 
Special attention has been given to Radio Corporation of America, 
which "has had pep sessions for its workers, with movie actresses 
sliding from the factory roof in breeches buoys and all the usual 


whoop-er-up devices, as well as free mid-winter trips to Miami for 
workers making the best suggestions toward speeding tip the 
plant's production." (Nation, April 4, 1942. p.393). Sidney Hill- 
man and Donald Nelson have proposed posters, stickers, graphic 
charts of progress, contests, and other such devices for stimulating 
greater effort. Representative Edith Nourse Rogers has introduced 
a bill to provide Congressional medals for laborers in war indus- 

On a sounder basis are the many plants which, in the spirit of 
the preceding chapter, have tried to respect the dignity of each 
worker, to promote friendly democratic relationships, and to give 
workers an increasing share in determining policy.^' ^^ 

The achievement of stability and high morale is only partly sub- 
ject to the control of the local factory manager. He can remove 
certain irritating foremen but he cannot provide new tires for 
workers cars. He can adjust inequities, but the division of profits 
between owners and workers is subject to collective bargaining. 
He can promote able individuals, but he cannot exorcize the fear in 
the hearts of the rank and file workers that devastating unemploy- 
ment may follow the war. Grosser ® points out that industry over 
the past half century has been characterized by "a growing inca- 
pacity of the individual to preserve peace in industry by informal, 
extemporized methods." Government regulation and labor organi- 
zation have become determining factors in industrial morale. It is 
the special problem of this chapter to explore what organized labor 
is now doing, what it might do, and especially what the general 
public might do in relation to labor unions, to help in the creation 
of the highest possible level of morale. 

Unions Help Foster Morale 

Most of the people of America, about 75% according to public 
opinion polls, say they ''believe in unions." If these spokesmen for 
America are asked why they support organized labor, they are less 
definite. They certainly don't think well of strikes, the closed shop, 


or check-off; they suspect communism, violence and racketeering 
in unions; in other polls they charge that labor interferes more 
than any other group with national defense ; but still and all they 
are ''for" labor unions. 

This inarticulate faith that unions are good for the country rests 
upon solid truth. The history of what the organized labor move- 
ment has done to make possible the higher standards of living 
which all enjoy, is impressive.^ The story of unions is a chapter in 
the long record of man's struggle for self-respect. There was a 
time, for example, in the garment industry,^ when the boss could 
play absolute monarch. At a whim he hired or fired ; he gave or- 
ders and bawled out his help as he saw fit. Girls and young men 
who would become sycophants were given special favors; those 
who tried to assert their own rights or dignity were too often per- 
secuted or black-listed. The bitterest fact was that there was no re- 
course. The boss was law and order incarnate. He ran his business 
as he pleased, and was free to regard criticism as insubordination. 
Men with families to support learned quickly to do as they were 
told, to take what was given to them, to keep their mouths shut, 
and to put up with whatever insults might be thrown about. They 
did not and could not learn, of course, to take this all without re- 
action. Morale suffered. The seeds of class hatred were sown by 
the defenselessness of employees against petty tyranny. 

Not only in the garment industry but almost everywhere, the 
union was presented to the workers as the road to economic de- 
cency and to spiritual independence. Unions were opposed — some- 
times with violence and bloodshed — but pioneer fighters like 
Mother Jones ^^ saw in them a chance to lift up the underdog and 
to befriend the helpless. Usually the establishment and recognition 
of a union meant both higher standards of living and some ad- 
vance toward democratic ideals. At the same time, the unions at- 
tracted men who wanted power.^^ The fact that the workers had 
not been trained to democratic forms of action often left them prey 
to their own leaders, as they formerly had been to the bosses. 


It is not yet possible to make any final assessment of the service 
of unions to the morale of rank and file workers, but a reconsid- 
eration of the eleven characteristics of democratic morale, sug- 
gested by Professor Allport in the first chapter of this volume, 
may serve as a kind of scale on which to appraise what unions 
have done and should do. 

1. Voluntary, wholehearted participation. ''A program is good 
if it arouses in Americans a sense of personal responsibility for 
sharing in the task." Because union recognition was seldom of- 
fered, and had to be won against odds, the early days of the labor 
movement brought to almost all participants a very stirring sense 
of responsibility. If the psychological pattern of political democ- 
racy is repeated, we must expect that some day the grandchildren 
or great-grandchildren of those who led the way, will come to take 
their union privileges for granted, and will only in crisis remember 
that freedom must be defended. Today, however, the organized la- 
bor movement gives to its leaders and to many of its members an 
exultant sense of progress toward increasing share in controlling 
the conditions of their work.^' ^ 

One of the first demands which American labor made in connec- 
tion with the conversion of our economy to defense and later to 
war purposes was for greater participation and responsibility.^ At 
the CIO convention in 1941 Philip Murray, president of the CIO 
proposed joint planning councils in which representatives of em- 
ployers and employees could together take responsibility for in- 
creasing war production. The proposal sounded to some business 
men like ''Soviets," but more and more employers have come to 
recognize that there are brains in the labor movement, too, and 
that cooperation is the better course. The conservative Washington 
Po.y^ editorialized (March 24, 1942) . .. "One of the chief criti- 
cisms of our industrial system is that there is not enough democ- 
racy in it. Donald M. Nelson's plan for joint labor-management 
war plant committees would be a step to meet such a criticism. To 
some industrialists the committees smack of a foreign importation. 


It is felt that they would be the thin end of the wedge of little 
Soviets, syndicalism, or the corporative state. This is a jaundiced 
view to take of an experiment in industrial relations which might 
have socially as well as economically fruitful results." Once the 
plan became Nelson's instead of Murray's it sounded better, and 
the experiment is now well along with the sanction of the War 
Production Board. 

In Great Britain also the labor movement's chief demand was 
opportunity for participation, and there the request has been more 
fully granted than has thus far occurred in the United States.^^ 
According to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the British 
Trade Unions Congress (N. Y. Post, Dec. 20, 1940) ''British la- 
bor unions are adequately represented on every public and private 
council from the war cabinet of Prime Minister Churchill to the 
smallest village group that has to do with the formulation of policy 
and administration of total defense of Great Britain. . . . There 
isn't a thing that labor isn't participating in. It ranges from food 
rationing to aircraft production, to distribution and to priorities." 

One word in this criterion for democratic morale deserves spe- 
cial attention — the word "voluntary." Theoretically men are free 
to join unions or not, as they desire. Sometimes employers inter- 
fere to prevent joining; sometimes unions coerce workers into 
joining up.^ There is a labor side to this story, as we shall see 
later, but let us record the question mark here. Insofar as the labor 
movement can maintain voluntary loyalties it will contribute more 
to morale. 

When it comes to coercion by employers or by government, the 
labor movement is obdurate. Labor in the United States, as in 
England, was ready voluntarily to relinquish rights and privileges 
which some wanted to take away by law. The proposal to require 
labor unions to do what they were willing to do on a voluntary 
basis has been one of the most damaging attacks on labor morale. 
Anti-strike legislation was bitterly fought, but both AFL and CIO 
unions have publicly disavowed strikes of any kind for the dura- 


tion of the war. On December 16, 1941, the official statement of 
the American Federation of Labor was adopted as follows : 

"While we reject repressive labor legislation and insist upon 
the preservation of the essential democratic right of workers to 
cease work collectively as a last and final resort, we nevertheless 
pledge ourselves to, forego the exercise of this right during the 
war emergency and to prefer submission of pending differences 
with employers to approved facilities and processes for voluntary 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. 

"We most heartily endorse the *no-strike' policy voluntarily as- 
sumed by all divisions and character of labor as announced by the 
executive council. Labor needs no restrictions upon the right to 
strike, when to cease production is to strike at the very heart of 
the nation. Labor will produce and produce without interruption." 

A few months later, when industry shifted to a seven-day week, 
the unfairness of paying men overtime for working on Saturday 
and Sunday, if they had other days off became patent. Again, how- 
ever, organized labor insisted that morale depended upon a volun- 
tary adjustment of this practice. This time we quote from Mr. 
Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. He referred 

"A unanimous action, surrendering our legal and contractual 
rights to premium payments for work on Saturdays and Sundays 
and holidays when these do not represent the sixth or seventh 
working day. We took this action of our own free will, because 
our President and our production chief recommended this sacrifice 
to promote increased production. 

"Labor's record, and I speak particularly for that of the CIO, 
has been one of which all Americans can be justly proud. Our 
members are the men and women who are actually producing the 
tanks, the planes, the ships and all the other war materials. 

"They are working long hours, often at insufficient wages, spar- 
ing no eflFort to increase production to win the war. Strikes have 
been eliminated and the unions are exerting all their efforts to 
stimulate morale and enthusiasm for ever greater production for 


In a similar mood, labor fought "cooling off" periods on a com- 
pulsory basis, but in accord with the no-strike policy, some unions 
are today suffering discharge of leaders for union activities, and 
are resorting only to appeals to an overworked War Labor Board 
which is so busy it cannot consider their case for many weeks. It 
is interesting to contrast this excellent result of voluntary action 
with Congressman Thomas Eliot's report that in one state where a 
cooling-off law was passed, there were eight times as many strikes 
the year after the law went into effect as there had been the year 

When we have said that democratic morale depends upon oppor- 
tunity for voluntary participation we have stated a large part of a 
sound labor program for America. 

2. Respect for the person. "A program is good if its aim and 
practice are to further the well-being, growth, and integrity of 
each individual personality." This would be accepted by most 
unions as their objective ; many could illustrate that their practice 
does indeed foster respect for individual personality. On the other 
hand union critics point to practices of unions which tend to sub- 
ordinate the individual to some sort of mass action. Whenever 
unions treat members as though they were simply numbers on a 
card, or sources of dues, or votes to be herded into some political 
camp, the union fails to contribute what it could to morale. In gen- 
eral, the history of the labor movement has been one of the emer- 
gence of the individual workers from a very submerged status, to 
one in which a working man can think, speak, and act with some- 
thing more of the independence which we proudly think of as part 
of the American frontier tradition. 

3. Universalism. The third demand, that a movement shall seek 
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness for all, envisioning a better 
world after the war, is an excellent characterization of the labor 
movement in all countries where it has been left free. The central 
union idea is to obtain more of the good things of life for the 
group as a whole, rather than for the lucky few. Even some union 
practices which have aroused considerable opposition — sympathetic 


strikes and boycotts, for example — grow out of the sense of soli- 
darity which workmen in one group felt for other groups of less 
fortunate workers. 

Few of us are capable of universal sympathies, and the labor 
movement has had its limited horizons too. It has been charged, 
with some truth, that unions have too often sought to advance the 
profit of their own members rather than the welfare of the coun- 
try as a whole. Higher wages benefit only the group receiving them 
— lower prices might help all low-income people to buy more. It is 
interesting to note in this connection that unions do sometimes act 
to get prices down. In April, 1941, the United Shoe Workers sent 
to Leon Henderson a letter protesting against what their research 
indicated to be excessive prices being charged for shoes ordered by 
the army. After government investigation the union was found to 
have been correct; the bids were rejected; and the public saved 

Another evidence of growing interest in universal welfare 
rather than just their own group, has been the pressure from the 
United Automobile Workers to hasten conversion of factories to 
war production. In December, 1940, union leader Walter P. 
Reuther first offered his proposal to stop making motor cars, to 
pool facilities, and to plan the whole gigantic automobile industry 
for production of war planes. "I say," he said later, ''that the 
skilled man-hours wasted in building a 1942 model car was the 
most criminal thing ever done against our program, because it rep- 
resented the greatest waste of skilled man-production and man- 
hours that has ever taken place in America at a time when we 
needed every single skilled man-hour we could get. We were wast- 
ing it, and the industry came out with a model which we called the 
'Christmas Tree' model, filled with gadgets, filled with trimmings, 
that used up more critical materials than were necessary." No one 
disputed the statement of the President of General Motors that to 
follow Reuther' s plan would have meant more lay-off of union 
members, at least during the re-tooling period. Reuther may have 
been technically correct or in error — we make no attempt to ap- 


praise his plan from that angle — but his psychology was interest- 
ing. Here was a powerful labor leader, anticipating the needs of the 
country as a whole, and laying out a plan for the general welfare, 
even at some cost to his own union. More than a year later many 
of the principles he had advocated did come into operation. 

So far as the effort for a better world after the war is concerned, 
it would be hard to find a group of America which has gone fur- 
ther than labor. The morale of labor is vitally involved in the ques- 
tion of what is going to happen when millions of men return from 
the army, and when factories no longer need to make tanks, planes, 
and munitions. For more than ten years before this war boom, la- 
bor lived close to the chronic fear of unemployment. Labor is ask- 
ing in no uncertain terms that our country shall continue to pro- 
duce goods in peace-time, directing production then toward higher 
standards of living. 

"While we are strengthening our defense against war," writes 
President William Green,^^ *'we must begin to prepare for the 
peace. . . . Every decision and every policy related to our de- 
fence program must be tested in terms of their application to the 
solution of the post-emergency crisis. The American Federation 
of Labor refuses to accept as inevitable the prospect of our great 
armory of defense being condemned to abolishment when the war 
ends. We are determined to convert this armory into a great tool- 
shed for building up the functions of world peace. Unless we pre- 
vent a post-war depression with widespread unemployment we 
shall have failed in our most crucial battle — the fight against 
privation and want." 

British labor has been even more forthright in demands for eco- 
nomic change to permit abundant production after the war. The 
Labor Party Conference (reported by the New York Times, June 
5, 1940) stated frankly: ''the price the Labor Party is asking for 
agreeing to enter the British government and swinging the full La- 
borite trade-union resources into the war, is a Socialist system 
after the war. . . . Only bold Socialist planning of the foundations 


of our system can give the faith and power to meet the claims of 
those who will bring us victory." 

For America, Socialism, even in the mild sense in which the 
English labor leaders may have used it, seems no adequate solu- 
tion. Many of us are suspicious of planning that comes down from 
the top. Nevertheless, we all recognize that some bold steps are go- 
ing to have to be taken. While we fight for survival against ene- 
mies abroad, our minds do turn to what is coming after. Construc- 
tive steps are being taken by Isador Lubin of the President's spe- 
cial committee, the National Resources Planning Board, the Board 
of Economic Warfare, the Department of Agriculture, and other 
government agencies. Some officials in government and business 
are frankly suspicious, preferring to return to economic laissez- 
faire, rather than to run any risk of socialism. If planning is to be 
put on an effective democratic basis, the organized labor movement 
is likely to play a major part in bringing this about. 

One criticism which may be directed at the trade unions involves 
this goal of "universalism." Although the movement professes to 
speak for the workers of America, it has never included more than 
about a quarter of the non-agricultural employees. The movement 
itself has a long history of internal conflicts. "Solidarity forever" 
has been a favorite song of the unions, but united fronts have been 
temporary. The American Federation of Labor and the Railway 
Brotherhoods lived together in more peace than characterized the 
labor movement during the first years of the life of the Committee 
(later Congress) on Industrial Organization. 

Although the criticism of disunity is well justified, it has been 
aggravated by unfavorable publicity. Curiosity led the writer to ask 
a group of co-workers the question, "About what proportion of the 
strikes by organized labor in the United States during 1941 arose 
from the claims of rival unions (CIO vs. AFL) or from jurisdic- 
tional disputes of some kind?" In a group of eleven social scien- 
tists the estimates ranged from 2^% to 60% with a mean esti- 
mate of 15%. In the group of a half dozen clerks and secretaries 
who, as one of them said, "know only what I've happened to see 


in the papers," guesses ranged from 15% to 75% with an average 
of 52%. It seems likely that the general public would be greatly 
surprised to learn that the correct answer, according to the United 
States Department of Labor, was only 2.3%. 

Recent developments, in response to the war, have shown in- 
creasing unity among the branches of organized labor. An opinion 
poll showed 71% of union members and 87% of union leaders an- 
swering ''Yes" to the question, ''Should the AFL and the CIO get 
together?" (Again one suspects that the public might be surprised 
to learn that unity sentiments were stronger in the CIO than in 
the AFL and stronger among the leaders than in the rank and 
file.) A "Combined Labor Victory Committee" has been organ- 
ized, and joint action is increasing. On April 7, 1942, the AFL and 
the CIO united in a great rally at Pittsburgh, to stimulate maxi- 
mum war production. 

"I ask the people of this country to accept our presence here to- 
night," said President Green, "as a symbol of the unity and soli- 
darity which must prevail throughout this nation. I come to you 
without any reservations. I am determined and willing to stand 
with President Murray and his associates in this fight for the de- 
fense of our country and the preservation of the rights of labor." 

The audience, according to press reports, responded with en- 
thusiasm. "What a team !" someone shouted. 

President Murray declared that "the presence of the presidents 
of the AFL and the CIO on the same platform tells beyond words 
that we know this is labor's war. Labor stands together. Labor's 
ranks are closed against the enemy. Labor faces the foe, the soul- 
destroying foe of dictatorship and tyranny, as a well-trained army 
determined that our country shall not suffer the fate of France and 
Norway through the disruptive efforts of fifth columnists or self- 
proclaimed patriots who preach disunity." 

4. Economic self respect and social status. "A program is good 
if it provides for reasonable security, fair treatment, and honor- 
able status in the group for all individuals." The contribution of 
the labor movement to winning fair treatment, economic security, 


and social status for its members is so evident that no further 
stress need be given. 

5. Majority rule. "A program is good if it expresses the major- 
ity will of the people, and if it enhances the acceptance of the prin- 
ciple of majority rule. No morale building policy can advocate 
schemes that would set up rule by an elite, whether of family, 
of race, or of wealth." When this test is applied to labor unions, 
the result is a general credit, with a few specific reservations. 

The general credit arises from the fact that before unions 
gained strength, industrial dictatorships, based on wealth and fam- 
ily, were the rule. As unions grow, the workers in an industry have 
an increasing voice on the matters of most concern to them. 

Three reservations seem to be important. One is that unions 
themselves are not always democratic This is certainly the excep- 
tion, but it is a source of serious weakness in the democratic struc- 
ture of America. There is a job for the schools and also for the 
unions themselves, to educate members so that majority rule does 
actually function. 

A second reservation is that workers and employers are not the 
whole set of interests involved in production. The consumer mat- 
ters, too. In some instances labor and employers have gotten to- 
gether, but in such a way as to set up a kind of racket which mulcts 
the consumer. It has been charged, for example, that in one East- 
ern city, the electrial workers agreed to work only for certain con- 
tractors, and those contractors were then free to charge prices far 
above what competitors would have charged, but the competitors 
could not get union labor. The principle of majority rule will re- 
quire that the consumer have not only a voice, but the major voice, 
in determining many policies. Only in the consumer cooperative 
movement has this principle had adequate recognition. 

A third reservation concerns the principle that an elite of race 
is repugnant to democratic morale. There are 21 national or inter- 
national unions (all in the AFL or the Railway Brotherhoods) 
which exclude Negroes completely. Only 8 of the 102 unions in 
these old-line groups follow the practice, quite general in the CIO, 


of giving full status to Negroes.^ As Professor Clark has shown 
in an earlier chapter, Negro morale represents a serious problem — 
perhaps the most serious problem — in American fighting spirit. 
When, as at Tampa, Florida, a Ship-builders Union (AFL) exe- 
cutes a defense contract including a closed shop, and thereby 
throws out of work 500 competent Negro workmen, previously 
employed by the concern, then the union has become a destroyer 
of American morale. Negroes have not unnaturally reacted 
against the unions, have become strike-breakers, and so made a 
bad situation worse. In April, 1941, when Henry Ford was fight- 
ing the CIO, some 1500 Negro strike-breakers were introduced 
into the Ford plant. It is very much to the credit of the United Au- 
tomobile Workers that they did not react by blaming the misled 
Negroes. The CIO has pledged itself to ''uncompromising opposi- 
tion to any form of discrimination." 

Unions do represent a forward step, but they could take a longer 
step if they could be rid of race discrimination, could join with 
consumer organizations, and could demonstrate genuine demo- 
cratic controls in their own ranks. 

6. Representative and evocative leadership. "A program is good 
if it raises the confidence of people in their chosen leaders.'' Unlike 
foremen, vice-presidents, superintendents and managers, labor 
leaders are chosen by the men and women they lead, and are re- 
sponsible to their rank and file. There are, it must be admitted, 
unions which are controlled by a clique of officers who perpetuate 
their favored status by manipulating elections or by failing to call 
conventions. These are exceptions to the more general rule. Demo- 
cratic government, whether in cities, states, or unions, has never 
been able to free itself wholly from the wiles of politicians. 
"Bosses" develop from time to time, especially in groups which 
are educationally and economically backward. Yet few would ar- 
gue that because our governments do sometimes get taken over by 
political gangs, the democratic form of government should be 
abandoned. In our cities and states, and in our unions, the rank 
and file can eventually get rid of officers who fail to express the 


popular will. But in industry, that is more difficult. Even at their 
worst, labor leaders are somewhat more responsive to worker opin- 
ion than are those short-sighted business administrators who think 
only of their responsibility to the stockholders. Representative 
leadership is better achieved through unions than without them. 

Another important contribution of the labor movement in the 
area of leadership and morale, is the provision of a new ladder by 
which the average boy or girl can rise to a position of influence. 
The average young man or woman from a working class home 
once had two avenues open. One was through rising to the top in 
the business hierarchy — a ladder which has now been largely 
blocked off for those youths without college training or family po- 
sition. A second has been the ladder of politics but elections, too, 
are expensive nowadays. The labor movement now offers another 
line of promotion. Some twenty thousand men and women have 
risen to full time positions in leading their fellow-workers. Some 
of these labor officials sit in at the top conferences of government 
and industry. It may well be that today the average boy has a bet- 
ter chance of reaching a post where he can mold American life, if 
he becomes a labor leader, than he would have if he aspired to be 
a legislator or a business mogul. Certainly the morale of America 
is better because this new chance has been opened up for our youth. 

7. Tolerance, "A program is good if it recognizes the creative 
role played by minorities in a democracy, and if it diminishes hos- 
tility among the in-groups of the nation." There are many who 
would argue that because labor unions represent the working class, 
they inevitably deepen class conflict. This does not necessarily fol- 
low. Differences in privilege between owners and workers existed 
long before the working class was organized, and some of the dis- 
tinctions were then more aggravated than they are now. In the old 
days of sweat shops, low wages, industrial accidents, and petty ty- 
ranny of the shop, more hostility was engendered than is likely to 
arise when unions have established decent standards of living, at- 
tractive working conditions, respect for individual dignity, and 
smoothly-working machinery for the adjustment of grievances. 


There are good psychological grounds for the belief that when ap- 
parent injustices can be expressed to shop stewards and taken up 
for adjustment, they are less likely to fester into malevolence. In 
countries like Sweden and Great Britain where labor organization 
has been longer established, there is probably more rather than less 
tolerance among classes. In those industries in the United States 
which have been organized for many years, the experience has 
been that cooperation is taken for granted. The most violent dem- 
onstrations of class feeling have come in connection with the at- 
tempt to impede formation of unions.^ 

8. Freedom of Speech. *'A program is good if it respects the 
principles of freedom of thought and uncensored communication." 
Labor organizations foster freedom of thought and expression 
through many channels. The educational classes conducted by 
unions are usually of the forum or discussion type. Worker rep- 
resentatives are given more place on public platform, in the public 
press, and over the broadcasting stations, in those communities in 
which union organization has grown strong. Millions of American 
citizens get from the labor press * an interpretation of labor news 
which is quite unlike that given by the big newspapers and radio 
chains. Whether due to the outlook of owners, managers, adver- 
tisers, or influential readers, the bias of most of the sources of 
news is strongly anti-labor. As a consequence, working people feel 
that they are being misrepresented and their morale suffers. One of 
the most serious problems before the American people today, in 
the attempt to build an effective national unity, is to cope with the 
gap between the news as presented in the papers and the facts as 
understood by men close to the situation. 

* The United Aline Workers Journal, Steel Labor, and the United Automobile 
Worker have circulation figures of around half a million each. The Federa- 
tionist and the CIO News each reach something like a quarter of a million 
members. Some local papers — e.g. Labor, the organ of the District of Columbia 
—reach a quarter of a million. There are 250 papers published by various inter- 
nationals of the AFL. One among them, Justice, reaches a quarter of a million 
members of the ILGWU. Labor representatives say that the combined circula- 
tion of all labor newspapers exceeds 8,000,000 ; how many family members read 
papers cannot well be estimated. 


Newspaper readers at the present time can recall plenty of head- 
lines about strikes threatening war production. Yet according to 
the figures of the War Production Board the time lost on war 
work due to strikes amounted in January, 1942, to four thousand- 
ths of one percent of the time worked. Members of the American 
Federation of Labor may have read in their press that the loss due 
to strikes averages out at 1.4 hours per man year of work, whereas 
industrial accidents take 26 hrs. per man year and illness 40 hours 
per man year. The record of labor in England since Dunkirk 
shows that time lost through strikes amounts to one day's work 
per man in fifteen years of constructive contribution. Few readers 
of the American press would suspect that the American labor rec- 
ord is even better. Since Pearl Harbor the loss of working time due 
to strikes has been at only half the British rate, or one day's work 
per man in thirty years. It would not be strange if labor felt it un- 
fair that so insignificant an aspect of their work is considered 
newsworthy, while labor is seldom credited with the impressive ar- 
ray of tanks rolling off the assembly lines. We read that battleships 
are ready a year ahead of schedule, and the credit is given to a gov- 
ernment of^cial or to a corporation. We read of a fourfold in- 
crease in airplane production and a five-fold increase in production 
of ships, and tribute is paid to Mr. Donald Nelson, or to "indus- 
try," but rarely to the men in overalls. They are news only at the 
rare moment when some little wild-cat strike can be blown up into 
scare-head proportions. 

The attention given by the commercial press and by certain 
radio commentators to strikes contrasts strangely with their treat- 
ment of a much more serious ''strike" on the part of industry dur- 
ing 1940-41. Senator Aiken of Vermont recently reported to Con- 
gress that "from June, 1940, to May, 1941, 160,000,000 man days 
were lost to defense by employers negotiating with the govern- 
ment, while only 2,450,000 man days were lost to defense by labor 
negotiating with employers." This was the period when business 
refused to accept government contracts until legislation had re- 
moved the ceiling over profits, and had provided for the amortiza- 


tion of the cost of new plants within five years, out of profits on 
government orders. These employer demands were criticized by 
some newspapers and radio programs, but the relative emphasis 
was not of the same order as the 60 to 1 difference between the 
losses caused by these delays and the losses caused by strikes. If all 
delays due to management were known, the discrepancy would be 
much greater. Never at any time in the last twelve years has the 
number of men on strike compared with the number of unem- 
ployed men whom industry has not yet put to work in war pro- 

Labor morale does not demand that all strikes should be sanc- 
tioned. Organized labor is a parvenu in social power, and mistakes 
are common. What America should find some way to provide, in 
the interests of fair play and genuine understanding, is a criticism 
of strikes which is less biased and emotional. They should be dealt 
with in rough proportion to their actual significance. The major 
causes of lag in production should be given a major share of at- 
tention. Only rarely should these be laid at the door of organized 

Consider another famous newspaper controversy : the campaign 
(current as this is written) against the forty hour week law. Let- 
ters to newspapers, magazines and to Congressmen reveal clearly 
that the public were led to believe that organized labor was work- 
ing only forty hours a week in the war industries. Apparently a 
major campaign to foster this misunderstanding was conducted by 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Southern States In- 
dustrial Council, and certain individuals like Mr. E. K. Gaylord 
who owns some newspapers, a radio station and a paper mill in 
Oklahoma. Some newspapers carried front page form letters and 
appeals for citizens to write Congress. In one Western city free 
stenographic service was offered so citizens could dictate their 
wrath. A Texas group wired Senator Connally ''When we hear of 
strikes and factories running only five days a week it makes us so 
mad that we are ready to shoot, kill or murder somebody, if we 
only knew whom to shoot." 


^ — 

While these protests were piling up, most factories were run- 
ning not forty but one hundred or even one hundred sixty-eight 
hours a week. Divided into shifts men were working in the air- 
craft factories 49 hours a week, and in the machine tool industry 
where it was harder to get competent employees, 55 hours a week. 
The issue was never one of how long factories should run. It was 
not even a question of how long men should work. The debate con- 
cerned the point at which men should begin to be paid for overtime 
work. Making the week nominally longer would reduce somewhat 
labor's weekly earnings without affecting the hours machines kept 
going or the hours men worked. The goal of employers in the cam- 
paign against the forty-hour week was fourfold : ( 1 ) to pay lower 
wages; (2) to discredit labor; (3) to attack the New Deal; and, 
(4) to stake a claim to longer working hours, despite possible un- 
employment, after the war. High government officials protested * 
that to order a wage decrease now — this was the real import of the 
proposal for a forty-eight hour week — would set all labor agen- 
cies to making demands for increases to keep up with the rising 
cost of living. That would upset the machinery of production just 
when it was running smoothly and when it was much needed. It 
w^as not surprising to find intelligent labor leaders very hostile to 
the campaigns which mobilized the anger of America in support of 
a program which would defeat the very ends sought. 

Another illustration of the problem of the news in relation to la- 
bor is the case of Genevieve Samp. On March 24, 1942, the Asso- 
ciated Press reported all throughout the country Congressman 
Rich's (Rep.Penn.) charge that one Genevieve Samp had been dis- 

* The statement of Donald Nelson was as follows: "If we abolish the forty- 
hour week by law, we do not gain one additional hour of work in our war in- 
dustries, but we create a widespread demand for increases in wage rates, throw 
the entire wage structure out of adjustment, and remove an important incentive 
for labor to shift from non-essential industries into war-production jobs." One 
old-line Congressman sought to make some anti-New Deal capital out of the 
testimony which was not censuring labor as he had hoped. 

"Hasn't it occurred to you, Mr. Nelson," he asked, "that the fact that the 
Army, the Navy, the White House, and you, all made similar statements is quite 
a coincidence?" 

"Hasn't it occurred to you," retorted Mr. Nelson, "that we're right?" 


charged at the demand of a Detroit union affiliated with the CIO, 
because she tried to do too much work on her war job. HeadHnes 
over the story reported tha,t' the union fired her for working too 
hard, and her picture added interest to the front-page display. 

The facts, as admitted in an obscure item a week later, were that 
Miss Samp had been involved in actual fist-fights with other em- 
ployees; her production record was not in question at all. "She 
denied she ever had said that fellow workers objected to increasing 
production and admitted responsibility for disturbances in the 
plant." (Associated Press, April 1, 1942.) It is a fair conclusion 
that for every reader who noted the correction, ten have carried 
the false impression that the union fired somebody for putting 
forth extra effort. A radio commenator on April 4 repeated the 
original uncorrected atrocity story. So labor smarted with resent- 
ment under another unjust attack. 

Another area in which labor has suffered serious misrepresenta- 
tion has been in connection with criminals and racketeers in unions. 
Three-fourths of the public polled by Gallup, believe that "many 
labor leaders are racketeers." Pegler's muckraking has turned up 
a few dramatically distasteful mobsters in the unions of motion 
picture operators, hod carriers, elevator construction workers, and 
operating engineers. Their exposure has been long overdue and 
should be welcomed by every friend of democracy, inside or out- 
side the labor movement. But the charges have been publicized in 
such a way as to give the false impression that these plug-uglies 
are typical of the thousands of men and women now holding influ- 
ential posts in the labor movement. A comprehensive survey would 
doubtless show that for every shady character there are dozens of 
honest, hard-working, clean living, idealistic labor leaders, devoted 
to democracy, and that the proportion of scum is no greater than 
would be found in any other group in American life who have re- 
cently gravitated into positions promising some power. 

A typical example was the charge made by Congressman Martin 
Dies that there were 500 criminals in the CIO. He gave the names 
of twenty, and promised the others later ; a promise still unfulfilled. 


According to Lewis Booth, associate editor of the Official Union 
Journal, (Cinn.), a careful check-up on the 20 cases named 
showed that the much-publicized Dies charges were 100% mis- 
taken. The most interesting part of the story was the attempt to 
get the refutation published. Of twenty big newspapers which 
had played up the Dies attack, only one was willing to print, even 
in an obscure place, the facts vindicating the labor leaders. 

"Labor," the organ of the conservative Railroad Brotherhoods, 
published on March 3, 1942, exposure of eleven misrepresenta- 
tions of labor in the big newspapers of current date. One of the 
stories, widely printed, called forth denials by Chairman H. S. 
Mills of the National Labor Relations Board; another was offi- 
cially denounced by Chairman W. H. Davis of the War Labor 
Board. A third was denounced by Brigadier General Hershey of 
the Selective Service. The denials were not given the publicity 
which the anti-labor stories had, and probably never caught up. 

Another example of facts twisted to give an absolutely contra- 
dictory impression arose after the CIO survey of New Jersey 
industry. The labor leaders found that fully half of the machines 
and machine-tools of that state were still idle, due to failure of 
government contracts and business management to mobilize the 
technical resources of the state. Contracts had been given to big 
new concerns, but many little businesses were unable to get either 
the raw materials to continue their old line of production or con- 
tracts to enter the war-production field. Labor protested in the in- 
terests of fuller production. But hear now how the facts reached 
the ears of the aroused citizens of Enid, Oklahoma. Their resolu- 
tion (reported by the Nation, March 28, 1942, p. 359) read: 

"With the head of the New Jersey CIO announcing that a com- 
plete investigation shows the war-production plants of that state 
to be operating at only 50 per cent capacity, and with this same 
condition prevalent throughout the United States, a Congress 
bankrupt of public spirit is betraying this country and its armed 
forces by an abject surrender to conscienceless labor leaders." 

What does it do to the morale of a group of American citizens, 


as patriotic as any, working hard to earn a wage which is meager 
enough at best, to find their organization consistently misrepre- 
sented and maHgned? No very profound psychology is required to 
understand this problem. None of us likes to be misunderstood. If 
the union for us had been, as it has been for millions of workers, 
a means to greater self-respect, more democratic control over con- 
ditions of work, and higher standards of living, then how would 
we react to allegations that we believed unfair and untrue? If the 
union leaders we knew happened to be conscientious, loyal men 
whom we fully trusted and were proud to have as spokesmen, how 
would we feel about the institutions that smear them ? Would we 
not over-react and refuse to admit even the defects and limitations 
which another approach might have made us willing to recognize 
and to correct? 

Here lie the roots of one of the major morale problems, so far 
as organized labor is concerned. The morale of labor will improve 
if labor's side can be guaranteed a fair hearing. 

A recent Fortune poll (February 1942) has given interesting 
data on the widespread ignorance concerning organized labor. 
Three American citizens out of four could not name the president 
of the CIO and less than half could name the man who, for many 
years, has held headlines as president of the AFL. Doubtless most 
of the citizens interviewed had pronounced opinions on open shop, 
closed shop and union shop, but few could define these terms satis- 
factorily. Only one in six knew that the unions af^liated with the 
CIO have much lower initiation fees. The writer in Fortune con- 
cludes, ''About 40% of the public is wholly unequipped to have 
any opinion about labor problems, and only about 25% really 
know enough to be intelligent on the subject." Even in the ranks of 
labor-union members and their families, only about one-third could 
be considered fairly well-informed about the labor movement. 

Obviously there is an educational job to be done. It is partly up 
to the public schools, for, although the typical union member in 
America will soon be a high-school graduate, few high schools 
have yet set aside any part of their curriculum to teach the history. 


Structure, rights, obligations and problems of the labor movement. 
The press and radio also face an educational assignment. If labor 
morale is as vital to winning the war as is soldier morale, and if 
public ignorance and prejudice are factors which lower the morale 
of labor, then the great agencies which enlighten adult public opin- 
ion can make a very important contribution on the home- front. 
Organized labor itself must bear a large measure of responsibility. 
While some unions conduct training courses, they are still too few, 
and even those do not reach a large proportion of members. For 
too many rank and file workers today the union is still only an in- 
strument for collecting dues and protecting wages. In many in- 
stances union members themselves accept the interpretation of 
current issues printed in the great newspapers or broadcast over 
the radio. 

The solution is probably not to be found in an extension of the 
present labor press and radio service, valuable as that would be. 
The essence of the problem is to get the great instruments of com- 
munication out from the control of a single class, representing a 
small minority of Americans. There will be serious morale prob- 
lems in our national life until the press and radio achieve at least 
that measure of impartiality and respect for truth which charac- 
terizes the scholars in our universities. The comparison suggests 
that state-owned newspapers and radio stations, alongside private 
enterprises in distributing news, might be as wholesome as have 
been state universities alongside private colleges. 

9. The whole man "A program is good if it utilizes the full in- 
tellectual equipment of each individual, so that his morale may 
involve the whole man and not merely an emotional segment of his 

Unions differ in the extent to which they try to serve all aspects 
of individual personality. Some conceive their responsibility rather 
narrowly as related to wages, hours, and working conditions. Even 
these, however, should not be regarded as wholly materialistic. 
Shorter working hours means more time for men and women with 
friends, families, and in a variety of educational and cultural ac- 


tivities. Adequate wages may represent freedom from care and 
have psychological consequences more far-reaching than would be 
associated with merely buying larger quantities of goods. Some 
unions have gone in for housing projects ; the Amalgamated Cloth- 
ing Workers developed one of the first and best of these. The same 
union has gone into the field of banking. Credit unions are com- 
mon. Probably the most wide-spread union activity outside of the 
bargaining field is education. Most of the larger unions have edu- 
cational directors or educational committees and conduct a variety 
of study classes. Some of these deal directly with labor problems, 
but others may bring workers into touch with art, music, literature, 
history, and a variety of cultural concerns. The Workers Educa- 
tion Bureau (AFL) was organized in 1921 to further the educa- 
tional objectives of this great branch of the labor movement. An 
outstanding union is the International Ladies' Garment Workers' 
Union. One of their locals, the Dressmakers Union, maintains the 
largest workers' education enterprise in New York City. The 
I L G W U itself is responsible for staging the highly success- 
ful *Tins and Needles." Out in the Poconos the workers maintain 
one of the finest rest and recreational camps in America, entirely 
for union members and their families. The following citation from 
the New York Herald Tribune (April 11, 1942) indicates another 
type of activity : 

Music Notes 

"Arthur Schnabel will play Beethoven's 'Emperor' piano con- 
certo with the I.L.G.W.U. Symphony Orchestra under Eugene 
Plotnikoff 's direction tonight at Town Hall in a concert presented 
by the Cultural Division of the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union. The I.L.G.W.U. String Ensemble, conducted by 
Herman Liebman, will also be heard. Besides the concerto, the 
program includes Schubert's fifth symphony, Beethoven's 'Prome- 
theus' overture, and a Handel concerto grosso," 

A union of this type becomes the center of social and intellectual 
life for its members, in something the way in which the church 


was the center for a more homogeneous community life a century 
ago in America. 

10. War, never an end in itself. "A program is good if it recog- 
nizes that democracy is not a violent process, but is a matter of 
'piecemeal and retail progress." 

Karl Marx, in the middle of the nineteenth century, anticipated 
that the reformist demands of the organized labor of that time 
would become revolutionary because the capitalist economic system 
would be unable to continue to make concessions. This has not 
proven to be the case. Despite periods of intense, prolonged depres- 
sion, the movement of organized labor has never become a threat 
to the capitalist order. The fears of some members of the Union 
League Club have not been paralleled by any subversive intentions 
in the minds of most labor leaders.^ If organized labor does con- 
tribute to revolutionary change in our economic order, it will be as 
a result of the unintended consequences of moves which were made 
wholly in the hope of making progress within the existing order. 
Union members and union leaders develop an interest in maintain- 
ing existing industry w^hich is almost as strong as that of corpora- 
tion executives. If economic change comes too quickly, plants 
cannot adjust and men are thrown out of work. This the union 
tries to prevent. Indeed, it may well be that the stronger criticism 
of organized labor should be directed at their resistance to change. 
Unions have often opposed the introduction of labor-saving ma- 
chinery on the ground that it might throw men out of work. The 
attitude of labor in the war crisis has been splendid evidence that 
if there is a prospect of work enough to keep all labor busy, there 
will be no continuing objection to any techniques for raising effi- 
ciency. Some of the most drastic proposals for conversion of 
plants to a war-time basis have come from labor itself; for ex- 
ample, the Reuther plan. As a rule, labor morale will be highest if 
the conditions of democratic progress can be maintained. When 
change is too long delayed, or when it threatens to move too 
quickly, labor opposition may be expected. 

11- Voluntary coordination, division of labor, and planning, ''h 


program is good if it aids in achieving a co-ordinated and volun- 
tary division of labor for the solution of common problems." 

The union itself represents for most workers a practical illus- 
tration of what it means to cooperate and to achieve voluntary 
coordination. Many workers get more practice of democracy from 
the wide range of their committee responsibilities in the union, 
than they ever obtained at school, in church, or from community 
government. Labor has an excellent opportunity to contribute fur- 
ther to democratic morale by helping every member to learn the 
ways of democracy in conducting the affairs of the union. 

The development of the CIO represented an important step 
forward, enabling labor to get out of a narrow rut of selfish think- 
ing. Craft unions tended to see the job in terms of their particular 
skill. Industrial unions, on the other hand, have forced American 
workers to consider problems of industry seen as a whole. Both 
the AFL and the CIO maintain research departments which give 
labor leaders basic facts about the general progress of American 
industry and the opportunities for labor in particular fields. Labor 
bulletins contain graphs and charts which tell the story of eco- 
nomic production, wages, dividends, cost of living, and the trend 
of other variables. Nevertheless, it was to be expected that most 
plans for large-scale industrial coordination would come from the 
CIO rather than the AFL. The Murray Plan, which we discussed 
above, is a natural outcome of an attempt to improve planning, not 
just for a particular group of workers or a particular factory, but 
for industry generally. Joint planning committees have been an- 
nounced for General Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric 
and Manufacturing Company, and the number of such enterprises 
is increasing. On March 14, 1942, Sidney Hillman set up in cer- 
tain picked industries "a Joint Committee to direct the production 
drive" in each plant. This Joint Committee must "truly represent 
both management and labor," and it is provided that "union repre- 
sentatives shall constitute the labor half of the Joint Commit- 
tee wherever the workers belong to a labor organization." This 
amounts to a sanction by the War Production Board of Murray's 


Industrial Council Plan. A pioneer among government agencies so 
far as cooperation with organized labor is concerned, has been the 
Federal Communications Commission which (January 12, 1942) 
granted labor full representation on the seven committees of its 
Defense Communications Board. 

Wherever labor has been given an opportunity to participate, the 
result has been a greater measure of responsible cooperation. 
When President C. E. Wilson of General Motors Corporation ap- 
peared for the first time before the General Motors Division of the 
United Automobile Workers Union (February 8, 1942) he was 
introduced by Walter Reuther : "I hope that the presence of Mr. 
Wilson will mark the beginning of a better type of relationship 
and will lay the basis for carrying out our mutual responsibility to 
the nation. . . . We want to do our part. If given half a chance, 
we'll come through." 

The spirit of both great branches of organized labor in the war 
effort has been cooperative rather than arbitrary or dictatorial. 
Labor's Monthly Survey expressed the attitude of the American 
Federation of Labor as follows : "Business men, labor leaders, and 
city officials in a given community * have found ways to combine 
forces and pool resources, so that as a group they can accomplish 
defense work which as separate individuals and groups they could 
never have accomplished. . . . This is true democratic procedure. In 
America, the defense program gives us an opportunity to prove 
the constructive value of our great trade union movement in the 
nation's time of need." (November, page 4) 

Divisive Issues 

A review of the eleven characteristics of democratic morale 
shows that in every instance, the net contribution of the unions is 
on the side of increasing the welfare and fighting strength of 

* An excellent example was the Kokomo, Ind., survey conducted by labor 
organizations and other community agencies in cooperation. They found skilled 
machinists working as clerks, janitors, policemen and digging ditches. They 
estimated that 40% of Kokomo labor could well be up-graded. 


America. We have tried not to soft-pedal the justifiable criticisms 
of labor unions which arose in the same connection: (1) tendency 
to submerge individuals in mass enterprises; (2) tendency to be 
coercive rather than to depend on voluntary cooperation; (3) ten- 
dency to seek the interests of their own group rather than the wel- 
fare of the country as a whole; (4) tendency toward dictatorship 
within unions ; ( 5 ) tendency to division and quarrels between un- 
ions; (6) race discrimination; and (7) resistance to technological 
change. Although these are not general characteristics of the trade 
union movement they do represent problems sufficiently serious so 
that labor faces a challenge to improve the situation. 

The reader, accustomed to think of labor unions in terms of the 
more dramatic struggles may be surprised that two issues have not 
emerged more sharply from the discussion. Two of the chief de- 
mands of labor have been for higher wages, and for the union 
shop. An appraisal of the morale of organized labor would be seri- 
ously incomplete without a consideration of wage levels and of the 
security of labor organizations. Employers and the organs of pub- 
lic opinion commonly represent the view that labor's demands for 
wage increases are so exorbitant as to threaten the nation's finan- 
cial structure, and that the demand for the closed shop is a subver- 
sion of the American way of life. What can be said for the facts? 

Wages and Morale 

The first and most obvious fact is that despite the gains made in 
recent years, and despite the favored position of American work- 
ers as compared with workers in any other country of the world, 
labor has not achieved a luxurious standard of living. While a 
typical family of four requires $2000 to live in modest comfort, 
with adequate diet, less than a third of working-class families in 
1941 could reach that high. In that same year, according to La- 
bor's Monthly Survey (AFL, March 1942, p. 3) 34% of Ameri- 
can families received incomes of less than $1000, an amount below 
even a bare subsistence level for a typical American home. Some 


55% of families in the United States, during the period when war- 
profits reached an all-time high, received less than $1500 a year. 
The Treasury Department reports that 3 million workers earned 
less than $10 a week; 8 million less than $15 a week; and 13 mil- 
lion less than $20 a week. These figures may not appear when 
comfortable representatives of more favored economic groups are 
asking for curbs on labor, but day in and day out the frustrations 
of low income do injure the morale of millions of American work- 

The next question concerns the increase in labor income during 
the war period. Wages in most industries have risen, but how 
much ? The average hourly wage for all manufacturing industry in 
the United States in August 1939 was 64^. This rose to 78(t! in 
November, 1941, a gain of 23%.* During the same period, how- 
ever, prices were also rising, so the gain in real wage was only 

Now if labor alone were profiting during this period, fair- 
minded American workers would be forced to admit that labor had 
been taking unwarranted advantage of the, national emergency. 
But consider what happened to net profits of industry from August 
1939 to November 1941. The Federal Reserve Board, reporting 
for 629 industrial corporations, found the average profit 50% 
higher in 1941 than in 1939. In certain industries the gains were 
much more striking. Profits in oil industries were up 77% ; in iron 
and steel up 188%, and in railroads up 450%. Leon Henderson 
testified before a Senate Committee that corporate profits, after 
taxes, would total $6 billion for 1941 as compared with $3 billion 
in 1939. Note that these profits were all computed after the in- 
creased Federal taxes had been deducted. ''No profits from U. S. 
Customer No. 1," wrote Time magazine as a heading for its story 
"Management Without Profit." (January 5, 1942) This was both 
propaganda and misrepresentation. The profits of business did in- 

* Incidentally wage rates in Great Britain increased 26% over the same 


crease, due to our American defense program, at something more 
than double the rate of increase in labor's pay. 

Labor naturally resents proposals to freeze wages while salaries, 
bonuses and profits mount sky-high. Labor remembers the sum- 
mer of 1940 when representatives of big business staged their 
''sit-down strike" and refused to accept defense contracts until a 
law, setting a ceiling on profits, had been repealed. Labor undoubt- 
edly noted the heat and fervor with which all large newspapers 
condemned Secretary Morgenthau's off-hand suggestion, in the 
fall of 1941, that a 6% return on investment might be enough dur- 
ing war-time. 

Workmen know, from their own experience, that output per 
hour has been rising. Labor research papers tell union members 
that while the wage per hour is 25% above 1929 levels, in the same 
plants production per hour is 41% above 1929. Even allowing for 
more expensive machinery, it would seem to labor that the "gravy" 
goes to the boss. According to Economic Outlook (organ of the 
CIO) for February, 1942, since this war began the wages paid per 
dollar's worth of steel produced, have fallen 15%, and at the same 
time the profits, per dollar's worth of steel produced, have risen 

To make the matter more aggravating, stories of profiteering 
appear from time to time. The Vinson report to the House Com- 
mittee on Naval Affairs cited a dozen companies which had made 
profits of more than 20% above the cost of production on war con- 
tracts. Bethlehem Steel Company, in December of 1941, was re- 
ported to be holding out for better contracts on plant expansion 
than had been accorded other companies, despite earnings at four 
times its 1939 rate, and despite profit of 21% above cost on 
$19 million worth of ship-repair contracts. Texas Corporation, for 
1941, after setting aside money to pay all Federal income and ex- 
cess profits taxes, and after charging off $7 million for possible 
losses on foreign investments, still had a profit 65% above its 1940 
earnings. The Truman Committee, in January, 1942, reported, 
"Nine of the 13 companies which had cost-plus-fixed- fee-contracts 


are entitled to receive fees plus possible bonuses which exceed the 
amount of their net worth on December 31, 19v39, as estimated by 
them." War business meant 20, 30, 40, and in one case 800 times 
the average profit of former years. James E. Barnes, Washington 
representative of Todd Shipyards, testified that government con- 
tracts were running 50% on invested capital, bringing his com- 
pany ''outrageous profits." Senator Bunken of Nevada charged 
(April 3, 1942) that Basic Magnesium, Inc. ''stands to make a 
profit of 4280 per cent, or $2,140,000 in one year on an admitted 
investment of not more than $50,000." These stories make Time's 
claim of "No profits on government business" sound hypocritical 
in the extreme. 

Sometimes profits have been disguised as bonuses but their ef- 
fects on labor morale have not thereby been improved. Representa- 
tive Gore, before the Naval Affairs Committee of the House on 
March 24, 1942 cited a bonus for President Dahlbert of Celotex 
Corporation of $150,000 in addition to his $36,000 salary. Mere 
vice-presidents were given bonuses of $32,000. Mr. Joseph W. 
Frazer of Willys-Overland Motors, Inc. had a salary of $60,000 
but received an additional bonus of $42,000. Workers know these 
facts and contrast the enormous rake-off of the higher-ups with 
their own weekly wage which barely covers rent and food. Many a 
CIO member knows that the salary appropriated by Mr. G. W. 
Mason of Nash-Kelvinator Corporation in 1941 was $225,000 — 
or three times that of the president of the United States. To this 
was added a bonus of $100,000 for good measure. But every CIO 
member knows that the press would immediately condemn as "self- 
ish" and "unpatriotic" any attempt by strike to boost a $35-a-week 
wage to $40. 

Labor will not quickly forget press revelations of Leon K. 
Shanack, who made a profit of $125,000 in ten months as a "de- 
fense broker" ; or that of Pratt and Whitney with profits 26% of 
cost on more than $10,000,000 of airplane engine contracts, or the 
notorious Jack and Heinz who ran out of a state to escape a Labor 
Board order to recognize a union, but paid a favorite secretary 


$39,000 bonus to evade taxation! That makes the ordinary pay- 
envelope look so insignificant, that many a hard-pressed family 
man is ready to fight for a larger share in the take. 

In the midst of this quarrel over what seems to be a very unfair 
distribution of the earnings of industry, the larger issues of the 
war are easily obscured. Both labor and management tend to resent 
ceilings over their income, but as the concept of ''total war" be- 
comes clearer the demand for some such control increases. The 
problem, if legislation along this line is attempted, will be to per- 
suade labor 1) that its share is large enough; 2) that capital is 
likewise restrained with no ''loopholes" ; and 3) that some adjust- 
ment will be made to meet rising costs of living. The American 
Federation of Labor, on this last point, has proposed a formula as 
follows : "Every worker's wage shall increase automatically each 
month by the same amount as the increase in the Labor Depart- 
ment cost of living index." This might be a prelude to continuous 
rises in both wages and prices, with dangerous inflation. Price con- 
trol is another, and perhaps better, remedy. 

As production shifts to war needs there are going to be fewer 
and fewer goods for workers to buy. Prices are rising dangerously. 
It becomes steadily harder for the average working-man to provide 
comforts for his family. Sacrifice need not destroy morale ; it may 
even strengthen morale, but there must be the conviction that all 
are sacrificing alike. Wage controls may be needed, but they will 
not be accepted cheerfully by organized labor until it is clear that 
profits, salaries and bonuses are also under control. Perhaps the 
best plan, for total morale, would be to put everyone on "war pay" 
for the duration. Let the "privates" in the army, in industry, in 
commerce, in professions and on the farms all serve for approxi- 
mately the same rate of pay. Let the corporals, petty officers, fore- 
men, and minor supervisors, whatever their field of work, all rate 
alike in pay. The managers, vice-presidents, stafT chiefs, superin- 
tendents, etc. may rate as colonels, or even major generals. This is 
total war, they say. Very well — let us try it that way and treat all 
workers and soldiers on a comparable scale. The enormous changes 


resulting from such a system would be not in the standard of liv- 
ing of ordinary labor, but in the luxuries of the wealthy whose in- 
comes are far above the level of high officers of army and navy. It 
is too seldom recognized that "dollar a year men" are not those 
ready to make any sacrifice for their country. In most instances the 
dollar-a-year big boys are those who prefer to retain the high sal- 
aries which industry will continue to pay them, rather than to 
accept the standard of living which they could earn for their execu- 
tive work as a Civil Service employee or as an army officer. There 
may be reasons why — even in a life-and-death struggle — the spe- 
cial privileges of wealth should be continued, but labor finds it in- 
creasingly hard to accept that tradition. 

The plan drafted by the United Auto Workers Union, CIO, at 
its conference April 9, 1942, is less drastic. They propose that all 
overtime pay be given to labor in War Bonds, a provision which 
would reduce spending at the present time, and release it when it 
may be needed during a post-war period. They propose a ceiling of 
3% profit on capital actually invested. They propose a top ceiling 
for families of the wealthy class of $25,000 a year, a level far 
above the pay of army generals or naval admirals. They want strict 
price-control and rationing of commodities for which demand ex- 
ceeds supply. If the war continues long, something of what this 
union proposes is likely to be the actual state of affairs, although it 
may prove simpler not to limit profits in advance, but to drain them 
off through taxation. Wage increases have pretty well stopped 
now, and are unlikely to be resumed. The wage issue is probably 
diminishing in importance, if the price control activities of govern- 
ment are effective. 

In summary, on the relation of wages to morale three conclu- 
sions may be justified. (1) the wage level in American industry 
as a whole is not high ; morale problems are still likely to arise in 
the third of the working class who receive less than $1000 a year; 
(2) wage increases due to the war have been substantially less 
than the increased return on capital ; (3) on the whole, while there 
have been offenders on both sides, the collective bargaining proc- 


ess has worked to maintain for American workers a fair standard 
of living, without giving labor any unfair advantage. From the 
standpoint of morale, the worst part of the whole wage-struggle 
has been the interpretation presented to the public by the American 
press and radio. 

Union Security 

The labor issue which has drawn most fire in the last year or 
two has been that of the desirability of compelling all workers to 
join a union. Labor leaders have argued for the "closed shop," the 
"union shop," or "union maintenance" as a necessary condition of 
union security. They reason that when all workers benefit from the 
provisions of a union contract, all workers should help to meet the 
necessary costs and elect the union officials. As they see it, com- 
pulsory participation is as necessary in industrial democracy as 
compulsory taxation and military service are in a political de- 
mocracy. Remember the young man who returned his income tax 
blank to the Collector of Internal Revenue with the reply, "I've 
decided not to join the income tax this year. It costs too much!" 
Certainly many laborers, if they could have all the benefits of 
union protection without taking any of the responsibilities of 
union life might conceivably choose that course. Then the union 
would dwindle and be unable to maintain the standards for which 
it has fought. The ideal of voluntary participation is good, say 
the union leaders, but there comes a point at which everyone has 
to do his share ; otherwise we reward the selfish and penalize those 
who are conscientious. It has been interesting to review the recent 
discussions of labor issues in magazines and newspapers, and to 
see how rarely this labor side of the case is stated. It was omitted 
from the Gallup poll of pro's and con's on the union shop. 

The other side of the argument has become more familiar to 
Americans outside the labor movement. The employers argue that 
it is un-American to compel workmen, against their preference, to 
join labor unions. Westbrook Pegler and Boake Carter have po- 
lemicized against the "racket," by which men are not permitted to 


work, even at defense jobs, unless they pay a rake-off, in the form 
of dues, to the fat purses of some union. It can easily be shown 
that there are many good agencies in American life: churches, 
service clubs, and political parties, for example, which do manage 
to live on voluntary contributions. The democratic way has some- 
times been called government by consent rather than government 
by force ; in that sense the closed shop is totalitarian. While it is 
true that some organizations of employers, bitterly opposed to the 
closed shop, maintain essentially the same kind of pressure to keep 
all the employers in the trade association and to boycott those who 
violate the agreements set up by organized industry, this type of 
counter-charge does not, of course, settle the rightness or social 
desirability of the practice. 

It is always precarious to undertake social prediction — the more 
so in a period like this when social change may be determined by 
unexpected forces. We venture, however, the guess that the issue 
of the closed shop is likely to follow the course of our culture as a 
whole. As the frontier has passed and interdependence has in- 
creased, our democracy has taken many steps away from anarchy 
and individualism in the direction of social control. Men once dug 
their own wells — today they use the city water. Once they formed 
volunteer fire-brigades — today they must pay for maintenance of 
the fire-department. A century ago the struggle over compulsory 
participation in the support of education was raging. Today it is 
taken for granted that all must contribute to the public school bud- 
get, in some proportion to ability to pay. Once insurance and sav- 
ings were left to individual discretion — today, through social se- 
curity, the nation directs compulsory provision for old age. It is 
not a far step to the conclusion that whereas once it was a matter 
for individual choice, whether one wished one union or another or 
no union at all, tomorrow we may see a general acceptance of the 
idea that whoever chooses to work as a teacher or plumber or coal 
miner, takes along with the job, a responsibility to participate with 
his fellow-teachers, fellow-plumbers, or fellow-miners in the union 
which represents their contribution to planning and control. In 


those industries which long have had practically 100% union or- 
ganization, industrial peace seems best established.^' '^' ^* 

A danger to morale seems to lie in the bitterness with which 
some reactionary groups are opposing this probable evolution of 
the labor movement. Addressing the Sales Executive Club on No- 
vember 18, 1941, President Walter D. Fuller of the National As- 
sociation of Manufacturers, condemned the strike of the United 
Mine Workers for a closed shop in the few remaining mines owned 
by steel companies, and concluded, ''If we can't Uck John Lewis, 
then we'd better lay off Hitler !" The decision of government arbi- 
trators, released the day after Pearl Harbor, granted the miner's 
demand, and must have seemed to Mr. Fuller a second damaging 
blow. More recently (March 15, 1942) Roger Babson wrote "Our 
most dangerous enemy today is not Hitler. It is not Japan. It is 
our own refusal to give up selfish privilege for the duration of the 
war. From the evidence at hand I regret to say that labor seems to 
be one of the worst offenders." An anti-labor editorial in the Tulsa 
World (quoted by the Nation, March 28, 1942, p. 358) said, "Cus- 
tomarily the wrath of the people in a war country is against the 
military enemy. Now the United States faces domestic foes, and 
wrath is being turned inwardly instead of outwardly." The New 
Republic concludes ominously (March 30, 1942, p. 414) : "There 
is now solid evidence that many American Tories intend to con- 
tinue to fight the administration and the unions even if it means, 
as it does mean, the risk of losing the war." Not long ago the 
writer heard a comfortable group at a dinner party predict that this 
international war would develop eventually into a bloody civil war 
between pro-labor and anti-labor factions within the United 
States. Preposterous as such a conclusion seems, it represents 
nevertheless a serious problem for agencies concerned to build 
morale. Speeches like these arouse the fears which Philip Murray 
expressed dramatically at the Joint Victory Rally in Pittsburgh 
(April 7, 1942) : "With their backs bent over their machines, 
their hearts and minds devoted to increased and increased produc- 
tion, the workers now look over their shoulders and find behind 


them with knife upraised, groups who would renew old attacks 
upon the workingman and his organizations." 


The morale of labor is almost as vital for victory as is the mo- 
rale of the fighting forces. At present there is little reason to fear 
for the morale of the workingmen of America. Four steps would 
help to preserve high morale : ( 1 ) insure a fair statement of la- 
bor's viewpoint, in the American press, radio, and movies ; (2) en- 
courage or require unions to extend democracy within their own 
ranks, purging organizations of dictators and racketeers; (3) pro- 
vide such a control of profits and prices and wages, as will demand 
approximate equality of sacrifice from all groups in American life ; 
and (4) dissuade the anti-labor extremists who are more inter- 
ested in fighting labor than in winning the War for Democratic 

Part Five: Recommendations 


Essentials for a Civilian Morale Program 

in American Democracy 

GARDNER . MURPHY College of the City of New York 

A MORALE program must be based squarely upon a firm and 
definite idea. Not only must this idea be clear; in order 
- to work, it must be capable of arousing loyalty at a deeper 
physiological or unconscious level. An American morale program 
must be based upon something that most Americans really believe. 
If these conditions are not fulfilled, more and more energy must 
be spent in trying to "put it over," and the venture will soon be- 
come self-defeating. Our first problem, then, in outlining a practi- 
cal morale program is to define the idea that can be developed to 
act as a sustaining principle. This idea will be sought in the Jef- 
fersonian tradition. Our second problem will be to define the 
organizational form which the Jeffersonian tradition demands. 
Third, we shall try to point out the chief obstacles to American 
morale; fourth, the ways of overcoming them. Fifth, we shall *ay 
a little about health as a sustainer of morale. Sixth, we shall try 
to formulate a basic objection which can be raised to our whole 
program, and undertake to meet it. Seventh, the existing organiza- 
tion of morale work will be sketched and, in the light of our whole 
argument, a plea made for a more unified morale leadership. The 
last and main point will be the central role of research in a morale 

The Historical Setting of a Present-day Program 

The settlement of the American Colonies involved a contrast 
between aristocratic principles, for the most part supported by 



landowners and merchant capitalists, and on the other hand farm 
and village democracy, a determination to strike out for new free- 
doms. The struggle of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians brought 
this contrast particularly to the surface, and it dominated most of 
the nineteenth century. Parrington found this dualism in American 
life — allegiance either to the ideas of an English landed gentry 
or to the common man's solidarity with his fellows — to be the basic 
determinant of American nineteenth-century thought.* This con- 
flict of ideas involved the necessity of repeated tests of strength. 
To simplify rather than be pedantically accurate, one may say that 
in the economic sphere the Hamiltonians have won more and more 
of the battles, in the political sphere the Jeffersonians. American 
economic life has become consolidated in a hierarchical monopo- 
listic form; yet a "New Deal," supported more and more ener- 
getically as one goes down the economic ladder,^ can gain the 
ascendancy. Masked by all sorts of minor struggles, the central 
struggle continues and will continue after the War. A morale pro- 
gram based upon central authority of any sort is likely to be 
seized upon by the economically dominant controls, and to become 
a Hamiltonian weapon. An approach based upon "grass-roots" 
ideas, middle- and lower-class determination to maintain and ex- 
tend the Bill of Rights, can give a Jeffersonian morale program 
the logical focus and the physical and political power necessary in 
long-range planning. 

If it be objected that to introduce this divisive note at a time 
when we must all stick together offers a weak spot for an enemy 
attack, the reply is that the conflict is here, and being honest about 
it is a way of coping with it ; secondly, that owing to the conditions 
of our own history, Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians have always 
been willing to accept temporary defeat. Their basic sense of 
identification with American life has proved sufficient to carry 
them through periods of economic or political reverse. 

Now the practical decision whether we shall use a Hamiltonian 
or a Jeffersonian program depends upon two very simple things : 
first, which one we think will carry us through the war and post- 


war years with the least danger and the most energy; second, 
which one will lay the best foundations for an enduring human 
happiness in this land and in others. I want to rest my case regard- 
ing this Jeffersonian message upon the actual contents of this 
volume,* with all its evidence of the superior human sense of the 
Jeffersonian message, and, second, upon the specific contents that 
I shall attempt to incorporate into my delineation of the program. 
The decision, then, is not arbitrary. It is not a question of per- 
sonal taste; it is not a question of the writer's feeling intellectually 
or emotionally more at home in the democratic tradition than in 
the aristocratic. If the research data gathered in the last few 
decades regarding the practical workability of a democratic idea 
are not in themselves convincing, the present chapter is insuffi- 
ciently grounded, its foundations inadequate. Whatever strength 
this program has, lies in the strength of a generalization whose 
empirical supports are clear. 

The Form of a Morale Program 

If, then, our Jeffersonian premises are clear, the first question 
regarding the practical establishment of a morale program is the 
question of the locus and form of its authority. The spirit of a 
proposal does not necessarily define its organization and structure. 
Shall it start in a centralized authority chosen by the group — in 
the same spirit, for example, as that in which Jefferson without a 
plebiscite negotiated with foreign powers, not hesitating to use the 
economic force of the nation to carry through his plans? Or, on 
the other hand, shall such a program arise as a spontaneous ex- 
pression of farm, village, or city conversations, mass meetings, 
newspapers, and those "indigenous" or spontaneous movements of 
thought which represent common reactions to a sensed situation — 
unplanned but collectively shared experience ? Shall a morale pro- 
gram start with the Administration and work downwards, or shall 
it start with a collectively sensed need working through larger and 

* See especially Chapters VII and VIII. 


larger local organizations until the mass effect is evident even at 
the apex ? 

Historical and experimental evidence alike indicate clearly that 
both methods need simultaneously to be applied. Central authority 
must move down to meet the groping hands below ; the groping 
hands must find more and more a way of achieving uniformity of 
effort, carrying their message upwards to the central authority. 
We may think of stalactites and stalagmites, which, after a long 
period of moving towards one another, sometimes actually coalesce. 
The higher democratic structures are regularly achieved in this 
way. Thus, for example, the extraordinary democracy of national 
life achieved by the Norwegians during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was based upon both an extremely enlightened 
government functioning in the spirit of a great tradition of indi- 
vidual liberty and also strongly organized regional controls such 
as health councils, with representation of various occupational 
groups and a passionate respect for the individual. The practical 
test of such a stalactite-stalagmite mode of organization was 
shown in the fact that the land of these health councils, a land 
poor in foods and unfavored as to climate, had the lowest infant 
mortality rate and the longest life span to be found anywhere in 
the world. 

In our own country, not only in '']tEtrson\2in'' political periods, 
such as the epoch of Jackson and the recent New Deal epoch, but 
even in periods of strong Hamiltonian accent, there has been a 
steady spread of local, democratically functioning organizations 
going to meet the authority of a central Administration. American 
life has often shown extraordinary democracy in its community 
organization. Farmers' organizations, trade and professional or- 
ganizations, women's organizations, fraternal, philanthropic, ath- 
letic, musical organizations, small and large, lead regularly to a 
pyramidal but nationally well-unified structure. We have a pas- 
sionate need to share with others living in the same sort of world ; 
we have to feel ourselves close to others who are thinking and 
doing the same things. Members of scientific organizations travel 


from all over the country to hear one another's papers. The co- 
operative movement struggles forward on the basis of an idea, 
often with little or no actual economic gain to the members ; the 
idea pushes up from below and reaches down from a leadership 
of intellectuals. Baseball clubs begin with village competition, then 
achieve state, regional, national organization. Typically, such 
organizations express the mixture of competition and co-operation 
which is characteristic of the tradition of our Western world; but 
we are not happy till there is a centred focus of our scattered 
activities — until we have a national federation of women's clubs, 
a world series of baseball games, national amateur auditions, and 
a national radio hookup to hear the girl from Springdale, Maine, 
who won them. This two-way action of pressure from above and 
from beneath is so fundamental an aspect of the Jeff ersonian tradi- 
tion that it will be set down as the major premise of a workable 

The Immediate Psychological Obstacles 

Now in the light of this historical setting, what does American 
war morale look like? On the one hand, we are proud of our 
tradition, as willing as our fathers were to struggle to maintain it. 
On the other hand, we have lived through a depression decade of 
insecurity and confusion; we have seen homeless and despairing 
youth bumming about and trying unsuccessfully to laugh its way 
through. We have been realists; we have learned to disbelieve 
newspapers and speeches; we have learned to hate war and to 
despise its tinsel. The old appeals that Civil War marching songs 
could make have lost much of their punch. If we are to have a 
determined morale, it will not come from refurbishing the heroic 
trappings of an age that is dead. It will come only if it is clear as 
daylight that the war can be fought to make life more secure, 
more abundant for our children. To prove this to the common 
man and woman is not a verbal task. It goes to the foundations of 
our leadership both in the Administration and in all the subleaders 


of our political, economic, educational life. Let me state the 
obstacles bluntly; then see if there is a way to overcome them. 

To state the obstacles in single words, they consist of apathy, a 
lack of enthusiasm either about the defense of democratic institu- 
tions or about the sort of a world which might emerge after the 
contest; second, a hardy skepticism, a disillusioned defeatism 
which, though very different from apathy, works much to the 
same end. The man bitten by the sleeping sickness of apathy moves 
forward with eyes half closed. But the doubting man has eyes 
wide open, watching for all the difficulties, obstacles, and dead 

Though both are extremely serious problems, it is important not 
to confuse them. Apathy, laziness, laissez-faire, the inability to 
take the crisis seriously will be steadily reduced both by the 
inevitable bad news of the next few months, and by a greater and 
greater insistence upon immediate action, by giving a clearer and 
clearer picture of the present perils, not only perils of physical 
defeat, but perils of economic and political disaster if apathy is 
allowed to continue. But the doubters constitute a completely dif- 
ferent problem; they are not going to be reached by any such 
simple technique. The doubters have an enormous amount of 
factual material at their disposal, starting with the causes of the 
1914 war, the mixed motives involved in American participation, 
the economic and moral contradictions of the Treaty of Versailles, 
the stupidity of much Allied and American diplomacy in the post- 
war period, the ambiguity of the peace which is to be achieved 
and the uncertainty of maintaining it. These are profound, indeed 
they may become absolute and inescapable reasons for doubt, 
even for cynicism. 

The techniques of coping with apathy will do nothing with such 
a temper but accelerate it, although, owing to physical or social 
hazards, the doubter may temporarily hide or suppress his doubts. 
A morale program aimed against apathy has nothing whatever to 
do with a morale program aimed against intelligent, honest, and 
profound skepticism. The overlooking of this distinction is the 


most serious error we can make. We do not even know today the 
role of these two very different sources of difficulty and conse- 
quently know very little about methods of coping with them. We 
can probably cope with apathy with relatively little trouble. But we 
do not know the exact form, extent, and depth of the basic 
skepticism; we know only that it is a major problem which has 
not been effectually dealt with. When, by opinion polls, clinical 
interviews, etc., it is properly assessed, it can probably be dealt 
with in terms of facts, facts of wide and deep personal importance, 
fact showing the inevitable long-range outcome of various courses 
of national action. 

Just a few examples. We have all read enough in the daily press 
and in magazines like the Readers Digest, and heard enough radio 
news commentators, to be uneasy about, and to want complete and 
clear information on many of the national perils which are still 
rather remote and indistinct. Morale deficiency can be expected as 
long as there is a shortage of : 

( 1 ) Facts about enemy strength : on the sea, in the air, in con- 
quered bases and territories, in natural resources, in man-power, 
morale and desperate ruthlessness ; the imperative of decisive de- 
feat before Triplice potential production becomes actual. 

(2) Facts about Nazi plans in Latin America for the establish- 
ment of economic, followed by military, pro-Axis cells working 
up to the Caribbean. 

(3) Facts about the rate of development of long-range super- 
bombers, and damage easily to be inflicted from the West Indies 
or Lower California bases by 1945 on both American seaboards 
regardless of antiaircraft or interceptors. 

(4) Facts about plans for preventing post-war depression in 
the United States, and for guaranteeing full employment with 
rising standards of living. 

(5) Facts about the types of civilization — in Germany, Italy, 
occupied Europe, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union — which our 
government will smile upon after the victory. 

Granted that in realistic practice, the Administration cannot 


funnel all their information into the next few fireside chats, 
the skeptic needs, above all, some facts about what kind of facts 
he can reasonably expect to receive. The majority of us are willing, 
in such a crisis, to take a lot on faith. But the skeptic must be 
honestly dealt with. 

A serious defect in the whole program up to the present is the 
silence of the federal government regarding the central plans, both 
as to the war and as to the peace. Granted that military and naval 
necessity may constrict the President's announcements, they did 
not constrict the utterances of the Atlantic Charter, and no mili- 
tary secret will be let out if the structure of our life during the 
war and after the peace is more directly envisaged. One provision 
of the Atlantic Charter, indeed, involving the destruction of the 
Axis powers, directly suggested a negative rather than positive 
plan on the part of the British and American governments, a situa- 
tion which would have been downright intolerable had not the 
public doubted whether anything much was to be expected of such 
a charter except "propaganda." The degree of distrust which has 
developed towards the Administration with regard to long-range 
planning is altogether lamentable, especially unnerving when one 
contemplates that the present Administration is more JeflFersonian 
than any we have had since the Civil War. The necessity for an 
all-out effort will, of course, have to take us beyond a patient 
''Of course, we all want the facts." It is much more than the 
already available facts — it is the trends, the indications, the likeli- 
hoods that we shall have to know. The longer the war, the more 
certain it is that no really high morale will be achieved except in 
terms of goals that really activate the deeper Jeffersonian tides 
of feeling. 

The Surmounting of the Obstacles 

The need, then, is great. Whose responsibility is it to meet this 
need — Administration or public ? Is this a stalactite or a stalagmite 
problem? It is both, as are all morale problems. But the time ele- 
ment is critical; leadership can move far faster in war than in 


peace. And the imperative need for unity puts further responsi- 
bilities upon the Administration. Most of what follows, then, is 
primarily a definition of the opportunity which exists for the Pres- 
ident and his cabinet. Such leadership, however, will be ineffective 
unless met by a sturdy popular response, going to meet, and to 
coalesce with the effort initiated in Washington. 

To define the opportunities offered to a morale program we may 
first simply invert the conditions of bad morale and then become 
more and more specific. We must mobilize personal effort into a 
national effort which will involve a minimum of friction and con- 
fusion, a program taking a realistic view of the existing economic 
or political structure and making whatever modifications are feasi- 
ble to move towards the improvement of the level of efficiency, at 
the same time observing the decencies and amenities which indi- 
vidual Americans assume to be a part of their heritage no matter 
what the national crisis. 

The second opportunity of a morale service arises directly from 
the fact that a really tough morale will depend a good deal upon 
whether or not we seize the opportunity to do a much longer and 
more fundamental job, the planning of a workable peace, a peace 
which will give some serious likelihood of being — literally — per- 
manent, and liberating the economic world resources for world 
use, canalizing science and technology in the service of a world 
standard of living, in other words utilizing an economic and politi- 
cal Allied victory for constructive rather than punitive purposes, 
and for permanent rather than temporary gain to the individual 
participants. This job is one which will not automatically be 
accomplished by the same network of arrangements involved in 
winning the War. Rather, there need to be two types of morale 
functions, a temporary and a permanent one, both to be jointly 
planned in their interrelation and both fully understood and 
accepted by the American public, one being understood as a neces- 
sary preliminary to the other, and receiving its justification largely 
in terms of the larger whole which our children and grandchildren 
may hope to enjoy. 


This means the need for a clear and convincing vision. Twen- 
tieth-century men are capable of visions, and Americans as much 
as any. They become traumatized if the visions are repeatedly 
found to be mirages, but the demand for a vision is pretty tough, 
and even when half dead can be revitalized if the conditions of 
health are so guaranteed that one is sure something real is there, 
to be seen in the distance. Putting aside apathy as something we 
can definitely conquer in a few months, there remains the central 
problem of guaranteeing the objectivity, the realizability of the 
thing portrayed in the vision. 

When we say that the temporary goal in winning the war and 
the long-range goal in winning the peace are two different goals, 
yet for the individual citizen two parts of one program of action, 
we must stress the fact that the articulation between the two must 
be absolutely clear. The individual must see the way in which his 
immediate sacrifices win not only the war but also the peace. He 
must not be overdosed with restrictions, abrogations of his civil 
and economic liberties in the name of the ultimate victory for 
which these are necessary. He can be subjected to these limita- 
tions if he sees them being applied universally and if he sees the 
guarantee of restoration of his privileges written with equal 
clarity upon the wall. He can give up some of the trappings of 
democracy if he sees the Administration and indeed the Allied 
forces throughout the world really aiming at something with 
which his heart is deeply identified. He can give up, step by step, 
more and more of the economic and other goods which he has 
counted his own, if step by step he sees with increasing clarity 
the security, democracy, and good will which will result from such 
temporary sacrifices. At the level of intelligence reached with 
our system of public schooling, he is not going to make these 
sacrifices willingly if he only half believes that the peace will give 
him and his children a better protection against ultimate im- 
poverishment or ultimate subjection to an autocracy. 

Now there is no sleight of hand, no psychological trick that 
can be effectively worked against the public in such a case. No 


amount of promising, no amount of signing of documents will 
convince him, will overcome either his apathy or his doubt or 
both; he must actually see, day by day, the political and institu- 
tional progress which he demands, or at least the steps made to 
implement such guarantees. Instead of more or less secret studies, 
made in Washington, of the economic and political structure to 
be achieved after the war, he has to have some knowledge of what 
is actually being done and what it may yield, and instead of being 
told only that the Axis is to be crushed, he needs to be told how 
the populations of these great powers are to be handled in the 
twenty years after the peace, what method of policing is to be 
carried out, what guarantee is to be given against a war between 
Britain and the Soviet Union for the assimilation of China; or, 
if these horrors are not allowed to happen, just what practical 
technique for their prevention is envisaged, just what sort of 
peace is going to exist for men everywhere to reach out for. 

If it be objected that all this is more than one harried Adminis- 
tration can be expected to do, the reply is that one chief reason 
why it is so hard to get spontaneous and energetic action is that 
the public has not been taken into confidence, the peace has not 
been clearly discussed, and a real reason for such tremendous 
sacrifices has been formulated only in negative terms. The fear of 
losing the war has a good deal of value; the fear of not winning 
the peace would add enormously. 

But this cannot be done all at once. There must be step-by-step 
progress, the social order moving monthly towards a Jefifersonian 
goal. Social Security has gone far ; there is still much to be done. 
Protection of women and children in industry still has a long way 
to go. Aid to education in a time of threatened curtailments is 
absolutely imperative if common people are really to believe it is 
democracy that is at stake. Direct aid to urban and rural families 
with incomes below the subsistence level cannot be kept so scan- 
dalously low as at present — let alone cut again — without impair- 
ment of both the armed forces and the civilian effort. The outcry 
of protest against nondefense spending will continue, but if it is 


listened to, we shall build beautifully for a fascism nurtured in 
disease and despair. Not all the economic gains have to be con- 
served; temporarily lowered standards of living can, and are, 
being taken cheerfully in many quarters. But where the danger 
signs are as clear as they now are in the sick parts of our indus- 
trial and agricultural system, a positive program of action, month 
by month, is the chief instrumentality of morale. It is a hundred 
times as important as a nice panelful of morale speeches. If the 
conservative critic objects that the Administration is using the 
crisis as a way of accomplishing democratic steps which could not 
ordinarily be achieved in peace (and this accusation has been 
voiced more than once) the reply is that that is exactly what must 
be done. It must, in fact, be done in long-range international 
terms,^ though our job is to begin at home. 

If all this had to be mapped out on paper first before any of it 
were achieved, the initial obstacles might be insurmountable. For- 
tunately, however, most people learn enormously more by prac- 
tical confronting of obstacles than they do by studying blueprints. 
The experience of Canada is a most striking example. It was not 
merely Churchill's propaganda that led to a more and more tre- 
mendous girding of the Canadian to his task ; it was the predica- 
ment and the promise of the situation itself. Learning by doing 
means that morale can be built by the steps taken if their temporal 
order is well planned. Confidence and courage come more by 
action than by precept, more by seeing the consequence of one's 
daily achievement than by seeing the logically necessary steps 
which follow from a master plan. The implementation of a grass- 
roots democracy through co-ordination of local efforts with the 
national plans will engender the sort of confidence and courage 
which no message from a leader, no matter how beloved, can 

Now as to the interrelations among the intellectual, labor, and 
business fronts in effecting a unified morale. There is doubtless a 


tendency in our analysis to overdo the intellectual front, a tend- 
ency to build morale in terms of the clarity of the ultimate goal 
to the thoughtful and educated man. We confess that all the fore- 
going displays this bias. But what the intellectual sees clearly al- 
most everybody glimpses or gropes at. We believe this bias has its 

It is very important, for all that, to show the relation of the 
intellectual to the other fronts. Americanism as conceived in Jef- 
fersonian fashion is in one sense profoundly conservative. "These 
are our privileges; nothing can take them away." "These ten 
specific items in the Bill of Rights have been won and we will 
die rather than give them up." For most Americans these simple 
privileges, liberties, guarantees, are interwoven emotionally with 
slogans, with the flag, with the observance of holidays, with 
familiar martial music, with a thousand large or small symbols of 
the great tradition. The intellectual front, the symbolic front, the 
action front, all these are interdependent. The intellectual front 
pays more attention to the structure of the future, but for that 
very reason has less solid roots in the motivating patterns of 
today. A serious morale program will involve all these fronts and 
their interrelation. It will not hesitate to utilize primitive and 
emotional forces provided always that these are led by rational 
and long-range intellectual processes rather than acting for the 
obfuscation of thought. 

The van may go too far ahead of the rear guard if the various 
aspects of such a program are not articulated. Thus, for example, 
martial music and camp routine may have some of these conserva- 
tive values for liberty-loving recruits, but if the intellectual front 
is not there, e.g., if the officers have no deep conception of what 
the war is about, the immediate experience in the camp can be one 
of unwelcome authoritarianism, arbitrary rules, mechanical obe- 
dience, officer and soldier class consciousness, and the frustration 
of the recruit's conception of what democracy means. We are not 
chiefly concerned here with military morale, but we are concerned 
with the effect which some conceptions of "discipline" may have 


Upon the civilian effort. If the boys go to the camps and become 
disgusted by much that they live through, particularly as to the 
relations obtaining between the soldiers and officers, the relations 
obtaining between different racial groups which share the hard- 
ships of military life, and the relations obtaining between soldiers 
and civilians; if they come out of camp, even on a week-end leave, 
feeling that the Army does not understand the relation of disci- 
pline to democracy, the effect on civilian morale can be devastating 
and there has already been tragic evidence that this is the case. 

The labor front is equally important. Labor, after its hard- won 
gains, has made tremendous sacrifices in submitting more and 
more of its freedom to arbitration of one form or another. When 
one gives Up in advance the right to strike, the whole economic 
system is upset. If labor sees industry making a similar guarantee, 
the situation is tolerable.* For the most part, however, sanctions 
can be imposed on investing capital only with much more difficulty 
than upon trade unions. And an industrial morale is just as much 
a question of long-range security as it is of immediate pay per 

It is imperative here that the Jeffersonian be honest about the 
business group — the large and small manufacturer, the salesman, 
the advertiser, the shopkeeper. British and Dutch democracy, and 
the Jeffersonian system, which developed so largely from them, 
are based on private ownership and private enterprise. The busi- 
ness world has been frightened by much that has happened, and 
with good reason. For a dozen years much capital has lain idle 
because the future was so uncertain ; and the social cost has been 
terrific. The progressive of every shade must inevitably identify 
himself with labor and with the small farm; but he cannot for- 
ever demand heavier and heavier taxation of business without 
trying to specify where the trend will lead. To suggest gleefully 
that the business class will be taxed or frightened to death, at a 
moment when it is clear as crystal that it will take all sorts of 

* See Chapter XVIII. 


capital to win the war, and twice as much again to win the peace, 
is to behave in the most fantastically unrealistic manner. 

If we reject the Marxist's conception of inevitable catastrophe 
which, as Jefifersonians, we think would give us a fascist world, 
we have no choice but to be honest about the business situation. 
This means making three things absolutely clear : ( 1 ) that busi- 
ness will never again be free to go back to the days of the "big 
killings," the ''Gilded Age" of swift exploitation of national re- 
sources or of unprotected labor; (2) that a definite sphere of 
private initiative and private profit, subject to government regu- 
lation, will be guaranteed, with all the sacredness of "deposit 
insurance" or a government bond; (3) that the form and func- 
tion of such business freedom will be determined by social-science 
research, not by punitive attitudes. 

Up to this point we have suggested a few of the many things 
which concern the federal government, with all of which it has 
grappled, and with all of which it needs to grapple more and 
more effectively. All the morale services so far depend on central 
federal authority, the stalactite in our earlier figure of speech. 

Special work with special groups in terms of age, of sex, of 
ethnic and religious background, is imperatively needed, too, in 
the interests of war and peace unity, but except for such examples 
as the studies of minority-group cultures now in progress in the 
Department of Justice, such work with special groups is more 
suited to the combination of stalagmite-stalactite procedures than 
to either one alone. Such morale efforts, for example, as the Julius 
Rosenwald Fund, have encouraged many positive morale achieve- 
ments in the South. Interracial councils, the interfaith conferences 
of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious and social leaders, 
the development of women's auxiliaries to all sorts of men's 
social and fraternal groups, a myriad of such opportunities exists 
for working out a unity based on the frank recognition of dif- 
ference3 in taste or aptitudes or aims. A unified long-range morale 


program must not only recognize but also emphasize very wide 
group diversities within the common framework of a reachable 

The same principle applies to the individual members of each 
such social group. The Iowa studies of democratic and autocratic 
groups, as well as the earlier and more diffuse experience of New 
England town meetings and party caucuses, have shown that in 
such a community as ours, healthy morale depends upon the 
recognition and encouragement of individual differences, even to 
the point of fierce rivalry. When the organization is free and very 
democratic, as in the case of French's study of student groups, 
individuality becomes a demonstrable, important feature in demo- 
cratic morale. The squelching of dissident elements is the worst 
possible way to achieve such democratic morale. We have argued 
that to give the dissident element a clear picture of facts rather 
than calling names is a fruitful morale procedure. More still, 
however, needs to be done. The minority-group member can be 
shown the specific contribution which he can make. His contribu- 
tion may add to the more placid and bovine contribution of the 
co-working group. Not only in Congress and in the press, but 
in the planning of the local morale work itself, there should be 
some acrid critics, not just to buy off the critics as a group, but 
to introduce some sulphur into the planning process. 

Physical and Mental Health 

Up to this point we have dealt with the major problem of 
democratic goals and means in mobilizing the energies we al- 
ready have. We come now to another major question, that of the 
basic physical and mental vitality from which such energies are 
derived. We confront not just the draftees who are physically 
unfit, but the vast discrepancy between scientific knowledge of 
nutrition and what is actually available to most American fami- 
lies, between known means of preventing disease and actual health 
levels. We face the paradox that occupational diseases and haz- 


ards **cost" enormously more than it would ''cost" to prevent 
them — e. g., a cent per ton of coal may stand between the safe 
coal mine and the mine from which disease and explosion strike 
without warning. At the psychological level we face the chasm 
between common-sense clinical knowledge of how to be reasona- 
bly sane and happy, and the practical finding that disturbed or 
even mentally upset children make up a fair proportion of the 
child population even in favored communities. Local health coun- 
cils, with the aid of doctors and nurses, can go a small part of 
the way, but with medicine organized on the basis of private 
profit, there must be much more than scattered volunteer efforts. 
It is high time to demand a central co-ordination of health- 
protecting activity (e.g., on the Norwegian plan), in which 
nutrition, industrial conditions, school and home, the healthfulness 
of physical and mental conditions of living, call out the collabora- 
tion of a vast number of varied specialists and the widest possible 
community support. Here, despite the opposition of the chief 
powers within the American Medical Association and of many 
individual industrialists and realty owners, the need is so clearcut 
and the authority so manifestly present in municipal, state, and 
federal hands, that no delay in action can be permitted without 
the gravest risks. 

Some Objections and Some Answers 

Now here we must let the rebuttal from dissenting voices make 
itself clearly felt. There is a logical and psychological defect in 
the whole program up to this point which must be faced with the 
utmost candor. Here we have an Administration already going 
far beyond traditional prerogatives, and subjecting itself to vio- 
lent criticisms because of its regimentation of the individual, and 
yet we are demanding in the name of democracy more and more 
such central authority. Here we are as individuals, writing morale 
programs — we, for the most part, academic psychologists with 
relatively meager knowledge of American national life, and even 


less about world patterns of culture — laying down rules as to 
what people ought to do. This is not far from W. G. Sumner's 
recipe: A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall 
be made to do for D^ On what possible basis can a democratic 
morale program be cooked up, formalized, or offered to the chief 
executive for implementation? 

Now, there are two lines along which an answer may be 
sketched. The first is the fact that with all the limitations of 
psychology and the social sciences, the persons in these disciplines 
have, as a group, somewhat more than the usual awareness of 
the kinds of things in human beings that have got to be studied 
if their morale is to be saved and augmented. They have, for ex- 
ample, a much more acute awareness than have the engineers 
and financiers regarding the ego needs, the sense of worth, the 
sense of individual respect upon which sound community organi- 
zation depends, and the price paid by refusal to recognize these 
"intangible" needs when girding ourselves to a huge task. In the 
second place, quite aside from the content of their sciences they 
have perhaps a clearer conception of the role of science in this 
enterprise than other groups can be expected to have, and are 
perhaps a little better able to talk about the role of science in demo- 
cratic morale. It is to these two points that I wish to devote the 
rest of my space. 

Now, with regard to the human needs which actually can be 
picked out and emphasized by psychology in support of the Jef- 
fersonian tradition. The thing that we call democracy involves a 
process of interdependent, mutual support and confidence which 
gives the individual the sense that while he or even the leader may 
drop out, the group will go on, not as a Hegelian entity, but as 
a mode of trusting interdependence of individual persons ; a naive, 
and yet, as our history shows, completely workable conception 
in which the ego, the sense of individual worth of each member, 
coincides with the fact — shown in experiments in group thinking 
— that the corporate product of group interstimulation is actually 
more workable, more satisfying than the product of individual 


and isolated activity. When the individual is given a place, when 
he feels his membership character in the whole, he has greater 
strength, and he gives more even to the most impersonal indus- 
trial process.^ 

Further, one could probably show that the two great intellectual 
movements of the modern world, science and education, arose as 
modes of interindividual stimulation under conditions of great 
individualism and at the same time are guarantees that any con- 
tribution, large or small, from any element, whether concurring 
or dissident, will find its place in the whole. Modern science and 
universal education have developed from democracy and have 
returned to it again. But economic centralization constitutes a 
more and more direct challenge to their integrity. We might use 
the term ''democratic paradox" to describe the fact that this great 
world movement toward science and education paralleled, and to 
some degree depended on, not only political democracy but also 
the movement towards consolidation of economic power ; the two 
great forces, economic autocracy and political-social democracy, 
still struggling for ultimate victory, have arisen in the same gen- 
eral cultural context, and despite the ''economic absurdity" of it 
all, the democratic process has, in the political field, held its own 
and even made critical gains. This seems to be because it is rooted 
in some psychological realities. The psychologist need not call 
himself sentimental when he discovers in the experimental studies 
of groups the same principle which the historical panorama re- 
veals. In fact, as an inductive scientist, he must not only point to 
the fact but must show the relation of his own experimental 
discipline to the larger social program. 

He believes, then, that he can meet thus the first argument 
raised by the rebuttal (page 421). At this point, he insists that 
his job is no longer that of maintaining the superiority of demo- 
cratic over authoritarian controls. Rather, he must show the 
context and function of authoritarian controls within the demo- 
cratic structure. He can, on the basis of existing data and fresh 
experiments, make clear just what sort of authority must remain 


and be cultivated. His experimental data show that leaderless 
groups, formless democracies, are ineffective or even frustrating. 
His data show that superimposed upon a broad foundation of 
mutual interindividual trust there must be individual resolution, 
the individual trying to mold the group to his will under condi- 
tions permitting the other members of the group to accept or 
reject such leadership. 

The very contrast of economic and political trends is an imme- 
diate challenge. The psychologist must help to discover those 
forms of economic consolidation which are necessary and essen- 
tial in a scientific and mechanical world. Instead of shouting down 
all efforts of a consolidating economy, he must carefully study 
the gains and the losses. He must study them in relation to the 
immediate world and in relation to the structure of a world at 
peace. He must help in the discovery of a workable amount and 
form of private property and of private initiative} What we 
know about individuals in relation to other individuals indicates 
that intensive study of this problem, including its psychological 
basis, must precede the completion of an economic plan for a 
world order, and that when such a world order is established it 
must continue its psychological investigation if it is to grow and 
remain healthy. 

Such a program is highly dissimilar from a totalitarian plan, 
a laissez-faire plan, or a Marxist plan. It differs from the totali- 
tarian in that respect for individual differences and the welcoming 
of criticism are essential. It differs from a laissez-faire plan in 
that a centralization of authority for short or long periods is 
recognized as essential. It differs from a Marxist plan chiefly 
in that the catastrophic phase of Marxism, the insistence on de- 
struction prior to reconstruction, appears from the present view- 
point to be unsound and to make the achievement of a Jeffersonian 
evolution that much the harder. There is no space to discuss the 
merits of these systems except to say that the merits of the four 
plans (the Jeffersonian, totalitarian, laissez-faire, and Marxist) 
is, from the Jeffersonian point of view itself, a question of re- 


search, not dogmatically laid down but offered as a hypothesis, 
which, with the encouragement of scientific research, should in 
time make clear the actual merits of such systems. It is only on 
the basis of unhampered historical, economic, and laboratory 
research that the precise area of usefulness of the Jeffersonian 
ideology can be defined, but paradoxically, it is only by proceed- 
ing in the Jeffersonian spirit that an answer to such a question 
can be scientifically sought. 

The Existing Organization of Morale Work 

We may attempt now a rapid enumeration of some types of 
morale work now being carried on in the United States. The 
Office of Facts and Figures under Archibald MacLeish has been 
entrusted with research on public opinion, the war-time experi- 
ences and attitudes of the American people, and with the release to 
citizens of appropriate information and inspiration. The O.F.F. 
analyzes also newspaper and radio comment; keeps close contact 
with organizations which might influence public opinion, but es- 
pecially those of racial or national minorities ; and supervises the 
speeches and press releases of government leaders. The Committee 
on War Information has been responsible for information re- 
leased directly to the public, and it also influences administrative 
policy in matters which might have an important effect on morale 
(e.g. treatment of enemy aliens, increased opportunities for Ne- 
groes). As this is written a reorganization and unification of in- 
formation services is in prospect. 

The Office of Civilian Defense is concerned with civilian morale 
as affected by reassurance against aerial attack, but is also organ- 
izing Community Councils and encouraging participation on a 
broad gcale. Industrial morale, in so far as it is cared for, is con- 
sidered to be a by-product of the work of the War Labor Board, 
the Department of Labor, Sidney Hillman, and the present 
rapprochement of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and 
the American Federation of Labor. The morale of minority 


groups, in so far as it is studied, is taken care of partly by the 
minority-group studies in the Department of Justice and by the 
President's Committee on Fair Employment under Malcolm Mac- 
Lean. The morale problem of children and of youth groups is 
shared by various subdepartments of the Federal Security Agency, 
the Department of Agriculture, the Children's Bureau, the Com- 
missioner of Education (under whom there is a service for the 
''morale of youth"), etc. and, indirectly, by many such agencies as 
the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Admin- 
istration. Army morale is fostered, not only by suggestions from 
Brigadier General Frederick Osborne, but also by the efforts of 
the Adjutant General's Office to test abilities of selectees, to pro- 
vide wise classification and efficient training. Morale in the Navy 
is partly the function of the Director of Education in the Navy 
who has given special attention to placing men where they really 
want to be within the various Navy subdivisions, ascertaining 
both their technical skills and their interest in shop work, steam 
fitting, electrical, radio, or at-sea service in one type of vessel or 

From this brief description, I believe it will be clear that there 
is no central federal morale service or anything like it. This leads 
us then to the matter of private services. The Committee for Na- 
tional Morale, organized by Arthur Upham Pope in the summer 
of 1940, undertook to get together a number of social scientists, 
psychologists, physicians, educators, journalists, and Army offi- 
cers, to which were rapidly added representatives of business, 
labor, women's organizations, etc., with the idea of drawing up 
a general plan for a federal morale service which, in some form, 
it was hoped the Administration would accept. In the course of 
that fall and winter, some hundreds of pages of specialized 
memoranda on the morale of various groups were prepared, some 
of which were read by various Cabinet members and to which, in 
general, there was apparently a rather favorable response. But a 
negative decision was reached with reference to the establishment 
of a central morale service. It was evidently felt by many that 


the Office of Government Reports, together with other federal 
agencies, was taking care of the publicity relating to the factual 
situation of the United States, and that a "morale service" of 
any sort would be publicly construed as a new effort of the type 
of the Creel Committee; that is, an attempt at whooping it up 
for war participation, active propaganda rather than the patient 
discovery by Americans of what they really thought about the 
world predicament. 

The Council for Democracy established by Henry Luce has 
quietly accumulated and distributed a number of factual and in- 
terpretative documents on the function of a democracy, with 
special reference to the differences in basic procedure between 
democratic and authoritarian societies as such differences are 
manifest in labor relations, legal relations, etc. 

Various university and college groups have set up morale 
agencies of which the one incorporated within the Harvard De- 
fense Council is perhaps the best. A seminar on morale conducted 
by H. A. Murray and G. W. AUport is an important component 
in a general program of co-ordinated research, as is a speakers 
bureau to which many staff members have offered their services. 
A number of other institutions are, in varying degree, copying 
the efforts of the Harvard Defense Council. For the most part, 
these defense councils are concerned with the more obvious and 
pressing military problems, including air-raid defense, but their 
speakers bureaus necessarily include reference to wider aspects 
of morale work. 

The community defense councils throughout the country show 
varying degrees of interest in morale. They are for the most part 
going at the matter realistically by putting people to work on 
specific jobs (first-aid, air warden, etc.). There seems to be no 
tendency toward local organization of morale committees as such, 
no spontaneous development within communities. The reason 
seems to be that for civilian morale, in the narrow sense as re- 
lated to war duties, no morale organizations are needed. There is 
no panic, no confusion as to individual civilian duties. The public 


has had it dinned into its head for a long time that morale is 
keeping up your spirits; and since spirits are being kept up, the 
question might arise in any community, ''We're doing our job; 
why the excitement about morale?" 

There are, moreover, three points I think that are overlooked 
when it is expected that local morale committees should or could 
play an important role. In the first place, the problems are not 
''locar but "horizontal" problems, having to do with special 
groups in the population. For example, there are industrial prob- 
lems, agricultural problems, camp problems, and metropolitan- 
area problems. In none of these cases can the local community 
organization work effectively. But in horizontal, or national-group 
terms, a great deal is being done and a great deal remains to be 
done. For example : 

(1) The C.I.O. and A.F.L. (as, for example, in the Labor Day 
broadcasts on defense against fascism) are both working to build 
up a basic morale, not a momentary labor morale in terms of just 
''sticking at work" ; and the unwillingness of the Administration 
to support extreme antistrike legislation has been a good case of 
mutual reinforcement of private and Administration efforts. 

(2) Many businesses have accepted with little protest those 
"priorities" which in many cases have made the promised land 
of recovery recede just as it came to sight, and are adjusting to a 
constantly shifting and expanding tax program. The willingness 
to give up big profits appears, in the light of a Senate investiga- 
tion, reported in the preceding chapter, to be unevenly distributed. 

(3) The press, necessarily under our system an organ of busi- 
ness, has reflected the business changes just described. The press 
has for the most part stopped bickering, accepting not only the 
necessary central authority, but the various official and unofficial 
censorships imposed. Three things will need to be closely watched ; 
(a) newspaper attitudes toward union labor, {h) their willingness 
to withhold "scoops" when requested for defense reasons, (c) 
their playing up the immediate news and playing down the long- 
range economic and social changes in progress. Cooperation with 


the U.S.S.R. is still more alarming to certain publishers than 
would be a compromise peace with Hitler. It is too much to hope 
that all the rabid isolationist newspapers will play clean ball, but 
on the whole the press has responded with rather decent spirit. 

(4) Response to the local defense councils, and to the appeal 
of the Office of Civilian Defense for air-raid wardens and for 
co-operation with their plans, has been extraordinarily hearty and 
spontaneous. Though the New York public, for example, has ut- 
tered the usual minor healthy grumblings, because of confusion in 
air-raid warnings and the inadequacy of the sirens ordered to 
give air-raid alarms, the general attitude has been very patient, 
and the energy of a great many wardens has been well nigh spec- 
tacular. If attack on the western or eastern coast begins on a 
large scale, a certain amount of panic can be expected among the 
emotionally unprepared, but there is no special reason to believe 
that our response will differ much from that of the British. All 
these are reasons against local community organisation of autono- 
mous morale committees. The thing need not be done that way. 

The Central Role of Research 

This brings us to our last and main point, the place of scientific 
work in a morale program. How little recognition there is of the 
vast possibilities is evident in the fact that in most minds, 
''science" still means physics, chemistry, biology, etc., with almost 
no interest in the creative possibilities of the social sciences in 
terms of what can be done for temporary and for permanent 
morale. When, in November, 1940, a national conference was 
held on morale, it had to be held under the National Research 
Council, because the Social Science Research Council had no 
status with the federal government ; and H. A. Murray's plan for 
a federal department of social science has, like so many carefully 
planned social-science proposals, gone to Washington and found 
no door open to it. 

It has indeed been a heartbreaking experience throughout re- 


cent months to see social-science experts of all sorts offering their 
services, or trying to offer their services, for specialized jobs, 
while week by week announcements are coming from Washington 
that some important task is going to a person scarcely familiar at 
all with the technical problems and methods required for its 
solution. This is one of the prices of democracy, of course. In 
the sense in which democracy is here being discussed, it is a 
luxury to be given up quickly. The National Roster of Scientific 
and Professional Personnel is one of the important steps taken and 
it is hoped that this and others will rapidly be implemented to- 
gether with civil-service lists and the membership lists of learned 
societies, to the end that some sort of real utilization be made of 
our social-science manpower. 

A very encouraging sign of progress is the plan for an inter- 
national conference in Washington of representatives of all the 
social sciences to cooperate in planning for the post-war world. If 
there is to be a stable world order based on an economy of abun- 
dance, it would be of importance to us to know at the present 
moment, and not merely after the armistice, what utilization of 
Chinese, Japanese, German, British, Italian, French, Dutch, and 
Soviet economists, historians, psychologists, educators is to be 
made when the peace is actually functioning. 

If there is to be an intense and enduring emphasis upon re- 
search, both in the techniques of morale-building and in the feasi- 
bility of the various goals to which a morale program is directed, 
there will need to be both privately and publicly a study of the 
research facilities and an appraisal of the institutional training 
centers, especially in the social-science fields, in psychology, child 
study, and education. 

In addition to the Roster, another bright spot is offered by the 
public-opinion polls, which can show the actual temper of the 
"public mind" at a given moment. Though from such data it is 
usually impossible to find out much about the deeper wants or 
long-range hopes, and though in most such polls one does not 
know which individuals who said yes to question 1 also said yes 


to question 3, forward-looking changes are nevertheless being 
made. Beginning about four years ago, the Department of Agri- 
culture undertook to place its remedial efforts on a broader factual 
basis than had previously been deemed possible. The idea was to 
study farmers' ideas, feelings, attitudes, hopes, not by the method 
of the whirlwind campaign or the stump-speech reaction, but by 
contact of trained interviewers with individual farmers and by 
active efforts of each county representative to get farmers to voice 
their feelings at meetings, collectively thinking about their pre- 
dicament, their relation to other farming groups and to the urban 
consumer, as well as their relation to the federal system of credit 
and marketing services. There developed during Mr. Wallace's in- 
cumbency as Secretary of Agriculture a vast and effective system 
of communication between farmers and the federal government, 
farmers becoming more and more in the habit of discussing their 
grievances at the federally stimulated county discussions and more 
and more taking for granted the conception that the Department 
of Agriculture was their Department, their sounding board. Late 
in the second New Deal term, moreover, some striking develop- 
ments were to be seen, particularly in the methods of ascertaining 
farmers' attitudes. The new method involved no mere ''sampling" 
of opinion. Rather, a casual but thorough conversational basis for 
the exchange of ideas was developed between farmer and inter- 
viewer. The interviewer was one who knew the area and the farm- 
ers' immediate problems. He spent whatever time he needed in 
getting the feel of the situation. The result has been that opinion 
polling has been advanced in two striking respects. The interrela- 
tion of attitudes has been made much clearer ; and the relation of 
the attitude syndrome to the personality and socio-economic situa- 
tion of the farmer has been analyzed. We thus have not only the 
possibility of large-scale statistical comparison of regions and of 
economic levels, but some conception of the dynamics of attitude 
and of attitude shift. Obviously, serious morale work must be 
based not upon knowledge of attitude only, but also upon this sort 
of knowledge of underlying dynamics. Such knowledge makes, for 


example, all the difference between ease and extreme difficulty in 
shifting attitudes. It will make the difference between trying to 
shift them by verbal means and getting at the situational circum- 
stances that will quasi-automatically result in their changing — in 
other words, the difference between propaganda and rectification 
of life difficulties. An extension and a deepening of this sort of 
attitude study may well become a basic bulwark of democratic 

It would be pointless to attempt to bring into relation, item by 
item, all the social-science services mentioned above and all the 
specific morale research fields just defined. An adequate survey 
of morale needs, short and long, and of research facilities and 
personnel can only be undertaken by the federal government. It 
can also be undertaken only by utilizing the national or regional 
organizations, horizontal associations of specialist groups, and 
leaders of occupational, religious, and ethnic organizations. 

The likelihood of persuading the President to establish a central 
morale service will depend, I believe, very largely upon the amount 
of emphasis given to the need for morale research as such. No 
chief executive can very well wish to see a thing as basic as na- 
tional morale put into technical hands for day by day operation. 
If he is a real President, he will want to be the morale leader, and 
he will want to handle the problem both by what he does day by 
day, and by broadcasts, press conferences, public announcements, 
and messages relayed through his spokesmen and agencies. When 
it comes to research, however, the case is quite different. The chief 
executive is in no position to conduct morale research. He has 
within the United States, by far the best trained personnel that 
ever existed to carry out basic studies of the conditions of our 
physical and mental health, and the conditions of our own greatest 
possible effort both for the immediate winning of the war and for 
long-range establishment of a decent and workable peace. If he 
cannot be persuaded to set up a co-ordinated morale research or- 
ganization of this type, much of the morale effort being carried 
out during this emergency will be abortive and inconsequential. 


Failing this, however, one important thing can still be done. Re- 
gional, occupational, and other horizontal organizations are work- 
ing out their own morale research programs. The psychologists, 
economists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, are making 
their own surveys of the morale situation. These surveys can 
actually coalesce, so as to set up a nongovernmental but neverthe- 
less national morale research organization, planning not just in 
terms of the moment, but in terms of the genuine application of 
the social sciences to the remaking of the world. Such a national 
organization, having a pyramidal structure and coming to an apex 
in some central office, could then function on a national basis. It 
would ultimately, belatedly, be recognized by the federal govern- 
ment exactly as the various national scientific groups welded to- 
gether in the American Association for the Advancement of Sci- 
ence have been recognized, and as the various national scientific 
societies electing their representatives to the National Research 
Council have a direct opportunity to voice their collective research 
ideas for any government agency that has a research interest. A 
national organization of all the sciences having to do with the con- 
ditions of temporary and permanent human well-being could, then, 
make itself valuable; it could in time dominate public opinion, it 
could in time weaken the resistance of reactionary vested inter- 
ests ; it could in time influence large blocs of voters and finally get 
federal action on a larger and larger scale. It is only on a research 
basis that any of this can be done. The attempt to organize a na- 
tional morale service in terms of slogans and rephrasing of our 
national predicament will never do the job better than the chief 
executive can, and probably not as well. But to lay the real basis 
of morale, which is essentially a research job, corporate activity 
can do very much better than any single individual can, no matter 
who he may be. 

To conclude, then, our stalactite would represent the earnestly 
desired establishment of a centralized federal morale division, in- 
corporating all the features described above and so organized as to 
develop rapidly on an international basis in terms of a long-range 


plan for a human and workable economic and social world pat- 
tern; or, failing that, a federation of social-science organizations 
(including psychology and medicine) could function as a substi- 
tute. The chief stalagmite consists of intensive, week-by-week, 
concrete, horizontally organized group efforts, based upon specific 
morale researches — researches on rural and urban children, youth 
groups in and out of camps, successful and impoverished farmers, 
union members, labor leaders and petty tradesmen, frightened and 
confident shopkeepers and small businessmen, big industrialists and 
financiers; Catholics, Protestants, Jews; doctors, lawyers; Ger- 
man-Americans, share-croppers, whites and blacks. 

There is no danger that we shall make the error of too much 
attention to factual detail. There is, as the foregoing volume will 
demonstrate, plenty of keen thinking about basic morale hypoth- 
eses, and the theoretical standards set in psychology and social 
science today are such that there is more likelihood of over gen- 
eralizing than of overfactual emphasis. Actually, the state of 
affairs as far as research is concerned is quite healthy. Most of 
the hypotheses in this book, for example, are realistically oriented 
about problems upon which factual data can be gathered. There 
is nothing abstract about studying children's clubs and their lead- 
ers, the reactions of college women to an announcement of world 
news, or studies of the morale of workers employed in a factory. 
Psychology is matter-of-fact enough to offer plenty of large 
and sweeping hypotheses waiting for genuine tests. The research 
itself must be local, specific, and capable of giving clearcut factual 
answers. The S.P.S.S.I. or the A.P.A. or any other central pro- 
fessional organization can consolidate such research as actually 
exists. Blueprinting is excellent, but actual samples of good morale 
research are perhaps more important still. It will be on the basis 
of examples of achievement that useful blueprints can be offered 
to federal or other authorities. 

As an aid to clarification of some of the research problems in 
individual morale to which the psychologist, physician, social 
scientist, and educator would be called, a very rough sketch of 




lO-C « 

^'o c 

o o 
















r; o 








some interrelations is given in Figure 1. This is hypothetical; re- 
search would be needed to determine how sound it is, and in what 
way the picture varies from one individual to another. It may help 
perhaps, nevertheless, to show the interrelations between the types 
of morale research and morale service that the emergency de- 


A morale program can be founded upon a Jeffersonian basis. 
The great morale needs have to do with apathy, skepticism, and 
inadequate health standards. These problems can be dealt with 
through a central federal morale agency. Failing this, the consoli- 
dation of morale work can be achieved through the co-operation 
of existing private services. In either case, a genuine morale serv- 
ice will be found to depend largely on carefully planned and 
oriented psychological research. 


The list of references for each chapter is separately alphabetized 
and numbered. 


1. Farago, L. German Psychological Warfare. New York: Com- 
mittee for National Morale, 1941. 

2. Hu Shih. The conflict of ideologies. Annals, 1941, 218, 26-35. 

3. Perry, R. B. The Philosophical Roots of Totalitarianism, James- 
Patten-Rowe Pamphlet Series, 9. Philadelphia: American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 1940. 


1. Alexander, F. Defeatism concerning democracy. Amer. J. Or- 
thopsychiat., 1941, 11, 643-651. 

2. Alexander, F. John Bollard's "Hostility and Fear in Social 
Life." Social Forces, 1938, 17, No. 1. 

3. Alexander, F. Psychiatric aspects of war and peace. Amer. J. 
Soc, 1941, 46, No. 4. 

4. Alexander, F. The social problem and the individual. Parent 
Educ, 1937, 3, No. 4. 

5. Follett, Mary P. The New State — Group Organization, the So- 
lution of Popular Government. New York: Longmans, 1934; and 
succeeding works. 

6. French, Thomas M. Social Conflict and Psychic Conflict, Amer. 
J. Soc, 1939, 19. 

7. Freud, S. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Lon- 
don: International Psychoanalytic Press, 1922. 

8. Lewin, K. Experiments on autocratic and democratic atmos- 
pheres. Social Frontier, 1938, 4, No. 37. 

9. Lewin, K., and Lippitt, R. An experimental approach to the 
study of autocracy and democracy. Sociometry, 1938, 1, 292-300. 



10. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., and Korsch-Escalona, S. Studies in 
Topological and Vector Psychology I. Univ. la. Stud., 1940, 16, No. 3. 

11. Sandburg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln, the Prairie Years. I. New 
York: Harcourt, 1926. 


1. Bakke, E. W. The Unemployed Man. New York: Button, 1934, 
Ch. 3. 

2. Brown, J. F. Psychology and the Social Order. New York: 
McGraw, 1936. 

3. Cannon, W. B. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and 
Rage. New York : Appleton, 1928. 

4. Gould, R. An experimental analysis of level of aspiration. 
Genet. Psychol. Monogr., 1939, 21, 3-115. 

5. Hansen, A. H. After the War — Full Employment. National Re- 
sources Planning Board, 1942. 

6. Happe, F. Erfolg und Miserfolg. Psychol. Forsch., 1930, 14, 

7. Jersild, A. T. Child Psychology. New York : Prentice, 1940. The 
citation is from p. 726. 

8. Lazarsfeld, P. F., Jahoda, M., and Zeisl, H. Die Arbeitslosen 
von Marienthal. Psychol. Monogr., Leipzig, 1933, No. 5. 

9. Sherif, M. Psychology of Social Norms. New York: Harper, 

10. Shirer, W. L. Berlin Diary. New York: Knopf, 1941. 


1. Anderson, C. L. The development of a level of aspiration in 
young children. University of Iowa, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 

2. Barker, R., Dembo, T., and Lewin, K. Frustration and regres- 
sion : an experiment with young children. Studies in Topological and 
Vector Psychology H. Univ. la. Stud., 1941, 18, No. 2. 

3. Bavelas, A., and Lewin, K. Training in democratic leadership. 
/. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol, 1942, 37, 115-119. 

4. Fajans, S. [Distance and strength of a valence in infants and 
young children]. Psychol. Foisch., 1933, 17, 215-267. 


5. Farago, L, [ed.] German psychological warfare: survey and 
bibliography. New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941. 

6. Farber, M. Imprisonment as a psychological situation. Univer- 
sity of Iowa, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1940. 

7. Festinger, L. Wish, expectation, and group standards as factors 
influencing the level of aspiration. [To be published in /. Abnorm. 
Soc. Psychol.] 

8. Frank, J. D. Studies in social pressure. Unpublished mono- 

9. Frank, L. K. Time perspectives. /. Soc. Philos., 1939, 4, 293-312. 

10. French, J. R. P., Jr. Disruption and cohesion of groups. /. 
Abnorm. Soc. Psychol, 1941, Z6, 361-378. 

11. Hall, O. M. Attitudes and unemployment: a comparison of the 
opinions and attitudes of employed and unemployed men. New York : 
Arch, of Psychol. 1934, No. 165. 

12. Keister, M. E. The behavior of young children in failure: an 
experimental attempt to discover and to modify undesirable responses 
of preschool children to failure. Studies in Preschool Education I, 
Univ. la. Stud., 1937, 14, 29-84. 

13. Korsch-Escalona, S. The effect of success and failure upon the 
level of aspiration and behavior in manic-depressive psychoses. Univ. 
la. Stud., 1939, 16, No. 3, 199-303. 

14. Lasswell, H. D. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 9. 
New York : Macmillan, 1933. 

15. Lippitt, R. Field theory and experiment in social psychology : 
autocratic and democratic group atmospheres. Amer. J. SocioL, 1939, 
45, 26-49. 

16. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., White, R. Patterns of aggressive be- 
havior in experimentally created '^social climates." /. Soc. Psychol., 
1939, 10, 271-299. 

17. Meyers, C. E. Child behavior under conflicting authority and 
different types of commands. University of Iowa, unpublished doc- 
toral dissertation, 1941. 

18. Roethlisberger, F. J. Management and Morale. Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1941. 

19. RoethHsberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. Management and 
the Worker. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. 

20. Sears, P. S. Level of aspiration in academically successful and 


unsuccessful children. /. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol., 1940, 35, 498-536. 

21. Wright, B. P. Selfishness, guilt feelings, and social relations. 
University of Iowa, unpublished master's dissertation, 1941. 

22. Wright, E. The influence of frustration upon the social rela- 
tions of young children. University of Iowa, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, 1940. 


1. Alexander, F. Educative influence of personality factors in the 
environment. Paper read at the Symposium on Environment and Edu- 
cation, University of Chicago, September 22, 1941. In press. 

2. Bateson, G. Culture contact and schismogenesis. Man, 1935, 8, 

3. Bateson, G. Naven. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1936. 

4. Dollard, J. Caste and Class in a Southern Town. New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1937. 

5. Ef ron, D. Gesture and Environment. New York : King's Crown 
Press, 1941. 

6. Gunther, Hans. Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes. Munich: 
Lehmanns Verlag, 1925. 

7. Klineberg, O. Race Differences. New York: Harper, 1935. 

8. Mead, M. Educative effects of social environment as disclosed 
by studies of primitive societies. Paper read at the Symposium on 
Environment and Education, University of Chicago, September 22, 
1941. In press. 

9. Mead, M. Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies. 
New York : Morrow, 1935. 

10. Mead, M. Social change and cultural surrogates. /. Educ. 
SocioL 1940, 14, 92-128. 

11. Roheim, G. The Riddle of the Sphinx. London : Hogarth Press, 


1. Anderson, Harold. Domination and integration in the social 
behavior of young children in an experimental play situation. Genet. 
Psychol. Monogr., 1937, 19, 343-408. 

2. Anderson, Harold. Measures of classroom behavior as a guide 
to teacher selection. Understanding the Child, 1941, 10, 7-11. 


3. Bavelas, A., and Lewin, K. Training in democratic leadership. 
/. Ahnorm. Soc. Psychol, 1942, 37, 115-119. 

4. Cur f man, M. M. An experimental investigation of some of the 
influences of authoritarian and democratic atmospheres on the be- 
havior of small groups. Stanford University, master's thesis, 1939. 

5. French, J. R. P. Jr. Behavior in organized and unorganized 
groups under conditions of frustration and fear. Harvard University, 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1940. 

6. French, J. R. P., Jr. The disruption and cohesion of groups. 
J. Ahnorm. Soc. Psychol, 1941, 36, 361-378. 

7. Gordon, Mary Martha. Discriminatory leadership and its effect 
on the relations between the more and the less privileged subgroups. 
University of Iowa, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1940. 

8. Jennings, Helen. The structure of leadership — development and 
sphere of influence. Sociometry, 1937, 1, 99-144. 

9. Kephart, Newell C. Group autonomy in a children's institution. 
Ment. Hyg., 1938, 22, 585-590. 

10. Kephart, Newell C. Notes on social group structure in an insti- 
tution for retarded children. Sociometry, 1939, 95-98. 

11. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., and White, R. K. An experimental 
study of group and individual reactions of children under three dif- 
ferent types of adult leadership (forthcoming publication). 

12. Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., and White, R. K. Patterns of aggressive 
behavior in experimentally created social climates. /. Soc. Psychol, 
1939, 10, 271-301. 

13. Lippitt, Ronald. An analysis of group reaction to three types 
of experimentally created social climates. University of Iowa, un- 
published doctoral dissertation, 1940. 

14. Lippitt, Ronald. An experimental study of authoritarian and 
democratic group atmospheres. Univ. la. Stud., 1940, 16, No. 3, 

15. Lippitt, Ronald. A report of an experimental teaching project 
in educational psychology. Unpublished manuscript. 

16. Marshall, Mariann. Democracy and dictatorship in a camp 
school. Progressive Educ, 1939, 16, 418-422. 

17. McCandless, B. R. The effect of enriched educational experi- 
ence upon the growth of intelligence of superior preschool children. 
University of Iowa, master's thesis, 1938. 


18. Moreno, J. L. (with Jennings, Helen). Who shall survive? A 
new approach to the problem of human relations. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 
Monogr. Ser. No. 58. Washington, D. C. : Nervous and Mental Dis- 
ease Publishing Co., 1934. 

19. Mowrer, O. H. Authoritarianism vs. "self-government" in the 
management of children's aggressive (antisocial) reactions as a prep- 
aration for citizenship in a democracy. /. Soc. Psychol., 1939, 10, 

20. Wright, Erik. The influence of frustration on the social rela- 
tions of young children. University of Iowa, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, 1940. 

Other studies not specifically mentioned which have entered 
into the formulation of the generalizations of this chapter : 

21. Baruch, Dorothy W. A study of reported tension in inter- 
parental relationships as co-existent with behavior adjustment in 
young children. /. Exp. Educ, 1937, 6, 187-204. 

22. Buhler, Charlotte. The Child and His Family. New York: 
Harper, 1939. 

23. Hahfman, Eugenia. Social structure of a group of kindergarten 
children. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., 1935, 5, 407-410. 

24. Lewin, Kurt. Field theory and experiment in social psychol- 
ogy: Concepts and methods. Amer. J. SocioL, 1939, 44, 868-896. 

25. MacDonald, A. K. A study of the use of natural groups in 
the formation of Scout Patrols. Springfield College, Springfield, 
Mass., master's thesis, 1941. 

26. MacFarlane, Jean W. The guidance study. Sociometry, 1939, 
2, 21. 

27. Pigors, Paul. Leadership or Domination. New York: Hough- 
ton, 1935. 

28. Redl, Fritz. Group psychological problems in classroom teach- 
ing. Chicago : Division of Child Development and Teacher Personnel, 
Commission on Teacher Education, American Council on Education, 

29. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. Management and 
the Worker. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1940. , 



1. Lippitt, Ronald. An experimental study of the effect of demo- 
cratic and authoritarian atmospheres, Univ. la. Stud., 1940, 16, No. 3. 

2. Tead, Ordway, The Art of Leadership. New York: McGraw, 


1. Allport, G. W. Liabilities and assets in civilian morale. Ann. 
Amer. Acad., 1941, July. 216, 88-94. 

2. Doob, L. W. Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique. New 
York: Holt, 1935. 

3. Sargent, S. S. Can adults be de-propagandized? /. Adult Educ, 
1934, 6, 440-4^3. 

4. Saunders, D. A. The failure of propaganda. Harper's Magazine, 
November, 1941 ; 183, 648-655. 

5. Wirth, L. Morale and minority groups. Amer. J. Sociol., 1941, 
47, 415-433. 


1. Kulp, D. H., II. Prestige as measured by single experience 
changes and their permanency. /. Educ. Research, 1934, 27, 663-672. 


1. Cantril, Hadley. Public opinion in flux. Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. 
Soc. Sci., March, 1942. 


1. Belden, J. That's what you think. Threshold Magazine, October, 

2. Cousins, N. Immunity complex in America. The Saturday Re- 
view of Literature, October 18, 1941. 

3. Hall, G. S. Morale. New York: D. Appleton, 1920. 

4. Saunders, D. A. The failure of propaganda. Harper's Maga- 
zine, Nov., 1941. 



1. Baron, S. The future of European Jews. Contemporary Jewish 
Record, 1940, 3, 355-369. 

2. Bogardus, E. S. Immigration and Race Attitudes. Boston: 
Heath, 1928. 

3. Cole, N. E. The personal attitudes of high school pupils in Colo- 
rado toward alien nations and peoples. Unpublished master's essay, 
Colorado State Teachers College, 1932. 

4. Dollard, J., and others. Frustration and Aggression. New 
Haven : Yale Univ. Press, 1939. 

' 5. Editors of Fortune. Jews in America. New York: Random 
House, 1935. 

6. Frank, R. Anti-Semitism in Congress. Jewish Frontier, 1941, 
8, No. 8, 11-13. 

7. Goodrich, N. H. Nazi interference in American affairs. Con- 
temporary Jewish Record, 1940, 3, 370-380. 

8. Goodrich, N. H. Politics and prejudices. Contemporary Jewish 
Record, 1940, 3, 571-576. 

9. Horowitz, E. L. Race attitudes. Ch. V in Characteristics of the 
American Negro, Otto Klineberg, ed. To be published by Harper's, 

10. Lesser, A. Anti-Semitism in the United States. /. Negro Educ, 
Yrbk. No. X, 1941, 545-556. 

11. Lippman, L. Forces fighting intolerance. Congress Weekly, 
1941, 8, No. 32, 6-7. 

12. Meltzer, N. Group differences in nationality and race prefer- 
ences of children. Sociometry, 1939, 2, 86-105. 

13. Monjar, E. Racial distance reactions. Sociology and Social 
Research, 1936, 21, 559-564. 

14. Thurstone, L. L. An experimental study of nationality pref- 
erences. /. Gen. Psychol, 1928, 1, 405-425. 

15. Wirth, L. Morale and minority groups. Amer. J. Sociol., 1941, 
47, 415-433. 


1. Carter, E. Opportunity: an editorial. /. Negro Life, 1941, Feb- 


2. Institute for Propaganda Analysis. Negroes ask about democ- 
racy. Propaganda Analysis, 1941, 4, No. 10. 

3. Johnson, E. E. Should Negroes save democracy? Scrihners 
Commentator, November, 1941. 

4. New York Temporary Commission on the Condition of the 
Colored Urban Population. Second report. Legislative document 
No. 69. 

5. Wilkerson, D. Special problems of Negro education. Staff study 
No. 12 prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education. Wash- 
ington : U. S. Govt. P. O., 1939. 


1. American Association for Adult Education, J. H. Bentley, dir. 
The Adjustment Service. New York: American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1935. 

2. Bakke, E. W. The Unemployed Man. New York : Button, 1934 ; 
pp. 62-72. 

3. Fisher, V. R., and Hanna, J. The Dissatisfied Worker. New 
York: Macmillan, 1931. 

4. Hall, O. M. Attitudes and unemployment. Arch. Psychol., 1934, 
No. 165. 

5. Hartmann, G. W., and Newcomb, T., eds. Industrial Conflict: A 
Psychological Interpretation. (First Yearbook of the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues.) New York: Cordon, 1939. 

6. Hoppock, R. Job satisfaction. New York: Harper, 1935. 

7. Jack, L. M. An experimental study of ascendant behavior in 
preschool children. Univ. la. Stud., 1934, 9, 7-65. 

8. Miller, D. C. Morale of college trained adults. Amer. Sociol. 
Rev., 1940, 5, 880-889. 

9. Miller, D. C. Personality factors in the morale of college trained 
adults. Sociometry, 1940, 3, 367-382. 

10. Miller, D. C. Youth and national morale. /. Educ. Sociol., 1941, 
Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 17-28. 

11. Page, M. L. The modification of ascendant behavior in pre- 
school children. Univ. la. Stud., 1936, 12, 3-69. 

12. Pitkin, W. B. Psychology of Happiness. New York: Simon, 


13. Reichenberg, W. An experimental investigation of the effect 
of gratification upon effort and orientation to reality. Amer. J. Or- 
thopsychiat., 1939, 9, 186-203. 

14. Rundquist, E. A., and Sletto, R. F. Personality in ihe depres- 
sion. Minneapolis : Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1936. 

15. Sailer, R. C. Happiness self -estimates of young men. New 
York: Teachers College, Bureau of Publications. 1931. 

16. Watson, G. Happiness among adult students of education. /. 
Educ. Psychol, 1930, 21, 79-109. 

17. Watson, G., and Kirsch, J. Morale among families on relief. 
(Unpublished study.) 


1. Adamic, Louis. Dynamite: the Story of Class Violence in Amer- 
ica. New York: Viking, 1931. 

2. Beard, Mary. Short History of the American Labor Movement. 
New York: Harcourt, 1920. 

3. Brooks, R. R. R. As Steel Goes: Unionism in a Basic Industry. 
New Haven : Yale Univ., 1940. 

4. Brooks, R. R. R. Unions of their own Choosing. New Haven: 
Yale University, 1939. 

5. Carsel, W. A History of the Chicago Ladies Garment Workers 
Union. Chicago: Normandie House, 1940. 

6. Cayton, H. R. and Mitchell, George S. Black Workers and the 
New Unions. Chapel Hill : Univ. N.C., 1939. 

7. Cooke, M. L. and Murray, Philip. Organized Labor and Pro- 
duction: Next Steps in Industrial Democracy. New York: Harpers, 

8. Grosser, Paul K. Ideologies and American Labor. New York : 
Oxford University, 1941. 

9. Golden, C. S. and Ruttenberg, H. J. The Dynamics of Industrial 
Democracy. New York: Harper, 1942. 

10. Green, William. We Work for the Future: American Federa- 
tion of Labor and National Defense. American Federation of Labor, 
901 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C, 1941. 

11. Jones, Alfred W. Life, Liberty and Property. Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1941. 


12. Jones, Mary, The Autobiography of Mother Jones. Chicago: 
C. H. Kerr, 1925. 

13. Minton, Bruce. Men Who Lead Labor. New York: Modern 
Age, 1937. 

14. Norgren, Paul H. The Swedish Collective Bargaining System. 
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1941. 

15. Seidman, Harold. Labor Czars: a History of Labor Racketeer- 
ing. New York : Liveright, 1938. 

16. Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues. Industrial 
Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation. S.P.S.S.I. Yearbook, New 
York: Cordon, 1939. 

17. Wunderlich, Frieda H. British labor and the war. Social Re- 
search, 1941, Suppl. 3. 


1. Kornhauser, A. W., in Hartmann, G. W., and Newcomb, T. 
(eds.) Industrial conflict: A psychological interpretation. New York: 
Cordon, 1940. 

2. Laski, H. Where do we go from here? New York : Viking, 1940. 

3. Means, G. Patterns of resource use. Washington : National Re- 
sources Committee, 1938. 

4. Parrington, V. L. Main currents in American thought. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927. 

5. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. Management and the 
worker. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. 

6. Sumner, W. G. War and other essays. New Haven : Yale Univ. 
Press, 1911, p. 247. 


Aberhart, Premier, 268 
Ability, morale and, 305-308 
Activity, morale and, 41-43 
Adjustment Service, 273-344 
Adjutant General's Office, 426 
Adolescence, time perspective in, 66-67 
Adult indecision, 287-288 
Advance, sense of, 44-47 
Africa, British defeats, 176 

British policy in, 242 
Age, morale and, 296-300, 348 

productivity and, 57 
Agriculture, Department of, 110, 375. 

morale program and, 430 
Aiken, Senator, 381 
Air power, U. S. morale and, 411 
Albert, case report, 97-98 
Alberta, 267-268 
Alexander, F., 78n. 
Allport, Gordon W., 3-18, 120 n., 

169 n., 369, 427 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 388 
Ambition, morale and, 336-341 
America First Committee, 215 

Negroes and, 241 
American ancestry, morale and, 305 
American Association for the Ad- 
vancement of Science, 433 
American Association for Applied 

Psychology, vi 
American Federation of Labor, 391 

co-operation with C.I.O., 425 

morale program and, 425, 428 

Negro pohcy, 377-378 

relation to labor movement, 375 

war attitude, 365, 370-371, 376-401 
American Institute of Public Opinion, 
190-214, 220, 384 

unions and, 398 
American Medical Association, 421 

American Psychological Association, 
vi, 30 n. 

morale program and, 434 
American Revolution, 19, 22, 112 

army democracy, 36 

success aspect, 44 
American Youth Congress, 209 
Americans, national character, 74, 83, 

Ancestry, morale and, 305, 306 
Anderson, Harold, 137 
Annapolis, Negroes excluded, 234 
Antioch College, 33, 107 
Anti-Semitism, 13 

extent in U. S., 219-226 

geographical distribution, 223-224 

Negroes and, 242-243 
Apathy, 410 
Aristotle, 12 

Armed forces, democracy in, 36-37, 68, 

recruiting in Canada, 250-251 

Negroes in, 233-234, 243 
Armenians, social distance, 223 
Armistice of 1918, 3 
Army, morale program, 426 
Army Air Corps, Negroes in, 241, 244 
Art judgment, morale and, 296, 308, 

Aspiration levels, 58-61, 160, 338, 347 
Atlantic Charter, 9 
Attitudes, American, 173 

propaganda and, 169 

shifts in, 178-182 
Austrian ancestry, morale and, 305 
Authoritarianism, morale practice, 164 

youth experience with, 137-138 
Authority, democracy and, 421-425 
Avocations, morale and, 296, 329. 331- 

Axis, attitudes toward, 189-200 

Negro attitudes toward, 243 

strength and U. S. morale. 411 





Babson, Roger, 400 

Bakke, E. W., 30 

Bali, 81 n., 86 

Balkan area, German successes, 192 

"Ballad for Americans," Robinson- 

Latouche, 11 
Barnes, James E., 395 
Baron, Salo, 227 
Basic Magnesium, Inc., 395 
Bateson, Gregory, 30 n., 71-91, 175, 

202 n. 
Bavelas, Alex, 64 n., 120 n., 137, 143- 

Belden, Eugenia, 119 n., 208-218 
Belden, Joe, 119n, 208-218 
Belgium, 256 

"Believe It or Not," Ripley, 11 
Belonging, 57 

Bennington College, 175-185 
Bernice, case report, 98-99 
Bernreuter Personality Inventory, 276- 

280, 282-344 
Bethlehem Steel Co., 394 
Betty, migrant child, 102 
Bill of Rights, 417-418 
Billy, nursery child, 104, 105 
Bipolarity, national character and, 79- 

Blood banks, Canadian, 251 

Negroes and, 244 
Blue Eagle, 273 

Board of Economic Warfare, 375 
Bogardus, E. S., 222 
Bois, J. S. A., 262-270 
Bombing, morale and, 37-38, 168 
Booth, Lewis, 385 
Bourget, Bishop, 264 
Boycotts, labor, ZIZ 
British, national character, 71, 80-83, 

postwar plans for, 430 
British Columbia, 249 
Brown, J. F., 34 
Bruner, K. L., vii 
Bund of German Girls, 112 
Bunker, Senator, 395 
Bureau of Information, Canadian, 253 
Burrell, migrant child, 102 

California, attitudes toward minori- 
ties, 222-223 
California, University of, 107 
Canada, French, 262-270 

morale experience, 249-270, 415 

student morale, 259-261 

U. S. relations, 254-255 
Cannon, W. B., 38 
Cantril, Hadley, 196 n., 204 n. 
Capitalism, 31 

democracy and, 11 

postwar plans for, 418-419 
Carl, migrant child, 103 
Carter, Boake, 398 
Carter, Elmer, 239 

Case reports. Adjustment Service, 

children, 97-105 
Catholics, Adjustment Service obser- 
vations, 274, ZZ'h-Z'hl, 343 

attitudes on World War II, 198-200 

French Canadian, 263-264 

morale program and, 419 
Celotex Corporation, 395 
Censorship, morale and, 173 
Chamberlain, Neville, 6, 41 
Charity, 9 

Chi Square test, 289 
Chicago, University of, attitudes to- 
ward minorities, 222 
Child, The, Children's Bureau bulletin, 

Child-guidance centers, in England, 

in United States, 107 
Child-study centers, universities hav- 
ing, 107-108 
Child Welfare Station, University of 

Iowa, 145 
Children, morale responses, 56-58, 95- 

morale value, 95-118 

needs summarized, 110-111 

place in a democracy, 95-118 

statistics concerning, 110-116 

time perspective, 66-67 

war morale problems, 117-118 
Children's Bureau, 108, 110, 426 



China, 243 

Canadian attitude toward, 256 

postwar plans for, 411, 415 

propaganda approach, 71 

U. S. attitudes, 191 
Chinese, 222 . 

national character, 71 

postwar plans for, 430 
Christian Mobilizers, 221 
Churches {see Religious groups) 
Churchill, Winston, 42, 143, 255 

labor and, 370 

news policy, 45 

Roosevelt meeting, 203 
C.LO. News, 380n. 
Citrine, Walter, 370 
Civil War, Army democracy, 36 

unity after, 44-45 
Civilian Conservation Corps, 114, 426 
Civilian Defense, Office of, 43, 425, 

Clark, Kenneth B., 228-248, 378 
Class conflict, 368-369, 380 

unions and, 379, 389 

union security and, 399-400 
Cleveland Trust Co., 366 
Cliffy, nursery child, 104 
Closed shop, controversy over, 398-400 

public opinion of, 367-368 
Club participation, morale and, 329, 

330, 347 
Cohan, George M., 166 
Cole, N. C, 222 
Collectivism, democracy and, 11 
Colleges, attitudes in, 175-185, 259-261 
Colorado, attitudes toward minorities, 

"Colored People Have a Stake in the 

War," 237 
Committee to Defend America, 237 
Communism, 171 

U. S. attitudes, 194 
Communists, 19 

Communities, psychosociological stud- 
ies, 7Z 
Competition, 26-27 

national character and, 82-83 
Complementary behavior, national 

character and, 83-89 
Comsomols, 112 
Conally, Senator, 382 

"Confirm own plans," 287-288 

Conflict, Negro feeling, 246 

Congress, anti-Semitism in, 220 

Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
breadth of interest, 390 
co-operation with A.F.of L., 425 
morale program and, 425, 428 
production promotion, 369-370 
relation to labor movement, 375 
war attitude, 365, 370-372, 376, 384- 

Connie, nursery child, 104 

Conscientious objectors, 63 

Consumers, labor movement and, Z77 

Consumers Research, 166 

Consumers Union, 166 

Co-operation, international, 46 
labor and, 389-391 
national character and, 82n. 

Co-ordination, voluntary, 16-17 

Corporatism, in French Canada, 267- 

Council for Democracy, 427 

Cousins, Norman, 213 

Creel Committee, 15, 35, 167, 173, 427 

Cresswell, Helen, 145n. 

Crisis, The, 236, 239-242 

Grosser, Paul K., 367 

Crosswaith, Frank R,, 237 

Culture, labor unions and, 387-389 

Culture contacts, national character 
and, 78-79 

Curfman, M. M., 127, 128, 130 

Czechoslovokia, 256 

Dahlbert, industrialist, 395 
Danger, awareness of, 37-40, 168 

French Canadian morale and, 267- 

morale and, 37-40, 168 

physiology of, 38 
Davis, W. H., 385 
Democracy, 3 et passim 
Democratic morale, nature of, 3-18 

unique features, 7-17 
Democrats, confidence in Roosevelt, 

Decisiveness, morale and, 346 

persistency and, 54 



Defeatism, 41-42 

Defense bonds, public opinion on, 203- 

Defense Communications Board, 391 

Defense councils, 427-428 

"Defense work," 43 

Developmental experiences, morale 
and, 100-101 

Dictatorship, morale in, 15-16 

Dies, Martin, 209, 384-385 

Dinarics, gesture, 72 

Discipline, morale and, 417-418 

Discrimination, 10, 230 
(see also Segregation) 

Discussion, freedom of, 14, 380-389 

Diversity, unity and, 57 

Divisiveness, 34 
Canadian problem, 252, 265-266 

Doenitz, Karl, 36 

Dollard, J., 79 n. 

Dominion Test of General Intelli- 
gence, 266 

Doob, L. W, 169 n. 

Dottie, nursery child, 104-105 

Doukhobors, 249 

Dressmakers Union, I.L.G.W.U., 388 

Dunkirk, 37, 176 

Dutch, postwar plans for, 430 

Duties, morale and, 8, 41-43 

Dynamogenesis, 180 

Economic Outlook, 394 

Economic environment, morale and, 

Education, in Canada, 265 

democracy in, 66 

on labor movement, 386-387 

morale and, 316-319, 346 

propaganda as, 166 

segregation in, 230-231 

statistics on, 114-116 
Education, Commissioner of, 426 
Efron, D., 73 
Eldora, migrant child, 102 
Eliot, Thomas, 372 
Elizabeth, queen of England, 266 
Emergencies, group response, 132-136 
Emotion, propaganda and, 173 
Emotional security, morale value, 345 

Employees, morale among, 349-364 
Employer, attitude toward, 296, 350- 

Employer-employee councils (see 

Murray Plan) 
Employment, duration and morale, 

Employment stability, morale and, 296, 

England (see Great Britain) 
Enid, Okla., 385 
Epictetus, 347 
Equality, in armed forces, 36-37 

army and, 36 

leadership and, 24-26 

Negro demand, 247 

political, 23-25 
Erbe, Fred O., 145 n. 
Escape from Freedom, Fromm, 73 n. 
Ethics, morale and, 7-17 
Ethiopia, Canadian attitude toward, 

Etiquette, Negroes and, 232-233 
Europe, postwar plans for, 411 
Experimental extinction, 39 

Facts and Figures, Office of, 425-426 
Failure, national character and, 74 
Fair Employment, President's Com- 
mittee on, 426 
Fairness, children, 66 
Family, morale and, 108-109, 345-346 
Fascism, French-Canadian attitude, 

Fascists, attitude toward Negroes, 237 
Fear, children and, 98-117 

groups and, 55 

morale and, 347 
Federal Communications Commission, 

Federal Security Agency, 426 - 
Federationist, The, 380 
Filipinos, social distance, 223 
Food, morale and, 55-56 
Ford, Henry, 378 
Fortune surveys, 31-32, 213 n., 222-224 

on labor, 386-387 
Forty-hour week, 382-384 
Four Freedoms, 9, 31 



Fourteen Points, 31 

France, attitudes toward, 190-200 

collapse of, 192 

early republic, 23 

French Canada and, 266 

morale experience, 37, 54 

propaganda approach, 71 
Frank, L. K., 49 
Frazer, J. W, 395 
French, national character, 71 

postwar plans for, 430 
French, J. R. P., Jr., 137, 420 
French, Thomas M., 19-29 
French Canadians, morale, 252, 262- 

French Revolution, 19 
Freud, Sigmund, 25-26 
Friendship, 57 
Fries, Margaret, 107 
Fromm, Erich, 73 n. 
Frustration, 57-58, 226 

group response, 132-136 

laissez-faire and, 124 

Negro experience, 244-247 
Fuller, Walter D., 400 
Future, psychological, 48-49 

Gallup Poll (see American Institute 

of Public Opinion) 
Gang, morale and, 33-34 
Garibaldi, G., 264 
Garveyism, 246 
Gaylord, E. K, 382 
General Electric Co., Murray Plan 

in, 390 
General Motors Corporation, 391 
George, problem child, 99 
George VI, 266 
German-American Bund, 221 
Germans, American attitude toward, 

Canadian attitudes toward, 253, 257 

national character, 71, 74, 80, 83-87, 

postwar plans for, 430 
Germany, Army social status, 36, 68 

attitudes toward, 184, 185, 190-200 

Jews' morale, 49 

leadership in, 143-144 

morale, theory and practice, 55, 164 
news programs, 175 
postwar plans for, 411 
propaganda approach, 71 
religious group attitudes, 199-201 
student attitudes toward, 184-185 
success claims, 45 

Gesture, national character and, 72 

Ginsburg, Morris, 71 n. 

Glen, nursery child, 104 

Goals, difficulty and morale, 58-61 
French Canadian, 263-264 
group and individual, 60-63 
morale essential, 30-33 
otherworldly, 263, 265 
propaganda and, 173 
psychological distance, 53, 66-67 
time perspective and, 50-70 
youth group, 137-142 

Godbout, Premier, 262 

Goebbels, P. J., 15 

Goethe, J. W., von, 171 

Golightly, C. L., 7n. 

"Good life," morale and, 229-230 

Goodrich, Nathaniel H., 221 

Gordon, Mary Martha, 133-134 

Gore, Representative, 395 

Gould, R., 44n. 

Government Reports, Office of, 426 

Graphology (see Handwriting) 

Great Britain, 12 
African and Indian policy, 242 
aid sentiment, 175-185, 238 
attitudes toward, 171, 190-200 
child-guidance centers, 118 
employer-employee councils in, 370 
family morale experience, 346 
freedom of discussion in, 14 
labor relations in, 370, 380 
labor war demands, 374 
morale experience, 37, 39, 54, 168, 

postwar plans for, 415 
propaganda approach, 71 
wage increases in, 393 n. 

Group morale, time perspective and, 
54-55, 62-63 
World War II and, 142 
youth, 119-142 

Groups, cohesive forces in, 131-136 



face-to-face, 66-67 

fear in, 55 

goals, 62-63 

interpersonal relations in, 127-131 

national, 79-89 

satisfaction with life in, 120-127 
Greece, British defeat in, 176 
Green, William, 374, Z^ 
Gunther, Hans, 72 


Habe, Hans, 239 
Hall, G. Stanley, 216, 230 
Hall, O. M., 299, 300, 312, 336 
Hall Scale for Measuring Occupa- 
tional Morale, 275-276, 280-344 
Hamilton, Alexander, tradition of, 

Hamiltonianism, 405-436 
Hampton Institute Conference, 234 
Handwriting, 294, 340 
Hansen, Alvin H., TtZ 
Happe, F., 44 n. 

Happiness, as morale measure, 121 
Harlem, children in, 111-112 
Harrisburg, child-guidance centers, 

Hartmann, G, W., 327 n. 
Harvard Defense Council, 427 
Harvard University, 107 
Hauck, Adolph, case report, 340-341 
Hawaii, 38, 69, 189 

{see also Pearl Harbor) 
Health, morale and, 314-316 
Hecht, Mortimer, case report, 328 
Henderson, Leon, 373, 393 
Herald Tribune, New York, 388 
Hershey, Louis B., 385 
Heterogeneity, national character and, 

Hillman, Sidney, 367, 390, 425 
Hirsch, Benjamin, case report, 294- 

Hitler, Adolf, 15, 34, 68, 194, 428 
attitudes toward, 170, 237-238, 243, 

Babson on, 400 
childhood influence, 112 
democracy and, 36-37 

Negro attitudes toward, 237-238, 

psychological war, 41, 56 

religious program, 264 

success propaganda, 44 
Hitler Jugend, 112 
Hope, defined, 48 

morale and, 44-46, 48-70 
Hoppock, R., 318 
Horowitz, E. L., 224 
Hospitals, segregation and, 231 
Hour, The, 243 

Hughes, Robert, case report, 284-286 
Hull, Richard L., 349-364 


Iceland, 203 

Income, morale and, 296 

statistics, 392-395 
India, British policy in, 242 
Individuals, national character and, 
relations within groups, 127-131 
respect for the, 8-9, 372 
Industrial Council Plan {see Murray 

Industry, employer-employee councils, 
morale in, 273-401 
Initiative, 55-58 

persistency and, 54 
Intelligence, morale and, 64-65, 296, 

305, 307 
International Labor Organization, 46 
International Ladies Garment Work- 
ers Union, 237 
educational work, 388 
press, 380 n. 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 

166-167, 211 
Iowa, University of, 107, 145 n. 
Isolationism, anti-Semitism and, 220- 
221, 224-225 
Negroes and, 237, 241-242 
students and, 212-215 
Italian ancestry, morale and, 305 
■Italians, American attitude toward, 
171, 223 
national character, 72 



social distance, 223 
postwar plans for, 430 
Italy, Army democracy, Z7 
news programs, 175 
propaganda approach, 71 
U. S. attitudes, 192 

Jack, L. M., 345 
Jack & Heinz, 395 
Jackson, Andrew, 408 
Japan, Army democracy, Z7 

attacks U. S., vii, 16, 2>?>, 38, 69-70, 
119, 193 n., 208 {see also Pearl 

Babson on, 400 

Negro attitudes, 243 

news programs, 175 

postwar plans for, 411 

propaganda approach, 71 

U. S. attitudes, 191-194, 196, 243 
Japanese, 13 

national character, 71 

postwar plans for, 430 

social distance, 223 
Jefferson, Thomas, 3 

quoted, 9 

tradition, 405-434 
Jeffersonianism, 405-436 
Jehovah's Witnesses, 250 
Jennings, Helen, 128 
Jersild, A. T., 40 
Jews, 252 

Adjustment Service observations, 
274, 294, 335-336, 341, 342 

as problem group, 223-224 

morale in Germany, 49-50 

morale in U. S., 218-227 

morale program and, 419 

national character, 72 

Negro attitudes toward, 243 

persecution of, 13 

social distance, 222-223 
Jim Crow, 230-248 
Jobs, Negro discrimination in, 233-234 
Johnson, Ernest E., 241 
Jones, Mary "Mother," 368 
Justice, 380 
Justice, Department of, 419, 426 


Keller, George D., 145 n. 

Kephart, Newell €., 128 

Ketchum, J. D., 249-261 

King, Mackenzie, 262, 264 

Kirsch, J, 316-318 

Klinberg, Otto, 72 n., 218-227 

Knights of Columbus, 269 

Knox, Frank, 262 

Kulp, D. H., 181 n. 

Kokomo, Ind., labor survey, 391 n. 

Kolstad, Arthur, 349-364 

Labor, lies about, 380-387 

morale of, 365-401 

morale program and, 418 

propaganda and, 172 

public opinion on, 384 

turnover and morale, 366 
{see also Unions) 
Labor, 380 n., 385 
Labor, Department of, 425 
Labor-management councils {see Mur- 
ray Plan) 
Labor Party, British, 374-375 
Labor relations, 349-364, 365-401 
Labor Statistics, Bureau of, 366 
Labor's Monthly Survey, 391-392 
Laissez-faire, 424-425 

goals and productivity, 63 

youth morale under, 124-127 
Lake, Timothy, case report, 338-340 
Laski, Harold J., 45 
Lasswell, H. D, 169 
Latin America, propaganda approach, 

Latins, national character, 71 
Latouche, John, 77 
Lazarsfeld, Paul R, 30 n., 31 
"Leader principle," morale aspects, 

Leaders, morale of, 64-65 

training and morale, 143-165 

U. S. confidence in, 200-202 

vital importance, 143 
Leadership, authoritarian, 121-127, 
128-131, 132-133, 137-138 

autocratic, 62 



defined, 120 n. 

democratic, 12, 62-63, 121-127, 132- 
133, 137-138, 141-142, 144 

dictatorial, 12 

equality and, 25-26 

laissez-faire, 122-127, 132-133 

morale response to, 163-165 

quality of, 146-165 

time perspective and, 64-65 

union, 378-379 

withdrawal of, 132-136 

youth attitudes toward, 120-127 
League of Nations, 46 
Learning, national character and, 75 
Lewin, Kurt, vi, 23, 30 n., 48-70, 122, 
124, 125, 128, 133, 137, 139, 164 n. 

experiments on national character, 
Lewis, Hartford, case report, 291-294 
Lewis, John L., 400 
Life, magazine, 262 
Life Satisfaction Index, 276-344 
Likert, Rensis, 30 n. 
Lincoln, Abraham, equality and, 24-25 

on unity, 34 
Lindbergh, C. A, 199, 225, 226 
Lippitt, Ronald, 119-142, 164 n. 

cited, 122, 124, 125, 128, 130, 133, 
137, 139 
Loice-Lee, migrant child, 103 
Love, 9 

Lubin, Isador, 375 
Luce, Henry, 427 
Lynd, Carl, case report, 283-284 


McCandless, B. R., 141-142 
McKenzie, Alan B., 238 n. 
McWilliams, Joseph E., 221 
MacLean, Malcolm, 426 
McLeish, Archibald, 425 
Majority rule, 11, 2,77-2>79> 
Management, labor relations and, 358- 

production and, 394 

war record, 381-382 
Margaret, migrant child, 103 
Marine Corps, Negroes in, 244 
Marital status, morale and, 300-304, 

Marrow, Alfred J., 60, 61 n. 

Marshall, Mariann, 137-138 

Marx, Karl, 389 

Marxism, 419, 424-425 

Mary, migrant child, 102 

Mary-Faye, migrant child, 103 

Mason, G. W., 395 

Mayer, Mrs. Max, 145 n. 

Mead, Margaret, 76 n., 78 n,, 82 n., 

86 n., 108 
Measures of morale, 30, 275-280, 350 

group-life satisfaction, 120-127 

handwriting analysis, 294, 340 

happiness, 121 

initiative, 55-58 

productivity, 55-58 

reliability, table, 279 

self-report and, 280-282 

tenacity, 51, 55 
Mechanical aptitude, morale and, 296, 

297, 308, 309 
Mechanical Assembly Test, 308 
Mein Kampf, A. Hitler, 46, 112 
Meltzer, H., 223 
Merelene, migrant child, 103 
Mexicans, social distance, 222, 223 
Mexican War, Army democracy, 36 
Miale, Flora R, 282 n. 
Migratory workers, child morale 

among, 102-105 
Miller, D. C, 299, 302, 308, 314, 327, 

Mills, H. S., 385 

Minnesota Spatial Relations Test, 285 
Minnesota, University of, 107 
Minorities, 13 

discrimination against, 230-236, 239- 

Jews {see Jews) 

labor unions and, 379 

morale program and, 419-420, 425 

Negroes, 228-248 

totalitarian treatment, 245 
Monjar, E., 223 
Monroe, James, 6 
Montreal, 262, 268 
Morale, 3 et passim 

definitions, 4-5, 55, 119-120, 216, 230, 

development of, 95-173 



five factors in, 30-47 

group (see Group morale) 

indices of (see Measures of morale) 

industrial, 273-401 

marginal, 228-229 

nature and importance, v-vii, 3-18, 

Nazi definition, 55 

program for (see Morale program) 

survey of, 189-270 

theory of, 3-93 

youth-group, defined, 119-120 
Morale program, in Army, 426 

essentials for, 405-436 

existing organization, 425-429 

national character and, 71-91 

Navy and, 426 

research in, chart, 435 
Mowrer, O. H., 128, 130 
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 394 
Moscow, 168 
Mothers, help for, 111 

working, 105-106 
Motivations, 20-29 
Murphy, Gardner, vi, 405-436 
Murray, H. A., 427, 429 
Murray, Philip, 369, 371, 376, 400 
Murray Plan, 369-370, 390-391 
Murrow, Edward R., 37 
Music, morale and, 332 
Mutual support, 33-37 


Nash-Kelvinator Corporation, 395 
Nation, The, 239, 240, 367, 385, 400 
National Association for the Advance- 
ment of Colored People, 236, 238, 
240, 243 n. 
National character, bipolarity, 79-89 
morale and, 71-91 
objections to theories of, 74-79 
National Conference of Jews and 

Christians, 222-223 
National Labor Relations Board, 385 
National Manufacturers Association, 

National Morale, Committee for, 426 
National Recovery Authority, 273 
National Research Council, 429, 433 

National Resources Planning Board, 
33, 375 

National Roster of Scientific and Pro- 
fessional Personnel, 429-430 

National Student Council for De- 
mocracy and Education, 209 

National Urban League, 236, 238 

National Youth Administration, 113, 
114, 426 

Nationalism, 9 

Nationality, 9 
variety of psychology, 71-91 

Naval Affiairs Committee, House of 
Representatives, 394-395 

Naval Reserve, Negro discrimination, 

Navy, U. S., 203 

morale program, 426 

Negroes in, 244 
Nazis, 85 

army democracy, 68 

attitude toward Negroes, 237-240 

influence on Negroes, 242-243 

Latin American plans, 411 

morale procedures and theory, 36, 

Negro attitudes toward, 237-238, 243 
Nazism, 15-16 
Negative adaptation, 39 
Negro in America, The, Fortune sur- 
vey, 223-224 
Negro Provisional Committee to De- 
feat Hitler, 238 
Negroes, 16, 226 

accommodation attitudes, 79 n. 

child morale problems, 111-112 

democracy and, 235-248 

democratic morale and, 10 

discrimination against, 10, 230 

morale among, 228-248 

persecution of, 13 

propaganda and, 172 

segregation (see Segregation) 

social distance, 223 

statistics on, 115 

unions and, 377-378 

youth morale problems, 115-116 
Negroes against War Committee, 241- 



Nelson, Donald, 367-370, 381 

forty-hour week and, 383 n. 
Neutrality Act, student attitude, 212 
Newcomb, Theodore, vi, 173-185, 

327 n. 
New Deal, ZIZ, 300, 408 
New Guinea, 76 

New Hampshire, child-guidance cen- 
ter, 107 
New Jersey, war industry, 385 
New Republic, 400 
New York City, children in, 111-112 

national groups in, 12 
News, 14-15 

confidence in, 45 

favorable and bad, 45-46 

labor and, 380-387 

morale and, 173-185, 206, 411-412 

public opinion on, 202-203 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15 
Nordics, gesture, 12 
Norway, British morale and, Zl 
Nursery schools, 105-106 

Occupation, morale and, 318-329, 346 

status and morale, 358-359 
Occupational preference, morale and, 

O'Leary, Michael, case report, 343-344 
Opportunities, in union careers, 379 
Opportunity, 236, 239 
Osborne, Frederick, 426 
Otherworldliness, 263, 265 
Ottawa, 253, 266 
"Our America," leaflet, 173 n. 

Pacifism, in Canada, 256 

Page, M. L., 345 

Papal States, 264 

Parents, education and training, 109 

Participation, morale and, 8, 40-43 

French Canadian feeling of, 268-270 

labor morale and, 369-372 
Pay {^see Wages) 
Peace, conditions of, 31-33, 411-416 

democracy in, 6 

morale and, 6-8 

social structure diagrammed, 35 

Pearl Harbor, vii, 6, 16, ZZ, 35, 45, 
69-70, 168, 193 n, 206, 208, 216- 
217, 225, 400 

labor attitudes after, 381 

morale results, 38 
Pegler, Westbrook, 384, 398 
Perry, migrant child, 103 
Persistency, decisiveness and, 54 

initiative and, 54 

time perspective and, 52-53 
Person, respect for the, 8-9, 372 
Personality, morale and, 96-118 
Personality problems, 287-288 
Personnel administration, morale and, 

Philippines, Japan attacks, 193 n. 
"Phony war," 192, 259 
"Pins and Needles," 388 
Pitkin, W. B, 338 n. 
Placement advice, 287-288 
Planning, agricultural, 45-46 

democratic approach, 46 

unions and, 389-391 
Pleasure principle, 58 
Poland, 256 

Polish ancestry, morale and, 305 
Political boundaries, national char- 
acter and, 78-79 
Pontifical Zouaves, 264 
Pope, Arthur Upham, 426 
Portugal, propaganda approach, 71 
Post, New York, 370 
Postwar plans, 31-33, 45-47, 91 

British labor and, 374-375 

labor and, 374-376 

national character and, 71 

Negroes in, 245 

propaganda and, 171 

social sciences in, 430 

unemployment in, 273 

U. S. morale and, 411-416 
Poverty, child morale and, 101-105 

Negro problem, 233 
Pratt & Whitney, 395 
Predispositions, 170-173 
Press, labor and, 380-387 

morale program and, 428-429 
Prestige, 10-11 

Prices, public opinion on, 203-205 
Privileges, 8 



Production, C.I.O. and, 385 

employer-employee councils, 369-370 

morale and, 366 

strikes and, 381 
Productivity, 55-58 

democracy and, 62-63 

increase of, 61 

leadership and, 62-63 

self government and, 63 

youth group, 137-142 
Profit system, democracy and, 11 
Profits, limitation proposals, 394, 396- 

statistics on, 393-396 
Progressive Education, 112 
Propaganda, difficulties of, 255 

morale and, 35-36, 42, 166-174 

national character and, 71 

nature of, 166-167 

objects of, 168-174 

success in, 44-46 
Protestants, Adjustment Service ob- 
servations, 274, 284, 292, 33S-337, 

attitudes on World War II, 198-200 

morale program and, 419 
Psychiatry, morale and, 290-292 

morale problems in, 342-344 

morale program and, 420-421 

national character and, 73 
Psychodynamic problems, 19-29 
"Psychological Bases of National 

Morale," Likert et al., 30 n. 
Psychological future, 53 
Psychological war, 41, 56, 347 
Psychologists, function in a morale 

program, 423-425 
Psychology, nationality and, 71-91 
Public health, morale program and, 

statistics on, 113, 115 
Public information (see News) 
Public opinion, issues in, 195-198 

Negro, 236 

relation to events, chart, insert 

sampling, 190-206, 210-218, 222-224, 
249, 268, 384 

trends on war. 189-207 

Public Opinion Research, Office of, 

Publicity, propaganda and, 166 


Quebec, 262, 264-269 
Questionnaires, in morale measure- 
ment, 349-355 

Race, 9 
morale and, 37 

(see also Japanese, Jews, 
Radicalism, morale and, 289, 296-297 
Radio, labor and, 380-382, 387 
Radio Corporation of America, mo- 
rale promotion, 366-367 
Railway Brotherhoods, Negro policy, 
relation to labor movement, 375 
Rationing, morale and, 37 
Realism, morale and, 54, 65-69, 338, 
time perspective and, 65-69 
Reason, recognition of, 69 
Rebellion, 21 
Recreation, 116 
segregation in, 231 
unions and, 388 
Regularity, in national character, 75 
Reichenberg, W., 345 
Relief status, ancestry and morale, 
300, 305 
avocations and morale, 335 
social relations and morale, 335 
Religion, morale and, 335-337, 347 
Religious groups. Adjustment Service 
experience, 274-343 
attitudes on World War II, 198-200 
Canadian morale and, 249-250 
French Canada and, 263-264 
segregation in, 231 
students in, 210 
Representative government, 11 
Republicans, confidence in Roosevelt, 

Research, morale program and, 429- 



Reuther, Walter P., Z7Z, 391 
Revolution, unions and, 389 
Rich, Congressman, 383-384 
Ripley, R. L., 77 
Robert, problem child, 117-118 
Robinson, Earl, 77 
Rogers, Edith Nourse, 367 
Roheim, G., 82 n. 
Rome, French Canada and, 266 
Roosevelt, F. D, 14, 143, 171, 220-221, 

Churchill meeting, 203 

confidence in, 201-202 

influence in French Canada, 264 

leadership and morale, 163 

news policy, 45 

Victory Program, 41-42 
Rosenwald (Julius) Fund, 419 
Rotary, 17 

Royal Canadian Air Force, 251 
Royal Canadian Army, recruiting, 

Royal Canadian Navy, 251 
Rugg, Donald, 169 n, 173, 189-207 
Rundquist, E. A., 299, 303, 316 
Russia {see U.S.S.R.) 
Russian ancestry, morale and, 305 

Sacrifice, 172 

mutual, 28-29 

public opinion on, 203-205, 207 
Sailer, R. C, 299, 302, 308 n., 314, 316, 

327, 332, 336 
St. Jean Baptiste Society, 262 
St. Louis, Mo., attitudes toward min- 
orities, 223 
Salvation Army, 269 
Samp, Genevieve, 383-384 
Sarah Lawrence College, 107 
Sargent, S. S., 166-174, 202 n. 
Saunders, D. A., 173 
Savings, proposals for, 397 
Schools, Canadian, 265 
Schuyler, George E., 241-242 
Security, 10 

labor morale and, 376 
Segregation, of Negroes, 230-248 
Seidman, Jerome, 289 n. 

Selective Service Act, student atti- 
tude, 212, 215 

Self-government, 19-29 
learning, 22-23 
productivity and, 6Z 

Self-report, morale appraisal by, 280- 

Sex, morale and, 300-304 

Sex differentiation, national character 
and, 76 

Shanack, Leon K., 395 

Sherif, M., 35 

Shirer, William L., 36 

Skepticism, 410 

Slavery, 24-25 

Sletto, R. F., 299, 303, 316 

Smith College, 107 

Social Credit, French Canadian atti- 
tude, 267 

Social relations, morale and, 330, 335, 

Social Science Research Council, 429 

Social sciences, morale program and, 

Social Security, postwar plans for, 

Social status, labor morale and, 376 
morale and, 10-11, Z6-Z7 

Social structure, war and peace, 35 

Social-welfare measures, morale and, 

Socialism, in postwar plans, 375 

Society for the Psychological Study 
of Social Issues, vi-vii, 30 n. 
morale program and, 434 

Solidarity, 28-29 

Southern States Industrial Council, 

Spain, morale experience, 37 

Speech, freedom of {see Discussion, 
freedom of) 

Spock, Benjamin, 107 

Stalin, J. v., 85 

Steel Labor, 380 n. 

Stoddard, George D., 145 n. 

Strikes, in French Canada, 268 
jurisdictional, 376 
moratorium on, 369-371 
production and, 381 
public opinion on, 367-368 
sympathetic, Z7Z ' 



Strong Vocational Interest Test, 276- 

Student Opinion Surveys, 210-218 
Students, Adjustment Service obser- 
vations, 294-312 

Canadian, 259-261 

morale, 208-217 

war attitudes, 175-185 
Success, morale and, 41-42, 44-46, 345 

propaganda base, 44-46 
Suffering, prison, 51-52 
Sumner, W. G., 422 
Supervision, morale and, 363-364 

youth attitudes toward, 120-127 
Sweden, labor relations in, 380 

propaganda approach, 71 
Symmetrical relationships, national 
character and, 82-83 

Taxes, 8 

in Canada, 250 
Tead, Ordway, 163 
Tenacity, 51-54 

Tennessee Valley Authority, 46 
Ternary relationships, national char- 
acter and, 81-82 
Terror strategy, 41, 56, 347 
Texas Corporation, 394 
Thurstone, L. L., 222, 223 
Threshold guidance, 287, 288 
Time, 393, 395 
Time perspective, 48-70 

adolescent, 66-67 

authoritarian, 139 

children, 66-67 

defined, 49 

democratic, 139-140 

goals in, 50-70 

group morale and, 62-63 

leadership and, 64-65 

realism and, 65-69 

youth group, 137-142 
Times-Dispatch, Richmond, 240 
Todd Shipyards, 395 
Togetherness, 33-37 

in French Canada, 265-267 
Tolerance, 13 

labor unions and, 379 
Toronto, 262 

Totalitarianism, morale in, 5-7, 164 

productivity and, 62-63 
Tradition, morale and, 53 
Training, morale and, 143-165 
Travel, segregation in, 230 
Treasury Department, labor statistics, 

Truman Committee, 172, 394-395 
Turkey, propaganda approach, 71 
Tyranny, rebellion against, 21-22 


Unemployment, 16 

Unemployment, morale and, 10, 30-31, 
48-70, 273-348 

in 1941-1942, 273 

postwar, 273, 367 
Uniformity, in national character, 75 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
army democracy, 36 

child care in, 108 

morale experience, 168 

morale program and, 429 

national character, 85 

postwar plans for, 411, 415, 430 

propaganda approach, 71 

religious group attitudes, 199-201 

U. S. attitudes, 171, 191, 193, 194 
Union League Club, 389 
Unions, 43 

area of usefulness, 388 

craft, 390 

criticisms of, 391-392 

democracy in, 378-379 

educational activities, 387-388 

industrial, 390 

membership conditions, 370 

membership security, 398-401 

morale and, 365-401 

morale contributions summarized, 

Negroes and, 377-37% 

press circulation, 380 n. 

public opinion on, 367-368 
United Automobile Worker, 380 n. 
United Automobile Workers, 373, 391 

Negro policy, 378 

war savings proposal, 397 
United Mine Workers of America, 



United Mine Workers Journal, 380 n. 

United Nations, 46-47 

United Service Organizations, 43 

United Shoe Workers, 373 

United States, army democracy, 36 

Canadian relations, 254-255 

child welfare tasks, 95-118 

Colonial experience, 28 

early democracy, 23-24 

educational democracy, 66 

government child welfare tasks, 

Japan attacks, 33, 38, 69-70, 119, 208 
(see also Pearl Harbor) 

Japanese relations, 193-194 

leadership in, 143-144 

morale experience, 54 

morale opportunities, 173-174 
United States Chamber of Commerce, 

United States Military Academy, 234 
United States Naval Academy, 234 
Unity, 34-37 

Canadian problem, 252, 262, 265- 

diversity within, 57 

forces making for, 131-136 

in labor movement, 375-376 

Pearl Harbor and, 38, 225 
Universalism, 9 

labor unions and, 372-376 
Universities, morale program and, 427 
Utopianism, 170-171 


Vassar College, 107 
Verdi, G., 171 

Versailles Treaty, 46, 91, 171, 410 
Veterans of Future Wars, 209 
Villeneuve, R., Cardinal, 262 
Vinson Report, 394 
Virginia, child problems, 110 
Vitamins, morale and, 55-56 
Vocabulary, morale and, 296 
Vocational guidance, 274 


Waelder, Robert, 26 n. 
Wages, British rise, 393 n. 
morale and, 322, 361-364, 392-398 

public opinion on, 203-205 

regulation proposals, 396-397 

statistics, 392-395 

union demands, 392-398 
Walworth County, Wise, child-guid- 
ance centers, 107 
Wallace, Henry A, 45, 431 
War, democracy and, 6, 15-16, 27 

morale and, 6-8 

social structure diagrammed, 35 
War bonds (see Defense bonds) 
War information, Committee on, 425 
War Labor Board, 372, 385, 425 
War Production Board, 370, 390-391 

strike statistics, 381 
War stamps (see Defense bonds) 
Warren, migrant child, 103-104 
Washington Post, 369 
Watson, Goodwin, vi, 30 n., 273-348, 

cited, 316-318, 332 
West Point, Negroes in, 234 
Western Hemisphere, co-operation, 46 
Westinghouse Electric and Manufac- 
turing Company, Murray Plan in, 
White, R. K, cited, 122, 124, 125, 128, 

130, 133, 137, 139 
White, Walter, 243 n. 
Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 144 
Williams, Louis, 145 n. 
Willkie, Wendell, quoted, 32 
Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 395 
Wilson, C. E., 391 
Wilson, Woodrow, 31 
Wirth, Louis, 172, 218 
Women, in Canadian war work, 250 

morale maintenance, 31 
Work satisfaction, morale and, 346, 

Work standards, improvement of, 61 
Workers Education Bureau, 388 
Working conditions, morale and, 349- 

World, Tulsa, 400 

World War I, Canadian armed forces 
in, 269 

Canadian attitudes toward, 253-257 

disappointments following, 31, 35 

labor in, 365 

morale activity in, 15, 36 ■ 



pacifist consequences, 170 

propaganda in, 167, 169, 173, 255-256 

student attitude, 214 
World War II, aims, 206 

Canadian attitudes toward, 253-270 

child morale and, 117-118 

chronology, chart, insert 

French Canadian attitudes, 262-270 

goals and prospects, 31-33 

group morale and, 142 

Jews and, 218-226 

labor in, 365 

morale trends in, 189-207 

Negro attitudes, 236 

neutral sentiment, 190-200 

peace objectives, 31-33 

propaganda in, 167-174 

sacrifice in, 172 

song symptoms, 166 

U. S. sympathies, 190-200 

youth morale and, 142 
W.P.A., child-directed work, 96-97, 
104-107, 110 

leader training and morale, 145-165 

morale in, 64 
Wright, Erik, 131 

Yale University, 107 

Yorkville, 221 

Young Men's Christian Association, 

Youth, college, 208-217 

democracy and, 137-139 

morale of, 297-300, 348, 426 

Negro, 115 

problems bearing on morale, 113- 

propaganda and, 172 

revolutionary potency, 112 

rural, 114-115 

statistics on, 113-116 
Youth Committee Against War, 209 
Youth groups, adult guidance, 140-142 

authoritarian responses, 127-130 

laissez-faire responses, 122-127, 130 

morale, 119-142 

Zionists, morale in Germany, 49-50